Deliberative Democracy in Context: Reflections on Theory and Practice
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The world is full of established institutions that claim to be democratic. Proponents of deliberative democracy need to confront two questions: First, why do we need yet another sort of institution—what does deliberative democracy add? Second, how might such designs fruitfully relate to current institutions that embody one notion or another of democracy—how does deliberative democracy connect?¹

In this paper, I will first distinguish four competing theories of democracy and identify the sorts of institutions that embody them. Three are familiar and well established while the fourth, deliberative democracy, is largely aspirational. As an effort to embody deliberative democracy, I will focus on the Deliberative Poll (DP) and discuss cases in which it has been employed. I will illustrate how those cases supplement or enrich decisions made in accordance with one or another of the other three theories—competitive democracy, mass participation, or elite deliberation (which I distinguish from deliberative democracy by the people themselves). In the case of competitive democracy, I will focus on how the DP can be used for candidate selection (a case from Greece) and in advising the public before elections (recent use of the DP in European Parliamentary Elections). In the case of Elite Deliberation, I will focus on how the DP can advise expert decision about the public’s values and priorities. The electric utility cases in Texas offer an illustration here. In the case of Participatory Democracy, I will focus on the DP’s connection to initiatives and referenda. The recent California project in which the DP was used to set an agenda for possible initiative propositions will be discussed.

Four Democratic Theories

There is not one democratic theory, but many. In order to get a handle on the range of different possible positions, I think it is useful to think of some core component principles—political equality, (mass) participation, deliberation, and avoiding tyranny of the majority (which I will call non-tyranny). Three of these principles are internal to the design of democratic institutions and one (non-tyranny) is about the effects of democratic decision, effects that have long worried critics of democracy. If we consider these four principles essential components of a

¹ Prepared for Yale-Oslo conference on Epistemic Democracy, October 2011. This is a very preliminary draft.
democratic theory, then the variations in commitment to them provide a kind of rudimentary grammar that allows us to specify the range of alternative theories. In other words, we can get a handle on different democratic theories according to whether or not they accept or reject these component principles.

By political equality I mean, roughly, the equal consideration of one’s views in the design of institutions. Does the design of a decision process give each person a theoretically equal chance of being the decisive voter? Or, to take an obvious example, do voters in Rhode Island have far more voting power than voters in New York in selecting members of the Senate? By participation I mean actions by voters or ordinary citizens intended to influence politics or policy or to influence the dialogue about them. By deliberation, I mean the weighing of reasons under good conditions in shared discussion about what should be done. The good conditions specify access to reasonably good information and to balanced discussion with others who are willing to participate conscientiously. This summary is a simplification but should do for now. By non-tyranny, I mean the avoidance of a policy that would impose severe deprivations when an alternative policy could have been chosen that would not have imposed severe deprivations on anyone.2 Obviously there are many interesting complexities about the definition of severe deprivations, but the basic idea is that a democratic decision should not impose very severe losses on some when an alternative policy would not have imposed such losses on anyone. The idea is to rule out only some of the most egregious policy choices and leave the rest for democratic decision.

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2 For more on non-tyranny as a principle of democratic theory see my Tyranny and Legitimacy: A Critique of Political Theories (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979).
Each of these four positions embraces a commitment to two of the principles just mentioned. The position is usually agnostic about the other two. While there are obviously sixteen possible positions defined by acceptance or rejection of the four principles, I have argued elsewhere that the useful positions reduce to these four. Variations that aspire to more than the four are either unworkable or merely utopian or empty (such as the rejection of all four principles). Those that aspire to less include elements of one of these but are less ambitious than necessary.

The four positions have all been influential. In some cases, I modify a familiar position to make it more defensible, in order to get the strongest version of each position.

By Competitive Democracy I mean the notion of democracy championed by Joseph Schumpeter and more recently by Richard Posner. Democracy is not about collective will formation but just a “competitive struggle for the people’s vote” to use Schumpeter’s famous phrase. Legal guarantees, particularly constitutional ones, are designed to protect against tyranny of the majority. Within that constraint, all we need are competitive elections. While Schumpeter did not even specify political equality in competitive elections, I have included it here, on the grounds that it makes the position more defensible than would a position that embraced competitive elections in rotten boroughs. The question marks signal agnosticism about the other two principles. Some variants of this position avoid prizing participation, viewing it as a threat to stability or to elite decision making. Better not to arouse the masses as their passions might be dangerous and motivate factions adverse to the rights of others, threatening the position’s commitment to protect against tyranny of the majority. Because of collective action problems and incentives for “rational ignorance” (to use Anthony Downs’ famous phrase) little can be expected of ordinary citizens. This postion makes that minimalism a virtue.

