UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences

Examination in:	MAT2700 — Introduction to Mathematical
Day of examination:	Finance and Investment Theory Friday, December 2nd, 2016
Examination hours:	09.00-13.00
This problem set consists of 9 pages.	
Appendices:	None
Permitted aids:	None.

Please make sure that your copy of the problem set is complete before you attempt to answer anything.

Problem 1

Consider a single-period market consisting of a bank account B and one risky asset S_1 . The bank is given by B(0) = 1 and B(1) = 1+r, where r > 0 is the interest rate. The sample space is $\Omega = \{\omega_1, \omega_2\}$, where the probability of ω_1 occurring is $p \in (0, 1)$. The risky asset is given by $S_1(0) = 1$, $S_1(1, \omega_1) = u$, and $S_1(1, \omega_2) = d$, where u > d are two given numbers.

1a

What is the definition of a risk-neutral probability measure Q? Use this definition to show that a probability Q is risk-neutral if and only if

$$E_Q[R_1] = r, (1)$$

where R_1 is the return of the risky asset S_1 .

<u>Answer:</u> A vector $Q = (Q_1, Q_2)$, with $Q_1, Q_2 > 0$ and $Q_1 + Q_2 = 1$, is risk-neutral provided

$$E_Q[\Delta S_1^*] = 0, \quad \Delta S_1^* = S_1^*(1) - S_1^*(0) = \frac{S_1(1)}{1+r} - 1,$$

or, equivalently,

$$E_Q[S_1(1)] = 1 + r.$$

From this it follows that

$$E_Q\left[\frac{S_1(1) - S_1(0)}{S_1(0)}\right] = r,$$

that is, $E_Q[R_1] = r$.

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1b

Use (1) to determine the risk-neutral probability Q.

<u>Answer:</u> Assuming Q = (q, 1 - q), with 0 < q < 1, and noting that

$$R_1 = \frac{S_1(1) - S_1(0)}{S_1(0)} = (u - 1, d - 1),$$

it follows from (1) that

$$r = E_Q[R_1] = Q \cdot R_1 = q(u-1) + (1-q)(d-1) = q(u-d) + d - 1$$

and therefore

$$q = \frac{(1+r) - d}{u - d}, \qquad 1 - q = \frac{u - (1+r)}{u - d}.$$

To ensure 0 < q < 1 we must have

$$r - d + 1 > 0 \iff d < 1 + r, \qquad r - d + 1 < u - d \iff u > 1 + r.$$

1c

Specify $d = \frac{1}{2}(1+r)$ and u = 2(1+r). Denote by X the payoff of a call option with exercise price e = 1 + r. Why is X is attainable? Use 1b) to compute the price of the call option.

<u>Answer:</u> In view 1b), since d < 1 + r and u > 1 + r, the market is complete and thus all claims are attainable. We have

$$S_1(1) - e = \begin{cases} 2(1+r) - (1+r) = 1+r, & \text{if } \omega = \omega_1 \\ \frac{1}{2}(1+r) - (1+r) = -\frac{1}{2}(1+r), & \text{if } \omega = \omega_2 \end{cases}$$

and so the payoff of the call option is

$$X = \max \left(S_1(1) - e \right), 0 \right) = \begin{cases} 1 + r, & \text{if } \omega = \omega_1 \\ 0, & \text{if } \omega = \omega_2 \end{cases}$$

The price is

$$E_Q\left[\frac{X}{B(1)}\right] = q = \frac{(1+r)-d}{u-d} = \frac{\frac{1}{2}(1+r)}{\frac{3}{2}(1+r)} = \frac{1}{3}.$$

1d

Prove the relation

$$\overline{R_1} - r = -\operatorname{cov}(R_1, L), \tag{2}$$

where $\overline{R_1}$ is the mean return, L is the state price density, and cov(X, Y) is the covariation between two random variables X and Y.

<u>Answer:</u> The state price density is given by

$$L = \frac{Q}{P}, \qquad E[L] = 1,$$

(Continued on page 3.)

and so

$$cov(R_1, L) = E[R_1L] - E[R_1]E[L]$$
$$= E_Q[R_1] - E[R_1]$$
$$= E_Q[R_1] - \overline{R_1}$$
$$= r - \overline{R_1} \quad by (1);$$

thus, (2) follows.

Problem 2

We continue to examine the one-period model from Problem 1, this time assuming that r = 1, d = 1, and u = 4.

