

## **Power Sharing, Agency and Civil Conflict**

National Science Foundation Grant # SES-0819507b

Principal Investigator: Kaare Strøm, University of California, San Diego (UCSD); and Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).  
Co-Investigator: Scott Gates, Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO); and Norwegian University of Science and Technology.

### **Official Codebook for the Inclusive and Dispersive Powersharing Dataset**

**DRAFT:**

**Please do not cite or quote without permission of authors.  
This is work in progress.**

## Introduction

This codebook documents the Inclusive and Dispersive Powersharing dataset collected by the Power Sharing, Agency and Civil Conflict project and supported by NSF grant number SES-0819507b. The core purpose of this dataset is to collect extensive data on various forms of power-sharing in order to assess the effect of these institutions with respect to public good provision and civil peace. This project builds on a distinct theory of power sharing institutions, which has informed the coding of this dataset. Users should familiarize themselves with this theoretical background before using the data.

Unlike many other power sharing data collections, this project does not limit the data collection effort to a subset of countries, but aims at a global sample. In practice, we limit our sample to countries with populations larger than 250,000, similar to and compatible with the international system membership definition of Gleditsch & Ward (2001).

### Inclusive and Dispersive Power Sharing

The key distinction in this definition of power sharing is between Inclusive and Dispersive. Power-sharing constraints can broadly be divided into, on the one hand, agreements that mandate the participation of several parties or groups in particular offices or decision-making processes, and on the other hand agreements that prohibit the representation of any party or social group in particular offices. The former kind of constraint is an **inclusive** power-sharing constraint, whereas the latter is a **dispersive** power-sharing feature. To illustrate, an institution such as an electoral commission or a truth commission can be designed either so as to include representatives of all major social groups (inclusive power-sharing) or so as to ban its members from having any formal association with such groups (dispersive power-sharing).

Inclusive power-sharing includes such practices as grand coalitions and proportional allocations of government offices and benefits (which serve to include all major parties/factions). Power is jointly held and inclusive. Inclusive power-sharing regards any rule or institution that establishes rights or mandates of participation or quotas of representation of any kind (whether they are proportional or over-proportional in favoring a minority group).

Dispersive power-sharing, on the other hand, includes practices that limit the power of one party/faction over others (e.g., federalism, independent courts or electoral commissions, or electoral constituencies that cross-cut ethnic boundaries). Dispersive powersharing is akin to what Roeder and Rothchild (2005) call “power-dividing”, but not exactly. The distinction lies in the emphasis on the distribution of authority. Dispersive systems can be thought of as a way to slice up authority so as to maximize citizen autonomy. Federalism fits this description, but so do non-partisan institutions. A non-partisan judiciary, an independent civil service, and an explicitly non-partisan election commission serve as examples of how partisan authority is delimited by the partitioning and dispersion of political authority.

### Data structures

The project goal is to assess the impact of power sharing on public goods provision and civil peace. While civil peace is generally viewed as a binary distinction between war and peace, public goods provision is better represented as a continuum along several dimensions. Any changes in the level or quality of public goods provision is likely to be slow and gradual, whereas transitions between states of war and peace are often quite sudden and can be precisely dated. Given the continuous nature of measures of public goods provision and the gradual nature of change in these values, these variables are best represented as averages over a fixed period of time. The most common period used in quantitative social science is the calendar year, both for simplicity and in order to cancel out seasonal variation.

Given the duality of the data structures used in the dependent variables, we have developed two versions of our dataset as well: One where the unit is the classification-period, and one where the unit is the country-year. The classification-period data structure defines periods. Within these periods, the fundamental aspects of power sharing, both inclusive and dispersive, are relatively constant. The transition between periods is triggered by a change in value by one or more of our core powersharing measures, or by other large changes in the institutional structure of

the country, such as the adoption of a new constitution. The precise process by which these breaks are determined, as well as other features of the classification-period data are discussed in the *Inclusive and Dispersive Powersharing Classification-Period Codebook*.

## De Jure and de Facto Institutions

The variables in this dataset focus primarily on de jure, rather than de facto, institutions. This focus is justified on two grounds. First, variables capturing the nature of the de jure institutions can be more consistently sourced and more objectively coded than de facto arrangements. Second, we are concerned theoretically with the effect of the formal rules of the game. We believe that formal rules continue to matter, even when they are being violated. When a country is de facto ruled by various militia groups –Lebanon in the mid-late 1980s for example – the constitution and other written rules still matter because they establish, at the very least, a focal point in the bargaining over what the rules would be if everyone put down their guns, and this in turn informs groups' decisions to put down the guns or not.

## Sources and Coding Procedures

We distinguish in the coding process between core sources and non-core sources. These distinctions are only relevant in that core sources are those always consulted in order to establish the absence of a particular institutional form. For example, before coding a country-year as a zero for *mveto*, which would indicate that the country has no provisions allowing for minority veto over a particular policy area, the coder checks all the core sources to establish that there is no mention of such a provision. All core sources, as well as the most commonly used non-core sources are listed at the end of the codebook. Additional non-core sources are listed as used in the notes.

