As usual, I write in English. These guidelines for grading are now made available to next years students on the course, and since most students in this course do not speak Norwegian, English is the language to use.

Also as usual, I write too much, but it takes time to shorten it, so you will have to bear with me. For Question 1 (concepts), I just give the main properties of the definition. For the essay topics, I first make some general comments on the evaluation and the required readings, then I provide a review of topics that might be included in the essay. Generally, the more such points the candidates include, the better.

**General instructions** SOS 2603 Written exam 2019

You must answer both question 1 and question 2. In question 2 you will answer either assignment 2A, 2B or 2C. Question 1 accounts for 1/3, and assignment 2 counts for 2/3 of the final grade in this school exam.

The exam can be written in English, Norwegian, Swedish or Danish.

**Question 1. Outline and discuss briefly two (2) of the three (3) following concepts**

Parental choice
De-familialization
Total fertility rate

**Parental choice**

This concept is used in Anne Lise Ellingsæter’s course writings on family, work and gender equality.

The concept of parental choice stems from liberal political philosophy: the state should not intervene in the private sphere, and cultural pluralism among families should be appreciated. Note that the term “parental” aggregates husband and wife, so it brackets any reference to inequalities between the units of the married couple. The opposite concept is *equal parenthood*, emphasizing the problem of paternalist attitudes, arguing that there should be real equality between the spouses. It emerges within a feminist position, especially a state feminist position that encourages state intervention into family matters.

Parental choice is a main argument against the daddy quota (DQ), i.e. the policy of reserving some weeks of the parental leave to the father on a “use it or loose it” basis. Demark introduced a two week DQ in 1998, but with a new and more right-wing government, it was abolished in 2002 with reference to parental choice and the need to shelter the private sphere from state intervention.
Parental choice is also used in various ways as an argument in discussions about care provision. Here it has been used from several positions in the debates: Leftist proponents of full childcare coverage (making cash-for-care unnecessary) argued that such coverage was a precondition for parental choice. The right was concerned with equalizing conditions between private and public childcare services, whereby choice implied the right to choose private providers. Finally, supporters of cash-for-care (CFC) would argue that parents who wanted to care for their children at home (it would mostly be the wife) should also receive support from the state. Parental choice is here the choice between kindergarten and keeping the child at home. The argument was particularly popular argument in Finland during high unemployment spells, and in Norway it was invoked by the Christian party with right-wing support in 1998.

Situations where the DQ has been reduced have served as kind of “experiments” in the effects of parental choice: In Norway, the DQ was reduced from 14 to 10 weeks in 2014. NAV-data (the national pension administration) showed: With just 10 weeks, fathers reduced their take-up of leave. Critics saw this as a proof that free parental choice reproduces unequal distribution of childcare tasks at home.

De-familialization

Here I provide a quote from Esping Andersen, *Social Foundations of Post-Industrial Economies*, 1999, Ch. 4 (reading for the Birkelund lecture): “A de-familializing regime is one which seeks to unburden the household and diminish individuals’ welfare dependence on kinship (…) De-familialization would indicate the degree to which social policy (or perhaps markets) render women autonomous to become ‘commodified’, or to set up independent households, in the first place.” The concept is also used in Mandel/Shalev’s analysis (p. 1878): “The state taking responsibility for care work that would otherwise fall primarily on wives and mothers, thereby freeing them to take paid employment. Here we expand the term to include all types of state support for working leave, favorable tax treatment, reduced working hours and the right to time off to care for sick children.”

Total Fertility Rate (TFR)

Total Fertility Rate (TFR): the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if she experienced the fertility conditions of her birth year for her whole (fertile) life. In more detail: …if (1) she would experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates through her lifetime, and (2) she were to survive from birth through the end of her reproductive life.

These are three slides from Torkild Lyngstad (earlier lectures in the course, present lecturer is Trude Lappegård).
Total Fertility Rate • Abbreviated TFR

- Average # children a woman will have
- Useful, but can be very decieving
- Clear for women older than ca. 45 (infecund)
- If you ask women in 20-44, how many kids they have?

How to deal with women still in their childbearing ages?

Two ways of measuring fertility

- \( TFR = \text{period} \times \frac{\text{avg.} \# \text{ children for one year}}{\text{period}} \) Assuming we «froze» the world as it is today
- Sum of fertility of todays women in their 20s, 30s, 40s
- Cohort completed fertility \( \frac{\text{avg.} \# \text{ children for one cohort of women}}{\text{cohort}} \) — E.g. those born in 1950

Cohort fertility vs. period TFR

- If women postpone their births, period TFR will underestimate completed fertility.
- If women’s fertility rates recuperate (speedup after postponement), period TFR will overestimate completed fertility.
- Period TFR sensitive to short-term change
- Completed cohort fertility mirror longer-term change

Lyngstad also provides three graphs. The first shows Norway’s TFR which declines from about 4.5 (average number of children per woman) down to about 1.8 1930-45. Then rapidly up to 2.5 in the late 1940s, then around 2-2.5 until the mid-1960s. Then TFR declines from the late 1960s, moving to about 1.6 in the early 1980s, then stabilizing at about 1.8 since 1990. Recently, as pointed out in Lappegård’s lectures, it tends to dip even lower.

The second displays TFR compared to CCF (Completed Cohort Fertility). It has two horizontal axes, and CCF is plotted 30 years before TFR (1870 CCF plotted with 1900 TFR). Plotted this way, the curves have the same shape. The third figure is the same as the second, but includes “level needed for reproducing population in the long run (with zero net migration)”.

Question 2. Essay
Discuss one of the following topics (2A, 2B, 2C)

2A. Social movements and the Nordic model

Assignment
Discuss the impact of social movement mobilization on the development of institutional complexes in the Nordic countries.