2a

Explain why $U(w) = 2\sqrt{w}$, for w > 0, is a utility function. Compute the Arrow-Pratt coefficient $\alpha_R(w) = -w \frac{U''(w)}{U'(w)}$ of relative risk aversion.

<u>Answer:</u> The function U is a utility function since it is continuously differentiable, concave, and strictly increasing. Indeed, we compute easily $U'(w) = \frac{1}{w^{1/2}} > 0$ and $U''(w) = -\frac{1}{2w^{3/2}} < 0$. The Arrow-Pratt coefficient is

$$\alpha_R(w) = -w \frac{U''(w)}{U'(w)} = w \frac{\frac{1}{2w^{3/2}}}{\frac{1}{w^{1/2}}} = \frac{1}{2},$$

hence $U(w) = 2\sqrt{w}$ displays constant relative risk aversion.

2b

Consider the portfolio problem

$$\max_{H \in \mathbf{R}^2} E\left[2\sqrt{V(1)}\right], \quad V(0) = \nu, \tag{3}$$

where V(t) is the portfolio value at time t = 0, 1 corresponding to a trading strategy $H = (H_0, H_1)$, and $\nu > 0$ is the given initial wealth. Suppose there is a solution H_{opt} to (3). Then use the optimality of H_{opt} to show that an arbitrage opportunity \hat{H} cannot exist.

<u>Answer:</u> To reach a contradiction, suppose there is an arbitrage opportunity \hat{H} ; i.e., $\hat{V}(0) = 0$, $\hat{V}(1) \ge 0$, $\hat{V}(1, \omega) > 0$ for at least one $\omega \in \Omega$, say ω_1 . Set

$$H := H_{\text{opt}} + H.$$

Then, clearly,

$$V(1) = V_{\text{opt}}(1) + \hat{V}(1) \ge V_{\text{opt}}(1)$$
 on Ω ,

and

$$V(1,\omega_1) > V_{\text{opt}}(1,\omega_1).$$

(Continued on page 4.)

Since $U(w) = 2\sqrt{w}$ is strictly increasing,

$$E[U(V(1))] = pU(V(1,\omega_1)) + (1-p)U(V(1,\omega_2))$$

> $pU(V_{opt}(1,\omega_1)) + (1-p)U(V_{opt}(1,\omega_2))$
= $E[U(V_{opt}(1))],$

which contradicts the optimality of H_{opt} .

2c

Make use of the risk-neutral probability approach to solve the $Q = (\frac{1}{3}, \frac{2}{3})$ is the unique risk-neutral probability measure in the market. Divide your answer into two parts: 1) Determine the optimal wealth. 2) Determine the optimal trading strategy.

<u>Answer:</u> The first step is to maximize expected utility of wealth:

$$\max_{W \in \mathbb{R}^2} E[U(W)], \quad \text{subject to } E_Q\left[\frac{W}{B(1)}\right] = \nu,$$

where $U(w) = 2\sqrt{w}$ and B(1) = 2. We employ the Lagrange multiplier method:

$$\max_{W} \left\{ E[U[W]] - \lambda E_Q \left[\frac{W}{2} \right] \right\},\,$$

where the Lagrange multiplier $\lambda > 0$ is found by demanding $E_Q\left[\frac{W}{2}\right] = \nu$. Using the state price density L = Q/P we can write

$$E[U(W)] - \lambda E_Q\left[\frac{W}{2}\right] = E\left[U(W) - \lambda \frac{LW}{2}\right].$$

The first order condition at a maximum reads:

$$U'(W) = \lambda \frac{L}{2}.$$

Denote the inverse of $U'(w) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{w}}$ by *I*, so

$$I(y) = \frac{1}{y^2}.$$

It then follows that the optimal wealth \hat{W} is

$$W_{\rm opt} = I\left(\lambda \frac{L}{2}\right) = \frac{4}{\lambda^2 L^2}.$$

We identify $\lambda > 0$ using $E_Q\left[\frac{W_{\text{opt}}}{2}\right] = \nu$:

$$\begin{split} E_Q\left[\frac{2}{\lambda^2 L^2}\right] &= \nu \Longleftrightarrow \frac{1}{\lambda^2} E_Q\left[\frac{1}{L^2}\right] = \frac{\nu}{2} \\ & \Longleftrightarrow \lambda = \left(\frac{2E_Q\left[\left(\frac{P}{Q}\right)^2\right]}{\nu}\right)^{\frac{1}{2}}. \end{split}$$

(Continued on page 5.)

