GOVERNMENT AND CONTROL

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Advanced liberal democracies are currently witnessing a bewildering variety of developments in regimes of control. These range from demands for execution or preventive detention of implacably dangerous or risky individuals—sexual predators, paedophiles, persistent violent offenders—to the development of dispersed, designed in-control regimes for the continual, silent and largely invisible work of the assessment, management, communication and control of risk. Political programmes of crime control appear to have little stability, cycling rapidly through all the alternatives from ‘prison works’, ‘short, sharp shocks’ and ‘boot camps’, through ‘community corrections’ and ‘reintegrative shaming’ via ‘therapeutic rehabilitation’ to ‘nothing works’ and ‘three strikes and you’re out’.

Of course, programmes of crime control have always had less to do with control of crime than they have to do with more general concerns with the government of the moral order. And concerns about illegality and crime have been articulated as much, if not more, by institutions and practices which are not part of the criminal justice system than by those that are conventionally considered to be part of such a ‘system’. Nonetheless, even at this more general level, things seem confusing. Despite claims that we live in a post-disciplinary society (Simon), that dangerousness has given way to risk (Castel), that control is now continuous, immanent and cybernetic rather than discontinuous, localized and individualizing (Deleuze), there appears to be little strategic coherence about these developments at the level of their rationalities, and much diversity and contingency at the level of their technologies.

This paper will attempt to explore this complexity along a number of dimensions. It will consider the ways in which particular ‘regimes of illegalities’ have been individuated and problematized, and suggest that, although these are diverse, some at least can be understood as infractions of freedom, that is to say, as problematic because they throw into question the very presuppositions of moral consciousness, self-control and self-advancement through legitimate consumption upon which governmental regimes of freedom depend. It will consider the ‘conceptions of the criminal’ that circulate within practices for the government of illegality, and suggest that, despite the apparent diversity of these conceptions—where biological arguments about inherited tendencies cohabit with communitarian arguments about the virtues—the pervasive image of the perpetrator of crime is not one of the juridical subject of the rule of law, nor that of the bio-psychological subject of positivist criminology, but of the responsible subject of moral community guided—or misguided—by ethical self-steering mechanisms. And it will consider the forms of knowledge and modes of expertise that are implicated in these new techniques and rationalities of control.

Governing Conduct

Analysts of control practices often seem to suggest that we are in the midst of a shift into a radically novel epoch, whether this be a post-disciplinary society, an electronic panopticon, risk society, actuarial justice or a society of control. Others, however, suggest

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The arguments in this essay are developed in more detail in Rose (1999a).
that the picture is more complex, that current control practices manifest, at most, a hesitant, incomplete, fragmentary, contradictory and contested metamorphosis, the abandonment of some old themes, the maintenance of others, the introduction of some new elements, a shift in the role and functioning of others because of their changed places and connections within the ‘assemblage’ of control. Thus David Garland and Pat O’Malley have pointed to the fact that the contemporary discourse of crime control seems to combine incompatible specifications of the problem to be addressed, and cycle rapidly between different programmes for its solution (Garland 1996; O’Malley 1999).

Proposals stressing the need for individuals and communities to take more responsibility for their own security, whether this be through schemes of ‘target hardening’ or by setting up neighbourhood watch, coexist with arguments for zero-tolerance policing. Demands for exemplary sanctions against offenders are accompanied by schemes for ‘naming, shaming and blaming’ focused on the relations between offender and victim. The prisoner is to be incapacitated, or the prisoner is to be taught life skills and entrepreneurship, or the prisoner is to be stigmatized and made to accept moral culpability, or the prisoner is to be helped to reintegrate into the community. The spread of community types of correction such as fines, probation orders, community service and so forth goes hand in hand with an inexorable increase in the prison population and the constant expansion of the prison building programme. Schemes of risk reduction, situational crime control and attempts to identify and modify criminogenic situations, portray the criminal as a rational agent who chooses crime in the light of a calculus of potential benefits and costs. Schemes for the retraining of offenders portray the prisoner as one who lacks the entrepreneurial skills to actualize himself in a competitive society. Proposals to increase the information, surveillance capacities and investigative skills of police divisions of criminal intelligence portray the criminal as an organized professional lacking normal moral controls who preys in a calculated manner upon the law-abiding. And so on.

In this essay I would like to see what, if anything, recent analyses of ‘governmentality’ can contribute to our understanding of this complex and contradictory situation. Over the past few years, Michel Foucault’s relatively brief published comments on governmentality have proved extraordinarily fruitful in generating conceptually rigorous, empirically rich and politically provocative studies of specific problem fields (Foucault 1991). Focusing upon the emergence and transformation of programmes, strategies and techniques for the conduct of conduct, such studies have described the rationalities and technologies underpinning a whole variety of more or less rationalized and calculated interventions that have attempted to govern the existence and experience of contemporary human beings, and to act upon human conduct to direct it to certain ends (useful introductions and overviews are provided in Barry et al. 1996; Dean 1999; Dean and Hindess 1998; Rose 1999a). They have demonstrated the historical variability and situational contingency of the problems that have seemed appropriate to be governed, the sites within which these problems come to be defined and delimited, and the diversity of authorities that have been involved in more or less rationalized attempts to address them. They have analysed the languages of description that have made these problems thinkable and governable and their dependence upon the concepts, explanations, arguments and theories of priests, philosophers, lawyers, doctors, statisticians, sociologists, psychologists and other experts. They have examined the different ways in which such strategies of
government depend upon and disseminate certain conceptions and models of the persons to be subjected to government—as members of a flock to be shepherded, as children to be nurtured and tutored, as citizens with rights, as rational calculating individuals whose preferences are to be acted upon. They have mapped the different spaces opened up for government—the nation, the economy, the city, the community, the factory, the home, the global world itself. They have charted the assembly of complex and hybrid technologies of government, linking together forms of judgement, modes of perception, practices of calculation, types of authority, architectural forms, machinery and all manner of technical devices with the aspiration of producing certain outcomes in terms of the conduct of the governed—the technologies that we have come to know as the social insurance system, the schooling system, the penal system and so forth. And they have suggested that, at particular historical periods, there are family resemblances amongst the various ways of thinking and acting upon human conduct, that give them a kind of strategic coherence, as, for example, in the plethora of attempts over the twentieth century to understand and govern conduct from a ‘social’ point of view.