You should focus particularly on one movement and the period in which it was most influential. That is: either religious movements in the early 19th century, or the peasant movement since the mid-19th century, or the labour movement since the 1930s, or the women’s movement since the 1960s.

At the end of your discussion, try to sketch a comparison with one of the other movements/periods.

The most relevant readings


The candidates are asked to pick one out of these movements:

- religious movements in the early 19th century,
- the peasant movement since the mid-19th century,
- the labour movement since the 1930s,
- the women’s movement since the 1960s.

Grading: My guess is that those who chose this essay will mainly chose the women’s movement, possibly the labour movement. Few will chose the two older ones. A good grade should give a thorough overview and explanation of the movement/period chosen. Below, I present a simple model of elite/movement-interaction that is implicit in the 2016-paper, and that I have explicates in the lectures. It is great if the candidates make the model explicit, but it should be possible to get a good grade also if the model is not mentioned. The candidates are asked to sketch a comparison at the end of their essay. We should not emphasize this too much, but if the last page of the essay includes a good comparison e.g. of the labour and the women’s movement, it may be taken as a criterion for a really good grade.
Some candidates may try to draw on some of the discussion of contemporary social movements in the 2018-paper, and if they do it in a clever way, we should reward it. However, strictly speaking, the assignment only asks for an analysis of the older movements.

*I now start my notes on the topic.* The 2016 paper is the most important one for this assignment. Here is the abstract:

This chapter studies the emergence and co-evolution of the institutions that today define the Nordic models of socio-economic development. It distinguishes three areas of institutional development: competence, social protection and social partnership institutions – tracing complementarities both inside of and between these areas. The origins of the various institutions are related to a periodization that combines economic and geopolitical factors: techno-economic paradigms, hegemony and international regimes, as well as the nature of the national political systems (non-democracy to first turbulent, then routinized democracy). Nordic liberal capitalism before 1870 develops through two periods of agrarian capitalism driven by interaction between elite institutional designs and social mobilization (religious and peasant movements). Nordic corporate capitalism between 1870 and 1940 develops through a period of paternalist labour relations with restrictions on democracy and on to a period of turbulent mass politics in the interwar years. This dynamic was primarily driven by the interaction between the state, corporate leadership and the labour movement. Institutional developments are traced through each period, and the degree of institutional complementary between an increasing number of institutions are evaluated. The final section analyses the strong institutional complementarities – with both international and national elements – through the early post-war period 1945-75. Throughout the analysis, contrasting patterns of development are highlighted. In particular, two types of Nordic development are found during the period of corporate capitalism: Denmark, Norway and Sweden develop relatively consensual models of development, while Finland and Iceland pursue more conflict-prone models marked by devaluation cycles. If a general concept of a “Nordic model” is to be defined, it must be built on this kind of analysis of national specificities.

The paper is built around the following schematic periodization:
Table 1. Periods of Nordic capitalism in a world-economic and geopolitical context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preconditions</td>
<td>Mercantilist structuring of the world economy</td>
<td>Authoritarian absolutist</td>
<td>Family farms, church, state and dominant export sectors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles 1780s-</td>
<td>Napoleonic wars (protection, blockade, then opening)</td>
<td>Pre-democratic</td>
<td>Educational and other institutions of skill formation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railways 1830s-</td>
<td>British hegemony Pax Britannica</td>
<td>Agrarian, peasant mobilization</td>
<td>Institutions of local governance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy engineering 1870s-</td>
<td>Weaker British hegemony, International gold standard</td>
<td>Paternalist</td>
<td>Paternalist institutions at the firm level. Early social protection.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4 War/inter-war period 1910s-</td>
<td>International fragmentation, collapse of world trade</td>
<td>Capitalism with fragile democracy</td>
<td>Institutions of social partnership. Social protection institutions revised</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 mass consumption 1945-</td>
<td>Pax Americana. Peak of US hegemony. Open for trade, tight regulation of financial flows</td>
<td>Routinized democratic mass politics</td>
<td>Institutions of social protection and social partnership generalized. Institutions of expert knowledge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 ICT 1975-</td>
<td>US weakening – Coping with financial openness</td>
<td>Internationalized welfare</td>
<td>Regulatory institutions mitigating global/national processes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Column 7, labelled “dynamics” is about elite/movement dynamics. I here use a simple model, specified in my ppt-slides:

**External/internal dynamics** – Elite/movement-dynamics is the “engine”, the dynamics, at the national level, while the left side of the scheme *(international integration – technology/hegemony/democratization)* are the external forces that the internal dynamic has to relate to.

**Elite/movement interaction:** might we think of them in retrospect as *institutional designs?* Be careful: they were certainly the unplanned outcomes of social struggles. No singular class, party or organic intellectuals “planned” the system/”model”. But elites can put power behind visions early on (their power resources can be immediately mobilized), while movements need time to consolidate (they are many “small” citizens, but they can build power resources by organizing as movement, becoming a party/interest group). In the last lecture we shall compare the roles of older and new social movements in the Nordic models (cf Mjøset 2018).

Here is another presentation of the same simple model (from my Family, work, gender-ppt slides – I did this lecture for Anne Lise because she has her sabbatical):

a model of elite/movement dynamics: *Elite offensives that are later countered by mobilization from below.*
Setting: distinct historical conjunctures, involving collective actors with limited foresight.

Elites are first movers: they try to implement some kind of institutional design (not necessarily consciously).

Social movements take longer time to mobilize and move into positions of influence: however, in the medium term they respond to the initial blueprint and their mobilization will change the actual institutional outcome into an “institutional design in which the role of the mobilizing group is greater than in the initial blueprint”.

Within this new institutional complementarity, the social movement also – as time goes by – contributes to renewal of the elite. For instance: the Labour party leader – an earlier young revolutionary – became prime minister in 1945, and the party had many of its earlier cadres seeking employment in ministries and other divisions of the state. Labour also gave preference to new groups of experts (such as social medical expertise and economic modellers). May help explain why there is high trust in government in the Nordic area.