Non-core sources are used to supplement core sources whenever 1) Core sources do not provide sufficiently detailed information to allow coders make the necessary coding decisions, and 2) Non-core sources are available. Coders were given a high level of discretion in identifying reliable non-core sources, though material from activist organizations was avoided. Most non-core sources were either academic papers or documents (often the text of specific laws) and websites written, posted, or published by the governments in question.

The greatest uncertainties facing coders involved assessing the length of time which institutional forms persist. Constitutional provisions are easy in this regard: there is a date when a constitution enters into force and a date when it is nullified, amended, or superseded. With some rules, however, it is difficult to identify the precise date at which a law was first enacted or the date at which it was superseded.

In all cases of uncertainty, coders were directed to employ a “preponderance of the evidence” standard rather than a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. Instances where the necessary information to make an informed coding is unavailable are coded as missing. Instances where information is available but the coder was uncertain were flagged for discussion in regular meetings of the coding team and a group decision was made on how to code the variable.

## Intercoder Reliability

Four outside coders were brought in to code a random subset of country-decades already coded by the primary coding team. This data was then compared to the master data to identify problematic variables or coders. This exercise lead one variable to be dropped from the dataset entirely, and several coding rules to be clarified in the codebook.

## Implemented vs. Mandated

Several of the core powersharing variables in the dataset have both a mandated and an implemented component. This allows us to capture both the de jure rules and the de facto implementation of the same institution. If the de jure institution does not exist, the de facto implementation of that institution is coded as -44 (NA).

## **A Note on Military Variables**

The military variables in this dataset capture only mandated institutional arrangements; it does not capture any difference that may exist in some cases between mandated institutional arrangements and actual institutional practice. Where coders observed an obvious deviation from what is mandated, a note is made in the comments, but such deviations are not incorporated into the data itself. Additionally, while we capture external rules that limit the behavior of the military, we do not capture regulations that are internal to the military itself. We focus on the constraints placed on the military by the constitution, and not on the constraints the military places on itself or its members. For example, if there is no constitutional provision stating that members of the military may not serve in the legislature, then no restriction is coded, even if there are rules internal to the military that prevent officers from serving in the legislature.

## **Missing Data and Additional Codes**

Missing data is left blank (.csv version) and coded as "." (stata version).

-44 Not applicable – a value here would be nonsensical

-77 Interregnum. This value is entered for all variables in units of analysis where it is unclear what institutions or individuals govern the polity, or in cases of foreign occupation when the domestic political institutions have been superseded.

## **Changes Within Year**

All observations are coded as of January 1<sup>st</sup> in the year indicated. Therefore, if a new institution, such as reserved seats for a minority group, is introduced in February of 1986, it would first show up in the country-year observation for 1987.

## Institutional Variables:

Concept	Variable	Variable Description	Coding	Notes on Sourcing
<b>Institutional Suspensions</b>	ConstSusp	Suspension of the constitution	<p>1 if the constitution is suspended                      -44 if no constitution                      0 Otherwise</p> <p>*Code 1 if any provisions of the constitution are suspended – partial suspensions are coded 1.                      *If there is military contravention of the constitution, it is considered suspended.                      *A constitution is no longer considered suspended once a new constitution is passed, or the old one is amended and returned to force.                      *If a constitution is suspended and returned to force within a calendar year, a note of the suspension should be made in the list of dates (and if the coding is likely to be controversial, in the comments section as well.)                      *If no mention of a constitutional suspension is mentioned in the core sources, a 0 is coded.</p>	These three variables are coded using the Europa history of each country.
	Treaty	Rule by treaty, rather than constitution	<p>1 if a peace treaty, or similar accord is in effect and mandates specific political institutions (as opposed to a constitution);                      0 otherwise.</p> <p>*Countries that have no constitution in effect but are not governed by peace treaties (e.g. non-constitutional monarchy, newly independent states which have not yet adopted a constitution) are coded 0.                      *If a constitution is in effect (i.e. is not superceded by a peace treaty) code 0. It will be common for a country to be coded 1 for a year or two after a peace treaty is signed but before the terms of that treaty are enshrined in a constitution.                      * If a state withdraws from the treaty in question, or announces its intentions to no longer abide by its terms, code 0 thereafter.</p>	
	MartialLaw	Martial law	<p>2 If martial law is in place in the entire country                      1 If martial law is in place in part of the country, but not all                      0 otherwise</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>If martial law is declared, with no mention that it is declared only in one</li> </ul>	

		region, then it is assumed to be declared in all regions.			
<b>Grand Coalition</b>	GCMan	Grand Coalition Mandated	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>If no mention of martial law is made in the core sources, code 0.</li> </ul> 1 if there is a constitutional provision (or a provision in a peace accord in the case of transitional governments) requiring representation by all major political parties (or relevant political organizations) in the cabinet 0 otherwise	The constitution is obviously the authoritative source for GCMan, but such an arrangement will almost always be mentioned in the Europa history and the “constitution and government” subsection of the Political Handbook.	
	GCImp	Grand Coalition Implemented	If seat share data isn’t available and GCMan =1, score as follows: 0 if not implemented 1 if implemented – if all major political parties are indeed represented in the cabinet. *If GCMan=0, and seat share data isn’t available, score 1 if, as part of a power-sharing arrangement, cabinet positions are given to opposition parties whose consent is not necessary to form a government.		
	Unity	National Unity Government	1 if members of opposition parties or groups are represented in the cabinet, but a grand coalition is NOT mandated in the constitution or a peace treaty, and representation in the government 0 otherwise. *Note: Unity may be scored 1 even in non-parliamentary systems, and in situations when the government is not elected (as is often the case in transitional governments).		
	GCSSeats	Government seat share	Percentage of legislative seat-holders whose party is represented in the cabinet (assume party ID as of beginning of legislative session)		constructed mechanically
	GCSSeats1	Grand Coalition by seats (Two largest parties in government)	1 if the following three things are true: A. the two largest parties are both in government AND B. the government is a majority government AND C. the legislature is competitive (liec > 6 in Database of Political Institutions) 0 otherwise *Note: We normally date the beginning of GC as the date of election. We deviate from this if there is more than a month between the election and the power sharing or if there are significant intervening events e.g. if election → riots → power sharing.		constructed mechanically

