

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

Exam: **ECON4310 – Macroeconomic Theory**

Date of exam: Monday, November 30, 2015

Grades are given: December 21, 2015

Time for exam: 2.30 p.m. – 5.30 p.m.

The problem set covers 12 pages (incl. cover sheet)

Resources allowed:

- No resources allowed (except if you have been granted use of a dictionary from the Faculty of Social Sciences)

The grades given: A-F, with A as the best and E as the weakest passing grade. F is fail.

Final Exam

ECON 4310, Fall 2015

1. Do **not** write with pencil, please use a ball-pen instead.
2. Please answer in **English**. Solutions without traceable outlines, as well as those with unreadable outlines **do not earn points**.
3. Please start a **new page** for **every** short question and for every subquestion of the long questions.

Good Luck!

	Points	Max
Exercise A		60
Exercise B		60
Exercise C		60
Σ		180

Grade: _____

**Exercise A:
Short Questions (60 Points)**

Answer each of the following short questions on a separate answer sheet by stating as a first answer True/False and then give a short but instructive explanation. You can write, calculate, or draw to explain your answer. You only get points if you have stated the correct True/False *and* provided a correct explanation to the question. We will not assign negative points for incorrect answers.

Exercise A.1: (10 Points) The Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution

Consider the optimal intertemporal consumption choice of a household in discrete and infinite time. The representative household has preferences $U = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t)$ where $\beta \in (0, 1)$ is the discount factor and the momentary utility function is

$$u(c_t) = \frac{c_t^{1-\theta} - 1}{1-\theta}, \quad \theta > 1.$$

The optimal behavior is characterized by the following consumption Euler equation

$$\beta \frac{u'(c_{t+1})}{u'(c_t)} = \frac{1}{1+r_{t+1}}.$$

The Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution (IES)

$$\text{IES} \equiv \frac{\partial \log(c_{t+1}/c_t)}{\partial \log(1+r_{t+1})},$$

does *not* depend on the discount factor β for this momentary utility function. True or false?

Your Answer:

True: ☐

False: ☐

Don't forget the explanation!

Exercise A.2: (10 Points) A Solow Model without productivity growth

Consider the following version of the Solow model, with an alternative production function specified in (2), a growing population, L_t , and a constant saving rate, s , as described by the following equations

$$K_{t+1} = sY_t + (1 - \delta)K_t \quad (1)$$

$$Y_t = [K_t^\rho + L_t^\rho]^{1/\rho}, \quad \rho > 0, \quad (2)$$

$$L_{t+1} = (1 + n)L_t, \quad L_0 > 0, A = 1,$$

where $0 < \delta < 1$ is the depreciation rate of physical capital, and $n + \delta > s$. (Hint: you will have to repeatedly use the fact that

$$x_t^{-1} [K_t^\rho + L_t^\rho]^{1/\rho} = [K_t^\rho x_t^{-\rho} + L_t^\rho x_t^{-\rho}]^{1/\rho},$$

in your explanation.)

The steady-state level of the capital stock per capita, $k_t \equiv K_t/L_t$, is given by

$$k^* = \left[\left(\frac{n + \delta}{s} \right)^\rho - 1 \right]^{-1/\rho}.$$

True or false?

Your Answer:

True: ☐

False: ☐

Don't forget the explanation!

Exercise A.3: (10 Points) War spending in the Ramsey model

Consider the dynamic equilibrium equations of the Ramsey model

$$\frac{c_{t+1}}{c_t} = \left[\beta(1 + \alpha k_{t+1}^{\alpha-1} - \delta) \right]^{1/\theta}, \quad c_t \equiv C_t / (A_t L_t),$$

$$k_{t+1} - k_t = k_t^\alpha - \delta k_t - c_t - \tau, \quad k_t \equiv K_t / (A_t L_t),$$

where K_t is the aggregate capital stock, $\alpha k_{t+1}^{\alpha-1} - \delta$ the interest rate, A_t is the state of technology, L_t the growing size of the population, C_t aggregate consumption, $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ the capital income share in the economy, $\delta \in (0, 1)$ the depreciation rate of physical capital, $\beta \in (0, 1)$ is the subjective discount factor, and $1/\theta$ the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Finally, τ is the lump-sum tax which finances the constant government expenditure according to a balanced budget,

$$\tau = G.$$

Suppose that the economy is in the steady-state. Consider now a temporary and unexpected increase of the lump-sum tax, τ , to finance an unexpected war.

As a consequence, consumption per efficiency unit, c_t , will jump upwards on impact and then fall in the transition back to the steady-state. True or false?