In focusing on practices of government, such analyses have reframed the role to be accorded to ‘the state’ in analyses of control and regulation. Centres of political deliberation and calculation have to act through the actions of a whole range of other authorities, and through complex technologies, if they are to be able to intervene upon the conduct of persons, activities, spaces and objects far flung in space and time—in the street, the schoolroom, the home, the operating theatre, the prison cell. Such ‘action at a distance’ inescapably depends on a whole variety of alliances and lash-ups between diverse and competing bodies of expertise, criteria of judgement and technical devices that are far removed from the ‘political apparatus’ as traditionally conceived. This generates an intrinsic heterogeneity, contestability and mobility in practices for the government of conduct. This mobility and contestability is intensified by the fact that ‘the state’ is neither the only force engaged in the government of conduct nor the hidden hand orchestrating the strategies and techniques of doctors, lawyers, churches, community organizations, pressure groups, campaigning groups, groups of parents, citizens, patients, survivors and all those others seeking to act upon conduct in the light of particular concerns and to shape it to certain ends. And mobility and contestability is further enhanced by the fact that contemporary strategies for the government of conduct, far from seeking to crush and eliminate the capacities for action of those persons and forces they act upon, on the contrary seek to foster and shape such capacities so that they are enacted in ways that are broadly consistent with particular objectives such as order, civility, health or enterprise. And what individuals, groups, factory workers, psychiatric patients and even prisoners are required to give, they are also empowered to refuse.

One can see such complexities in most historical periods and political contexts. However I have suggested that they become particularly significant within contemporary programmes, strategies and techniques for the government of conduct—forms of government that I have termed ‘advanced’ liberal (Rose 1999a). A number of elements are involved. There is a widespread recasting of the ideal role of the state, and the argument that national governments should no longer aspire to be the guarantor and ultimate provider of security: instead the state should be a partner, animator and facilitator for a variety of independent agents and powers, and should exercise only
limited powers of its own, steering and regulating rather than rowing and providing. There has been a fragmentation of ‘the social’ as a field of action and thought, a unitary domain more or less coterminous with a national territory and coincident upon a single national economy. In its place we see economic circuits territorialized in other ways, for example in the themes of globalization and localization. The idea of a unified solidary social domain and a single national culture is displaced by images of multiple communities, plural identities, and cultural diversity. A whole range of new technologies—‘technologies of freedom’—have been invented that seek to govern ‘at a distance’ through, not in spite of, the autonomous choices of relatively independent entities. Hence, as far as organizations are concerned, privatization, marketization, consumerization have been accompanied by the increased use of techniques of accountability such as centrally set but locally managed budgets, and the practices of evaluation and auditing. As far as individuals are concerned, one sees a revitalization of the demand that each person should be obliged to be prudent, responsible for their own destinies, actively calculating about their futures and providing for their own security and that of their families with the assistance of a plurality of independent experts and profit-making businesses from private health insurance to private security firms. This alloy of autonomization and responsibilization underpins shifts in strategies of welfare, in which substantive issues of income distribution and poverty have been displaced by a focus upon processual issues that affiliate or expel individuals from the universe of civility, choice and responsibility, best captured by the dichotomy of inclusion and exclusion. And, in the recent interest in the politics of communitarianism, associationalism and the ‘Third Way’, ones sees an accentuation of the strategies that I term ‘ethopolitics’ (Rose 1999b). These seek to regenerate and reactivate the ethical values that are now believed to regulate individual conduct and that help maintain order and obedience to law by binding individuals into shared moral norms and values: governing through the self-steering forces of honour and shame, of propriety, obligation, trust, fidelity, and commitment to others.

Taking these themes as my guides, and drawing upon the work of other researchers, I would like to suggest that we are, indeed, witnessing some intelligible shifts in ways of thinking about and seeking to ensure control. However, to understand such shifts, it is necessary to de-centre analysis from ‘the criminal justice system’—codes, courts and constables—and to relocate the problem of crime and its control within a broader field of rationalities and technologies for the conduct of conduct. At least since the mid-nineteenth century, schooling, family life, the labour market and factory organization, public architecture and urban planning, leisure facilities, the mass media and much more have been mobilized and instrumentalized governmentally in the name of good citizenship, public order and the control or elimination of criminality, delinquency and anti-social conduct. In many ways, the criminal justice system itself plays a minor role in control practices—a role that is historically variable and should itself be the subject of analysis. From this perspective, I shall suggest that, despite their apparent complexity and heterogeneity, contemporary control strategies do show a certain strategic coherence. They can be broadly divided into two families: those that seek to regulate conduct by enmeshing individuals within circuits of inclusion and those that seek to act upon pathologies through managing a different set of circuits, circuits of exclusion.
In advanced liberal societies, one family of control practices operates by affiliating subjects into a whole variety of practices in which the modulation of conduct according to certain norms is, as it were, designed in. These are the practices that Deleuze referred to in his thesis that we now lived in 'societies of control' (1995). In disciplinary societies it was a matter of procession from one disciplinary institution to another—school, barracks, factory...—each seeking to mould conduct by inscribing enduring corporeal and behavioural competences, and persisting practices of self-scrutiny and self-constraint into the soul. Control society is one of constant and never ending modulation where the modulation occurs within the flows and transactions between the forces and capacities of the human subject and the practices in which he or she participates. One is always in continuous training, life-long learning, perpetual assessment, continual incitement to buy, to improve oneself, constant monitoring of health and never-ending risk management. Control is not centralized but dispersed, it flows though a network of open circuits that are rhizomatic and not hierarchical. In such a regime of control, we are not dealing with subjects with a unique personality that is the expression of some inner fixed quality, but with elements, capacities, potentialities. These are plugged into multiple orbits, identified by unique codes, identification numbers, profiles of preferences, security ratings and so forth: a ‘record’ containing a whole variety of bits of information on our credentials, activities, qualifications for entry into this or that network.