	GCSeats2	Grand Coalition (Excess party in coalition)	<p>1 if the following three things are true:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. a government coalition contains an excess party – i.e. a member without which it would still represents a majority of the seats in the legislature</li> <li>B. the government is a majority government AND</li> <li>D. the legislature is competitive (lic &gt; 6 in Database of Political Institutions)</li> </ul> <p>0 otherwise</p> <p>*Note: If the first 4 parties are required to reach a majority, the data does not allow unnecessary parties to be coded. However, this is likely rare. A 4th unnecessary party only occurs in 10 country years in the data and we would expect that a constellation of 4 or more necessary parties AND an extraneous party to be quite rare.</p>	constructed mechanically
	GCSeats3	Grand coalition (permissive)	<p>1 if GCseats1 or GCseats2 = 1</p> <p>0 otherwise</p>	constructed mechanically
<b>Parties</b>	PartyEx	Exclusion of Political Parties	<p>3 if No parties excluded</p> <p>2 if One or more minor or "extremist" parties excluded</p> <p>1 if Significant exclusion of parties (or groups)</p> <p>.5 if only one party (or only divisions of that one party) is allowed</p> <p>0 if all parties are excluded</p> <p>*We generally accept Banks's coding in the years and cases for which he has data. If we see clear evidence that the original Banks codings are incorrect, the correct score is entered and a note is made in the comments section.</p>	<p>The Banks dataset codes this – use the Banks codings where available. If the Banks codings are obviously mistaken, code it correctly and make a note of the discrepancy in the comments section.</p> <p>These two arrangements are rare and generally noted, if they exist, either in the "electoral system" section of Parline or the "Political Parties" section of the Europa World Handbook.</p>
	PartyInc	Party Inclusiveness	<p>1 if it is mandated that political parties be inclusive, either in membership or in candidates, of religious, ethnic, or linguistic groups. For example, if it is mandated that parties field candidates of multiple ethnicities, or if some mention is made in the constitution that parties must be inclusive of multiple ethnic/religious or other groups.</p> <p>0 otherwise, or if no evidence of such a policy is found in the constitution, The Political Handbook of the World, or the Parline database.</p>	
	Partynoethnic	Ban on ethnic and/or regional parties	<p>1 if there is a law or constitutional amendment banning ethnically, religiously, or regionally based parties.</p> <p>0 otherwise or if no evidence of such a policy is found in The Political Handbook of the World, the Parline database, or the constitution.</p> <p>-44 if no parties or only 1 party is allowed are allowed.</p>	

<b>Mutual Veto</b>	MVeto	Mutual Veto	<p>1 if there is any provision for minority veto over a particular area of policy e.g. if the approval of an ethnic minority is necessary for any change of language or cultural policy.</p> <p>0 otherwise or if no evidence of such a policy is found in The Europa World Factbook, The Political Handbook of the World, the Parline database, or the constitution.</p>	<p>These two arrangements are rare, but are generally listed in multiple sources if they exist – if you're not running across mention of them while coding other variables, it is because the arrangements don't exist.</p>
<b>Reserved Exec Positions</b>	ResMan	Reserved Executive Positions (Mandated)	<p>1 if it is mandated that particular executive positions be reserved for members of particular (minority) ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups;</p> <p>0 otherwise</p> <p><i>*This does not include countries, such as Turkmenistan, where all government posts are reserved for members of the dominant ethnic group.</i></p>	
	ResImp	Reserved Executive Positions (Implemented)	<p>1 if the particular executive positions reserved for members of particular ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups are held by members of that group;</p> <p>0 otherwise</p> <p><i>*If reserved positions are mandated, and non-implementation of the mandate isn't noted in The Europa World Yearbook, The Political Handbook of the World, or the Parline database, code 1</i></p>	
<b>Reserved Legislative Seats</b>	ResSeats	Reserved Legislative seats (Mandated)	<p>If a certain number of legislative seats (lower house) are reserved for members of particular ethnic, linguistic, caste, or religious MINORITY groups, then divide the number of seats reserved for minorities by the total number of seats in that house of the legislature.</p> <p>0 otherwise</p> <p><i>*Coding Note: This variable is coded only for the lower house of the parliament.</i></p> <p><i>*Coding Note: If seats are reserved for the majority group, but not for minority groups, this is coded 0. For example, Samoa reserves 95% of its seats for ethnic Samoans, who make up 92% of the population. The other two seats are open for any group (including Samoan). Resseats is coded 0 for Samoa.</i></p>	<p>Parline electoral rules will note this. So will the political handbook under "constitution and government"</p>
	ResSeats2	Reserved Legislative seats (mandated)	<p>2 if greater at least 10% of the seats in the legislature are reserved for minority groups (i.e. resseats ≥ .1)</p> <p>1 if reserved seats exist, but account for less than 10% of total seats (i.e. 0 &lt; resseats &lt; .1)</p> <p>0 if no seats are reserved for minority groups (i.e. resseats = 0)</p>	
	ResSeatsImp	Reserved Legislative seats (implemented)	<p>1 if the legislative seats reserved for members of particular ethnic, linguistic, or religious group are held by members of that group;</p> <p>0 otherwise</p>	<p>created mechanically</p>