The following scheme specifies the institutions involved:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Long surges</th>
<th>Political system</th>
<th>Basic economic institutions</th>
<th>Competence institutions</th>
<th>Social partnership</th>
<th>Social protection</th>
<th>Complementarity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preconditions</td>
<td>Authoritarian absolutist</td>
<td>Family farms, dominant export sectors</td>
<td>Protestantism</td>
<td>Administrative traditions, church</td>
<td>Family (North-European family form)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Textiles 1780s-</td>
<td>Predemocratic</td>
<td>Formal educational, and other institutions of skill formation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Railways 1830s-</td>
<td></td>
<td>Local government institutions</td>
<td>Early state activism</td>
<td>Potential, based on paternalist principles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Heavy engineering 1870s-</td>
<td>Emerging mass politics</td>
<td>Paternalist institutions at the firm level</td>
<td>“Main agreements” – late 1930s, DK earlier</td>
<td>Improved, mainly in the late 1930s</td>
<td>Low (industrial and democratic basis)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4 War/inter-war period 1910s-</td>
<td>Turbulent mass politics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Mass consumption 1945-</td>
<td>Routinized democratic mass politics</td>
<td>Growing importance of expert knowledge</td>
<td>Generalized</td>
<td>Generalized</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 ICT 1975-</td>
<td>Regulatory institutions mitigating global/national-processes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Can high c. be retained?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here are some comments on the relevant movements/periods:

*Religious movements (cf scheme above: preconditions and the textiles-period):* One can see Protestantism and the evolving state church as an elite/movement-interaction: the key feature is literacy: Iceland had nearly generalized reading skills around 1800,
without a formal school system: the protestant priests helped illiterate parents to push their children to learn to read, if they could not, confirmation and later marriage was out of question. Later the same interaction led to the formation of early primary schools for all children, male and female. However, there was also the revivalist religious movements, especially in the 19th century: they have been seen as pioneers in the struggle for freedom of speech and assembly (2016 paper p 9). Main Norwegian case: Hans Nielsen Hauge (2018-paper p 11).

Peasant movements (cf scheme above: railways period: local government institutions)

Cf 2016-paper p. 12:

Peasant movements closely linked to revivalist mobilization. Uncertainty about “freedom of association” – arguments often couched in religious terms.

Inclusion of peasant freeholders into political decision making: Norway with the 1814 constitution, Denmark in the 1840s. But mainly local government reforms (Norway 1830s). In Sweden and Finland as part of strengthening of the old estates-system (freeholding peasants as the “fourth estate”).

Note also point that the Nordic area was open for social mobilization even before democracy was generalized:

in the nineteenth century, Nordic states became open to mobilization. In the earliest cases, this was more than 50 years before fully democratized mass politics. The peasant populations were not turned into clients, represented by various elite patrons. They were at the core of the religious revivalism, based on a reading public that conceived faith as an individual matter. In various fashions, the freeholders also influenced local government. These associations and organizations formed the backbone of an evolving civil society. By the mid-nineteenth century, the peasants had influence, to varying degrees, in their own local ‘peasant republics’ (2016, p 13).

Later the organized peasant movement also was important for cooperatives and for corporatist arrangements between the state and primary producers (landbruksavtalene).

Labour movement (cf scheme above: periods 3 and 4).

The influence of the labour movement on institutions spans a longer period. In period 3, the movement was in its infancy, and there was an elite offensive: paternalist or despotic organization of new industrial firms. In the 1880s/90s, we also see the first, rudimentary welfare state arrangements (2016, p 18). They were not driven by the labour movement, but by paternalist, conservative and liberal political forces who hoped that support to various self-help arrangements might counteract autonomous mobilization by the growing number of workers. But such an “institutional design” was not generalized.

Instead, in the WW1/interwar (3/4) period a counter-mobilization follows. There is full democracy and labour movement mobilization, the 1920s/early 1930s is
“turbulent mass politics”, but the institutional innovation is the “main agreements” Norway 1935, Sweden 1938, but Denmark earlier (1899) and Finland/Iceland later, see 2016, 23-24. In the late 1930s, there was a major extension of social insurance coverage in Norway in 1936, and parallels in the other countries (2016, p. 23), and here the labour movement played a major role for the strengthening of social protection institutions (the welfare state).

In the post-war, mass consumption period (4 in the scheme above), labour market institutions (social partnership) and welfare state institutions (social protection) are generalized. In this period, the labour movement becomes integrated, and many of their leaders and organic intellectuals become new elites. There is growing importance of expert knowledge (think of national accounts economics and folkehelse-experts, both emerged in close contact with the labour movement).

**Women’s movement (cf scheme above, periods 4 and 5)**

As mentioned, I included some material on the women’s movement in my lecture on Anne Lise’s Family, work and gender-equality topic. The students have had access to all these ppts, of course, but they are not required readings. As for the women’s movement, the required reading mainly analyses the late 1960s feminist movement and its impact as state feminism, influencing the family policy institutions (see 2016, pp. 30-31). (The earlier role of the women’s movement in mobilisation for universal suffrage is mentioned (2016, p 19), but not thoroughly analysed.

*The women’s movement*

Social base: Male and female gender. Family form: older preconditions (see Mjøset 2016, p. 7), but also formed by paternalist legislation through the early modern period.

Political legacy: No important political parties have been formed solely with reference to gender. Women are in all layers of the social stratification, so women’s movements have formed associations organizing women of various classes/strata: upper class, middle class, working class.


* “Women’s cause” period, 1850-1920.
* Housewife era 1920-70
* Feminist movement 1970-ca 2000


*The women’s movement: “Women’s cause” period, 1850-1920.*

“Kvinnesak” - “Women’s cause”: John Stuart Mill 1869, “Subjection of
Women”: absence of discriminating laws, this would optimize total utility. Mill was convinced women were most happy in the domestic sphere! Work and politics was for unmarried women.

