


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
Robotomorphy

Becoming our creations


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

When robots become the blueprint for humanity,
they simultaneously become benchmarks and
ideals to live up to ...
suddenly the things we make are no longer
representations of ourselves, but we of them.

"Anthropomorphism explains how we see ourselves in other things…"




"… ratomorphy how we see rats in ourselves …"







"Robotomorphy is a term used to describe what occurs when we project the characteristics and capabilities of robots onto ourselves, to make sense of the complicated and mysterious beings that we are."



Robotomorphy tells the tale of how robots partly shift the rules of the game. Rather than humans being tricked into believing that the robots are human, the tables are turned and humans are somehow tricked into believing that they are robots.



Like anthropocentrism, robotomorphy can be used both to analyze and understand the interaction between particular individuals and robots and, perhaps more importantly, the long-term shifts in human self-perception.





For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part within, why may we not say that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life?

For what is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints, but so many wheels …




Computational (of) Mind

CTM


Theory

"Advances in computing raise the prospect that the mind itself is a computational system—a position known as the computational theory of mind (CTM)."

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/



If we accept the robot as an image of ourselves, we become little more than conditioned reflex-automata [8], and this is partially accepted by new mechanists directly or indirectly continuing the lineage of Hobbes and other early mechanists [9].



B.F. Skinner • BEYOND FREEDOM & DIGNITY

B.F. Skinner

BEYOND FREEDOM & DIGNITY

Radical behaviourism - “insist[s] that the meanings people attach to their actions and to other objects play no part in determining what they do” - Sayer 2010





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ORIGINAL RESEARCH/SCHOLARSHIP


Welcoming Robots into the Moral Circle: A Defence of Ethical Behaviourism

John Danaher[1]

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Abstract

Can robots have significant moral status? This is an emerging topic of debate among roboticists and ethicists. This paper makes three contributions to this debate. First, it presents a theory—'ethical behaviourism'—which holds that robots can have significant moral status if they are *roughly performatively equivalent* to other entities that have significant moral status. This theory is then defended from seven objections. Second, taking this theoretical position onboard, it is argued that the performative threshold that robots need to cross in order to be afforded significant moral status may not be that high and that they may soon cross it (if they haven't done so already). Finally, the implications of this for our procreative duties to robots are considered, and it is argued that we may need to take seriously a duty of 'procreative beneficence' towards robots.




Robotomorphy is similar to ratomorphy in that it might engender a situation in which we seek to explain all human phenomena through mechanisms we can build into our robots—or that are at least hypothetically implementable in robots [34].






*The human champions of chess still compete for second place—**the position of the best human** – and while they play their games everyone watching is most concerned about how Stockfish and AlphaZero evaluate their moves.*




Machines are more rational—in a certain sense an embodiment of the enlightenment logic and Western science—and humans are in this respect deeply flawed. Irrational and helpless, we are urged to aspire to the rules and performance of computational science [15].



Like wayward and primitive robots, humans must be shepherded, controlled, nudged, and prodded onto better paths—the paths determined by those with unsullied rationality and computationally superior capabilities.

Where the yardstick is perfect computation and rationality, human quirks and idiosyncrasies are flaws to be purged.



Humanity is in a sense a rather motley crew, whereas robots eliminate much of this disorder and introduce uniformity, both in outward appearance and in behavior.


Photo by Adrian Swancar on Unsplash







Photo by Reid Zura on Unsplash

What we make and what we are co-evolve [4, 5], and this gives rise to a recursive process in which the mirror mirrors itself and influences both the trajectory for machine development and human self-perception.



Robots, then, are media of sorts. But media are not just neutral channels through which we communicate, and according to McLuhan [61], the media is in fact the message.

A SCHOOLMAN'S GUIDE TO MARSHALL McLUHAN

The notion that we become what we behold, that we shape our tools, which in turn shape us [5], nicely captures the recursive nature of robotomorphy.

By JOHN M. CULKIN, S.J., *director of the Center for Communications, Fordham University*

EDUCATION, as someone-or-another assures me, is "how kids learn stuff." Few definitions are as satisfying. It includes all that is essential—a who, a what, and a process. It excludes all the people, places, and things which are only sometimes involved in learning. The economy and accuracy of the definition, however, are more useful in locating the problem than in solving it. We know little enough about *kids*, less about *learning*, and considerably more than we would like to know about *stuff*.

In addition, the whole process of formal schooling is now wrapped inside

and the schools. One thing is certain: It is hardly a time for educators to plan with nostalgia, timidity, or old formulas.

Enter Marshall McLuhan.

He enters from the North, from the University of Toronto, where he teaches English and is director of the Center for Culture and Technology. He enters with the reputation as "the oracle of the electric age" and as "the most provocative and controversial writer of this generation." More importantly for the schools, he enters as a man with fresh eyes, with new ways of looking at old problems. He is a man who gets his ideas first and judges them later. Most of these ideas are summed up in his book, *Understanding Media*. His critics tried him for not delivering these insights in their most lucid and practical form. It isn't always

world handed to the present. McLuhan feels that very few men look at the present with a present eye, that they tend to miss the present by translating it into the past, seeing it through a rear-view mirror. The unnoticed fact of our present is the electronic environment created by the new communications media. It is as pervasive as the air we breathe (and some would add that it is just as polluted), yet its full import eludes the judgments of commonsense or content-oriented perception. The environments set up by different media are not just containers for people; they are processes which shape people. Such influence is deterministic only if ignored. There is no inevitability as long as there is a willingness to contemplate what is happening.




Humans
Robots


Humans
Robots




Photo by Adrian Swancar on Unsplash

… even if the
machine metaphor leads us to conceptualize ourselves as robots, this in and of itself does not need to be accompanied with the idea that humans should be treated as such, or that robots should be our ideals.