In our societies of control, it is not a question of socializing and disciplining the subject ab initio. It is not a question of instituting a regime in which each person is permanently under the alien gaze of the eye of power exercising individualizing surveillance. It is not a matter of apprehending and normalizing the offender ex post facto. Conduct is continually monitored and reshaped by logics immanent within all networks of practice. Surveillance is ‘designed in’ to the flows of everyday existence. In these circuits of inclusion, the calculated modulation of conduct according to principles of optimization of benign impulses and minimization of malign impulses is dispersed across the time and space of ordinary life. This is not a rehearsal of the sociological thesis perhaps first proposed by E. A. Ross, who, in 1894, ‘jotted down 33 ways in which society exercised social control... [and then] proceeded to develop these preliminary thoughts into the organizing principles of sociology’: the assertion that informal controls upon conduct are exercised in all areas of social life (Kay 1993: 22–3; cf. Ross 1901; Hamilton and Sutton 1989: 14–15, Lumley 1925; Rose 1999: 120–4). For what is entailed here is the calculated instrumentalization and enhancement of control features that are potential within a whole variety of practices in the service or specific projects for the management of conduct.

Inclusive identities

Perhaps the clearest example of such control strategies concerns identity itself. The exercise of freedom in the regulated societies of consumption that took shape in the second half of the twentieth century required incessant proof of legitimate identity. These link identification, individuation and control: computer-readable passports, driving licences with unique identification codes, social insurance numbers, bank cards,
credit cards, debit cards electronically checking available resources at the point of sale, store cards...—the list could be prolonged (cf. Gandy 1993; Gordon 1987; Marx 1988; Poster 1990; Webster and Robins 1986). Each identifies the bearer with a virtual identity—a database record storing personal details—whilst at the same time allowing access to various privileges. Each access to such a privilege, for example the purchase of an item using a credit card, entails a further entry upon the database, a further accretion to the virtual identity. Access to other privileges, to mortgages, to credit purchase facilities, to accounts allowing use of telephone, electricity or gas, is dependent upon the provider accessing and checking these databases, through specialist intermediaries. Other databases, such as those of criminal records, may be linked into these circuits of information flow; government agencies use computer matching facilities to compare data from different sources in order to identify miscreants, for example those making false claims for social security benefits. Information on driving licences can be linked with police and court records in criminal investigations. Insurance companies check databases held by banks and credit card companies in order to identify bad risks. Proposals are made for national databanks of ‘DNA fingerprints’ in which the identity of each individual, written indelibly in their body, will act as a unique identifier that will not only qualify or disqualify them for entry into these circuits of consumption but will also identify them in a host of other potential encounters.

Critics have tended to stress the totalitarian potentials in the dissemination of networks of surveillance across the territory of everyday life (see Marx 1988 for this list). They overcome the barriers of space and time involved in physical surveillance; they are not labour intensive; they are of low visibility; they are of high durability; they have high transferability across domains; they are largely involuntary or participated in as an uncalculated side-effect of some other action; they are pre-emptive and preventive, denying access to benefits on the basis of what one might do rather than apprehending one after the act; they are amenable to rapid augmentation as new modes of identification come on stream. But the image of a ‘maximum security society’ or an ‘electronic Panopticon’ is misleading (cf. Lyon 1994). Totalitarian control is neither the intended or unintended consequence of the new technologies of securitization of identity. Of course, there is no doubt that law enforcement agencies and other similar control agencies will utilize these new sources of information in any ways that they can. They will use them to identify and monitor offenders. They may also utilize them to profile and identify potentially pathological individuals and groups. But the control practices of identification that do not principally involve the tentacles of the state are spreading across everyday life. The securitization of identity is dispersed and disorganized. Problems of the individualization of the citizen have formed in a whole variety of sites and practices—of consumption, of finance, of police, of health, of insurance—to which securitization of identity can appear as a solution. Does this person have sufficient funds to make this purchase; is this citizen entitled to enter this national territory; is this person creditworthy; is this individual a potential suspect in this criminal case; is this person a good insurance risk? The image of control by totalizing surveillance is misleading. Control is better understood as operating through conditional access to circuits of consumption and civility: constant scrutiny of the right of individuals to access certain kinds of flows of consumption goods; recurrent switch points to be passed in order to access the benefits of liberty.
Control, here, is related to the very form that citizenship had been given by the close of the twentieth century. Citizenship is not primarily realized in a relation with the state, nor does it involve participation in a uniform public sphere; citizenship, rather, entails active engagement in a diversified and dispersed variety of private, corporate and quasi-corporate practices, of which working and shopping are paradigmatic. In this context, the securitization of identity is a control strategy that operates by securing the obligatory access points for the exercise of such active citizenship. This strategy produces the obligation to continuously and repeatedly evidence one’s citizenship credentials as one recurrently links oneself into the circuits of civility. In a society of control, a politics of conduct is designed into the fabric of existence itself, into the organization of space, time, visibility, circuits of communication. And these enwrap each individual life decision and action—about labour, purchases, debts, credits, lifestyle, sexual contacts and the like—in a web of incitements, rewards, current sanctions and forebodings of future sanctions which serve to enjoin each citizen to maintain particular types of control over their conduct. These assemblages which entail the securitization of identity are not unified, but dispersed, not hierarchical but rhizomatic, not totalized but connected in a web or relays and relations. But in policing the obligatory access points to the practices of inclusion, they inescapably generate novel forms of exclusion.