By Elite Deliberation I mean the notion of indirect filtration championed by Madison in his design for the US Constitution. The constitutional convention, the ratifying conventions, the US Senate were supposed to be small elite bodies that would consider the competing arguments. They would “refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a

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3 See Fishkin, When the People Speak, “Appendix: Why We Only Need Four Democratic Theories.”
5 See Posner, for example, pp. 172-3.
chosen body of citizens” as Madison said in Federalist 10 in discussing the role of representatives. Madison held that the public views of such a deliberative body “might better serve justice and the public good than would the views of the people themselves if convened for the purpose.” A similar position of elite deliberation was given further development in J.S. Mill’s Considerations on Representative Government particularly in his account of the “Congress of Opinions” which was supposed to embody a microcosm of the nation’s views “where those whose opinion is over-ruled feel satisfied that it is heard, and set aside not by a mere act of will, but for what are thought superior reasons” (prefiguring Jurgen Habermas’s famous notion about being convinced only by the “forceless force of the better argument”). 6 This position like the last one, avoids embracing mass participation as a value. The passions or interests that might motivate factions are best left un-aroused. The Founders after all, had lived through Shays’ rebellion and had an image of unfiltered mass opinion as dangerous. If only the Athenians had had a Senate, they might not have killed Socrates. 7

By Participatory Democracy, I mean an emphasis on mass participation combined with equal counting. While many proponents of Participatory Democracy would also, of course like deliberation, the essential components of the position require participation, perhaps prized partly for its educative function (as Carole Patemen argued 8) and equality in considering the views offered or expressed in that participation (even if that expression is by secret ballot). Advocates of Participatory Democracy might also advocate voter handbooks and new technology for voter information, as did the Progressives, but the foremost priority is that people should participate, whether or not they become informed or discuss the issues. 9 Part of the problem with this position is that it is sometimes advocated based on a picture of small scale decision making such


7 See Federalist 63 if the Athenians had only had a Senate: “Popular liberty might then have escaped the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same citizens the hemlock on one day and statues on the next.”

8 Carole Pateman Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976)

9 For an overview see David Magleby Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984). For the relative ineffectiveness of voter handbooks and other efforts to get voters more informed, see pp. 137-139.
as the New England town meeting, in which discussion is facilitated, but then implemented in the social context of mass democracy –the California process of ballot initiatives, for example, where essentially plebiscitary processes are employed for constitutional change.

A fourth position, which I call Deliberative Democracy, attempts to combine deliberation by the people themselves with an equal consideration of the views that result. One method for implementing this two fold aspiration is the deliberative microcosm chosen by lot, a model whose essential idea goes back to Ancient Athens for institutions such as the Council of 500, the nomethetai (legislative commissions), the *graphe paranomon* and the citizens jury. Modern instances of something like this idea include the Citizens Assemblies in British Columbia and Ontario and the research program I am involved in (Deliberative Polling or the DP. A second approach to implementing Deliberative Democracy would be the kind of institution Bruce Ackerman and I outline in *Deliberation Day*. Here the idea would be to get everyone deliberating in a balanced process of reason-giving with good information much like those in the DP. One could either get the whole population or a representative sample of the population deliberating. In one case, equal participation by everyone before an election embodies political equality in the selection process. In the other case, political equality in the selection process is achieved by giving everyone an equal chance of being chosen.