			-44 if not mandated If reserved seats are mandated, and non-implementation of the mandate isn't noted in The Europa World Yearbook, The Political Handbook of the World, or the Parline database, code 1	
	ResSeatsInt		If a certain number of legislative seats are reserved for members of particular interest groups (e.g. labor unions), then divide the number of seats reserved for these groups by the total number of seats in that house of the legislature. 0 otherwise Note: If reserved seats are present in more than one house of the legislature, enter the highest score.	Very rare. Parline electoral rules will note this. So will the political handbook under "constitution and government."
	ResSeatsIntImp		1 if the legislative seats reserved for members of particular interest groups are held by members of that group; 0 otherwise -44 if not mandated *If reserved seats are mandated, and non-implementation of the mandate isn't noted in The Europa World Yearbook, The Political Handbook of the World, or the Parline database, code 1	
<b>Electoral System</b>	Thresh	Threshold for Representation	% of vote necessary for a party to gain legislative representation	
<b>Religion</b>	RelEstablish	State establishment of religion	0 if the state has no established religion 1 if the state has multiple established religions <sup>1</sup> 2 if the state has one established religion *Coding note: If the state singles out a single religion for support, this counts as establishment.	Fox has this data back to 1990. It is generally pretty easy to find in the constitution. Also, Library of Congress case studies.
	RelEstablish2	State Establishment of Religion	1 the constitution denotes a single religion as the state religion 0 otherwise *If multiple religions are given the status of official state religion, code 0. *De Facto state support of a particular religion is NOT sufficient to code 1. The constitution must denote a single religion as the religion of the state.	Code from the constitution

<sup>1</sup> This is coded only if the state recognizes more than one religion as the official religion of the state and if these religions are given equal status. Each of these codings was verified by BG December 2010.

RelRestrict	State restriction of (minority) <sup>2</sup> religions	<p>0. No (minority) religions are illegal and there are no significant restrictions on minority religions.</p> <p>1. No (minority) religions are illegal but some or all (minority) religions have practical limitations placed upon them or some religions have benefits not given to others due to some form of official recognition or status not given to all religions.</p> <p>2. No religions are illegal but some or all (minority) religions have legal limitations placed upon them.</p> <p>3. Some (minority) religions are illegal.</p> <p>4. All (minority) religions are illegal</p> <p>*Note: These guidelines are drawn directly from Jonathan Fox. However, because categories 0 and 1 are not mutually exclusive, we make the following minor clarification: if no religions are illegal or restricted, but benefits ARE given to some religions that are not given to others, code 1.</p> <p>*Note: While Fox's data was consulted in coding this variable, in a significant number of cases our coding differs from his (see coding notes for descriptions of these instances). We have also significantly expanded the coverage of the variable. Recent years of these variables are coded from Freedom House case studies and the 2007 State Department Report on International Religious Freedom, as well as Library of Congress country studies and other core sources. The Freedom House studies are available back to 1979, but in earlier years the studies are often insufficiently detailed to code from. There remains a great deal of missing data prior to 1991, though the information necessary to code is generally available. Coding this variable prior to 1991 has been treated as a low priority, but coding post 1999 is a high priority.</p>	Fox has this data back to 1990. Freedom House can be used to extend it forward. Pre-1990 we have a high level of missingness. See also 2007 State Department Report on International Religious Freedom.
RelConstP	Freedom of Religious practice	<p>1 if the freedom of worship or religious practice is guaranteed in the constitution (or peace agreement if no constitution is in place)</p> <p>0 otherwise</p> <p>-44 if there is no constitution</p> <p>*Coding note: If freedom of religious belief or freedom of conscience is protected, score 1. Similarly if "freedom of religion" is generically protected, score 1.</p>	Code from the constitution

<sup>2</sup> The word "minority" is placed in parentheses in this coding in order to recognize that states with no official or favored religion may discriminate against all religions but states with official or favored religions will discriminate only against minority religions. (Fox 2004 codebook, p. 4)