Partners in prudence

Political discourse stresses not merely the economic and technical limits of what can be provided by the state for its citizens but also the paradoxical and undesirable effects of the promise of total social protection. The dream of the social state gives way to the metaphor of the facilitating state, the state as partner and animator rather than provider and manager. Individuals, families, firms, organizations, communities are urged to take upon themselves the responsibility for the security of their property and their persons, and for that of their own families. Protection against risk of crime through a investment in measures of security becomes part of the responsibilities of each active individual, each responsible employer, if they are not to feel guilt at failing to protect themselves, their loved ones, their employees against future misfortunes. And, in exercising prudence, individuals cannot look solely to the public police and the formal mechanisms of the legal system: they must educate themselves with the assistance of experts and must actively engage in partnerships with expertise to maintain order and combat threats to individual and collective security.

These reactivated technologies of prudentialism have been best analysed by Pat O’Malley (1991, 1992, 1996). Prudentialism is most usually associated with the last half of the nineteenth century (O’Malley 1995; Ewald 1986, 1991). Twentieth century programmes for social insurance always sought to maintain this prudence and not destroy it, but the new technologies of social citizenship nonetheless mitigated and socialized these obligations: welfare states assumed the responsibility of being both the ultimate and the proximate guarantor of security. But within the economic rationalities of advanced liberalism, the implicit contract between state and citizen was no longer valued for its socializing consequences and the creation of solidarity. It appeared that, in any case, the promise of universal security had never been delivered; but further, the drain on individual incomes and on national finances was unwarranted and unbearable.
Responsibility was being stifled, risk-taking inhibited; entrepreneurship penalized, dependency induced. Hence a society of security now appeared to exacerbate, rather than reduce, the division between the included and the excluded. In the strategies that took shape in the shadow of these criticisms, individuals were not only to be encouraged to provide for their own future security through such measures as private health insurance, private pensions. They were also to secure themselves against crime risks and to take care not to make themselves the victims of crime. As O’Malley puts it, ‘not only does responsibility for crime-risk-management shift, but co-relatively, the rational subject of risk takes on the capacity to become skilled and knowledgeable about crime prevention and crime risks’ (O’Malley 1996: 201).

Hence security is no longer a matter of a national monopoly of actuarial wisdom, but nor is it to be assured through the encouragement of thrift by means of the personal relation with the contributions collector, or through the link to a commercial organization whose ‘rock-like’ reputation for stability and probity will assure peace of mind. Each of us is to be our own rock: insurance is now part of a politics of choice and lifestyle, sold through market mechanisms, and promoted though consumerized dreams of desired futures, which thrive on the reciprocal—if often implicit—exacerbation of anxiety. Further, insurance agents now offer themselves as versatile advisers in the techniques of risk reduction and risk management, providing information ‘about local crime rates, about how to recognize suspicious persons, how to make the home and its contents secure, how to recognize and avoid high-crime-risk-situations, about the value of insuring and marking property and so on’ (O’Malley 1996: 201, cf. O’Malley 1991). This responsibilization of the subjects of government is not restricted to individuals in their ‘private lives’—it extends to firms, neighbourhoods, communities, none of whom can now allocate responsibility for crime control to an all powerful state. As David Garland has pointed out, the message now is that ‘Property owners, residents, retailers, manufacturers, town planners, school authorities, transport managers, employers, parents and individual citizens’ must recognize their responsibilities in the reduction of criminal opportunities and the increase of controls, working in partnership with the public police, with the burgeoning empire of private security, with other traders, with neighbours in their locality (Garland 1996: 453). In these partnerships in prudence, the social space of welfare is fragmented into a multitude of diverse pockets, zones, folds, each comprised of a linking of specific persons, organizations, spaces and types of conduct, each with their own dangers and risks.

**Territories of security**

The security practices of the social state were, in principle at least, territorialized across a single uniform plane, that of ‘society’. A domain of collective security was to be maintained by the state on behalf of all citizens, through universal measures ranging from old age pensions to a unified and socially funded police force. In the new, fragmented political space, each community is to take responsibility for preserving the security of its own members, whether they be the residents of a neighbourhood, the employees of an organization, the consumers and staff of a shopping complex. Security, here, is to be managed within a variety of discrete spatio-ethical zones, each of which circumscribes what Clifford Shearing has termed a ‘contractual’ community. And this community assumes—or is forced to assume—responsibility for ‘its own’ risk

As space is reconfigured in the name of security, new conceptions of ‘criminogenic spaces’ and new strategies of ‘situational crime control’ have taken shape. These strategies have given us two striking images: the ‘gated community’, internally monitored and pacified, surrounded by walls, with entry and exit controlled by security guards; the ‘fortress city’ so vividly portrayed by Mike Davis in his account of downtown Los Angeles (Davis 1990). These strategies involve a reconfiguration of the work of the security agencies. Not merely the private security firms who undertake the labour-intensive work of guarding, patrolling, surveilling and all the rest. But also the public police (Ericson and Haggerty 1997, chs 7, 8, 9). They are involved in tracing out the territories for surveillance using high-tech electronic surveillance and data-analysis systems. They use their information technology and database resources to provide information on types of crime and suspects prevalent in particular zones. They alert inhabitants to the dangers of crime through leaflets warning of risks and exhorting alertness and responsibility. They mobilize territories through residential watch programmes. They advise on design and security features of new homes and conversions. They visit schools and colleges. They help make up communities of active citizens committed to the securitization of their habitat. They become advisers on risk management in public and private spaces intersecting with a whole range of other professions involved in this task: licensing and certifying security technology, advising on the information technology necessary for securitization, advising on the location of such things as automatic banking machines, underwriting particular alarm systems and much more. And a host of new professions becomes expert in security—architects, store designers, manufacturers of street furniture, management consultants, those running training courses for staff, insurance companies, high-tech designers of video and audio systems and many more.

