The texts wich are marked with an * are the curriculum.
Rabin, M: "A Perspective on Psychology and Economics" in European Economic Review, 46, pp. 657-685, 2002.
Camerer, C and G. Loewenstein : Behavoiral Economics: Past, Present, Future, 2003. Mimeo, Carnegie Mellon University.
Rabin, M: "Psychology and Economics" in Journal of Economic Literature, 36, pp. 11-46, 1998.
Laibson, D. and R. Zeckhauser: "Amos Tversky and the Ascent of Behavioral Economics" in Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1998.
Topic 1: Behavioral decision theory
* Kahneman, D., J. Knetsch,and R. Thaler: "Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias" in Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5, pp. 193-206, 1992.
Expected utility and conjunction fallacy:
Hylland, A.: Decisions under uncertainty - Standard theory and alternatives, 2003.
* Tversky A. and D. Khaneman: "Extensional versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgement" in Psychological Review, 91, pp. 293-315, 1984.
* Chateauneuf, A. and P. Wakker: "An axiomatixation of Cumulative Prospect Theory for Decision Under Risk" in Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 18, pp. 137-145, 1999. (Only part 1. Pasic Concepts).
* Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky: "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk" in Econometrica, 47, pp. 263-291.
* Plott, C R and K Zeiler: The Willingness to Pay-Willingness to Accept Gap, the "Endowment Effect", Subject Miscounceptions and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Values, American Economic Review 95, pp. 530-545, 2005.
* Rabin, M. and R. Thaler: "Anomalies: Risk aversion" in Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15, pp. 219-232, 2001.
Camerer, C.: "Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence from the Field" in Choices, Values and Frames, 2000.
Rabbin, Matthew: "Risk Aversion and Expected-Utility Theory: A Calibration Theorem" in Econometrica, 68, pp. 1281-1292, 2000.
Starmer, C.: "Developments in Nonexpected-Utility Theory: The Hunt for å Descriptive Theory of Choice Under Risk" in Journal of Economic Literature, 38, pp. 332-382, 2000.
Mental accounting, endowment effects, and the equity premium puzzle:
* Benartzi, S. and R. Thaler: "Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle" in Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, pp. 73-92, 195.
* Thaler, R.: "Mental Accounting Matters" in Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 12, pp. 183-206, 1999.
* Kahneman, D., J. Knetsch, and R. Thaler: "Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem" in Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1325-1348, 1990.
* List, J.: "Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from Marketplace" in Econometrica, 72, pp. 615-625, 2004.
Barberis, N., M. Huang, and T. Santos: "Prospect Theory and Asset Prices" in Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, pp. 1-53, 2001.
Camerer, C., L. Babcock, G. Loewenstein, and R. Thaler: "Labor Supply of New York City Cabdrivers: One Day at a Time" in Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, pp. 407-443, 1997.
Prelec, D. and G. Loewenstein: "The Red and the Black: Mental Accounting of Savings and Debt" in Marketing Science, 17, pp. 4-28, 1998.
Topic 2: Time inconsistency and self-control.
* Frederick, S., G. Loewenstein, and T. O'Donoghue: "Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review" in Journal of Economic Literature, 40, pp. 351-401, 2002.
Loewenstein, G. and D. Prelec: "Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and an Interpretation" in Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, pp. 573-597, 1992.
Rubinstein, A.: "Discussion of 'Behavioral Economics'" in To appear in : Advances in Economics and Econometrics - Theory and Applications, Ninth World Congress of the Econometric Society.
General economic models of time-inconsistent preferences:
Strotz, R.H.: "Myopia and Inconsistency in DynamicUtility Maximization" in Review of Economic Studies, 23, pp. 165-180, 1956.
Goldman, S.M.: "Consistent Plans" in Review of Economic Studies, 47, pp. 533-537, 1980.
* O'Donoghue, T. and M. Rabin: "Doing it Now or Later" in American Economic Review, 89, pp. 103-124, 1999.
* Laibson, D.: "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting" in Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, pp. 443-477, 1997.
* Laibson, D. : "Life-Cycle Consumption and Hyperbolic Discount Functions" in European Economic Review, 42, pp. 861-871, 1998.
* Angeletos, G. -M., D. Laibson, A. Repetto, J. Tobacman, and S. Weinberg: "The Hyperbolic Consumption Model: Calibration, Simulation, and Empirical Evaluation" in Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15, pp. 47-68, 2001.
O'Donoghue, T. and M. Rabin: "Choice and Procrastination" in Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, pp. 121-160, 2001.
Ariely, D. and K. Wertenbroch: "Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance: Self-Control by Precommitment" in Psychological Science, 13, pp. 219-224, 2002.
Gul, F. and W. Pesendorfer: "Temptation and Self-Control" in Econometrica, 69, pp. 1403-1435.
* Gul, F. and W. Pesendorfer: "Self-Control and Theory of Consumption" in Econometrica, 72, pp. 392-406, 2004.
* Thaler, R. and H. Sherfin: "An Economic Theory of Self-Control" in Journal of Political Economy, 89, pp. 392-406, 1981.
* Fudenberg, D. and D.M. Levine: A dual-self model of impulse control, 2006. American Economic Review, 96, pp. 1449-1476.
Topic 3: Social preferences and fairness
* Fehr, E. and U. Fischbacher: "Why Social Preferences Matter - the Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives" in Economic Journal, 112, pp. C1-C33, 2002.
* Sobel, J.: "Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity" in Journal of Economic Literature 43, pp. 392-436, 2005.
* Camerer, C. : "Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust Games" in Chapter 2 in : Behavioral Game Theory. Experiments in Strategic Interaction, pp. 43-113, 2003. Princeton University Press/Russell Sage Foundation.
Smith, V. L.: "Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economics and Psychology" in Journal of Political Economy, 99, pp. 877-897, 1991.
* Fehr, Ernst, and K.M. Schmidt: "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation" in Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, pp. 817-868, 1999.
* Camerer, C: "Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust Games", Behavioral Game Theory. Experiments in strategic interaction, pp. 101-104, 2003. Princeton University Press/Russell Sage Foundation.
* Camerer, C: "Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust Games", Behavioral Game Theory. Experiments in strategic interaction, pp. 105-117, 2003. Princeton University Press/Russell Sage Foundation. Chapter 2.8.4 (Extensive-Form Fairness Equilibrium) can be skipped.
Rabin, M: "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics" in American Economic Review 83, pp. 1281-1302.
Fehr, E., and S. Gächter: "Altruistic Punishment in Humans" in Nature 415, pp. 137-140, 2002.
* Nyborg, K and M Rege: "Does Public Policy Crowd Out Private Contributions to Public Goods?" in Public Choice 115 (3), pp. 397-418.
Andreoni, J: "Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence" in Journal of Political Economy 97 (6), pp. 1447-1458.
Frey, B.: "Pricing and Regulating Affect Environmental Ethics" in Environmental and Resource Economics, 2, pp. 399-414, 1992.
Social norms and social approval
Akerlof, G A (1980): "A Theory of Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence" in Quarterly Journal of Economics 94 (4), pp. 749-775.
Lindbeck, A (1997): "Incentives and Social Norms in Household Behaviour" in American Economic Review 87 (2), pp. 370-377.
* Nyborg, K., and M. Rege: "On Social Norms: The Evolution of Considerate Smoking Behavior" in Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, 52, pp. 323-340, 2003.