	RelConstD	Religious non-discrimination	1 if there is a constitutional provision (or provision in a peace agreement if no constitution is in force) against discrimination on the basis of religion 0 otherwise *Coding Note: A provision that all citizens are equal before the law is not sufficient to warrant a score of 1. Religion must be specifically mentioned in a clause on nondiscrimination. Similarly, a generic statement of “freedom of religion” or freedom of belief or conscience does NOT justify a score of 1 here. -44 if there is no constitution	
<b>Federalism</b>	StConst	State Constituencies in the Senate	1 if the states/provinces are the constituencies of a majority of senators; 0 otherwise -44 if no senate or no states/provinces	DPI codes this, but it is sometimes missing, and it is always easy to code.
	State	State/provincial governments locally elected	0 if neither legislature or executive is elected at the local level 1 if the legislature is locally elected but the executive appointed by the central government 2 if both the legislature and executive are locally elected * Coding note: If executive is elected/appointed by a locally elected legislature, then score 2. *Coding note: If executive power is shared between a locally elected executive and a centrally appointed one, code 1. * If no states/provinces, code 0	Sometimes difficult to find, but usually it is fairly easy to fill in any years that DPI leaves missing.
	Muni <sup>3</sup>	Municipal governments locally elected	0 if neither legislature or executive is elected at the local level 1 if the legislature is locally elected but the executive appointed 2 if both the legislature and executive are locally elected *Coding note: If executive is elected/appointed by a locally elected legislature, then score 2. *Coding note: If executive power is shared between a locally elected executive and a centrally appointed one, code 1. *Coding note: If executive is locally elected but legislature is not, code 1.	Same as above. Also citymayors.com is a core source used for this variable.
	SubTax	Sub-national tax authority	1 if state/provincial governments can levy their own taxes; 0 otherwise 0 if no states/provinces or equivalent level of government *Note: For countries with autonomous regions (auton = 1), this variable is coded	These variables are important, but can be very difficult to code. Sub-Police is easy – that comes from

<sup>3</sup> The variables State and Muni can be combined into the 5th component of the Brancati index (SubElect) by adding .5 if State = 1 and another .5 if Muni = 1. (I prefer this method of combination, though in the original Brancati index SubElect would be scored 1 if either State or Muni was 1).

		for states/provinces/regions OTHER THAN the autonomous region i.e. if the autonomous region has the ability to levy its own taxes and other regions do not, code 0.	the Encyclopedia of World Police and Penal Systems. The other two you have to find where you can – sometimes the constitution, sometimes in articles or books about federalism in particular regions of the world.
SubEd	Sub-national education authority	1 if state/provincial governments have sole control of education policy; .5 if state/provincial governments and the national government share control of education policy 0 otherwise *Control of education policy is distinct from provision of education – if schools are run by the local government but curriculum and other policies are set by the central government, score 0. *Note: For countries with autonomous regions (auton = 1), this variable is coded for states/provinces/regions OTHER THAN the autonomous region i.e. if the autonomous region has the ability to control its own education policy and other regions do not, code 0 (This is extremely rare).	
SubPolice	Sub-national police authority	1 if sub-national governments (municipal or state/regional) have control of local police/paramilitary forces in their area; .5 if sub-national governments and the central government share control of the local police/paramilitary forces in their area. 0 if the central government is in exclusive control of police/paramilitary forces. *Note: For countries with autonomous regions (auton = 1), this variable is coded for states/provinces/regions OTHER THAN the autonomous region i.e. if the autonomous region has control of police/paramilitary forces and other regions do not, code 0.	
SubConst	Subnational ratification of constitutions and constitutional amendments	1 if state/provinces must approve constitutions or constitutional amendments in order for them to take effect; 0 otherwise -44 if there is no constitution in effect	Code from the constitution. (However it appears only the US does this, so don't worry about it too much – we'll probably just drop it.)
Fedunits	Change in federal units	1 if there is creation, division, merger, or elimination of any highest order subnational units. . otherwise *note: If highest order subnational units exist only as administrative extensions of the central government i.e. if state = 0 and auton = 0, then fedunits cannot take a score of 1. *note: If the boundaries of these units is adjusted, but no units are not created,	

			merged, or eliminated, code 0	
	Auton	Assymmetric federalism	We use the Auton variable from DPI and simply extend it forward to 2007. Following the DPI coding: 1 if there is one or more autonomous regions contiguous to the main territory of the country 0 otherwise or if no information is available	There is a fairly low level of missingness in DPI, but we supplement it where it is missing.
<b>Military</b>	DefMin	Defense Minister in the Military	1 if defense minister is a military officer; 0 otherwise N/A if there is no one in the cabinet with such responsibility or if there is no military If the military is controlled directly by the president, code the same as the MILITARY variable in DPI – 1 if a military rank is included in the president’s title (source = Europa or Banks), 0 otherwise.	DPI does this just fine.
	MilLeg	Military officers in the legislature	1 if there is a constitutional provision (or provision in the peace agreement in the case of transitional governments) against current military officers holding seats in the legislature, or if the Parline database notes such a restriction in its section on legislative incompatibilities. 0 otherwise -44 if there is no legislature * Coding note: If only full time members of the armed forces or only career officers are banned from holding office, still code 1. Any ban is considered a ban. * If the constitution prohibits the military from “participating” in elections or participating in politics, then milleg, milvote, and milparty all are scored 1.	Code from the constitution and the “electoral rules” section of Parline.
	MIMan	Inclusive Military (mandated)	1 if it is mandated that all major groups (e.g. ethnic, religious, or linguistic groups) be represented in the military or its officer corps, or that the military or its officer corps be representative of different regions; 0 otherwise	Constitution. We haven’t found other good sources for this and fear that we are failing to observe it even where present.
	MFound	Foundational Military	1 if the military is assigned by the constitution to preserve the constitution from its infringement by other political actors. 0 otherwise	Code from the constitution (easy)
	MilVote	Constitutional provision against military voting	1 if there is a constitutional provision (or provision in a peace agreement if no constitution exists) denying active-duty members of the military the right to vote, or if a ban on voting by members of the military is noted in the Parline database.	Constitution and Parline

