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*INF5390 – Kunstig intelligens*

# **Making Simple Decisions**

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# Outline

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- Uncertainty and utility
- Maximum expected utility
- Preference structures
- Decision networks
- Value of information
- Decision-theoretic expert systems
- Summary

AIMA Chapter 16: Making Simple Decisions

# Agents and decision theory

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- Agents need to make decisions in situations of *uncertainty* and *conflicting goals*
- Basic principle of decision theory: *Maximization of expected utility*
- *Decision-theoretic agents* are based decision theory, and need knowledge of *probability* and *utility*
- Here, we are concerned with “simple” (*one-shot*) decisions, can be extended to *sequential* decisions

# Principle of Maximum Expected Utility (MEU)

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- Let
  - ✓  $U(s)$  - Utility of state  $s$
  - ✓  $RESULT(a)$  - Random variable whose values are possible outcome states of action  $a$  in current state
  - ✓  $P(RESULT(a) = s' | a, e)$  - Probability of outcome  $s'$ , as a result of doing action  $a$  in current state, and given agent's available evidence  $e$  of the world
- Then the *expected utility*  $EU$  of  $a$ , given  $e$  is

$$EU(a | e) = \sum_{s'} P(RESULT(a) = s' | a, e)U(s')$$

- MEU: Agent should select  $a$  that maximizes  $EU$

# Problems with applying MEU

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- Often difficult to formulate problem completely, and required computation can be prohibitive
- Knowing state of the world requires perception, learning, representation and inference
- Computing  $P(RESULT(a) | a, e)$  requires complete causal model and NP-complete belief net updating
- Computing utility  $U(s')$  may require search or planning since agent needs to know how to get to a state before its utility can be assessed

# Preference and utility

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- MEU appears to be a rational basis for decision making, but is not the only possible
  - ✓ Why *maximize average* utility, instead of e.g. *minimize losses*?
  - ✓ Can *preferences* between states really be compared by comparing two numbers?
  - ✓ Etc.
- We can state *constraints on preference structures* for a rational agent, and show that MEU is compatible with the constraints

# Lotteries and preferences

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- Lottery
  - ✓ Scenario with different outcomes with different probabilities
  - ✓ The agent have preferences regarding the outcomes
- Example  $L = [p, A; 1-p, B]$ 
  - ✓ Lottery  $L$  with two outcomes,  $A$  with probability  $p$ ,  $B$  with probability  $1-p$
- Preferences
  - ✓  $A > B$   $A$  is preferred over  $B$
  - ✓  $A \approx B$  Agent is indifferent between  $A$  and  $B$
  - ✓  $A \geq B$  Prefers  $A$  over  $B$  or is indifferent
- Constraints on preferences include orderability, transitivity, etc.

# Utility follows from preferences

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- The constraints on preferences are the *axioms of utility*, from which utility principles follow
- *Utility principle*
  - ✓ If the agent's preferences obey axioms of utility, there exists a real-valued *utility function*  $U$  such that

$$U(A) > U(B) \Leftrightarrow A > B$$

$$U(A) = U(B) \Leftrightarrow A \approx B$$

- *MEU principle*
  - ✓ Utility of a lottery can be derived from outcome utilities

$$U([p_1, S_1; \dots; p_n, S_n]) = \sum_i p_i U(S_i)$$




# Utility of money

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- Utility theory comes from economics, and money is a common basis for utility functions

Typical curve of utility vs. money



# Human decision making

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- Decision theory is *normative*, but not *descriptive*:  
People violate axioms of utility in practice
- Example
  - ✓ A: 80% chance of \$4000      C: 20% chance of \$4000  
B: 100% chance of \$3000      D: 25% chance of \$3000
  - ✓ Most people choose B over A, and C over D. Since only the scale is different, there does not seem to be a utility function that is consistent with the choices
- Possible descriptive theory
  - ✓ People are risk-averse with high-probability events (A-B)
  - ✓ People take more risks with unlikely payoffs (C-D)


# Decision networks

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- *Decision networks* (also called *influence diagrams*) are a general mechanism for making rational decisions
- Decision networks combine belief networks with nodes for actions and utilities, and can represent
  - ✓ Information about agent's *current state*
  - ✓ Agent's *possible actions*
  - ✓ States that will *follow* from actions
  - ✓ *Utilities* of these states
- Therefore, decision networks provide a substrate for implementing rational, utility-based agents

# Decision network for airport location

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# Node types in decision networks

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- *Chance nodes* (ovals)
  - ✓ Represent random variables (as in belief networks), with associated conditional probability table (CPT) indexed by states of parent nodes (decisions or other chance nodes)
- *Decision nodes* (rectangles)
  - ✓ Represent points where the decision maker has choice of actions to make
- *Utility nodes* (diamonds)
  - ✓ Represent the agent's utility function, with parents all nodes that directly influence utility