Your Answer:

True: ☐

False: ☐

Don't forget the explanation!

Exercise A.4: (10 Points) Income, substitution and wealth effect

Consider a representative consumer who lives for only two periods denoted by $t = 1, 2$. The consumer is born in period 1 without any financial assets and leaves no bequests or debt at the end of period 2. The consumer's labor income is w_t in each period and her preferences over consumption can be represented by the utility function

$$U(c_1, c_2) = u(c_1) + \beta u(c_2), \quad 0 < \beta < 1, \quad (3)$$

where the momentary utility function is given by

$$u(c) = \begin{cases} \frac{c^{1-\theta}-1}{1-\theta}, & \theta \neq 1. \\ \log(c), & \theta = 1, \end{cases}$$

with $\theta > 0$. The optimal consumption in period 1 is given by

$$c_1 = \frac{1}{1 + \beta^{1/\theta}(1+r)^{1/\theta-1}} \left(w_1 + \frac{w_2}{1+r} \right).$$

Now, consider the effect of an increase in the gross real interest rate $1+r$ on the optimal first period consumption. The overall effect of this increase is always strictly positive if the labor income in the second period is zero, $w_2 = 0$. True or false?

Your Answer:

True: ☐

False: ☐

Don't forget the explanation!

Exercise A.5: (10 Points) Optimal policy, Laffer curve

Suppose the aggregate labor supply, $h(\tau)$, of an economy as a function of the labor income tax rate, τ , is given by

$$h(\tau) = [(1 - \tau)w]^\varphi.$$

where φ is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Suppose that the government must raise a level of tax revenue to finance an expenditure g^* , where

$$0 < g^* < \bar{\tau}wh(\bar{\tau}),$$

and $\bar{\tau}$ is the tax rate associated with the top of the Laffer curve.

The optimal labor income tax rate to finance g^* is only one, and it is $\tau = \bar{\tau}$. True or false?

Your Answer:

True: ☐

False: ☐

Don't forget the explanation!

Exercise A.6: (10 Points) Optimal policy: fully-funded pension system

Consider the simple two period life-cycle overlapping generations model. The representative agent lives for two period $t = 1, 2$, and has a labor income $w_1 > 0$ in the first period, no labor income in the second period, $w_2 = 0$, and can save across periods. The agent's preferences can be represented by the utility function

$$U(c_1, c_2) = \log(c_1) + \beta \log(c_2), \quad 0 < \beta < 1,$$

and she is subject to the lifetime budget constraint

$$c_1 + \frac{c_2}{1+r} = w_1,$$

where $r > 0$ is a given exogenous interest rate. The government considers the introduction of a compulsory fully-funded pension system, such that the agent is obliged to contribute a lump-sum $\tau > 0$ in the first period, and receives a pension

$$P = (1 + \tilde{r})\tau,$$

in the second period. Moreover, suppose the government has better investment opportunities than the agent such that $\tilde{r} > r$.

The introduction of the pension scheme will never affect the optimal consumption choice of the agent. True or false?

Your Answer:

True: ☐

False: ☐

Don't forget the explanation!

Exercise B: Long Question (60 Points)

A comparison of the Solow model and the Ramsey growth model

Consider a closed economy without exogenous technology and population growth, where firms produce a generic good Y_t with the production function

$$Y_t = F(K_t, L) = K_t^\alpha L^{1-\alpha}, \quad 0 < \alpha < 1,$$

where K_t is aggregate capital and L is the number of workers in the economy. The law of motion for aggregate capital is given by

$$K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta) K_t + I_t, \quad K_0 > 0, \quad (4)$$

where I_t denotes aggregate investment, and $0 < \delta < 1$ the depreciation rate. For simplicity, let aggregate labor supply (population) be equal to one, $L = 1$, such that consumption per worker, c_t , is the same as aggregate consumption, $C_t = c_t = c_t L$.

Consider now two different models. The Solow model where agents have a constant savings rate, s , such that

$$I_t = sY_t.$$

And the Ramsey growth model where household utility is maximized

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(C_t), \quad (5)$$

such that aggregate investment (savings) is endogenous

$$I_t = Y_t - C_t.$$

In both models markets are competitive, thus input factors K_t and L are paid their marginal products.