			0 otherwise -44 if no military or no elections	
	MilParty	Constitutional provision against members of the military belonging to political parties	1 if there is a constitutional provision (or provision in a peace agreement if no constitution exists) banning members of the military from belonging to political parties. 0 otherwise -44 if no military or no political parties * If the constitution prohibits the military from “participating” in elections or participating in politics, then milleg, milvote, and milparty all are scored 1.	Code these two from the constitution and “Political Parties” section of Political Handbook. Also Library of Congress country studies.
	MilParty2	Mandatory party membership	1 if there is a constitutional provision (or provision in the peace agreement in the case of transitional governments) requiring that military officers belong to a particular party (i.e. the ruling party) 0 otherwise -44 if no military or no political parties	
<b>Civil Service</b>	CSANP	Civil Service Appointment (nonpartisan)	1 If hiring of the civil service is done by a nonpartisan body or on the basis of an exam 0 otherwise Coding Note: Any provision for examination-based employment in the civil service is sufficient for coding a 1. -44 if no parties * This variable suffers from a high level of missingness.	These two variables have a high level of missingness and are likely not useable. Use region or country-specific sourcing.
	CSProtect	Civil Service protection	1 if there is a law protecting civil servants from being fired without cause 0 otherwise * This variable suffers from a high level of missingness.	
<b>Judiciary</b>	JTenure	Judge Tenure (Supreme Court)	0 if terms are 6 years or less, 1 if terms are longer than 6 years but less than lifelong 2 if terms are lifelong or until a mandated retirement age *In countries with a court of constitutional review, code tenure of these judges. In countries with no court of constitutional review, code for the highest appellate court	Code these two variables from the constitution, or if they’re not there (they usually are), then look at Library of Congress country studies and/or region-specific sources like UNDP-POGAR
	JCause	Judge removal without cause (Supreme Court)	1 if judges can be removed from office without cause (e.g. serve at the pleasure of the president) 0 otherwise *In countries with a court of constitutional review, code rules regarding these judges. In countries with no court of constitutional review, code for the highest	

JRemoval	Judge Removal (Supreme Court)	<p>appellate court.</p> <p>1 if judges from the highest court are removed from office mid-term by any means other than a constitutionally mandated impeachment process</p> <p>0 otherwise or if no such removal is observed in (Europa, Political Handbook)</p> <p>*Code 1 only in the year in which an extra-constitutional removal takes place</p> <p>*IMPORTANT CAVEAT FOR USE OF THIS VARIABLE: The extra-legal removal of judges is a phenomenon not always recorded in the core sources of this study. The set of country-years which are coded 1 for this variable should be treated as a subset of the country-years in which extra-legal removals occurred. In other words, it is believed that there may be a significant number of country-years in which extra-legal removals occurred but were still coded 0.</p>	Europa World Factbook history section. I don't believe we observe this phenomenon in our core sources most of the time it happens, so we'll have to drop it.
JApptBr	Judicial appointments	<p>1 if the power to appoint judges to the highest court is divided between branches of govt (e.g. if all justices are nominated by the executive and confirmed by the legislative, or if a certain number of justices are appointed by each branch; or if the exec appoints from a list provided by the legislature)</p> <p>2 if the power to appoint judges to the highest court is held by the executive branch only</p> <p>3 if the power to appoint judges is held by the legislative branch only</p> <p>(In countries with a court of constitutional review, code how these judges are appointed. In countries with no court of constitutional review, code for the highest appellate court)</p> <p>4 if not shared between branches and appointed by neither the legislative nor the executive branch e.g. appointed by lower court judges, or a special judicial commission.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coding Note: If there is a figurehead executive, then division of power with this individual is not counted and a 0 is coded.</li> <li>• (The coding of this variable was changed somewhat belatedly. Any codings of 0 for this variable that remain must be coded either 2 or 3)</li> </ul>	Code this from the constitution, or if they're not there (they usually are), then look at Library of Congress country studies and/or region-specific sources like UNDP-POGAR
JConst	Judiciary in the Constitution	<p>1 If the role of the supreme court or judiciary is specified in the constitution;</p> <p>0 otherwise</p> <p>* To justify a score of 1, the following items must ALL be specified in the constitution:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The jurisdiction of the court</li> <li>2. The appointment of judges</li> </ol>	Constitution only

