

## EKSAMEN HIS4010 VÅREN 2018

### Om eksamen

#### LES DETTE NØYE FØR DU BEGYNNER:

Eksamen består av tre deler:

- begrepsforklaring der du velger 3 av 5 begreper du skal forklare
- én kortsvarsoppgave der du får 2 valg
- én langsvarsoppgave der du får 2 valg

Du må du lese oppgaveforklaringen nøye. Disponer tiden din slik at du får tid til alt.

Du kan svare på norsk, svensk, dansk eller engelsk.

Det er autolagring hvert 15. sekund. Du kan når som helst navigere mellom de ulike oppgavene, men hver oppgave må besvares under riktig oppgavenummer.

Ingen hjelpemidler er tillatt.

Sensuren vil bli publisert i Studentweb 22. juni. Du vil få beskjed på e-post når sensuren er tilgjengelig.

Lykke til!

1

## Oppgave 1 Begrepsforklaring

Forklar følgende begreper kort. Du svarer på 3 av 5:

- 1) Den språklige vending
- 2) Minnekultur
- 3) Hermeneutikk
- 4) Kjønnshistorie
- 5) Situert sannhet

2

## Oppgave 2 Historiografi i praksis

Besvar enten 6 eller 7.

- 6) Plasser det vedlagte tekstutdraget historiografisk, dvs. i tid, mht. historiefaglig tradisjon, historiens nivå og historiesyn og andre elementer du mener er relevante.
- 7) Grei kort ut om den tyske historiske skole. Sammenlikn med det vi omtaler som den norske historiske skole.



## SHARED CONSTRAINTS: ECOLOGICAL STRAIN IN WESTERN EUROPE AND EAST ASIA

HAVING SEVERED industrialization from any “natural” working out of early modern economic processes in *any* area, we can now suggest ways in which a developing pattern of relations between certain areas gave western Europe important advantages on the eve of industrialization. These were not advantages that *had* to lead to an industrial breakthrough, but advantages that greatly increased that possibility and made such a breakthrough much easier to sustain. These advantages helped address a major problem shared by Old World cores: that before synthetic fertilizer, synthetic fibers, and the cheap mineral energy that makes synthetics economical, there were limits on the ability of labor and capital to substitute for land. These limits made it difficult to continue to expand populations, raise per capita consumption, and increase an area’s degree of specialization in industry simultaneously, much less to do so at the accelerating rates of the nineteenth century. Trade helped, as we will see, but it could not solve these problems. Labor-intensive land management could support more people and perhaps sustain modest improvements in living standards, but probably no more than that; and it would tend to lower, not raise, the percentage of the population able to work outside agriculture.

Europe’s advantages in escaping these constraints were largely ecological. Some stemmed from slack resources in Europe itself—and were ironic benefits of barriers to the earlier development of these resources—but these were largely offset by east Asian advantages in the efficient use of land and fuel. Others, already discussed in chapter 1, were related to the fortunate location of coal deposits and skill at exploiting them. Others were based on the bounty of the New World and the particular conjunctures that shaped its relationship to Europe: this part of the story will be the focus of chapter 6. These favorable resource shocks, in turn, bought time for the emergence of other innovations; together they transformed Europe’s world of economic possibilities. That does not, of course, mean that having this extra breathing room explains technological creativity—but the two factors worked hand in hand, each increasing the rewards of the other.

Thus, in this chapter, I first recap briefly how western Europe's prospects compared to those of other regions, emphasizing what it shared with other densely populated areas. Then I sketch a set of common eighteenth-century ecological challenges and find that, despite being less densely populated in absolute terms than either China or Japan, western Europe faced comparably serious ecological problems. Both in western Europe and east Asia, there was relatively little room left by the late eighteenth century for further extensive growth to occur without significant institutional change, new land-saving technologies, and/or vastly expanded imports of land-intensive commodities. While Japan still had some peripheral domains in which, if institutional changes could be made, growth could be realized by applying existing best practices to land that was not yet used intensively, and Europe much larger areas (especially in eastern Europe) of this kind, China had relatively few. All three areas also had cores (the Yangzi Delta and Pearl River Delta, Britain and the Netherlands, the Kinai and Kantō) where only major technological change, vastly increased trade with peripheries, or both could sustain further growth in population and consumption.

Theoretically, Europe had more room left than did east Asia to sustain further population growth by increasing the labor intensity of its land use; but the nature of European farming made it unlikely that it would ever fully exploit these possibilities. Moreover, such a path was unlikely to lead to large further increases in per capita consumption, much less industrialization. When we look at one European country that did more or less develop in this direction—Denmark—we will see that increased labor intensity allowed it to stabilize its fragile ecology and *maintain* its standard of living; but population and per capita consumption stagnated, and no foundation for a major breakthrough was laid.

Finally, I examine the extent to which all these core regions attempted to alleviate their problems through trade with various less fully populated Old World areas. In each case, such trade was only a partial solution, not only because of technical limits (e.g., high transport costs) that might have been surmounted eventually, but because of social and economic limitations that were inherent in the nature of consensual trade between more and less “advanced” parts of the Old World.

It seems reasonable to assume that only those areas that combined relatively dense populations, productive agriculture, extensive and sophisticated commerce, and extensive handicraft industries were even possible sites for an industrial transformation. But these criteria would still leave China, Japan, and perhaps India—especially north India—in the same category as western Europe.

Upon further consideration, India comes to seem a less likely site than the other regions. Though it had a large, dense population in absolute terms, it was still far from its peak preindustrial carrying capacity. Population growth ap-

## Oppgave 3 Langsvarsoppgave

Besvar enten 8 eller 9

8) I år er det 200 år siden Karl Marx ble født. Som grunnlegger av marxismen, eller den vitenskapelige sosialismen, kom hans historieteori til å få stor historisk betydning for politikk og samfunnsutvikling i det 20. århundret. Men hvilken rolle spilte historieteorien til Max i historiefaget og for historieskrivning *utenfor* den kommunistiske verden? Diskuter med utgangspunkt i pensum. Du kan trekke veksel på eget arbeid med forskningslitteraturen tilknyttet masteroppgaven der det er relevant, men det trekkes ikke i karakter om du avstår fra dette.

9) Da Lynn Hunt i 1989 lanserte "ny kulturhistorie" som historiefaglig begrep, pekte hun samtidig på at faget alt rommet en eldre kulturhistorie. Hva er forskjellene og likhetene mellom den eldre og den nye kulturhistorien? Og hvordan vil du på bakgrunn av pensum vurdere kulturhistoriens faglige relevans og status i dag? Du kan trekke veksel på eget arbeid med forskningslitteraturen tilknyttet masteroppgaven der det er relevant, men det trekkes ikke i karakter om du avstår fra dette.