

Causality

Actions, Confounders and Interventions

Christos Dimitrakakis

October 25, 2018

Introduction

Decision diagrams

Common structural assumptions


Interventions

Policy evaluation and optimisation


Individual effects and counterfactuals

Headaches and aspirins

Example 1 (Population effects)



(a) Dose-response curve.



(b) Response distribution

Figure: Investigation the response of the population to various doses of the drug.

- ▶ Is aspirin an effective cure for headaches?
- ▶ Does having a headache lead to aspirin-taking?

Example 2 (Individual effects)



- ▶ Effects of **Causes**: Will **my** headache pass **if I take** an aspirin?
- ▶ **Causes** of Effects: Would **my** headache have passed if I had **not taken** an aspirin?

Overview

Inferring causal models

We can distinguish different **models** from observational or experimental data.

Inferring individual effects


The effect of possible intervention on an individual is not generally determinable. We usually require strong assumptions.

Decision-theoretic view


There are many competing approaches to causality. We will remain within the decision-theoretic framework, which allows us to crisply define both our knowledge and assumptions.

What causes what?

Example 3



(a) Independence of a_t .



(b) Independence of x_t .


Suppose we have data x_t, a_t where

- ▶ x_t : lung cancer
- ▶ a_t : smoking


Does smoking cause lung cancer or does lung cancer make people smoke?
Can we compare the two models above to determine it?

What causes what?

Example 3



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(b) Independence of x_t .

Suppose we have data x_t, a_t where

- ▶ x_t : lung cancer
- ▶ a_t : smoking

Does smoking cause lung cancer or does lung cancer make people smoke?

Can we compare the two models above to determine it?

$$P_{\theta}(D) = \prod_t P_{\theta}(x_t, a_t) = \prod_t P_{\theta'}(x_t | a_t) P_{\theta'}(a_t) = \prod_t P_{\theta''}(a_t | x_t) P_{\theta''}(x_t).$$




Figure: A typical decision diagram where x_t : individual information, y_t : individual result, a_t : action, π : policy




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


Figure: A typical decision diagram where x_t : individual information, y_t : individual result, a_t : action, π : policy

Example 4 (Taking an aspirin)

- ▶ Individual t
- ▶ Individual information x_t
- ▶ $a_t = 1$ if t takes an aspirin, and 0 otherwise.
- ▶ $y_t = 1$ if the headache is cured in 30 minutes, 0 otherwise.
- ▶ π : intervention policy.




Figure: A typical decision diagram where x_t : individual information, y_t : individual result, a_t : action, π : policy

Example 4 (A recommendation system)

- ▶ x_t : User information (random variable)
- ▶ a_t : System action (random variable)
- ▶ y_t : Click (random variable)
- ▶ π : recommendation policy (decision variable).

Conditional distributions and decision variables.

$$P(A | B) \triangleq \frac{P(A \cap B)}{P(B)}.$$

The conditional distribution of decisions

$$\pi(\mathbf{a}) \equiv \mathbb{P}^\pi(\mathbf{a}) \equiv \mathbb{P}(\mathbf{a} | \pi).$$

$$\mathbb{P}_\theta^\pi(\mathbf{a}) \equiv \mathbb{P}(\mathbf{a} | \theta, \pi).$$

Basic causal structures

Non-cause




Figure: π does not cause y

No confounding




Figure: No confounding: π causes y_t

Basic causal structures

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


Figure: π does not cause y

No confounding




Figure: No confounding: π causes y_t

Covariates

Sufficient covariate




Figure: Sufficient covariate x_t

Instrumental variables and confounders




Figure: Instrumental variable z_t

Covariates

Sufficient covariate




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


Figure: Instrumental variable z_t

Modelling interventions

- ▶ Observational data D .
- ▶ Policy space Π .

Default policy


The space of policies Π includes a **default policy** π_0 , under which the data was collected.

Intervention policies

Except π_0 , policies $\pi \in \Pi$ represent different interventions specifying a distribution $\pi(a_t \mid x_t)$.

- ▶ Direct interventions.
- ▶ Indirect interventions and non-compliance.

Example 5 (Weight loss)



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


Figure: Model of non-compliance as a confounder.

The value of an observed policy




Figure: Basic decision diagram

$$\hat{a}_D^* \in \arg \max_a \hat{\mathbb{E}}_D(U | a),$$

The value of an observed policy




Figure: Basic decision diagram

$$\hat{\mathbb{E}}_D(U | a) \triangleq \frac{1}{|\{t | a_t = a\}|} \sum_{t: a_t = a} U(a_t, y_t) \quad (3.1)$$

$$\approx \mathbb{E}_{\theta^{\pi_0}}(U | a) \quad (a_t, y_t) \sim \mathbb{P}_{\theta}^{\pi_0}. \quad (3.2)$$

$$\hat{a}_D^* \in \arg \max_a \hat{\mathbb{E}}_D(U | a),$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 x_t \mid \theta &\sim P_\theta(x) \\
 y_t \mid \theta, x_t, a_t &\sim P_\theta(y \mid x_t, a_t) \\
 a_t \mid x_t, \pi &\sim \pi(a \mid x_t).
 \end{aligned}$$

The value of a policy

$$\mathbb{E}_\theta^\pi(U) = \int_{\mathcal{X}} dP_\theta(x) \sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} P_\theta(y \mid x, a) U(a, y) \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \pi(a \mid x).$$

The optimal policy under a known parameter θ is given simply by

$$\max_{\pi \in \Pi} \mathbb{E}_\theta^\pi(U),$$

where Π is the set of allowed policies.