Since

$$E_Q\left[\left(\frac{P}{Q}\right)^2\right] = \frac{1}{3}\left(\frac{p}{\frac{1}{3}}\right)^2 + \frac{2}{3}\left(\frac{1-p}{\frac{2}{3}}\right)^2 = 3p^2 + \frac{3}{2}(1-p)^2,$$

we obtain $\lambda = \sqrt{\frac{\kappa}{\nu}}$, with $\kappa = 6p^2 + 3(1-p)^2 = 3(3p^2 - 2p + 1)$. This gives the optimal wealth W_{opt} :

$$W_{\rm opt} = \frac{4\nu}{\kappa} \left(\frac{P}{Q}\right)^2 = \begin{cases} \frac{36\nu p^2}{\kappa}, & \omega = \omega_1\\ \frac{9\nu(1-p)^2}{\kappa}, & \omega = \omega_2 \end{cases}.$$

The second step is to find the optimal trading strategy H_{opt} . We seek a vector $H = (H_0, H_1)$ such that $V(1) = H_0 B(1) + H_1 S_1(1) = W_{\text{opt}}$, that is,

$$2H_0 + 4H_1 = \frac{36\nu p^2}{\kappa},$$

$$2H_0 + H_1 = \frac{9\nu(1-p)^2}{\kappa}.$$

The solution to this system is $H_0 = \frac{6(1-2p)\nu}{\kappa}$ and $H_1 = \frac{3(3p^2+2p-1)\nu}{\kappa}$, and so

$$H_{\text{opt}} = \left(\frac{6(1-2p)\nu}{\kappa}, \frac{3\left(3p^2+2p-1\right)\nu}{\kappa}\right).$$

Problem 3

Consider a multi-period market (T = 2) with one risky asset evolving as follows:

$$S_{1}(0) = 1, \quad S_{1}(1,\omega) = \begin{cases} \frac{3}{2}, & \omega = \omega_{1}, \omega_{2} \\ \frac{1}{2}, & \omega = \omega_{3}, \omega_{4} \end{cases}, \quad S_{1}(2,\omega) = \begin{cases} \frac{9}{4}, & \omega = \omega_{1} \\ \frac{3}{4}, & \omega = \omega_{2} \\ \frac{3}{4}, & \omega = \omega_{3} \\ \frac{1}{8}, & \omega = \omega_{4} \end{cases}.$$

The bank pays zero interest, i.e., B(0) = 1, B(1) = 1, and B(2) = 1. Moreover, $\Omega = \{\omega_1, \omega_2, \omega_3, \omega_4\}$ and the probability measure is

$$P(\omega) = \begin{cases} 1/4, & \omega = \omega_1 \\ 1/4, & \omega = \omega_2 \\ 1/4, & \omega = \omega_3 \\ 1/4, & \omega = \omega_4 \end{cases}$$

3a

Identify the filtration $\mathbb{F} = \{\mathcal{F}_t\}_{t=0,1,2}$ generated by the risky asset. Compute the conditional expectation

$$E\left[S_1(2)|\mathcal{F}_1]\right].$$

Verify that

$$E\left[E\left[S_1(2)\big|\mathcal{F}_1\right]\right] = E\left[S_1(2)\right].$$
(4)

(Continued on page 6.)

<u>Answer:</u> We read off the filtration from the tree in Figure 1:

$$\mathcal{P}_0 = \{\Omega\}, \quad \mathcal{F}_0 = \{\Omega, \emptyset\},$$

 $\mathcal{P}_1 = \{\{\omega_1, \omega_2\}, \{\omega_3, \omega_4\}\}, \quad \mathcal{F}_1 = \{\Omega, \emptyset, \{\omega_1, \omega_2\}, \{\omega_3, \omega_4\}\},\$

 $\mathcal{P}_2 = \{\{\omega_1\}, \{\omega_2\}, \{\omega_3\}, \{\omega_4\}\}, \quad \mathcal{F}_2 = \text{the collection of all subsets of } \Omega.$