Why should we care about deliberative democracy when we have established institutions of one sort or another that embody the other three theories? What would it add? As indicated by the chart, what it adds is reason-based public will formation by the people themselves. Competitive democracy, as formulated most famously by Schumpeter, was dismissive of this possibility, focusing instead on just “the competitive struggle for the people’s vote.” It does not matter on this view, how misled the people may be, how ill informed, how lacking in reasons. Most anything goes in the competition. Just count the votes. Elite deliberation is clearly a theory that prizes deliberation, but on behalf of the people by representatives, not by the people themselves. Participatory democrats would of course like to have deliberation. Progressive reformers have long distributed voter handbooks and other information. But the essential elements of the position involve participation and political equality. And as I have argued in the trilemma of democratic reform, at the large scale, this puts individual voters in the position of participating in plebiscitary democracy with incentives for rational ignorance. If I have one vote

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10 See When the People Speak, chapter two.
in millions, I am unlikely to pay a lot of attention to voter handbooks or well intentioned public affairs programming. Would that it were otherwise but the social context for deliberation is mostly missing.

**Deliberation and Public Will Formation**

By *deliberation* we mean the process by which individuals sincerely weigh the merits of competing arguments in discussions together. We can talk about the *quality* of a deliberative process in terms of five conditions:

**a) Information**—the extent to which participants are given access to reasonably accurate information that they believe to be relevant to the issue.

**b) Substantive balance** the extent to which arguments offered by one side or from one perspective are answered by considerations offered by those who hold other perspectives.

**c) Diversity**: the extent to which the major positions in the public are represented by participants in the discussion.

**d) Conscientiousness**: the extent to which participants sincerely weigh the merits of the arguments.

**e) Equal consideration**: the extent to which arguments offered by all participants are considered on the merits regardless of which participants offer them.\(^{11}\)

The DP design aspires to realize these five conditions to a high degree, at least compared with public opinion as we ordinarily find it. The projects always include an initial briefing document whose balance and accuracy is certified by an advisory group that represents the competing points of view. The random sample is randomly assigned to small groups with trained moderators. Those moderators are trained to cover the agenda in the briefing document and to ensure that no one dominates the discussion. Participants come up with key questions that are addressed to panelists in plenary sessions with balanced panels of experts answering them and with more than expert answering each question so that opposing points of view are aired by the experts. At the end of the process participants take a confidential questionnaire with similar questions to those they took before deliberation.

\(^{11}\) I develop these conditions in *When the People Speak*, pp. 33-43.
This simple design serves information gains since the participants learn from the vetted briefing materials, the competing expert panelists and from each other. We always measure information and the projects routinely show large information gains.

The second criterion, substantive balance is served by the vetted materials and by the balanced panels. In addition we know from Alice Siu’s work examining transcripts of the small group deliberations that it is balanced argumentation that tends to move opinion. The third criterion, diversity of viewpoints, is served by the random sample itself, since it is evaluated for attitudinal as well as demographic representativeness. In addition, if the advisory group is properly constructed, its diversity should also be reflected in the briefing materials and in the choice of panelists. The fourth criterion, conscientiousness, rests with the participants. But remember that they are not running for re-election. They are there to discuss public issues because the design of the process attempts to give them a sense that their voice matters. Under these conditions, they have every reason to behave sincerely. The fifth condition equal consideration, is fostered by an atmosphere of group discussion in which everyone’s voice is valued. Its success in showing non-domination by the more privileged has been demonstrated by our analyses of whether or not the opinion changes systematically move in the direction of the initial positions of the more privileged. They do not. It is also apparent from the evaluation questions that participants perceive an equal process in which all viewpoints are valued.

Of course the DP design is but one possible design for facilitating deliberation by the mass public. There may well be other successful designs. The importance of the relatively good news thus far is not that it makes the case that public consultations should only be conducted with DPs. Rather it makes the case that fulfilling these criteria for deliberation can be achieved to a high degree. The basic idea is to take a random, representative sample and engage it in good conditions for thinking about the issues. This is our account of good conditions. With changing technology someone else may well come up with an alternative account. But this account works well and thus shows that it is possible to achieve public deliberation with samples that are highly representative.

12 Alice Siu Look Who’s Talking (Stanford PhD Disseration).
Adding the DP to Competitive Democracy

As noted we have many established institutions of Schumpeterian competitive democracy around the world. Of course with different electoral systems, different levels of development and different media systems, the terms of competition may differ from one polity to another. But the basic point is that from this perspective parties and candidates do whatever is necessary within the rules to win and maintain office. They have little need to foster a value such as deliberation on the part of the mass public, unless particular circumstances make that advantageous. As a result, competitive democracy without deliberation lacks meaningful public will formation. Of course this is no surprise. Schumpeter ridiculed “classical” theories of democracy for presuming some account of meaningful public will formation. He then offered a modern alternative that dispensed with it. Posner in his recent restatement of the theory did much the same.