Monte-Carlo estimation

Importance sampling¹

We can obtain an unbiased estimate of the utility in a model-free manner through importance sampling:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}_{\theta}^{\pi}(U) &= \int_{\mathcal{X}} dP_{\theta}(x) \sum_a \mathbb{E}_{\theta}(U \mid a, x) \pi(a \mid x) \\ &\approx \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T U_t \frac{\pi(a_t \mid x_t)}{\pi_0(a_t \mid x_t)}.\end{aligned}$$

¹Also known as Propensity Scoring

Bayesian estimation

If we π_0 is given, we can calculate the utility of any policy to whatever degree of accuracy we wish.

$$\begin{aligned} \xi(\theta \mid D, \pi_0) &\propto \prod_t \mathbb{P}_\theta^{\pi_0}(x_t, y_t, a_t) \\ \mathbb{E}_\xi^\pi(U \mid D) &= \int_\Theta \mathbb{E}_\theta^\pi(U) d\xi(\theta \mid D) \\ &= \int_\Theta \int_{\mathcal{X}} dP_\theta(x) \sum_{t=1}^T \sum_a \mathbb{E}_\theta(U \mid a, x) \pi(a \mid x) d\xi(\theta \mid D). \end{aligned}$$

Causal inference and policy optimisation

Example 6




Figure: Simple decision problem.

Let $a_t, y_t \in \{0, 1\}$, $\theta \in [0, 1]^2$ and

$$y_t \mid a_t = a \sim \text{Bernoulli}(\theta_a)$$

Then, by estimating θ , we can predict the effect of any action.

Causal inference and policy optimisation

Example 6




Figure: Decision problem with covariates.

Let $a_t, x_t \in \{0, 1\}$, $y_t \in \mathbb{R}$, $\theta \in \mathbb{R}^4$ and

$$y_t \mid a_t = a, x_t = x \sim \text{Bernoulli}(\theta_{a,x})$$

Then, by estimating θ , we can predict the effect of any action.




Figure: Decision diagram with exogenous disturbances ω .

Example 7 (Structural equation model for Figure 12)

$$\theta \sim \mathcal{N}(\mathbf{0}_4, \mathbf{I}_4),$$

$$x_t = \theta_0 \omega_{t,x},$$

$$y_t = \theta_1 y_t + \theta_2 x_t + \theta_3 a_t + \omega_{t,y},$$

$$a_t = \pi(x_t) + \omega_{t,a} \quad \text{mod } |\mathcal{A}|$$

$$\omega_{t,x} \sim \text{Bernoulli}(0.5)$$

$$\omega_{t,y} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1)$$

$$\omega_{t,a} \sim 0.1 \mathcal{D}(0) + 0.9 \text{Unif}(\mathcal{A}),$$

Treatment-unit additivity




Figure: Decision diagram for treatment-unit additivity

Assumption 1 (TUA)

For any given treatment $a \in \mathcal{A}$, the response variable satisfies

$$y_t = g(a_t) + \omega_{t,y}$$

Example 8 (Pricing model)




Figure: Graph of structural equation model for airport pricing policy π : a_t is the actual price, z_t are fuel costs, x_t is the customer type, y_t is the amount of sales, ω_t is whether there is a conference. The dependency on θ is omitted for clarity.

Assumption 2 (Relevance)

a_t depends on z_t .

Assumption 3 (Exclusion)

$z_t \perp\!\!\!\perp y_t \mid x_t, a_t, \omega_t$.

Assumption 4 (Unconfounded instrument)

$z_t \perp\!\!\!\perp \omega_t \mid x_t$.

Prediction tasks

$$y_t = g_\theta(\mathbf{a}_t, \mathbf{x}_t) + \omega_t, \quad \mathbb{E}_\theta \omega_t = 0, \quad \forall \theta \in \Theta \quad (4.1)$$

Standard prediction

$$\mathbb{P}_\theta^\pi(y_t | \mathbf{x}_t, \mathbf{a}_t), \quad \mathbb{E}_\theta^\pi(y_t | \mathbf{x}_t, \mathbf{a}_t) = g_\theta(\mathbf{x}_t, \mathbf{a}_t) + \mathbb{E}_\theta^\pi(\omega_t | \mathbf{x}_t, \mathbf{a}_t).$$

Counterfactual prediction

$$\mathbb{E}_\theta^\pi(y_t | \mathbf{x}_t, \mathbf{z}_t) = \int_{\mathcal{A}} \underbrace{[g(\mathbf{a}_t | \mathbf{x}_t, \mathbf{z}_t) + \mathbb{E}_\theta(\omega | \mathbf{x}_t)]}_{h(\mathbf{a}_t, \mathbf{x}_t)} d\pi(\mathbf{a}_t | \mathbf{x}_t)$$

Further reading

- ▶ Pearl, *Causality*.
- ▶ ?