Norway: Woman’s cause/Kvinnesak association formed 1884.

Issue of education: further education and suitable waged work for unmarried women. Female surplus, especially in urban areas (in agriculture, women worked). Irrelevant for working women.

Domestic sphere issues: co-determination within married couples. Changes in legislation: husband would determine all economic matters, the wife did not even control the wealth that she brought into the family. This was neither relevant for working women (had no wealth, more important for women that the husband did not waste the wage on drinking).

Both issues were brought into politics by the Liberal party (Venstre)

**Democratization issue**: Struggle for suffrage extension. Before universal male suffrage (1898), working women and bourgeois women had little common interests. Upper class women (Kvinnestemmerettsforeningen) only opted for female suffrage on par with men (i.e. restricted by property/offices). But after 1898, working women joined them. However, working women also had interests in improved working and living conditions, while upper class women mainly wanted better educational opportunities.

**Difference-related issue**: These are issues relating to the difference between men and women. Women give birth to children. But upper class women did generally not support mobilisation for issues around access to contraception and abortion laws. The “spirit” of the late 19th/early 20th century was also rather puritan. Provoked, illegal abortion became a main problem. Upper class activist Katti Anker Møller, 1913, engaged in such matters of interest to working women: decriminalize abortion, but she was alienated by the upper class women’s movement. There was no progress on abortion. For the many children born out of wedlock, Møller did a major effort by influencing Johan Castbergs “laws on children” (barnelover), passed in 1915 (parts of Conservatives and Liberals were against). The law equalized children born in and out of wedlock. Male responsibility was written into the law. Møller later also organized offices for maternal hygiene, mainly visited by working women.

**The women’s movement – the “housewife”-period 1920-70**

Upper/middle class ”women’s cause” organizations ran schools for housewives, educating women for domestic, non-wage work. Economic growth (the masse consumption/mass production “Fordist” period) allowed single-income household.

In this period (Mjøset 2016, 24ff) interventionist capitalism implied the consolidation and extension of the welfare state, but there was a male bias. Cf
Mjøset 2018 (course reading), section 6.6: "Although postwar elites were composite ones (including organic intellectuals from farmers’ and labour movements), they consisted mainly of men. The Nordic countries built a welfare state that was largely universalistic, but the supplementary pension schemes and most social policy measures were tailor-made for the male breadwinner. There was universal access to state-provided education, but men dominated in most occupations, especially those with high prestige." (See also Inger E. Haavet, “Milk, mothers and marriage”, in N. F. Christensen, et al, eds, The Nordic Model of Welfare. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum 2006). Since the late 19th century, leave in connection with childbirth was of course labelled “maternity leave” (Ellingsæter, 2012, 697). This changed only in the 1970s.

The women’s movement – Feminist period since 1970s

Now even lower class women began to acquire decent education. Women were seeking jobs in many middle class areas, and particularly in state administration and welfare state services. This led to the development of the present structure of a gender-segmented occupational structure. In this situation, there was a certain convergence of interests between women in all layers of society.

See definition of the feminist women’s movement in Mjøset 2018, section 6.6. Feminism clarifies how women are oppressed, mobilizing against discrimination of women. Note that feminism is both the name of a critical theory within social science, and the name of a social movement. Feminism started as an intellectual wave emerging in the post-war academic and literary public sphere. In the Nordic realm, feminists – as a movement – mobilized within a culture that was already marked by egalitarian ideals. The new women’s movement served to make the formal, democratic right to vote more substantive.

Abortion issue (difference, autonomy of decision). Mobilization to secure the right to self-determined abortion. Denmark, Norway and Sweden in the 1970s

Other issue areas


* division of domestic work (housework and care for children, the elderly and other persons in need).

Feminism is a middle class movement, but many of its victories implied progress for women of all classes.

Sorry for reproducing all this text. In case some candidates uses this material to write about the impact of the women’s and feminist movements’ impact on institutions, the
should of course be rewarded for that, although this material is not strictly required readings. But note that if other candidates write about the feminist movement and its impact on family policies (which is in the 2016-reading), they should not be accused of not including the material from the power-points.

My 2018 paper is a follow up to the 2016 paper, but it mainly discusses new social movements (environment, anti-immigration, anti-globalisation), and since we do not know how these have influenced institutions, they are not relevant to the assignment. However, I include the abstract of the 2018 paper, since it does contain some more material on the women’s movement (a case discussion of the internationalisation of the Nordic feminist movements in their efforts to counter the US “global gag rule” which prevents health NGOs who give advice on abortion from receiving US funds).

Abstract of the 2018-paper
This paper asks whether new social movements will be as successful as the older ones in sustaining and revising institutional complementarities, thereby enabling the Nordic countries to sustain democracy and to adjust successfully in a world economy marked by the relative decline of the West. The analysis shuttles back and forth between tracing of international developments (five sections) and comparisons of mobilisation in the Nordic area (six sections). Old social movements (religious, peasant, labour and women’s movements) were offensive ones, securing and extending democracy at the national level. Using the same set of five properties, the latest of the old movements, the women’s movement, is compared with three new ones. These new social movements (anti-waste/environmental, anti-globalisation, anti-immigration) are defensive ones, taking democracy for granted, and relating to challenges that can only be fully managed through coordination of the world’s great powers. However, international coordination is presently under pressure. In the early post-war phase of regulated internationalism, the US was strong enough to act like a generous world state. But in the present globalisation phase, US hegemony is weakened by unequal developments, spurring three crises. Generalisation of the fossil fuel-intensive growth model drives global warming. The US subprime crisis triggered financial instabilities that created sovereign debt crises, especially among the weak EU-economies. Finally, failure of the US to pursue an effective strategy as the world’s policy force in the Middle East was a main factor behind the 2015 immigration crisis, which mainly affected Europe. The Nordic countries are caught in a paradoxical situation: the issues (global warming, financial instability, migration flows from conflict zones into the rich Western world) addressed by present-day defensive social movements can only be solved by international coordination between great powers, while the history of industrial capitalism thus far shows that in phases like the present – marked by transition from globalization towards fragmentation – has been associated with a weakening (and even breakdown) of such international coordination. Thus, even if present-day social movements in the Nordic countries would be able to establish sustainable welfare states based on green industrial economies and tight control of immigration, they would remain exposed to risks of international financial instability, pressures from international commitments (e.g. human rights regimes) and climate change resulting from global warming. The new social movements in Norden will not be as successful as the older ones.
2B. Explaining the development of the Nordic comprehensive school system