If we prize the public will as the very point of democracy, are there points of connection for deliberative democracy within the on-going mechanisms of competition? Generations of reform since the Progressives have focused on giving the public more of a role, with the hope that as a side benefit, people would be motivated to become informed. Australian Progressives, for example, pushed compulsory voting with something like this rationale. The idea was that if people had to vote, they would go to the trouble to become informed and really think about the power they had to exercise. But Australian experience (or Brazilian for that matter) has not borne that out. People may be compelled to vote but they do not feel as a result an effective motivation to spend significantly more time becoming well informed or discussing the issues with diverse others. There is no effective individual motivation to become informed if your individual vote is trivial in its effect. American Progressives pushed direct democracy, a subject we will return to, including mass primaries that would change candidate selection. But the primary has turned out to be a low information environment, heavy on television spending, where voters need to distinguish between candidates without the one key heuristic of party. The Progressives also pushed voter handbooks, which we still have, but often have not read.

The end result has been a lack of information and deliberation both in candidate selection and in the general election. This pattern holds true in most places most of the time.

First it is worth noting that if people deliberated in an election, it could well make a significant difference to the outcome. For example, a Deliberative Poll in the 1997 British
General Election, showed very large opinion changes in the sample, including a 22 point increase in support for the Lib Dems.\textsuperscript{13}

Perhaps an even better demonstration is the European Parliament, where it is fairly obvious that elections are currently “second order” and there is little or no substantive deliberation by voters. In fact there is little communication across political boundaries. The unitary version of the European wide public sphere, where arguments would be shared and elections would hold people accountable across the boundaries of language and nationality, is an aspiration of European scholars, most forcefully presented by Habermas. But it has come to seem utopian or even impossible. It was however piloted with the mass public in a recent DP before the European Parliamentary Elections. There was not only substantive deliberation across all the boundaries of language and nationality but a coherent connection after deliberation between policy positions and voting intention. In a random sample representing the entire European Union, communicating in 22 languages discussing detailed briefings on climate change and immigration, the voters, after deliberation, connected their preferences about climate change and immigration to their voting intentions. For example, after deliberation, support for strong action on climate was strongly connected to support for the Greens. Support for climate change efforts was negatively connected with support for the center right EPP grouping (European People’s Party). Toleration of immigration was negatively connected in the regressions with support for the EPP. Toleration of immigration was also connected to support for the Socialists as well as the Greens. Before deliberation, support for further action on climate change was also connected to support for the Socialists, but not after deliberation when the participants evidently learned more about the Socialist positions.\textsuperscript{14}

The difficulty with connecting this kind of microcosmic deliberation to actual elections in competitive democratic systems is that the microcosm has no clear effect on everyone else. Even media broadcasts, which have been common with Deliberative Polls have limited effects in the height of an election season where there is so much coverage from every possible angle.

Note first that the experiments show that if people deliberated it would make a difference. Advocates of heuristics who try to conclude that deliberation would make little difference to

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\textsuperscript{13} British paper
\textsuperscript{14} James Fishkin, Robert C. Luskin and Alice Siu: Europolis and the European Wide Public Sphere: Empirical Explorations of a Counter-factual Ideal available at:
\url{http://cdd.stanford.edu/research/papers/2011/fishkin-europolis.pdf}
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voting intention are sometimes, perhaps often proved wrong. And in any case, when people deliberate and weigh the reasons their votes have a different meaning. They become an expression of considered judgments rather than top of the head impressions.

Bruce Ackerman and I have a scheme for spreading an experience like a Deliberative Poll to the entire electorate. We call it Deliberation Day and we think it would offer the most authentic and consequential point of entry for deliberation into competitive democracy. It would be the most authentic because then the entire public would weigh competing arguments (rather than listening to cues from the microcosm). It would be the most consequential because a transformation in public opinion would have big effects on voting intention. Lacking Deliberation Day, a second best would be to adapt John Gastil’s proposal to put the recommendations of a deliberating microcosm on the ballot or on the voter handbook. That would clearly give them impact. However, it would not really get the wider public to participate in deliberation. Rather it would amplify the effect of the microcosm’s conclusions.

