

Introduction to Cryptography

TEK 4500 (Fall 2024)

Problem Set 6

Problem 1.

Read Chapter 11 in [Ros] and Appendix A in [BR] (Birthday problem).

Problem 2.

Suppose we have three different hash functions producing outputs of lengths 64, 128 and 160 bits, respectively. Approximately how many values do you need to hash in order to find a collision with probability $p = 0.5$? What about $p = 0.1$?

Hint: Use whatever formulation of the birthday paradox you want.

Problem 3.

Suppose $H_1, H_2 : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ are two hash functions for which we know that at least one is collision-resistant. Unfortunately, we don't know which. Consider now the following derived hash functions.

- a) $H : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y} \times \mathcal{Y}$, defined by $H(X) = H_1(X) \| H_2(X)$. Is H collision-resistant? Justify your answer.
- b) $H : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ defined by $H(X) = H_2(H_1(X))$ (here we assume that $\mathcal{Y} \subset \mathcal{M}$). Is H collision-resistant? What about $H(X) = H_1(H_2(X))$? Justify your answer.

Problem 4.

Suppose we tried to simplify the Merkle-Damgård construction by not using an IV and not including the length of the message in the final block. Instead of the IV, we simply use the first n bits of the input. The remainder of the message is split into b bit blocks as usual. Show that this version of Merkle-Damgård is not collision-resistant. For simplicity you can assume that the input length always will be such that no padding is required. An example of this simplified Merkle-Damgård construction is shown in Fig. 1 for a message consisting of $n + 3b$ bits.




Figure 1: Simplified Merkle-Damgård using no IV and no encoding of the message length in the final padding block. Here $|M_1| = n$ and $|M_2| = |M_3| = |M_4| = b$.

Problem 5. [2nd-preimage-resistance]

The two main security properties for hash functions are *collision-resistance* and *one-wayness*. However, there is also a third security property commonly found called *2nd preimage-resistance*. In a 2nd-preimage attack the adversary is given $X \in \mathcal{M}$ and $Y \leftarrow H(X)$, and is then asked to find a *different* $X' \in \mathcal{M}$ that hash to the same value as X . That is: given X and Y , find $X' \neq X$ such that $H(X') = H(X) = Y$. In other words, the adversary is asked to find a *second* pre-image for Y , hence the name. See Fig.2 for the formal definitions. Note that 2nd preimage-resistance is a *weaker* security requirement than collision-resistance, i.e., we're asking for *more* from the adversary. Indeed, for finite $\mathcal{M}$ and $\mathcal{Y}$, and assuming $|\mathcal{M}| \gg |\mathcal{Y}|$, we have

$$\text{collision-resistance} \implies \text{2nd preimage-resistance} \implies \text{one-wayness}.$$

- a) Explain why the first implication above holds, i.e., why collision-resistance implies 2nd preimage-resistance.
- b) Suppose $\{0,1\}^{200} \subset \mathcal{M}$ and that $H : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ is a collision-resistant hash function. Now define $H' : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ as follows:

$$H'(X) = \begin{cases} 0^{200} & \text{if } X = 0^{200} \text{ or } X = 1^{200} \\ H(X) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Show that H' is 2nd preimage-resistant, but not collision-resistant.

Problem 6.

Suppose $F : \{0,1\}^m \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$ is a secure one-way *permutation*. Define $H : \{0,1\}^{2m} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$ as follows. Given $X \in \{0,1\}^{2m}$, write

$$X = X' || X'',$$

Exp_H^{cr}(A):	Exp_H^{2pre}(A):	Exp_H^{ow}(A):
1: $(X_1, X_2) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_H$	1: $X \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{M}$	1: $X \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{M}$
2: if $X_1 \neq X_2 \wedge H(X_1) = H(X_2)$:	2: $Y \leftarrow H(X)$	2: $Y \leftarrow H(X)$
3: return 1	3: $X' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_H(X, Y)$	3: $X' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_H(Y)$
4: else	4: if $X' \neq X \wedge H(X') = Y$:	4: if $H(X') = Y$:
5: return 0	5: return 1	5: return 1
	6: else	6: else
	7: return 0	7: return 0
$\text{Adv}_H^{\text{cr}}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr[\text{Exp}_H^{\text{cr}}(\mathcal{A}) \Rightarrow 1]$		
$\text{Adv}_H^{2\text{pre}}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr[\text{Exp}_H^{2\text{pre}}(\mathcal{A}) \Rightarrow 1]$		
$\text{Adv}_H^{\text{ow}}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr[\text{Exp}_H^{\text{ow}}(\mathcal{A}) \Rightarrow 1]$		

Figure 2: Security definitions for *collision-resistance*, *2nd preimage-resistance*, and *one-wayness* for a hash function $H : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$.

where $X', X'' \in \{0, 1\}^m$. Then define

$$H(X) = F(X' \oplus X'').$$

Is H one-way? Is it 2nd preimage-resistant? Justify your answers.

Problem 7. [Problem 11.3 in [Ros]]

I've designed a hash function $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$. One of my ideas is to make $H(X) = X$ if X is an n -bit string (assume the behavior of H is much more complicated on inputs of other lengths). That way, we know with certainty that there are no collisions among n -bit strings. Have I made a good design decision?

Problem 8. [Davies-Meyer alternatives]

Recall that the Davies-Meyer construction is a way of turning a block cipher $E : \{0, 1\}^b \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ into a collision-resistant compression function $h : \{0, 1\}^{n+b} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ as:

$$h(V\|M) = E(M, V) \oplus V.$$

Here we look at some alternative constructions to Davies-Meyer that all turn out to be insecure. Show that none of the compression functions below are collision-resistant. For b) and c) we assume that $b = n$.

a) $h_1(V\|M) = E(M, V)$

b) $h_2(V\|M) = E(M, V) \oplus M$

c) $h_3(V\|M) = E(V, V \oplus M) \oplus V$

References

- [BR] Mihir Bellare and Phillip Rogaway. *Introduction to Modern Cryptography*. <https://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/classes/227/spring05/book/main.pdf>.
- [Ros] Mike Rosulek. *The Joy of Cryptography*, (draft Jan 3, 2021). <https://web.engr.oregonstate.edu/~rosulekm/crypto/crypto.pdf>.