**Essay assignment**
Discuss the main factors that explain the development of the Nordic comprehensive school system.

When the Pisa-measurements (OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment) were first published in 2000, only Finland among the Nordic countries scored significantly higher than the average. What additional factors are needed to explain this?

**Readings**
Blossing et al. (eds.), The Nordic Education Model: ‘A School for All’ Encounters Neo-Liberal Policy, Policy Implications of Research in Education 1, Dordrecht: Springer Science/Business Media. DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-7125-3_7 [14 p]

**Grading** – A good answer to the first question would recount the Wiborg 2004 periodization and discuss the explanatory theories that she links to each period. However, since the comprehensive system strictly speaking is the school system as it was since 1936/1950s, we should also reward essays that starts from that point in time. In both cases, we would also require some account of that systems development since the early post-war period, classical to 1970, radical to 1985 and neo-liberal/neo-conservative since then. The second question refers to Finland, which is the topic of the Sahlberg reading. Answers to that question should roughly weigh one third of the total grade for the essay. See below for an overview of the main comparative points that explain why Finland scored higher on the PISA-measures.

**Wiborg 2004 Abstract**
The purpose of this article is to outline a framework of explanation of the unique tradition of comprehensive schooling in Scandinavia. All the countries developed an all-through system of education from grade one to nine/ten with mixed ability classes for nearly all. This all-through system of education is a product of a long historical development. It will be argued that four factors shaped the development: strong state intervention, a relative egalitarian class structure, powerful Liberal Party and a strong Social Democracy.

**Sahlberg abstract**
This article argues that system-wide excellence in student learning is attainable at reasonable cost, using education policies differing from conventional market-oriented reform strategies prevalent in many other countries. In this respect, Finland is an example of a nation that has developed
from a remote agrarian/industrial state in the 1950s to a model knowledge economy, using education as the key to economic and social development. Relying on data from international student assessments and earlier policy analysis, this article describes how steady improvement in student learning has been attained through Finnish education policies based on equity, flexibility, creativity, teacher professionalism and trust. Unlike many other education systems, consequential accountability accompanied by high-stakes testing and externally determined learning standards has not been part of Finnish education policies. The insight is that Finnish education policies intended to raise student achievement have been built upon ideas of sustainable leadership that place strong emphasis on teaching and learning, intelligent accountability, encouraging schools to craft optimal learning environments and implement educational content that best helps their students reach the general goals of schooling.

The main factors explaining the Nordic comprehensive school system refers to the Wiborg 2004 paper. The comprehensive system has the following characteristics

It is typical of countries with strong state church, state dominance and commitment to equality. Instead of different types of schools existing in parallel, a common structure was developed for all children and young people extending as far up in the educational system as possible. The contrast is “mixed” school systems: Large share of private schools, curricula may not be the same across all schools, few barriers towards elite schools (upper class pupils avoid state schools). Such systems are typical of states with a weak state church and/or strong Catholic elements. Example: Ireland, US, Netherlands, UK. Comprehensive only to 4th or 5th grade, 10 or 11 years of age.

I developed the following synthetic scheme in my lecture ppt. Wiborg sketches four theories and claims that each of them fits one historical period of school development. In my view, the four theories are varieties of broader historical-sociological approaches to the study of state formation and nation building. In the scheme, you find the theories: state formation theory, class theory, peasant mobilisation theory and worker mobilisation theory.
### Key summary in the field of education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>School system</th>
<th>Time period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State formation</td>
<td>Intensive state building process → early legislation to integrate schools</td>
<td>Parallel system (3 years elementary school, elite schools)</td>
<td>Early 19th century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class</td>
<td>Egalitarian social structure. Nobility too weak to halt integration. Bourgeoisie develops, but is balanced by strong peasant movement</td>
<td>Further consolidation of universalism: public elementary schools. Transition phase to 7 years compulsory school</td>
<td>Mid-19th century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasant mobilisation</td>
<td>Peasant movement gains strength through representation (local and state level) → Strong liberal parties based on peasants and teachers</td>
<td>Linear school structure: elementary (3 to 5 years) → middle school (4 to 6 years) → secondary school (3 years)</td>
<td>Norway 1869 Sweden/ Denmark 1890s to 1903/05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker mobilisation (strong social democracy)</td>
<td>Worker mobilisation. Labour movement: party and unions. Proportional representation voting system. Red green alliances</td>
<td>Termination of middle school → the comprehensive school system, all-through system in all compulsory school years</td>
<td>Norway 1936 Sweden 1950s Denmark 1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A certain radicalization</td>
<td>Mixed-ability classes: Termination of streaming (selection to academic versus vocational tracks)</td>
<td>1970s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I include here also my more detailed slides on each of these periods.