			3. The tenure of judges *If there is no constitution in force, this variable should take a value of 0, rather than -44 This is due to the fact that a court gains power from a constitutional mandate, and that (lack of) mandate is the concept at issue in coding this variable.	
	JRevMan	Judicial review Mandated	1 if the judicial branch has the power to declare the actions of the legislature AND executive unconstitutional; 0 otherwise -44 if there is no constitution	Same sources as other judicial variables
<b>Indices of inclusive powersharing</b>	Proport_broad	Proportional distribution (broad)	1 point each for: Reserved seats (5% threshold) Reserved executive positions Party Inclusiveness mandated (i.e. multiple ethnicities on party list) Military Inclusiveness mandated Reserved Seats for Interest Groups Proportional Representation system *Note: PR dwarfs all other variables in this index	
	Proport_narrow	Proportional distribution (narrow)	1 point each for: Reserved seats (5% threshold) Reserved executive positions Party Inclusiveness mandated (i.e. multiple ethnicities on party list) Military Inclusiveness mandated	
	proport_any	Proportional Distribution (any, not including pr)	1 if any of the following are present: Reserved executive positions Party Inclusiveness mandated (i.e. multiple ethnicities on party list) Military Inclusiveness mandated Reserved Seats for Interest Groups  0 otherwise	
	gc_any	Grand Coalition (Any)	1 if any of the following are present: Grand coalition mandated Grand coalition by seats Unity government (i.e. opposition brought into cabinet) Reserved Executive Positions	
	gc_broad_man	Grand Coalition Mandated (broad)	1 if either of the following are mandated: Grand coalition or Reserved Executive Positions	

gc_broad_wjure	Grand Coalition Broad (with de jure inclusiveness)	1 point for each of the following that are present: Grand coalition mandated Grand coalition by seats Unity government (i.e. opposition brought into cabinet) Reserved Executive Positions
mv_any	Mutual Veto (any)	1 if any of the following are present: Mutual Veto Reserved Executive Positions
mv_broad	Mutual veto (broad)	1 point for each of the following that are present: Mutual Veto Reserved executive positions
inclusive_any_wpr	Inclusive powersharing (any, including pr)	1 if any of the following are present: Proportional Representation Reserved Legislative Seats for Minorities Reserved Legislative Seats for Interest Groups Reserved Executive Positions Mutual Veto Grand Coalition Mandated or by Seats Unity government (i.e. opposition brought into cabinet)
inclusive_any_nopr	Inclusive powersharing (any, no pr)	Same as above, without pr
inclusive_wpr	Additive Index of Inclusive Powersharing, with pr	1 point for each of the following that are present: Proportional Representation Reserved Legislative Seats for Minorities Reserved Legislative Seats for Interest Groups Reserved Executive Positions Mutual Veto Grand Coalition Mandated or by Seats Unity government (i.e. opposition brought into cabinet)
inclusive_nopr	Additive Index of Inclusive	Same as above, without pr

<b>Dispersive Powersharing Indices</b>		Powersharing without pr	
	fedbrancati	Brancati Index	1 point for each of the following that are present: State/provincial control of education policy State/provincial authority to levy taxes Subnational control of police/paramilitary forces (state or municipal) State/provincial legislators directly elected State/provincial executive directly elected
	fedben	Ben's federalism Index	1 point for each of the following that are present: State/provincial control of education policy State/provincial authority to levy taxes State/provincial legislators directly elected State/provincial executive directly elected
	judicialind	Judicial Independence	1 point if role of the judiciary is enumerated in the constitution 3 points if there is a right of judicial review 1 point if judicial tenure if > 6 years, 2 points if it is > 12 years or lifelong *This index automatically takes a 0 if judges serve at the pleasure of the executive and can be dismissed without cause
	nomilexec	No Military in the Executive	1 if neither the president nor the defense minister has a military title 0 otherwise *Note: This is calculated directly from DPI without our own coding
	militaryind	Military outside of politics	1point for each of the following: No military in the executive Military banned from the legislature Military banned from either voting or party membership *Note: This index takes a value of zero if all members of the military are required to belong to the ruling political party.
Disp_broad	Index of Dispersive Powersharing	(judialind/2) + fedbrancati + militaryind	

<b>Violation of Mandated Powersharing</b>	violation	Dummy for Violation of Mandated Powersharing	1 if violations if any of the following institutions are mandated and not implemented: Reserved executive positions Reserved legislative seats (for minorities or interest groups) Grand Coalitions

Variables for which we are using ONLY other people's data:

Concept	Variable	Variable Description	Coding	Source/ coverage	Concept
<b>Electoral System</b>	1	PR1	Proportional Representation	1 if PR; 0 otherwise	Golder, 1946-2000 (and DPI 1975-2006)
<b>Electoral System (robustness check)</b>	1	ElecSys1	Electoral System	0 if Dictatorship, 1 if Parliamentary Democracy, 2 if Mixed Democracy, 3 if Presidential Democracy	ACLP dataset; full coverage (use INST2)
<b>Electoral System (robustness check)</b>	2	Closed	Closed List	1 if PR System is closed list 0 otherwise	DPI 1975-2006
<b>Electoral System</b>	2	MDM	Mean District Magnitude	Number of residents	DPI, 1975-2006; Golder 1946-2000
<b>Electoral System (robustness check)</b>	1	Golder	Electoral System	1 = Majoritarian 2 = Proportional 3 = Multi 4 = Mixed	Golder coverage 1946-2000
<b>Federalism (Robustness check only)</b>	3	CENT	Centralization	0 if federal state 1 if intermediate category 2 if centralized state	Polity II only – we'd have to update it
<b>Federalism (Robustness check only)</b>	2	Auton	Autonomous Regions	1 if there are constitutionally designated autonomous regions contiguous to the rest of the country; 0 otherwise	DPI 1975-2006
<b>Federalism (Robustness check only)</b>	1	Author	State/Provincial control over taxing, spending, or legislating	0 if no control 1 if states/provinces have authority over taxing, spending, or legislation (control over "cultural affairs" or control over "planning" in communist systems doesn't count)	DPI 1975-2006 (only 38% coverage – mostly missing values)
<b>Autocracy/Military (robustness check)</b>	2	MilReg	Military regime	1 if the chief executive is a military officer; 0 otherwise	DPI; 1975-2006