A quite different point of entry would be candidate selection. The Deliberative Poll was originally conceived as a new way of starting off the presidential primary season. Instead of Iowa and New Hampshire (or even the Iowa straw poll), it would represent voters in the entire country and it would represent their considered judgments, rather than their top of the head impressions of candidate sound bites. The 1996 National Issues Convention successfully piloted this notion on the issues and with the candidates, but it did not include candidate evaluations (just focused on the issues) so it did not have the desired effect.

However, in 2006, a more daring application took place in Greece. One of the country’s two major parties, PASOK, led by George Papandreou, used the DP to officially select its candidate for a major office. Faced with the idea of possibly democratizing candidate selection, Papandreou thought the deliberative microcosm chosen by lot or random sampling offered a method that would take the choice out of the hands of party elites while at the same time allowing for a deliberative choice—one based on extensive discussion and information. A random sample of all registered voters was convened in Maroussi, the large suburb of Athens which hosted the Olympics to choose PASOK’s candidate for a mayor. The least well known of the six finalists was eventually selected after an entire day of dialogue in small groups and questioning of the candidates on the issues in two long plenary sessions. Papandreou proposed
this as a new mode of candidate selection that should have wider application in Greece and elsewhere in Europe.\(^\text{15}\)

Primaries were originally proposed as a means of empowering the public to determine candidate selection. But they have become tests of fund raising, organization and the ability to communicate via sound bite campaigns. A deliberative process of candidate selection that also was representative of the people rather than of party elites would add a significant dimension of public will formation to the processes of competitive democracy.

**Adding the DP to Elite Deliberation**

The American Republic was born in a vision of elite deliberation, not competitive democracy. Madison famously engaged in the “strategy of successive filtrations” of public opinion for the constitutional convention, the ratifying conventions, the Senate and even the Electoral College. Representatives were supposed to “refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens.” But this vision was either innocent of political parties or hostile to it. In the modern republic one must look in unexpected places for elite deliberation independent of calculations of partisan advantage. One such place turned out to be the Texas Public Utility Commission in 1996 and the years immediately following.

The PUC was given the option by the legislature to require the state’s eight regulated public utilities to consult the populations in their service territories before submitting “Integrated Resource Plans” about how they proposed to meet the future energy needs in their areas. Were they going to use coal, natural gas, wind power or other renewable sources? Were they going to engage in demand side management (conservation cutting the need for power) or were they going to pipe in the power from outside (requiring investment in transmission lines)?

Hundreds of millions of dollars turned on these decisions. The companies, when faced with the requirement to consult the public, quickly realized that if they did conventional polls the public would be unlikely to have the kind of detailed information that would make the


See also George Papandreou “Picking Candidates by the Numbers” International Herald Tribune, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/07/opinion/07iht-edpapa.1914443.html

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consultations meaningful. If they did focus groups, they could never demonstrate that they were representative. If they had open meetings, they were likely to be dominated by lobbyists and special interests. So all eight utilities conducted DPs.

The DPs began with briefing materials vetted by advisory groups involving all the relevant stakeholders who might comment on the results in a regulatory proceeding—environmental groups, consumer groups, advocates of alternative energy, the large industrial customers, advocates of the different forms of energy. With difficulty they would all eventually be led to agree on materials that posed the different options with pros and cons that were vetted for balance and accuracy. These materials provided the basis for discussion and for the questionnaires given before and after deliberation.

Averaged over the eight projects, the percentage of the public willing to pay more on its monthly utility bill for wind power went from 54% to 84%. A similar rise in support took place for conservation or demand side management. Generally the public went for mixtures of natural gas (which was clean and relatively inexpensive) over coal which was even cheaper but much dirtier. It supported wind power and conservation and was willing to pay for it. Each project produced an integrated resource plan based on the results yielding larger and larger investments in wind power. The accumulated data from all eight projects provided the legislature with a basis for including a “renewable energy portfolio) in new legislation strongly supported by the PUC. The end result of these consultations was that Texas went from being last among the fifty states in wind power in 1996 when the projects started to surpassing California in 2007 as the number one state in wind power.  