Figure 1: Filtration generated by the price process (Problem 3). By definition,

$$\begin{split} E\left[S_{1}(2)\big|\mathcal{F}_{1}\right] &= \sum_{A\in\mathcal{P}_{1}} E\left[S_{1}(2)\big|A\right]\right] \mathbf{1}_{A}(\omega) \\ &= \begin{cases} E\left[S_{1}(2)\big|A_{1}\right], & \omega\in A_{1} := \{\omega_{1},\omega_{2}\}\\ E\left[S_{1}(2)\big|A_{2}\right], & \omega\in A_{2} := \{\omega_{3},\omega_{4}\} \end{cases} \\ &= \begin{cases} S_{1}(2,\omega_{1})\frac{P(\omega_{1})}{P(A_{1})} + S_{1}(2,\omega_{2})\frac{P(\omega_{2})}{P(A_{1})}, & \omega\in A_{1}\\ S_{1}(2,\omega_{3})\frac{P(\omega_{3})}{P(A_{2})} + S_{1}(2,\omega_{4})\frac{P(\omega_{4})}{P(A_{2})}, & \omega\in A_{2} \end{cases} \\ &= \begin{cases} \frac{9}{4} \cdot \frac{1}{4} + \frac{3}{4} \cdot \frac{1}{4}, & \omega\in A_{1}\\ \frac{3}{4} \cdot \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{8} \cdot \frac{1}{4}, & \omega\in A_{2} \end{cases} \\ &= \begin{cases} \frac{3}{2}, & \omega\in A_{1}\\ \frac{7}{16}, & \omega\in A_{2} \end{cases} \end{split}$$

Since

$$E\left[E\left[S_{1}(2)\big|\mathcal{F}_{1}\right]\right] = \left(\frac{3}{2}\cdot\frac{1}{4} + \frac{3}{2}\cdot\frac{1}{4}\right) + \left(\frac{7}{16}\cdot\frac{1}{4} + \frac{7}{16}\cdot\frac{1}{4}\right) = \frac{31}{32}$$

and

$$E[S_1(2)] = \frac{9}{4} \cdot \frac{1}{4} + \frac{3}{4} \cdot \frac{1}{4} + \frac{3}{4} \cdot \frac{1}{4} + \frac{3}{4} \cdot \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{8} \cdot \frac{1}{4} = \frac{31}{32},$$

the claim (4) follows.

(Continued on page 7.)

3b

Determine the risk-neutral probability (martingale) measure Q.

<u>Answer:</u> We determine $Q = (Q_1, Q_2, Q_3, Q_4)$ using

$$E_Q \left[S_1^*(t+s) \middle| \mathcal{F}_t \right] = S_1^*(t), \qquad t = 0, 1, \ s = 1, 2,$$

that is,

$$E_Q[S_1(t+s)|\mathcal{F}_t]] = S_1(t), \quad t = 0, 1, s = 1, 2.$$

Moreover,

$$Q_1 + Q_2 + Q_3 + Q_4 = 1. (5)$$

 $\underline{t=0}$: With s=1, the condition is

$$E_Q\left[S_1(1)\big|\mathcal{F}_0\right]\right] = S_1(0),$$

which reads

$$\frac{3}{2}(Q_1 + Q_2) + \frac{1}{2}(Q_3 + Q_4) = 1.$$
 (6)

With s = 2, the condition is

$$E_Q\left[S_1(2)\big|\mathcal{F}_0\right]\right] = S_1(0),$$

which reads

$$\frac{9}{4}Q_1 + \frac{3}{4}(Q_2 + Q_3) + \frac{1}{8}Q_4 = 1.$$
(7)

 $\underline{t=1}$: With s=1, the condition is

$$E_Q\left[S_1(2)\big|\mathcal{F}_1\right]\right] = S_1(1).$$

By definition,

$$\begin{split} E_Q \left[S_1(2) \big| \mathcal{F}_1 \right] &= \sum_{A \in \mathcal{P}_1} E_Q \left[S_1(2) \big| A \right] \right] \mathbf{1}_A(\omega) \\ &= \begin{cases} E_Q \left[S_1(2) \big| A_1 \right], & \omega \in A_1 := \{\omega_1, \omega_2\} \\ E_Q \left[S_1(2) \big| A_2 \right], & \omega \in A_2 := \{\omega_3, \omega_4\} \end{cases}. \end{split}$$

We continue by computing

$$E_Q \left[S_1(2) \middle| A_1 \right] = \sum_{\omega \in A_1} S_1(2, \omega) \frac{Q(\omega)}{Q(A_1)}$$

= $S_1(2, \omega_1) \frac{Q(\omega_1)}{Q(A_1)} + S_1(2, \omega_2) \frac{Q(\omega_2)}{Q(A_1)}$
= $\left(\frac{9}{4} Q_1 + \frac{3}{4} Q_2 \right) / (Q_1 + Q_2)$

 $\quad \text{and} \quad$

$$E_Q \left[S_1(2) \middle| A_2 \right] = \sum_{\omega \in A_2} S_1(2,\omega) \frac{Q(\omega)}{Q(A_2)}$$