Through this multiplication of expertise in alliance with responsibilization, the collective logics of community come into alliance with the ethos of individual autonomy characteristic of advanced forms of liberalism: choice, personal responsibility, control over one’s own fate, self-promotion and self-government. They are also brought into line with prevailing anti-political themes in political discourse, in that self-activating communities are promoted as an antidote to the combined depredations of market forces, remote central government, insensitive local authorities and ineffective crime control agencies, which have combined responsibility for the breakdown of law and order at the heart of urban—and rural—existence. New modes of neighbourhood participation, local empowerment and engagement of residents in decisions over their own lives will, it is thought, reactivation self-motivation, self-responsibility and self-reliance in the form of active citizenship within a self-governing community (Rose 1999b; cf. Stenson 1993).

Government of security here operates through the activation of individual commitments, energies and choices, through personal morality within a community setting. Community is not simply the territory within which crime is to be controlled, it is itself a means of government: its detailed knowledge about itself and the activities of its inhabitants are to be utilized, its ties, bonds, forces and affiliations are to be celebrated, its centres of authority and methods of dispute resolution are to be encouraged, nurtured, shaped and instrumentalized to enhance the security of each and of all.

These patterns of reconfiguring urban space inaugurate a spiral of amplification of risk—as risk is managed in certain secure zones, the perceived riskiness of other
unprotected zones is exacerbated. Nowhere is this clearer than in the fortress city, where a corporate citadel of offices and shopping malls, and their attendant facilities such as car parks and walkways, is enclosed and gated off from the poor neighbourhoods that surround it (Davis 1991). In these regenerated downtowns, space is reconfigured in a project of control and urban design, architecture and the police apparatus have merged into an integrated programme in the name of security. The civilizing public spaces of nineteenth century liberalism and twentieth century social architecture—public parks, libraries, playgrounds, the streets themselves—are increasingly abandoned, desolate and dangerous. They are replaced by an archipelago of secured spaces—shopping malls, arts centres and gourmet restaurant strips. Access to each is guarded, the internal space is under electronic surveillance and private security policing, its architecture and design so organized as to eliminate or expel those who have no legitimate—that is to say, consumerized—reason to be there. In fact, a double exclusion occurs. The third world proletariat who service these spaces of consumption are herded into public housing zones that are expelled to the outer rings of the city. And the poor, ‘street people’, the homeless and workless are expelled to spaces outside the circuits of security and inclusion, spaces which are increasingly avoided and feared by those who used to walk, shop and visit there. Hence, whilst this securitization of consumption may succeed in producing enclaves of contentment and encouraging the pursuit of pleasure, it is grounded in an exclusionary logic: those who are excluded—the new ‘dangerous classes’—are forced to consume elsewhere.

**Exclusion: Circuits of Insecurity**

Opposed to inclusion, and the circuits that maintain it, stands exclusion. Not that the excluded are to be merely cast out—they are also to be subject to strategies of control. On the one hand, there are those strategies that seek to reaffiliate the excluded, through a principle of activity, and to reattach them to the circuits of civility: active labour market policies emphasizing the retraining of the unemployed, interventions to regenerate and empower disadvantaged communities and individuals, programmes to ‘re-familialize’ life in the inner cities. On the other hand, there are the strategies which deem affiliation impossible for certain individuals and sectors, and seek to manage these anti-citizens and marginal spaces through measures which seek to neutralize the dangers they pose. Here one can locate ‘three strikes’ policies, the upsizing of the penal complex, the increase in the prison population and strategies for the preventive detention of incorrigible individuals such as paedophiles.

**Subjectification**

Since at least the eighteenth century, the political imaginations of most European countries have been haunted by a succession of figures that seem to condense in their person, their name, their image, all that is disorder, danger, threat to civility: the vagrant, the pauper, the degenerate, the unemployable, the residuum, the social problem group. Even over the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, when projects to forge universal social citizenship were being formulated and set in place, not all were thought to be includable, notably the mad, the criminal, those who
refused the bonds of regular labour, but also, in different ways at different times, the
child, the African, the woman and the Jew. But to think of the excluded as a kind of
eternal presence, an inescapable other to the aspirations of civilization is to oversimplify.
Who, or what are today's excluded?

The contemporary specification of exclusion arises out of a problematization of the
social states that formed in the second half of the twentieth century. 'We tried to provide
for the poor and produced more poor instead. We tried to remove the barriers to escape
from poverty and inadvertently built a trap' (Murray 1984: 9). Charles Murray's welfare
dependants were rational individuals, calculating that they could earn more or live better
by not working, and using the welfare system to their own advantage. Lawrence Mead’s
dependents lacked competence: ‘Victims of a culture of dependence spawned by
well-meaning but misguided liberal policy, they had lost the capacity to work and to carry
out the ordinary duties of citizens’ (Katz 1993: 15; cf. Mead 1986). In either case, the
problem created by welfare was essentially a moral and ethical one (Himmelfarb 1995):
some were lured into welfare dependency by the regimes of social security themselves,
some were unable to accept their moral responsibilities as citizens for reasons of psycho-
logical or other personal incapacity, some were enterprising, rational and calculating but
enterprised themselves in the culture of anti-civility, of crime and drugs, rather than
within the values of civility and responsible self-management.

New political rationalities, including those of crime control, came to be articulated in
terms of this distinction between a majority who can and do ensure their own well-being
and security through their own active self-promotion and responsibility for themselves
and their families, and those who are outside this nexus of activity: the underclass, the
marginalized, the truly disadvantaged, the criminals. These excluded sub-populations
have either refused the bonds of civility and self responsibility, or they are unable to
assume them for constitutional reasons, or they aspire to them but have not been given
the skills, capacities and means. It appears as if, outside the circuits of inclusion—in
‘marginalized’ spaces, in the decaying council estate, in the chaotic lone parent family, in
the shop doorways of inner city streets—exists an array of micro-circuits, micro-cultures
of non-citizens, failed citizens, anti-citizens, comprised of those who are unable or
unwilling to enterprise their lives or manage their own risk, incapable of exercising
responsible self-government, either attached to no moral community or to a community
of anti-morality. It is in relation to these zones of exclusion that the new strategies of risk
management are directed.