- (a) (10 Points) Compute the interest rate in this Solow model's stable steady state. (hint: compute the stable aggregate steady-state capital stock first.)
- (b) (10 Points) In the Ramsey growth model households maximize lifetime utility in Equation (5) with respect to C_t and K_{t+1} and subject to the law of motion of capital stated in Equation in (4). Taking into account the functional form of output, Y_t , and investment, I_t , and that $L = 1$, write up the Lagrangian of this maximization problem and derive the following optimality conditions of the Ramsey growth model

$$\frac{u'(C_t)}{u'(C_{t+1})} = \beta \left[1 + \alpha(K_{t+1})^{\alpha-1} - \delta \right]$$

$$K_{t+1} - K_t = K_t^\alpha - \delta K_t - C_t.$$

The first optimality condition is the model's Euler equation and the second the resource constraint.

- (c) (5 Points) Compute the interest rate in the Ramsey model in a steady-state. (hint: you can solve this part even if you were not able to solve part (b).)
- (d) (10 Points) Does the interest rate in the Solow model depend on the saving rate s in the stable steady-state? Is the interest rate increasing or decreasing in s or independent from s . Why? (hint: you can try to answer this question even though you were not able solve previous parts.)
- (e) (10 Points) Does the interest rate in the Ramsey model depend on the discount factor β in a steady-state? Is the interest rate increasing or decreasing in β or independent from β . Why? (hint: you can try to answer this question even though you were not able solve previous parts.)
- (f) (5 Points) Compute the saving rate \bar{s} which gives the same steady-state capital stock in the Solow model as in the Ramsey growth model. Is this saving rate, \bar{s} , increasing or decreasing in the discount factor β ?
- (g) (10 Points) Compute the saving rate \hat{s} which gives the same interest rate in the Solow model as in the Ramsey growth model. Is this saving rate increasing or decreasing in the depreciation rate δ ?

Exercise C: Long Question (60 Points)

Consumption response to income shocks

Consider a household decision problem under uncertainty, when preferences are linear-quadratic:

$$u(c_t) = c_t - \frac{b}{2}c_t^2, \quad b \geq 0.$$

The household lives from period 0 to period $T < +\infty$ and discounts the future at rate $\beta = 1$. Assume $1 + r = 1/\beta = 1$, that is $r = 0$. The lifetime budget constraint of the household viewed from period 0 reads

$$(1 + r)a_0 + \sum_{t=0}^T \frac{I_t}{(1 + r)^t} = \sum_{t=0}^T \frac{c_t}{(1 + r)^t}, \quad (6)$$

and viewed from period 1

$$(1 + r)a_1 + \sum_{t=1}^T \frac{I_t}{(1 + r)^t} = \sum_{t=1}^T \frac{c_t}{(1 + r)^t}, \quad (7)$$

where I_t is income in period t which is uncertain in any previous period $s \leq t$ and only learned in period t . Expected income (or, consumption) in period t viewed from period $s \leq t$ equals $E_s[I_t]$ (or, $E_s[c_t]$), and the Euler equation is given by

$$u'(c_t) = \beta(1 + r)E_t[u'(c_{t+1})], \quad \forall t \leq T - 1. \quad (8)$$

- (a) (10 Points) Under the given assumptions, (i) show that the Euler equation can be written as

$$c_t = E_t[c_{t+1}], \quad \forall t \leq T - 1, \quad (9)$$

and, (ii) give an interpretation (just one sentence!) of Equation (9).

- (b) (10 Points) Note that Equation (9) together with the law of iterated expectations implies that

$$E_s[c_t] = c_s, \quad \forall s \leq t.$$

Now, assume that the household expects to not pay any taxes such that income I_t is equal to wage income w_t in any period t . Take expectations on the lifetime budget constraints and show that consumption in period 0 and 1 are given by

$$c_0 = (T + 1)^{-1} \left(a_0 + \sum_{t=0}^T E_0[I_t] \right), \quad E_0[I_t] = E_0[w_t],$$

and

$$c_1 = T^{-1} \left(a_1 + \sum_{t=1}^T E_1[I_t] \right), \quad E_1[I_t] = E_1[w_t],$$

respectively.

- (c) (10 Points) Now assume that the household knows (already in period 0) that from period 1 to period T the government levies taxes g , so that income is $I_t = w_t - g$ from period 1 onwards. Derive again consumption in period 0 and 1.
- (d) (10 Points) Assume now that in period 0 the household expects to never pay taxes. In period 1 the household is surprised since the government levies now taxes g from period 1 to period T , so that income $I_t = w_t - g$ from period 1 to T . Derive consumption in period 0 and 1.
- (e) (10 Points) Assume now that in period 0 the household expects to never pay taxes. In period 1 the household is surprised since the government levies now taxes g but only in period 1. From period 2 to period T no taxes are levied.
- (f) (10 Points) Explain your results and the differences in consumption for the different scenarios in parts (c), (d), and (e), relative to part (b).