= $S_1(2,\omega_3) \frac{Q(\omega_3)}{Q(A_2)} + S_1(2,\omega_4) \frac{Q(\omega_4)}{Q(A_2)}$
= $\left(\frac{3}{4} Q_3 + \frac{1}{8} Q_4 \right) / (Q_3 + Q_4),$

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and obtain therefore the equations

$$\left(\frac{9}{4}Q_1 + \frac{3}{4}Q_2\right) / (Q_1 + Q_2) = S_1(\omega) = \frac{3}{2},$$

for $\omega = \omega_1, \omega_2$, and

$$\left(\frac{3}{4}Q_3 + \frac{1}{8}Q_4\right) / (Q_3 + Q_4) = S_1(\omega) = \frac{1}{2},$$

for $\omega = \omega_3, \omega_4$. Slightly rewriting, we arrive finally at

$$9Q_1 + 3Q_2 = 6(Q_1 + Q_2) \iff Q_1 - Q_2 = 0 \tag{8}$$

and

$$6Q_3 + Q_4 = 4(Q_3 + Q_4) \iff 2Q_3 - 3Q_4 = 0.$$
(9)

Solving (5)–(9) gives

$$Q_1 = \frac{1}{4}, \quad Q_2 = \frac{1}{4}, \quad Q_3 = \frac{3}{10}, \quad Q_4 = \frac{1}{5}.$$

3c

Denote by X the payoff of a put option with exercise price e = 1. The option expires at T = 2. What does it mean for X to be attainable (marketable)? Why is X attainable? Use the risk-neutral pricing formula to compute the t = 1 value of X.

<u>Answer:</u> The claim X is attainable if there exists a self-financing trading strategy such that $V_2 = X$. Since there is a unique martingale measure $Q = (\frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{3}{10}, \frac{1}{5})$, the market is complete and thus all claims are attainable. Since

$$e - S_1(2) = \begin{cases} 1 - \frac{9}{4} = -\frac{5}{4}, & \omega = \omega_1 \\ 1 - \frac{3}{4} = \frac{1}{4}, & \omega = \omega_2 \\ 1 - \frac{3}{4} = \frac{1}{4}, & \omega = \omega_3 \\ 1 - \frac{1}{8} = \frac{7}{8}, & \omega = \omega_4 \end{cases}$$

the payoff is

$$X = \max(e - S_1(2), 0) = \begin{cases} 0, & \omega = \omega_1 \\ \frac{1}{4}, & \omega = \omega_2 \\ \frac{1}{4}, & \omega = \omega_3 \\ \frac{7}{8}, & \omega = \omega_4 \end{cases}.$$

The t = 1 value of X is

$$E_Q\left[\frac{X}{B(2)}\Big|\mathcal{F}_1\right] = E_Q\left[X\Big|\mathcal{F}_1\right] \quad (\text{since } (B(2)=1).$$

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We compute the conditional expectation $E_Q\left[X|\mathcal{F}_1\right]$ as before:

$$E_Q \left[X | \mathcal{F}_1 \right] = \sum_{A \in \mathcal{P}_1} E_Q \left[X | A_1 \right] \mathbf{1}_A(\omega)$$

$$= \begin{cases} E_Q \left[X | A_1 \right], & \omega \in A_1 := \{\omega_1, \omega_2\} \\ E_Q \left[X | A_2 \right], & \omega \in A_2 := \{\omega_3, \omega_4\} \end{cases}$$

$$= \begin{cases} X(\omega_1) \frac{Q(\omega_1)}{Q(A_1)} + X(\omega_2) \frac{Q(\omega_2)}{Q(A_1)}, & \omega \in A_1 \\ X(\omega_3) \frac{Q(\omega_3)}{Q(A_2)} + X(\omega_4) \frac{Q(\omega_4)}{Q(A_2)}, & \omega \in A_2 \end{cases}$$

$$= \begin{cases} 0 \cdot \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{4} \cdot \frac{1}{4}, & \omega \in A_1 \\ \frac{1}{4} \cdot \frac{1}{12} + \frac{7}{8} \cdot \frac{1}{5}, & \omega \in A_2 \end{cases}$$

$$= \begin{cases} \frac{1}{8}, & \omega \in A_1 \\ \frac{1}{2}, & \omega \in A_2 \end{cases}$$

Hence, the t = 1 value of X is $\begin{cases} \frac{1}{8}, & \omega \in \{\omega_1, \omega_2\} \\ \frac{1}{2}, & \omega \in \{\omega_3, \omega_4\} \end{cases}$.

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