Managing risk

Malcolm Feeley and Jonathon Simon have suggested that a ‘new penology’ is taking
shape which is ‘markedly less concerned with responsibility, fault, moral sensibility,
diagnosis, or intervention and treatment of the individual offender. Rather, it is
concerned with techniques to identify, classify, and manage groupings sorted by danger-
ousness. The task is managerial not transformative . . . It seeks to regulate levels of
deviance, not intervene or respond to individual deviants or social malformations’
(1992: 452). They suggest that this new penology is actuarial in character, not seeking to
discipline and normalize individual offenders but to map out distributions of conduct
across populations and to reshape the physical and social habitat in which individuals
conduct their lives so as to minimize criminal conduct and maximize efficiency of the
population as a whole. For those whose risk cannot be managed in these ways, imprison-
ment is utilized as a means of enduring incapacitation, whilst for those who appear to
present lower risk, conduct can be managed through measures like probation, valued
now only to the extent that they can demonstrate themselves as efficient techniques for
the more or less permanent management of dangerous sectors of the population.

This thesis is suggestive, and finds confirmation from shifts in other areas such as
psychiatry (Castel 1981, 1991; Rose 1996, 1998). We should not, however, misunderstand
the argument, and assume that the increasing focus upon factors influencing the distrib-
ution of behaviours in the population and on strategies for prevention and risk
minimization amounts to a totalized shift towards actuarial control (cf. Feeley and Simon
1994). The languages of description and techniques of calculation that are pervading the
work of control professions may be probabilistic, but they are seldom actuarial, and are
often only weakly numericized. For the control professionals, it is probably better to
understand what is happening in terms of the emergence and routinization of a
particular style of thought: risk thinking. This is concerned with bringing possible future
undesired events into calculations in the present, making their avoidance the central
object of decision-making processes, and administering individuals, institutions, expert-
tise and resources in the service of that ambition. Understood in this way, risk thinking
has become central to the management of exclusion in post-welfare strategies of control.

Take, for example, the public police. Ericson and Haggerty suggest that in the contem-
porary work of the police ‘categories and classifications of risk communication and . . .
the technologies for communicating knowledge [about risk] internally and externally' pro-
spectively structure the actions and deliberations not just of police officers and police
tactics, but also of other professionals who are now enrolled in the business of control by
risk management—welfare workers, psychiatrists, doctors, teachers . . . (Ericson and
Haggerty 1997: 33). Once stabilized in ‘communication formats’—more or less
systematic rules for the organization and presentation of information and experience—
risk classifications tend to become the means by which such professionals think, act and
justify their actions. In that sense, the very gaze of the control professional and the nature
of their encounter with their client, patient or suspect, is liable to be formatted by the
demands and objectives of risk management. Ericson and Haggerty suggest that this
constitutes a dispersed ‘expert system’ of risk management, to which the professionals
are subject: ‘He or she is one of many contributors to the expert system of risk
management that creates the patient’s dossier, and therefore lose control over particular
outcomes as well as over the progress of cases’ (Ericson and Haggerty 1997: 37–8). The
central work of such agents is thus structured around information.

This is not just information on the internal characteristics of particular persons—the
extent to which they are ‘dangerous individuals’—but concerns an array of factors that—
formally via research or informally via professional beliefs—are associated with an
increased likelihood of undesirable conduct (housing conditions, employment history,
abuse of alcohol or drugs, family circumstances . . . ). It is these factors that become the
focus of the risk gaze, and that are increasingly organized and packaged by structured
risk assessments, risk schedules, forms and proformas, database fields, into indicators of
risk, risk classifications and the like that are communicated to other professionals, to law
enforcement agencies, to the courts, to other decision makers, with consequences far
removed from those surrounding the initial consultation, encounter, or occasion which
led to the collection of the information in the first place (cf. Castel 1991: 281).
Control workers, whether they be police or psychiatrists, thus have a new administrative function—the administration of the marginalia, ensuring community protection through the identification of the riskiness of individuals, actions, forms of life and territories. Hence the increasing emphasis on case conferences, multidisciplinary teams, sharing information, keeping records, making plans, setting targets, establishing networks for the surveillance and documentation of the potentially risky individual on the territory of the community. In the circuits of exclusion, control is not merely a matter of constraining those who are individually pathological; it is about the generation of ‘knowledge that allows selection of thresholds that define acceptable risks’ and generates practices of inclusion and exclusion that are based on that knowledge (Ericson and Haggerty 1997: 41). A plethora of quasi-autonomous agencies work upon the territories of control that have taken shape after the welfare state, within the ‘savage spaces’ of exclusion, in the ‘anti-communities’ on the margins, or with those abjected from civility by virtue of their lack of competence or capacity for responsible ethical self-management. Within this new territory of exclusion, a whole array of control agencies—police, social workers, doctors, psychiatrists, mental health professionals—seek to link up in circuits of surveillance and communication in a perpetually failing endeavour to minimize the riskiness of the most risky. They form a multiplicity of points for the collection, inscription, accumulation and distribution of information relevant to the management of risk.

Whereas social notions of risk were universalizing, these risk agencies focus upon ‘the usual suspects’—the poor, the welfare recipients, the petty criminals, discharged psychiatric patients, street people. The logics of risk inescapably locate the careers and identities of such tainted citizens within a regime of surveillance which actually constitutes them all as actually or potentially ‘risky’ individuals. The incompleteness, fragmentation and failure of risk assessment and risk management is no threat to such logics, merely a perpetual incitement for the incessant improvement of systems, generation of more knowledge, invention of more techniques, all driven by the technological imperative to tame uncertainty and master hazard. Risk management—the identification, assessment, elimination or reduction of the possibility of incurring misfortune or loss—has thus become an integral part of the professional responsibility of a host of professionals. The respecification of one dimension of the problem of control in terms of risk is bound to a revised governmental role for such professionals, to manage dangerous sites and dangerous persons on the territory of the community, under the threat of being held accountable for any harm to ‘the general public’—‘normal people’—which might result. However the emphasis on factors, probabilities and categories of sub-populations does not efface the pathological individual as a key object of attention and intervention. Indeed, the problem is precisely to deploy actuarial classifications of risk to identify and control risky individuals in order to ascertain who can, and who cannot, be managed within the open circuits of community control.