Adding the DP to Participatory Democracy

As with competitive democracy, the DP can be added before a public vote. In both Australia and Denmark, the DPs were nationally broadcast before referenda, in Australia before the Republic referendum and in Denmark before the Euro referendum. In both cases, there were significant opinion changes, significant coverage and come clear media effects on the issues in the dialogue and perhaps on voting intention. The effect on voting intention was clearer in Australia since the results were much sharper. But the effect on the dialogue was dramatic in

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16 See When the People Speak, pp. 152-4.
Denmark since there were serious issues raised in the DP about possible effects of Euro membership on the pension system and the government did not succeed in responding to those concerns either on the broadcast or later in the campaign. The policy elites had not thought of the issues in terms close to the voters and there is nothing more precious to voters who are heavily taxed in a welfare state than the security of their pensions. So in the Danish case, the deliberating public ended up changing the agenda of discussion (or at least priming a key issue) before the national vote.

A current project, *What’s Next California* gave the public even more of a role by formally determining an agenda for public vote. California, like 23 other states, does not just have referenda, it has the initiative—where the people rather than the legislature can put a proposition on the ballot. As it happens, October 2011 marks the 100th anniversary of the initiative in California. Born in hopes of genuine self-government, it has only occasionally lived up to those aspirations. The agenda is often set by special interests who spend immense sums to persuade, manipulate or confuse the public.

California’s first state-wide DP shows how the people can take hold of the agenda for direct democracy. It will likely lead to a number of proposals being put on the ballot. If it succeeds, it will, in itself, be a deliberative reform of the initiative process. Sponsored by a non-partisan group of eight reform organizations, it actually allowed the people to deliberate about the merits and defects of thirty proposals and determine an agenda for reform. Two of the proposals coming out of the process have actually passed the state legislature and would not require ballot initiatives. Others, particularly those concerned with state local reform in the provision of public services, are likely to go on the ballot for 2012.

How can the people actually deliberate about complex reforms in a state the size of California? The DP based on an ancient form of democracy, provides a solution to the defects of mass participatory democracy. A deliberating microcosm chosen by random sample can seriously engage with the issues and come to a considered judgment based on good information. A mini-version of the population can engage in extensive face to face discussion and weigh the reasons for any proposal being important enough to bring to a public vote. In ancient Athens, the Council of 500, chosen by lot, set the agenda for everyone’s votes in the Assembly. In this case, a representative group of 412 Californians, chosen by random sampling, set the agenda for everyone’s votes in ballot propositions. From the standpoint of statistics, one does not need a
larger sample to represent a larger population. And the sample gathered for the California project was demonstrably representative in all the key demographics as well as in party and political ideology.

*What’s Next California* is the first statewide Deliberative Poll in California. It showed dramatic changes in opinion once people thought about the issues. To the surprise of many reform advocates the people did not support getting the legislature involved in the initiative. But they did support requirements for transparency and citizen review of initiative propositions. To the surprise of many observers, the people did not support a part time legislature with part time pay, at least once they thought about it in the weekend deliberations. But they did support dramatic changes in the structure of the legislature itself—increasing the number of legislators and increasing the length of terms in the Assembly and State Senate so that people were not running for re-election from the moment they took office. Despite an initial 14% approval rating for the legislature, the support for increasing the terms of the legislature went from 33% on first contact to 80% at the end of the weekend. There was also strong support after deliberation for realignment of government service delivery, moving it more to the local level provided that guarantees were in place for accountability. And there was even support for certain tax proposals, including a lowering of the two thirds threshold for new taxes required by Proposition 13. 17

The basic insight of the Progressives was correct—the people are capable of self-government. It is just a question of adjusting the institutional design so that individual voters, each with one vote in millions, can feel it is worth their time and effort to pay attention. In this case, as with competitive democracy, it seems that the most consequential route to real influence for deliberative democracy is in setting the agenda for public voting. If the people deliberatively select candidates, then there is an element of public will formation in the competitive democracy process. If the people deliberatively select the alternatives that are worth a public vote, then there is an element of public will formation in direct democracy, even on the scale of California.

These entry points for deliberative democracy are far from exhausting the possibilities. But they offer glimpses of what is possible. We are in a period of dramatic mass disaffection from the political process in many countries around the globe. Such disaffection can be

channeled into populism or it can be channeled into thoughtful redesign. Rethinking the prospects for deliberative democracy should be part of that dialogue.