*State formation theory explains early 19th century fusion*

Countries with intensive state building processes established public school systems early: England, France, Germany. Also in Denmark/Norway and Sweden under absolutism: well-educated civil servants were needed. England only had a small patronage-based civil service, while the Scandinavian countries (Denmark in particular) had a meritocratic link between schools and the state. In late 18th century reforms, public schooling was established both in rural and urban areas. Laws on universal compulsory schooling (breaking with the parallel system): Denmark 1814, Norway 1824, Sweden 1842. In the late 19th century, half of the secondary schools in Scandinavia were controlled by the state. The rest were mostly subject to state law and largely funded by the state. “The Scandinavian states, together with the church, initially promoted schooling for the lower classes in order to promote Christianity and to encourage patriotism and loyalty to the state.” (Wiborg 2004, 86).

But this factor did not *always* generate integrated/comprehensive systems. Also France and Prussia had intensive state building, but they did not abolish their parallel systems. *“State theory” explains the early start of school integration in Scandinavia.* However, Wiborg argues that class theory is needed to explain how these countries managed to abolish the (parallel) lower part of the secondary school, replacing it with a *middle school.*
Class theory explains the further success of the singular school structure

“Relative egalitarianism of the social structures”, in particular the spread of family farming (a large, independent Yeoman peasantry), and the relatively small nobility (or absent, as in Norway and Iceland), which implied limited political influence by a noble aristocracy (see also Mjøset 2016 reading, p 13-15).

Wiborg claims that there was a slow take off into industrialization in the second half of the 19th century. But this analysis is dubious. She claims that only Sweden had a large scale industry, only in forestry, and only after World War I (Wiborg 2004, 87). This misrepresents the timing of industrialization in Sweden (see Mjøset 2016, p 12 for early industrialization 1830s-1870s, p 14 for industrialization 1870s to 1910s). Her statement: ”absence of large industrial magnates”, and ”lack of any sizeable industrial working class” is too strong.

Still, the contrast she establishes, holds in relative terms: England, France, Germany had stronger bourgeoisies, and landed upper classes fought against comprehensive primary plus secondary schools. In Norden, even children of bourgeois families attended public elementary schools, which had good quality due to the school acts. These elementary schools became the basis of a singular school structure. Private elementary schools vanished. Symmetrically: many peasant children advanced to secondary school (late 19th century between 15 and 18%). Both levels thus increasingly ”served all classes”.

Peasant mobilization – powerful Liberal party – explains timing of the linear school structure: Norway first, Denmark/Sweden later.

State theory and class theory only serves as preconditions. A full explanation, claims Wiborg, must consider the role of political factors. Landowning family farmers emerged as politically active from the 1840s (see also Mjøset 2016, p. 11ff on peasant mobilisation). The basis of Liberal parties was peasants and teachers. Their growth in the late 19th century weakened the conservative forces (based on bureaucracy and/or nobles).

Norway introduced the “linear school structure” already in 1869, Sweden & Denmark only 20 years later. Norway had no second chamber, Denmark/Sweden had, since they had some nobility (Wiborg 2004, 89). In Sweden, the upper chamber turned down several reform plans proposed by the liberals in the lower chamber. In Sweden and Denmark, comprehensive schooling reform was caught up in parliamentary conflict between liberals and conservatives. But the liberals won in 1903 (Denmark), and 1905 (Sweden).

Worker mobilization - strong Social Democracy explains the all-through compulsory system

The middle school was replaced by “all-through system of education in all the compulsory school years”. Wiborg relates this to the growth of the social
democratic parties, interacting with worker mobilisation through unions, in a setting of proportional representation electoral systems (for this background, see Mjøset 2016, 20-22). Farmers parties split from liberal parties (from conservatives in Sweden), and would support social democratic parties (“red-green” alliances of the late 1930s, repercussions of this alliance in the stabilized post-war 1950s; see next slide: Norway 1936, Denmark & Sweden, 1950s). The latter would also appeal to white-collar state employees. Social democratic parties, liberals and agrarian parties were crucial to school legislation in the 20th century.

Result: a ”system of all-through, mixed-ability, comprehensive education which is unique, at least in Europe, to the Scandinavian states” (Wiborg 2004, 91). The next slide shows the timing of the emergence of the comprehensive school system.

This development is also briefly summarized in LM 2016 (p. 30) [course reading, see reference below under 2C].

The old ‘parallel system’ restricted the number of pupils that could enter grammar schools, which further allowed entry into higher education. (...) All the Nordic countries switched to a comprehensive school system integrating both theoretical and practical education, neutral in terms of class, gender and intelligence. The years were 1962 in Sweden (nine years comprehensive education, decided in 1950), 1968 in Finland, 1969 in Norway (seven years comprehensive education 1936) and 1972 in Denmark and Iceland (Sysiharju 1981, 422−423). In this system, all pupils have a chance of choosing any further educational route. It has relatively few school tracks and few private schools (Denmark is an exception here). Schools do not differ much in terms of their capacity to teach the curricula. Such a system minimizes the effects of class background. Still, it was unavoidable that to some extent the earlier vocational/general education dichotomy was reproduced within secondary schools.

Note that the years mentioned are the final versions of the comprehensive system, in Norway: niårig school in 1969, but the start of it was 1936.

In my lecture, I used the Volckmar/Wiborg 2014 reading to distinguish the “classical” period 1945-70, the radical period 1970-85 and the neo-liberal/neo-conservative period since the 1980s.

The Finnish case

Sahlberg emphasizes that Finland’s development diverges from general trends in Europe (including the other Nordic countries). He notes the high status of teachers, which was maybe the case in all the Nordics just after 1945, but only in Finland teachers have maintained that high rank (and uniquely, all teachers have to take an MA) until today. Furthermore, in Finland the radical, decentralized model that all the Nordics experimented with in the radical period (1970s), was maintained while the other Nordics have had waves of reforms. Given some serious fiscal problems for the state (especially in the 1990s), Finland could not afford reforms. Finland retained the
experimental style typical of all the primary/secondary school systems in the 1970s. Many experts were highly sceptical of the Finnish system, complaining about a serious mismatch between its standards and the needs of a flexible efficient economic sphere. However, in 1990, when the Pisa-results were first published, Finland scored highest (with Japan and other Asian peak performers), while none of the other Nordic countries differed from the OECD average. One might argue that Finland has more democracy in its educational system: curriculum is decentralized to the separate schools, there are hardly any national tests, and teachers are trusted to cater for the pupil’s individual needs.