In these exclusionary circuits, the role of custodial institutions is redefined. They are understood and classified not in terms of their reformatory potential, but in terms of the secure containment of risk. On the one hand, confinement becomes a way of securing the most risky until their riskiness can be fully assessed and controlled. On the other, a group of individuals emerge who appear intractably risky—‘monstrous individuals’, who either cannot or do not wish to exercise the self-control upon conduct necessary in a culture of freedom. Sexual predators, paedophiles, the incorrigibly anti-social are
representatives of a new ‘human kind’—individuals whose very make up as human beings appears somehow faulty or incomplete, and whose very nature thus seems to place them permanently beyond the limits of civility and its demands on subjectivity. For such monstrous individuals a whole variety of paralegal forms of confinement are being devised, including pre-emptive or preventive detention prior to a crime being committed or after a determinate sentence has been served, not so much in the name of law and order, but in the name of the community that they threaten, the name of the actual or potential victims they violate. It appears that the conventions of ‘rule of law’ must be waived for the protection of the community against a growing number of ‘predators’, who do not conform to either legalistic or psychiatric models of subjectivity (see Pratt 1999; Simon 1998; Scheingold et al. 1994).

From dependency to activity

Whilst confinement without the aspiration of reformation is certainly on the increase in these new control practices, it would be a mistake to think that the logics of control pay no attention to the transformation of the excluded individual. Whilst analysts of the prisons have focused on the shift from reformation to incapacitation and punishment, at a more general level, the ethical reconstruction of the excluded individual is a central problem for one set of control strategies. Thus workfare programmes in the United States and welfare reform in the United Kingdom seek to micro-manage the behaviour of welfare recipients in order to remoralize them. They stress the need to reform habits as a condition of receipt of benefits, and ultimately, to seek to get all those physically able to work off benefits entirely. The aim, once more, is responsibilization: to reconstruct self-reliance in those who are excluded. But responsibilization here takes a characteristic form. Within this new politics of conduct, the problems of problematic persons are reformulated as moral or ethical problems, that is to say, problems in the ways in which such persons understand and conduct themselves and their existence. This ethical reformulation opens the possibility for a whole range of psychological techniques to be recycled in programmes for governing ‘the excluded’. The imperative of activity, and the presupposition of an ethic of choice, is central not only to the rationale of policy but also to the reformatory technology to which it is linked.

Barbara Cruikshank in the United States and Karen Baistow in the UK have drawn attention to the significance of the language of empowerment for professionals operating within such technologies (Cruikshank 1994; Baistow 1995). For empowerment—or the lack of empowerment—codes the subjective substrate of exclusion as lack of self-esteem, self-worth and the skills of self-management necessary to steer oneself as an active individual in the empire of choice. The relations that humans have with themselves are to be the target of professional reconstruction, often backed with the power of law. The beauty of empowerment is that it appears to reject the logics of patronizing dependency that infused earlier welfare modes of expertise. Subjects are to do the work on themselves, not in the name of conformity, but to make them free. The binary of dependency and control becomes a powerful formula for judging the conduct by others, and for judging oneself. Autonomy is now represented in terms of personal power and the capacity to accept responsibility—not to blame others but to recognize your own collusion in that which prevents you from being yourself, and in doing so, overcome it and achieve responsible autonomy and personal power. High self-esteem is
linked to the power to plan one’s life as an orderly enterprise and take responsibility for its course and outcome. The vocabulary of dependence as a problem of the will provides the common language of description for conditions ranging from lack of work to dependence on alcohol (cf. Sedgwick 1992; Fraser and Gordon 1994; Valverde 1998).

The tactics of empowerment exemplify a much wider phenomenon—exclusion has become a fundamentally subjective condition. It is not a psychological subjectivity with social determinants, as in welfare regimes. It is an ethical subjectivity, and a cultural subjectivity. Hence welfare to work, zero tolerance, ‘naming, blaming and shaming’, parental responsibility for the crimes of their children. This is ‘tough love’, ‘compassion with a hard edge’. The problems of the excluded, of the underclass are to be resolved by a kind of moral rearmament: ‘a politics of conduct is today more salient than a politics of class’ (Mead 1991: 4, quoted in Procacci 1998: 30). It is through moral reformation, through ethical reconstruction, that the excluded citizen is to be reattached to a virtuous community. Within such programmes for the ethical reconstruction of the excluded, everyone within the ghetto, every member of the underclass, each excluded person, even the convicted prisoner, should be ‘given the opportunity’ to achieve full membership in a moral community, and to adhere to the core values of honesty, self-reliance and concern for others. Their willingness to do so is to form the object of scrutiny of new moral authorities. For those who can be included, control is now to operate through the rational reconstruction of the will and self-control, of the habits of independence, life planning, self-improvement, autonomous life-conduct, so that the individual can be reinserted into family, work and consumption, and hence into the continuous circuits and flows of control society. But as I have already suggested, for those who cannot or will not be included, and who are too risky to be managed in open circuits—the repeat offender, the predator, the irredeemably anti-social, the irretrievably monstrous, the paedophile, the psychopath—control will take the form of more or less permanent sequestration. Those who refuse to become responsible, to govern themselves ethically, have also refused the offer to become members of our moral community. Hence, for them, harsh measures are entirely appropriate. Three strikes and you are out: citizenship becomes conditional upon conduct.

