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Vislie, Jon
(2015).
Norges Banks makropris til Andre Kallåk Anundsen.
Samfunnsøkonomen.
ISSN 1890-5250.
129(2),
s. 84–85.
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Vislie, Jon
(2015).
Norges Banks makropris til André Kallåk Anundsen.
Samfunnsøkonomen.
ISSN 1890-5250.
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Sibbern, Kai & Vislie, Jon
(2014).
Om OL i Oslo 2022.
[Radio].
Verdibørsen NRK P2.
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Vislie, Jon & Strøm, Steinar
(2014).
Renten som virkemiddel.
Dagens næringsliv.
ISSN 0803-9372.
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Vislie, Jon
(2013).
Effektiv forvaltning - en forutsetning for økonomisk vekst og velstand?
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Vislie, Jon & Strøm, Steinar
(2013).
Krav og Risiko.
Dagens næringsliv.
ISSN 0803-9372.
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Vislie, Jon
(2013).
Innledning til "månedens klassiker": "Akademikersamfunnet" av Steinar Strøm.
Samfunnsøkonomen.
ISSN 1890-5250.
127(5).
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Vislie, Jon & Strøm, Steinar
(2013).
EU i krise.
Dagens næringsliv.
ISSN 0803-9372.
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Vislie, Jon & Strøm, Steinar
(2011).
Skadelig eurosorti.
Dagens næringsliv.
ISSN 0803-9372.
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Vislie, Jon & Førsund, Finn Ragnar
(2011).
From Macro Growth to Disaggregated Production Studies.
Memorandum from Department of Economics, University of Oslo.
ISSN 0809-8786.
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Krogh, Tord Sigurd Holmsen; Anundsen, Andre Kallåk; Nymoen, Ragnar & Vislie, Jon
(2011).
Overdeterminacy and endogenous cycles: Trygve Haavelmo's business cycle model. Presentasjon på forskningsseminar i Statistisk Sentralbyrå.
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Vislie, Jon & Strøm, Steinar
(2010).
"EU's drømmeprosjekt".
Dagens næringsliv.
ISSN 0803-9372.
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Strøm, Steinar & Vislie, Jon
(2010).
"Får ikke i pose og sekk".
Dagens næringsliv.
ISSN 0803-9372.
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Vislie, Jon
(2010).
Minnetale over Per Meinich.
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Vislie, Jon
(2010).
Optimal saving when productivity shocks are triggered by stochastic threshold caused by stock pollution.
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Vislie, Jon & Førsund, Finn Ragnar
(2010).
Survey of the research of Leif Johansen.
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Vislie, Jon
(2010).
Comments to David Zilberman: "The Legacy of Leif Johansen in Resources and Environmental Economics".
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Vislie, Jon
(2010).
Insentiver i offentlig sektor.
RØST: Radikalt økonominettverks skriftserie.
ISSN 1503-9595.
s. 22–28.
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Vislie, Jon & Strøm, Steinar
(2009).
Vi trenger en verdidebatt.
Aftenposten (morgenutg. : trykt utg.).
ISSN 0804-3116.
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Vislie, Jon
(2009).
Samrøre og eierskap.
Dag og Tid.
ISSN 0803-334X.
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Vislie, Jon & Strøm, Steinar
(2008).
Sentralbankene laget krisen.
e24 (internett).
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-
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Vislie, Jon
(2004).
Privatisering og konkurranseutsetting i effektivitetens navn: Overser vi noe?
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Vislie, Jon
(2002).
Anmeldelse av "Økonomisk politikk og samfunnsøkonomisk lønnsomhet", av Kåre Petter Hagen.
Økonomisk forum.
ISSN 1502-6108.
56(3),
s. 32–35.
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Vislie, Jon
(2000).
Fortrinn og solidaritet.
Klassekampen.
ISSN 0805-3839.
-
Vislie, Jon
(2000).
Grenser for offentlig virksomhet?
Klassekampen.
ISSN 0805-3839.
-
Vislie, Jon
(2000).