Sahlberg has five reasons why Finland was so successful. (1) The comprehensive system, which is common with the other Nordics, but the rest of the factors are specific to Finland. (2) Well-trained, high status teachers, i.e. all have MAs. (3) Intelligent accounting, meaning that the schools at the local level are the units most responsible for learning outcomes. (4) Culture of trust, each school choses its own strategy, method and schedules. (5) Sustainable leadership: instead of overall reforms, teachers have been trusted to make the right choices at the local level. In my lecture, I also added one more factor which is the Finnish system of special education teachers that select and work with problem-pupils are the earliest possible stage of their educational career. This is being emulate din many countries, Norway included.
2C. The welfare state and citizenship policies

Essay assignment
During the 1960s and 1970s, when the welfare state was generalized and strengthened in the Nordic area, there was not much discussion about citizenship. However, since the 1980s and 1990s, citizenship policies (naturalization policies) have become a divisive topic in politics.

Compare citizenship policies in at least two countries, with special reference to their importance for debates on the welfare state. You can choose two Nordic countries, or compare one Nordic country with a non-Nordic country that you know.

Main readings:


Grading: A good essay should use one or more of the pairs in the table below (ethnos/demos, etc), placing Denmark on the ethnos side and Sweden on the demos-side, with Norway in between. Then they should go on to compare two of them, or to compare one of them with a country of their own choice. Since Asian countries are generally to the ethnos side, Sweden would be a good choice for comparison, but some candidates might feel they know Norway better. Since France’s tradition is to the demos-side, Denmark would be a good case for comparison. Then main thing, however, is that the comparison is as systematic and comprehensive as possible. You can use the table below (in dimensions of citizenship policies) as a checklist.

I now turn to the topic. The latter 2010-paper has this abstract

This article analyzes the recent changes in naturalization policies in three Nordic countries, Norway, Denmark and Sweden. Considering the homogeneity of the region in terms of culture, social structure and polity, the discrepancy in current citizenship regulation is remarkable. Similar problem definitions have generated diametrical opposite solutions. This is even more striking as the three countries, hailing on perceived ideas of common interests and various experiences of shared rule in different political constellations for the best part of the last 500 years, also cooperated closely in forging their national citizenship legislation from the 1880s up till 1979. The article gives perspective to this novel variation, analyzing the interplay between aims and means in the naturalization policies. Basic questions like citizenship rights, the social and cultural cohesion of the nation state, national ideology and questions of identity will be addressed.
I refer to the two relevant papers as HB (Hagelund & Brochmann) and BS (Brochmann & Seland). They analyse three Scandinavian countries: Denmark, Norway and Sweden (I often abbreviate: D, N, S). The candidates can compare two of these, but they can also chose one of these, comparing with a non-Nordic country, e.g. their home country.

Naturalization (or citizenship) policies is used according to the terminology of international law: “describing the act of giving a foreigner the formal right of citizenship.”

HB/BS does qualitative analysis, mainly looking at the legislation (legal sources) and the discussions that led to the proposal, as can be gathered from white papers, expert investigations (like NOUs):

The citizenship law can in many ways be seen as a national presentation of self; what it takes to become naturalized, indirectly indicates what it means to be a member of the national community. In what ways can such reflections be detected in the central documents in the three countries?

The wording in the assignment

During the 1960s and 1970s, when the welfare state was generalized and strengthened in the Nordic area, there was not much discussion about citizenship. However, since the 1980s and 1990s, citizenship policies (naturalization policies) have become a divisive topic in politics.

…refers to BS’ concluding remarks (440). Candidates may note how HB/BS has an implicit periodization. The legislation in the Scandinavian countries were coordinated and converging until the late 1970s (see BS, 432, and HB, 149). They claim (BS, 440) (but just as a hypotheses to be investigated) that differences in nationhood traditions reach back in history, but before 1979 they were set aside with reference to intraregional (Nordic) migration. Immigration was also low, naturalization was not politicized.

The late 1960s to the late 1970s, however, was a period marked by an unexperienced attitude of multiculturalism within the old legislative framework. Increasing flows of immigrants led to a strengthened emphasis on definition of national interests (if this was a period of globalization, it did not extend to labour flows from poorer into richer areas.) As discussions spread on how to revise and upgrade citizenship legislation, the result was citizenship regimes that diverged strikingly. The change came in the 1990s, with an increasing number of refugees and asylum seekers, and was strengthened after 9/11 with even more concern for national cohesion.

After the revisions, HB sees D and S as polar cases with Norway in-between. While the similar early naturalization policies were all based on ethnos (see table), the revisions since the 1990s saw Denmark strengthening this feature, while Sweden turned to the demos-tradition.

Jus sanguinis, the ethnic principle, they note, is a powerful force, indicating the relative ethnic homogeneity of the Nordic countries (although there was of course a
Sami population). In the legal revisions studied by HB/BS, Sweden turned to the demos approach, which presupposes that foreigners can be integrated by being included to take part in social and political processes. In contrast, the Danish legislation increasingly implied that foreigners opting for Danish citizenship should prove their worthiness for this over an extended period before being granted citizenship. Denmark thus sticks closer to jus sanguinis, were elements of the legislation demotivate immigration, trying to restrict entry by newcomers. The Swedish legal framework, in contrast, seems to aim at easing a newcomer’s integration. D has more restrictive (both stricter access control and stricter welfare policies). S is liberal (emphasizing the importance of labour supply in the economy) and has a humanitarian ideology. At the time of writing (papers are from 2009/10), Sweden had not had a far rightist party in government. Norway – in the middle – wants reinforced nationhood but also a retained humanitarian image.