The penal-welfare complex

The theorists of decarceration in the 1970s suggested that advanced industrial societies were witnessing a sharp decline in the size of the populations who were confined. There has, indeed, been a marked reduction in the numbers of inmates of many publicly run institutions, notably mental hospitals and old people’s homes. In the United States, for example, by 1990 the rate of incarceration in state mental hospitals had dropped to less than 50 per 100,000 residents aged 15 and over, from a peak in 1955 of over 450 per 100,000. Yet this ‘decarceration’ has led to a new incarceration, in the growth of a highly lucrative market sector in private residential facilities run for profit. And at the same time, many jurisdictions are introducing new measures for the preventive detention of those thought to present a threat to the public: a new archipelago of confinement without reformation is taking shape. In the criminal justice system, despite the proliferation of non-custodial punishments, there has been no reduction in the prison population in Britain and the United States. By the end of the 1980s, Britain’s rate of
imprisonment was around 100 persons for every 100,000 population: more than almost any other European state. But the American example is even more striking. In 1996, the incarceration rate for sentenced adult prisoners in the United States had risen to over 400 for every 100,000 of the population; where all jail inmates are included, the figure reaches over 600 per 100,000. Almost 1.2 million inmates were serving sentences of a year or more in state and federal prisons, and almost 4 million were on parole or probation: almost 3 per cent of the adult population and 7 per cent of the male adult population was subject to the control practices of the criminal justice system.

There are undoubtedly many reasons for the use of imprisonment in the United States, as elsewhere, and many plausible explanations of the rise in the penalized population can be provided. But I think it is possible to argue that the new regimes of welfare and control that I have described in this essay entail a new relation between the penal and welfare complexes. The prison, and penalty more generally, have become crucial elements in the government of insecurity. If the United States can be regarded as a test case in this developing diagram of control, the poor, the dispossessed, the unemployed and the recipients of benefits are, in Jonathan Simon's telling phrase, 'governed through crime'. It is not merely that prisoners are overwhelmingly recruited from the ranks of the poor, the uneducated and unaffiliated, as everywhere, and from African-Americans. Nor is it merely that tough crime control and the virtues of penalty have become vital elements in political rhetoric. Nor is it merely that the criminal justice system is used to fight a war that is undoubtedly the longest, costliest and least effective in human history—the 'war on drugs'—although drug convictions have been a powerful contributor to the growth of the penalized population. Rather, it is that the obverse of the responsibilizing moral imperatives of welfare reform is the construction and exclusion of a semi-permanent quasi-criminal population, seen as impervious to the demands of the new morality. Of course, within the prisons there are many projects that seek to reconstruct the will of the confined individual in the name of self-control or even enhanced entrepreneurship (Garland 1997; Fox 1999). And, in the community there are innumerable 'inter-agency' programmes—involving police, welfare agencies, health agencies, school staff, family members and the like—that seek to do the same prior to incarceration, targeting the select few from high risk youth, habitual offenders and so forth: these redeploy all the moralizing techniques of ethical reconstruction in the attempt to instil the capacity for self-management—'naming, shaming and blaming'—or 'reintegrative shaming' as it is more properly known—has become a great favourite in these techniques of ethical reconstruction (Braithwaite 1989). But the procedures for the selection of these experimental subjects themselves arise out of the detailed profiles that identify risky individuals on the basis of the compilation of all manner of data on crime, criminal records, offender profiles and the like. In the same movement as the circuits of insecurity exclude the homeless, the workless and all those other non-consumers from the inclusory logics of control, they are consigned to unending management by the agents, agencies and technologies of the new penal complex. Exclusion itself is effectively criminalized, as crime control agencies home in on those very violations that enable survival in the circuits of exclusion: petty theft, drinking alcohol in public, loitering, drugs and so forth. These new circuits cycle individuals from probation to prison because of probation violations, from prison to parole, and back to prison because of parole violations (cf. Simon 1993). Whilst the welfare budgets are cut, the penal budgets expand, and police, magistrates, parole

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officers and a host of others have become integral to the management of exclusion, playing a key role in the government of insecurity. A penal grid comes to overlay and define zones of exclusion.

Conclusion

I have suggested that a number of current features of crime control become intelligible when located within some rather general mutations and reconfigurations in the rationalities and technologies of government that I have termed ‘advanced’ forms of liberalism. Central to these are the revised ambitions of political government, the aspiration to govern ‘at a distance’, the fragmentation of sociality and subjectivity into communities and identities, the emphasis upon creating active individuals who will who take responsibility for their own fates through the exercise of choice, and the organization of socio-political concerns around the management and minimization of risks to lifestyles of contentment and consumption.

Approached in this way, contemporary control strategies do have a strategic coherence. Although the problems addressed by these new strategies of control are varied, at their heart lies the problem of control in a ‘free society’ and hence the kinds of subjects that are imagined to inhabit and deserve such a society. The pervasive image of the perpetrator of crime is not one of the juridical subject of the rule of law, nor that of the social and psychological subject of criminology, but of the individual who has failed to accept his or her responsibilities as a subject of moral community. Punishment by shaming and reform by ethical reconstruction seek to reconstruct these ethical self-steering mechanisms. And the increased punitiveness of the welfare and penal systems, which many have remarked upon, is also linked to the conception of the criminal as a violator of his or her moral responsibilities to others: violating the bonds of obligation and trust of community life; violating individual rights to contentment and the pursuit of happiness; violating legitimate pride in the personal possessions that define our existence as certain kinds of self; violating the personhood of the victim; violating the love of their families. Conduct is problematized as an infraction of freedom. The problem of control today is increasingly understood in terms of the violation of the assumptions of subjectivity—of responsible morality, self-control and self-advancement through legitimate consumption—upon which contemporary strategies for the government of freedom have come to depend. But, just because of that, a whole variety of spaces and practices of control are open for contestation, not in the name of universal principles of justice and the rule of law, but in the name of the capacities and obligations that have been conferred upon us by those who claim to govern us as ethical subjects of freedom.

References