Myter og tvangstrøyer.
Klassekampen.
ISSN 0805-3839.
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Vislie, Jon
(2000).
Privatisering av omsorg.
Klassekampen.
ISSN 0805-3839.
-
Vislie, Jon
(1995).
"Economics" av J.E.Stiglitz.
Norsk Økonomisk Tidsskrift.
ISSN 0801-9568.
s. 303–308.
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Vislie, Jon
(1994).
Strategisk handling - Innføring i bruk av rasjonalitetsmodeller og spillteori; av Jon Hovi og Bjørn Erik Rasch.
Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning.
ISSN 0040-716X.
s. 295–298.
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Vislie, Jon
(1987).
Spillteori anvendt på teorier for bransjestruktur og markedsformer.
Sosialøkonomen.
ISSN 0038-1624.
41,
s. 14–19.
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Vislie, Jon
(1986).
Langsiktige gasskontrakter.
Sosialøkonomen.
ISSN 0038-1624.
40,
s. 28–33.
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Vislie, Jon
(1985).
Om beslutningskriterier for trinnvise investeringsprosjekter.
Sosialøkonomen.
ISSN 0038-1624.
39,
s. 29–33.
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Vislie, Jon
(1985).
Om bilaterale kontrakter for naturgass.
Norsk Økonomisk Tidsskrift.
ISSN 0801-9568.
99,
s. 1–34.
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Vislie, Jon & Brunborg, Helge
(1982).
Økonomiske modeller og fruktbarhet.
Sosialøkonomen.
ISSN 0038-1624.
36,
s. 12–17.
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Vislie, Jon & Bramness, Gunnar
(1978).
Om konflikten mellom økonomi og økologi.
Samtiden.
ISSN 0036-3928.
86,
s. 620–624.
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Vislie, Jon
(1978).
Begrepet "konkurranseevnen overfor utlandet".
Sosialøkonomen.
ISSN 0038-1624.
32,
s. 13–18.
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Kostøl, Fredrik Bakkemo; Gran, Bjørn; Evjenth, Anders & Vislie, Jon
(2018).
Finansiering av offentlig infrastruktur i utbyggingsområder.
Samfunnsøkonomisk analyse AS.
ISSN 978-82-8395-027-4.
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Vislie, Jon & Nævdal, Eric
(2013).
Resource Depletion and Capital Accumulation under Catastrophic Risk: Policy Actions against Stochastic Thresholds and Stock Pollution.
Økonomisk institutt.
ISSN 0809-8786.
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Vislie, Jon & Strøm, Steinar
(2009).
Mål og virkemidler for bredere bredbånd.
Fornyings-, Administrasjons-, og Kirkedepartementet - Rapport fra interdepartemental arbeidsgruppe.
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Nævdal, Eric & Vislie, Jon
(2008).
Climate Change, Catastrophic Risk and the Relative Unimportance of Discounting.
Økonomisk institutt.
ISSN 0809-8786.
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Strøm, Steinar & Vislie, Jon
(2008).
A Discrete Choice-Model Approach to Optimal Congestion Charge.
Økonomisk institutt.
ISSN 0809-8786.
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Vislie, Jon & Strøm, Steinar
(2006).
Effektivitet, Fordeling og Økonomisk Politikk.
Unipub forlag.
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Vislie, Jon
(2004).
Samfunnsøkonomisk lønnsomhet og økonomisk politikk.
Emneside - elektronisk.
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Vislie, Jon
(2003).
Domestic Environmental Policy under Asymmetric Information.
Universitetet i Oslo.
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Hoel, Michael Olaf; Iversen, Tor; Nilssen, Tore & Vislie, Jon
(2003).
Genetic testing and repulsion from chance.
Universitetet i Oslo.
Vis sammendrag
A central theme in the international debate on genetic testing concerns the extent to
which insurance companies should be allowed to use genetic information in their design
of insurance contracts. We analyze this issue within a model with the following important
feature: A person�s well-being depends on the perceived probability of becoming ill in
the future in a way that varies among individuals. We show that both tested high-risks
and untested individuals are equally well off whether or not test results can be used by
insurers. Individuals who test for being low-risks, on the other hand, are made worse off
by not being able to verify this to insurers. This implies that verifiability dominates nonverifiability
in an ex-ante sense.