# Evaluating decision networks

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- Set the evidence variables (chance nodes with known values) for the current state
- For each possible value of the decision node
  - ✓ Set decision node to that value (from now on, it behaves like a chance node that has been set as an evidence variable)
  - ✓ Calculate posterior probabilities for parent nodes of the utility node, using standard probabilistic inference methods
  - ✓ Calculate resulting utility for the action
- Return the action with the highest utility

# Value of information

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- The agent will normally not have all required information available before making a decision
- Important to know which information to seek, by performing tests that may be expensive and/or hazardous
- The importance of tests depend on
  - ✓ Will different outcomes make significant difference to the optimal action
  - ✓ What is the probability of different outcomes
- *Information value theory* helps agents decide which information to seek, by using *sensing actions*

# Motivating example

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- Oil company to buy one of  $n$  indistinguishable blocks, exactly one block contains oil worth  $C$ , price for each block is  $C/n$
- A seismologist offers to investigate block 3, determining if it has oil or not. How much is this information worth?
  - ✓ With probability  $1/n$ , block 3 has oil. Then the company will buy block 3 for  $C/n$ , and make profit  $C - C/n = (n-1)C/n$
  - ✓ With probability  $(n-1)/n$ , block 3 is empty. The company will buy another block. Probability of oil there is  $1/(n-1)$ , with profit  $C/(n-1) - C/n = C/n(n-1)$
- Expected profit given the survey information
$$\frac{1}{n} \times \frac{(n-1)C}{n} + \frac{n-1}{n} \times \frac{C}{n(n-1)} = \frac{C}{n}$$
- The information is as much worth as the block itself!



# Considerations for information gathering

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- Information has value if it is likely to cause a change of plan, and if the new plan will be significantly better than the old
- An information-gathering agent should
  - ✓ Ask questions in a reasonable sequence
  - ✓ Avoid asking irrelevant questions
  - ✓ Take into account importance of information vs. cost
  - ✓ Stop asking questions when appropriate
- Requirements met by using  $VPI(E)$  - *Value of Perfect Information* of evidence  $E$ . Properties:
  - ✓ Always *non-negative*
  - ✓ Depends on current state and is *non-additive*
  - ✓ *Order-independent* (simplifies sensing actions)

# An information gathering agent

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function INFORMATION-GATHERING-AGENT(percept) returns an action  
persistent:  $D$ , a decision network  
integrate percept into  $D$   
 $j \leftarrow$  the value that maximizes  $VPI(E_j) / Cost(E_j)$   
if  $VPI(E_j) > Cost(E_j)$   
  then return  $REQUEST(E_j)$   
  else return the best action from  $D^*$ 
```

\*non-information seeking action

# Comments on information-gathering agent

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- Information-gathering agent is *myopic*, i.e. it just considers one evidence variable at a time
- It may hastily select an action where a better decision would be based on two or more information gathering actions
  - ✓ “Greedy” search heuristic - often works well in practice
- A perfectly rational agent would consider all possible sequences of sensing action that terminate in an external action
  - ✓ May disregard permutations due to order-independence

# Decision analysis vs. expert systems

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- Decision analysis (application of decision theory)
  - ✓ Focus on *making decisions*
  - ✓ Defines possible actions and outcomes with preferences
  - ✓ Roles
    - *Decision maker* states preferences
    - *Decision analyst* specifies problem
- Expert systems (“classical” rule-based systems)
  - ✓ Focus on *answering questions*
  - ✓ Defines heuristic associations between evidence & answers
  - ✓ Roles
    - *Domain expert* provides heuristic knowledge
    - *Knowledge engineer* elicits & encodes knowledge in rules

# Decision-theoretic expert systems

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- *Decision-theoretic expert systems*
  - ✓ Inclusion of decision networks in expert system frameworks
- Advantages
  - ✓ Make expert preferences explicit
  - ✓ Automate action selection in addition to inference
  - ✓ Avoid confusing likelihood with importance
    - Common pitfall in expert systems: Conclusions are ranked in terms of likelihood, disregarding rare, but dangerous conclusion
  - ✓ Availability of utility information helps in knowledge engineering process

# Knowledge engineering for decision-theoretic expert systems

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- Create causal model
- Simplify to qualitative decision model
- Assign probabilities
- Assign utilities
- Verify and refine model
- Perform sensitivity analysis

# Summary

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- *Probability theory* describes what an agent should believe based on evidence, and *utility theory* describes what an agent wants
- *Decision theory* combines the two to describe what an agent should do
- Decision theory can be used to build *a rational agent*, that considers all possible actions and chooses the one with the best expected outcome
- Under certain reasonable assumptions, outcomes can be scored by a real-valued *utility function*
- Rational agent acts to *maximize expected utility*

## Summary (cont.)

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- *Decision networks* can be used to express and solve decision problems,
- They extend belief networks with *decision* and *utility* nodes in addition to *chance* nodes
- *Value of information* is expected improvement in utility compared to deciding without information
- *Decision-theoretic expert systems* combine decision networks and inference
- They can make decisions, choose to get more information, and perform sensitivity analysis