Pensum/læringskrav

The course will be divided into two parts. In the first part of the course, we will be discussing questions in the philosophy of mind. The plan is to use Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument against physicalism as a starting point and look at some prominent responses on behalf of physicalism. In the second part of the course, we will be discussing possible worlds and the metaphysics of modality. The plan is to focus on David Lewis’ modal realism. The only book you will need to get is David Lewis’ On the Plurality of Worlds. It will be the main text for the second part of the course. It is available at Akademika. Everything else on the list will be made available. If an electronic copy is not available, a master copy will be made available at the IFIKK front office. When you have copied the material you need, please bring everything back as soon as possible.

Ball, D. (2009). There Are No Phenomenal Concepts. Mind, 118, 935-962.

Cath, Y.(2009). The Ability Hypothesis and the New Knowing How. Noûs, 43,137-156.

Chalmers, D. (1996). The Conscious Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (only chapter 3.1, p. 93-106).

Chalmers, D. (2004). Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument. In P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa, & D. Stoljar (Eds.), There’s Something About Mary (p. 269-298). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Dennett, D. (2007). What RoboMary Knows. In T. Alter & S. Walter (Eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge (p. 15-31). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jackson, F.(1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly, 32, 127-136.

Jackson, F. (1986). What Mary Didn’t Know. Journal of Philosophy, 83, 291-295.

Lewis, D. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.

Lewis, D. (1988). What Experience Teaches. In Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology (p. 262-290). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Loar, B.(1997). Phenomenal States. In N. Block, O. Flanagan, & G. Güzeldere (Eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates (p. 597-616). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Nemirow, L. (1990). Physicalism and the Cognitive Role of Acquiantance. In W. G. Lycan (Ed.), Mind and Cognition (p. 490-499). Oxford: Blackwell.

Nida-Rümelin, M. (1996). What Mary Couldn’t Know. In T. Metzinger (Ed.), Conscious Experience (p. 219-242). Exeter: Imprint Academic.

Stalnaker, R. (1976). Possible Worlds. Noûs, 10, 65-75.

Stanley, J., & Williamson, T.(2001). Knowing How. Journal of Philosophy, 98, 411-444.

Tye, M.(2003). A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts. In A. O’Hear (Ed.), Minds and Persons (p. 91-106). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Publisert 3. okt. 2012 14:20 - Sist endret 14. jan. 2013 16:07