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Vislie, Jon
(2001).
Incentive Contracts for Public Health Care Provision under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard.
Health Economics Research programme at the university of Oslo.
ISSN 82-7756-068-0.
Vis sammendrag
Many payment reforms are based on a (high-powered) DRG-price system. We analyse the design of an optimal compensation scheme for public hospitals, when each hospital is privately informed about any patient's true disease, while cost control cannot be verified, and treatment offered has a stochastic outcome.
We analyse the contracting issue both when treatment can and cannot be verified. In both cases we show that in order to reduce rent to the hospital, treatment should be less intensive than under complete information, when cost of treatment is disease-dependent. When treatment can be verified, rent extraction is accomplished not only by a demanding a less aggressive treatment, which has a negative impact on the likelihood for recovery, but also by offering a cost-reimbursement scheme, but no bonus. With non-verifiable treatment, we show that the optimal payment contract is a combination of a recovery-contingent bonus (being declining in severity) and cost sharing, with the fraction of cost reimbursed by the government increases in severity.
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Vislie, Jon
(2001).
Environmental regulation, asymmetric information and foreign ownership.
Department of Economics, University of Oslo.
ISSN 0801-1117.
Vis sammendrag
Regulating an export firm with private information about emission technology is analysed, when the firm, owned partly by foreigners, has an option to bypass domestic regulation through costly relocation. If the firm chooses to relocate, a new plant will be set up in a region practicing environmental dumping, at a cost that is correlated with emission efficiency. The reservation utility then becomes type-dependent. We characterise the set of optimal contracts offered by the uninformed, domestic government under different ownership structures, when domestic taxation is distortive abd when welfare is the sum of consumers' surplus and the share of rent accruing to domestic residents. As ownership has no real effects under complete information, we show that under incomplete information ownership matters, because rent extraction becomes more important when ownership rights are shifted towards foreigners. Rent extraction is now accomplished by offering contracts with lower output and higher emissions to a subset of the efficient types, whereas a subset of the inefficient types are induced to relocate. When barriers towards foreign ownership are lowered, and then shifting the distribution of ownership rights in favour of foreigners, more pollution will be generated for types of the firm that do not exit, whereas a larger fraction of types should be induced to relocate.
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Vislie, Jon
(2000).
Environmental Regulation under Asymmetric Information with Type-dependent outside Option.
Department of Economics.
ISSN 0801-1117.
Vis sammendrag
We consider how a benevolent regulator should regulate a polluting export industry when the industry, having private information about its abatement efficiency, has an option to move its operations abroad, with a type-dependent outside option rent. The paper focuses on the case where outside option is negatively correlated with abatement efficiency, implying unilateral incentives for overstating abatement efficiency. Because lump-sum taxation is ruled out, rent will have a social cost which is also affected by foreign ownership to the industry. It is demonstrated that optimal regulation calls for excessive pollution among the participating types (relative to complete information), for the purpose of rent extraction, while types being excluded are the ones with the higher outside option (the least efficient types). We also demonstrate that with a higher foreign ownership share, the larger is the set of excluded types, while overpollution should be reduced.
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Vislie, Jon
(2000).
Environmental regulation under asymmetric information with type-dependent outside option.
Department of Economics.
ISSN 0801-1117.
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Vislie, Jon
(1999).
The role of foreign ownership in domestic environmental regulation under asymmetric information.
Department of Economics.
ISSN 0801-1117.
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Vislie, Jon & Dalen, Dag Morten
(1997).
"Konkurranseforhold, etablering og distribusjon i markedet for legemidler".
SNF.
ISSN 82-7296-748-0.
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Vislie, Jon
(1995).
Designing optimal environmental incentive schemes under moral hazard and private information.
Department of Economics.
ISSN 0801-1117.