**Overlapping terminology in BH/BS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle of national identity</th>
<th>Ethnos</th>
<th>Demos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of nationhood</td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>Civic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naturalization principle</td>
<td>jus sanguinis</td>
<td>jus soli/jus domicilis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brubaker’s classic comparison</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In a comparison involving non-Scandinavian cases, Japan (for instance) would be an even more radical version of the Danish approach, and a comparison with Sweden would give a strong polarisation.

Here is a tabular overview of the three countries (all this information is in HB/BS), but not in tabular form, I draw this one from Arnfinn Midtbøen (Midtbøen, Arnfinn Haagensen (2015). Citizenship, integration and the quest for social cohesion: nationality reform in the Scandinavian countries. *Comparative Migration Studies*. 3(3).

**Overview of key provisions in the nationality legislation of the Scandinavian countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Provisions</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance of dual citizenship</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No*</td>
<td>No*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Required time of residence</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>7 years</td>
<td>9 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceremony to mark naturalization</td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oath of allegiance</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Compulsory when attending ceremony</td>
<td>Compulsory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requirement for language proficiency</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Indirectly, in the form of documented language training</td>
<td>Yes, separate language exam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requirement for knowledge of society</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Indirectly, as part of language training</td>
<td>Yes, separate citizenship exam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requirements for financial self-sufficiency</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to citizenship when conditions are fulfilled</td>
<td>Several groups, not all</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Only second-generation Nordic citizens</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Allegedly, Denmark will accept dual citizenship in the summer of 2015.*
The BS paper discusses three main aspects of citizenship law: (1) dual citizenship, (2) required time of residence, and (3) required skills. They also discuss parallels and differences between Swedish and Norwegian debates on dual citizenship, and the same for Danish/Norwegian debates on language courses/citizenship tests. As for the first, in the NOU 32 (2000), where the majority suggested dual citizenship in Norway (like they had decided in Sweden), the minority position did point to the cultural aspects of citizenship, opposing dual citizenship, criticizing the narrow definition of integration as just converging living standards. Norway’s Bondevik II government (centre/right) went with the minority.

In the following I provide some additional notes, although they have at least indirect relevance for the actual grading.

It is a problem that the readings are about 10 years old. Over these 10 years, the Swedish stance has been modified somewhat, given the massive success of the Sweden Democrats in the last two elections, the experiences during the 2015 migration shock, and growing indications of problems of crime and drugs in suburbs of the largest cities.

Another interesting recent change relates to dual citizenship. BS seems quite sure that both Denmark and Norway has buried ideas of dual citizenship. But by 2015, Denmark had introduced it, and in 2019, Norway also passed a law to allow it, effective from 1.1.2020. Consider here a recent paper by Arnfinn Midtbøen (Midtbøen, Arnfinn Haagensen (2019). Dual Citizenship in an Era of Securitisation: The Case of Denmark. Nordic Journal of Migration Research. doi: 10.2478/njmr-2019-0014) He suggests an explanation of the unexpected convergence of both Denmark and Norway with Sweden:

> The gradual acceptance of dual citizenship in Western countries since the early 1990s has been seen either as a symptom of a post-national era or as a pragmatic adjustment to the transnational realities of international migration. By contrast, the case of Denmark shows that dual citizenship may serve as a lever to protect the political community of the nation-state from terrorism and, as such, function as a tool of securitisation.

Cynically, one might say that politicians on the right wing changed their mind because they found out that it would be easier to expatriate people with a dual citizenship. The various tragic events related to jihadi warriors travelling to engage in the Syrian civil wars possibly triggered this reflection.

It would be great if some of the candidates are so up to date that they think of this, but we cannot require that.

Let me also note two problems in HB/BS:

(1) The HB paper starts by noting a major paradox: Sweden scores lowest on OECD indicators of immigrants’ labour market integration, but it is at the very top of the Migrant Integration Policy Index concerning integration policies, which taps the
formal extension of rights to immigrants. Paradoxically, strong rights do not seem to promote societal (here: economic) integration? This paradox can be resolved in several ways: Some economists claim that welfare state rights for immigrants may entail a disincentive to work (this is discussed in the Are Skeie Hermansen readings). Other may claim that there are still socio-cultural features of the labour market/civil society that causes immigrants to be discriminated. However, through the rest of the HB paper, their analysis only covers the legislation and policy statements. I.e. they discuss the “ideals” without every linking back to analyses of the “realities”.

(2) HB/BS also use the term “denizenship”. It is probably not well defined. The term goes back to medieval British law, where a person could gain permanent residence but not full citizenship. This was quicker, cheaper and simpler than becoming a citizen, but the number of rights gained were less than for citizens. They claim (BS, 441f) that today, substantive social rights are covered in denizenship institutions (or by institutionalization of human rights), and thus “the legal citizenship proper will most importantly be of political and symbolic significance” (442). “The renewed importance of national sovereignty in relation to citizenship law in Scandinavia may signal more individual revisions also in the equal treatment policy and hereby in the generous denizenship policy of the 1980s and 1990s.” (442) This also leads them to emphasize that

The formal principles of naturalization by either jus sanguinis or jus domicilis are shared and respected by all three Scandinavian countries. With exception of the mandate of language skills (and, in Denmark, knowledge of Danish society and history), the overall kinds of requirements necessary for obtaining citizenship are more or less the same between the states. The national adaptation and understanding of the same requirements, however, hail on different ideals of what it takes to become a member of the national group. These ideals are, however, clearly and directly formulated only in the Swedish case. (442)

To me this analysis is not so clear. The main problem is that they never give a proper definition or any substantive examples of “denizenship institutions”. We may reward candidates who are able to make sense out of this, but we should not penalize candidates that fail to mention the concept.