## Core Sources:

**Europa World Year book:** This is an annual (in some periods bi-annual) publication with coverage back to 1989 as the Europa World Year Book and back to 1959 as the Europa Year Book. It contains descriptions of the current political institutions in each country (sometimes including mention of electoral commissions), but it is most useful in its section on recent history, which covers political history in detail, including dates of institutional and constitutional changes, election results, attempted coups, coups, wars, major protests, etc.

**Political Handbook of the World:** This is an annual publication with coverage back to 1975. It contains similar, though slightly more abbreviated, information to that in the Europa World Year Book.

**Parline Database:** This is an online product of the Inter-parliamentary Union and it describes parliaments, as well as presidencies. It outlines electoral rules, procedural rules, eligibility requirements and responsibilities of members, and other information.

**Library of Congress Country Studies:** These were produced between 1988 and 1998 and are focused on “lesser-known regions of the world.” They contain, among other things, more thorough descriptions of the judicial system than most other sources, but they provide information from a single point in time, rather than over time. Sometimes, however, the studies will discuss historical changes in institutions as well as current institutions.

**Global Legal Information Network (Library of Congress):** This is a repository of constitutional texts and other laws (including many pertaining to federalism). It primarily covers Africa and Latin America but includes laws from some countries outside those regions. <http://www.glin.gov/search.action>

**State Department 2007 Report on International Religious Freedom:** This report contains information on a broad cross-section of countries, discussing both the laws regulating religion and the de facto availability of religious freedom. <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2007/index.htm>

**Nationmaster:** Nationmaster generally duplicates information available elsewhere, but also keeps an online historical list of all acts establishing and disestablishing state religions that is somewhat useful in coding RelEstablish (it is unfortunately not as accurate a list as might be hoped).

**Citymayors.com:** This site provides a description of local governance in a wide range of countries. Among other information, it generally indicates if and how local executives are elected.

**Constitutions:** Constitutional texts are the source of much of the information that is coded for each country. The constitutions are acquired online from the following sites:

1. Official Government websites: Often the central government web site of the country in question will provide texts for the current constitution (and sometimes previous constitutions) in English. This is considered the first-best option for acquiring texts.
2. The University of Richmond has a constitution-finder that provides links to online constitutions from a variety of third-party sites – often this site links to official government websites, but not always.
3. International Constitutional Law: This website is operated by A. Tschentscher at the University of Bern. It provides English translations of constitutions in a standard format.
4. Legislationonline.org which is run by the OSCE.
5. ICL constitutional translations

6. Political Database of the Americas

Print constitutions from 1971 are collected in: *Constitutions of the Countries of the World*

**Encyclopedia of World Constitutions** (Gerhard Robbers) and **Constitutions of the World** (Robert Maddex): These sources are useful for identifying the nature of constitutional amendments.

**Government Web Sites:** Sometimes official government websites contain information on civil service laws, electoral commissions, and other institutional variables that are difficult to source elsewhere. They are considered reliable sources of mandated institutions, but not of institutional implementation.

**Freedom House Country Studies:** Mostly these will be used to code RelRestrict. They are available for multiple years.

**World Encyclopedia of Police and Penal Systems:** This will be used to code SubPolice only.

### **Sub-Core Sources with Limited Cross-sectional Coverage:**

**The World Factbook of Criminal Justice Systems:** This site is managed by the US Department of Justice and contains narrative descriptions of the criminal justice systems in 45 countries, most written in 1993.

**LLRX:** This is a Web journal run by Sabrina Pacifici (now an adjunct professor at University of Maryland), that, among other things, publishes country studies on legal systems.

**The Scope of the Civil Service in the OECD and Select CEE Countries:** This is a report prepared by the World Bank in 2001 that covers the current civil service laws in 34 countries.

**Legislationonline.org:** This website is run by the OSCE and provides texts of constitutions and legislation online – including in some cases civil service legislation.

**Programme on Governance in the Arab Region:** This is a publication of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and contains a wide range of institutional data on Arab governments, including judicial institutions, local governance institutions, and electoral commissions.

**Nobribes.info:** This site is run by the American Bar Association (Rule of Law Initiative, Central and Eastern Europe), but it hasn't been updated since 2002. The entire CEELI program was shut down in 2007. However, the website provides English texts of civil service laws for many Eurasian countries.

<http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/election.htm> If you scroll down at this link, there is an alphabetical list of countries with links for each country related to electoral commissions.

#### NOTES ON TRANSFORMATIONS OF VARIABLES

For many of the variables, such as MilVote etc, these only make sense in countries with elections....

#### NOTES ON THE MASTER DATA

Ben and Megan both coded Rwanda and Zaire. Megan's coding are currently in the master. They should be supplemented with Ben's.

