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1st lecture
Introduction, Markets and
Uncertainty
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## Practical matters.

- Most lectures here at this time (Wednesday 12-14)
- Lecture 2 and 4 in Auditorium 6
- Lecture 3 on Tuesday 12-14, Auditorium 4
- Curriculum
- Papers are linked up in the schedule
- Chapters form Colin Camerer (2003) are in a Kompendium


## Department of Economics

## (4) vivetionsititit

## Three main topics

- Decision theory (Lectures 1-4)
- Decisions under uncertainty
- Time preferences (Lectures 5-8)
- $10 \$$ today versus $11 \$$ tomorrow
- $10 \$$ ten days from versus $11 \$$ after 11 days
- Justice / Non-selfish behavior (L 9-13)
- Share 100 kroner with a recipient/responder
- Dictators share
- Responders reject unfair offers
- But we will also discuss experimental markets today.


## Time preferences / Self control

- It is a good idea to read the papers before the lectures, and to allocate work evenly over the semester
- Most students know
- Some lack the self control to do it.
- But then:
- Who is the 'self' if not the student?
- If it is the student, who is the 'self' controlling?


## Study pre-commitment technique

- Suppose at the start of the semester you decide to
- Solve all seminar exercises in advance
- Read all relevant papers on the reading list before each lecture
- Attend all lectures and seminars
- But you know that you (maybe) will not follow through
- And that you will regret as exams are approaching
- Make a contract with another student
- Attend at least $90 \%$ of lectures and seminars - have someone to sign. - Have written answers to $80 \%$ of all seminar problem (signed)
- If the contract is not met - give 1000 kroner to an organization that you disagree strongly with.
- Homo oeconomicus would not need this contract
- Why do we need it?


## Social preferences

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- When you watch someone in pain and when you yourself is in pain, some of the same neurons light up in your brain.
- Old wisdom: We share others pain, sorrow, happiness.
- But may enjoy their pain if they have done us wrong
- Is it then reasonable to assume my utility only depend on my own consumption?
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## Experimental economics

- Nobel Price in economics 2002
- Daniel Kahneman: "For having integrated insights from psychological research into economic science, especially concerning human judgment and decision-making under uncertainty"
- Vernon L. Smith: "For having established laboratory experiments as a tool in empirical economic analysis, especially in the study of alternative market mechanisms".
- This course - my part in particular - mainly in the Kahneman tradition.
- A brief visit to the Smith tradition.


## Experiment

- hitto://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/da/da2.php
- http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/admin.htm
- kab1
- Students will need to use this session name to join your experiment.
They can log in
from veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/login.htm
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## Information

- Note that you only know your own payoff
- The equilibrium can only be computed if you knew everybody's payoff.
- The market reveal this information
- In some experiment the value of an item is unknown and depend on the state.
- If two players know the state other not, then everybody learn the state within seconds.
- You cannot make a profit from knowing that the state is high without making a bid, thus revealing that you know the state is good.
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## Induced values

- The payoff is controlled by experimenter.
- You where told how much the item was worth/cost
- No social construction of values
- No fashion
- Still, we do not have perfect control of the utility function.
- Some players may prefer to leave the lab with 50 kroner less but a better conscience
- This will in particular be the case in the experiments discussed in the last part of the course.


## Experiments in Economics

- They are always paid.
- Deception is not allowed
- Deception is used in psychology
- E.g. The Asch experiment.
- Lab experiment with students dominates
- But an increasing amount of field experiment.



## (4) vivetionsititit

## Back to decision theory

- Use your smartphone or PC
- If you do not have one join one who does have.


## Linda

"Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations."
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## The dice with 4 green faces

- We roll a dice with 4 green $(G)$ and 2 red (R) faces
- Write R on the board if face is Red and G if Green.
- Rolled 20 times, produce a sequence of 20 letters, R or G
- Choose one of three sequences, If your sequence appear you win $\$ 25$
- The three sequences are:

1. RGRRR
2. GRRRRR
3. GRGRRR

## Conditional probability

- Suppose HIV-test has the following quality
- Non-infected have $99.9 \%$ probability of negative
- Infected always test positive
- Base rate:
- It is known before the test is done
- only 1 out of 1000 of those who take the test, are infected.
- Bill did a HIV-test and got a positive. What is the probability that Bill are in fact infected?
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## Fundamental law of statistics

- If the event $A$ is contained in $B$ then $\operatorname{Pr}(A) \leq \operatorname{Pr}(B)$
- Example: An urn contains Red, Blue and

Green balls. A ball is drawn at random $\operatorname{Pr}($ Red OR Blue) $\geq \operatorname{Pr}$ (Red)

- Conjunctions: $\mathrm{A} \& \mathrm{~B}$ is contained in B $\operatorname{Pr}(A \& B) \leq \operatorname{Pr}(B)$
- Applies to all alternatives to probability, like Belief functions and non-additive measures
$\qquad$ Pr(Red OR Blue) $\geq \operatorname{Pr}($ Red $)$
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## Bill

- Bill is 34 years old. He is intelligent but unimaginative, compulsive, and generally lifeless. In school he was strong in mathematics but weak in social studies and humanities.
- Bill is a physician who play poker for a hobby
- Bill is an architect
- Bill is an accountant (A)
- Bill plays jazz for a hobby (J) [Rank 4.5]
- Bill surfs for a hobby
- Bill is a reporter
- Bill is an accountant who play jazz for a hobby (A \& J) [Rank 2.5]
- Bill climbs mountains for a hobby.


## Indirect and Direct tests

- Indirect versus direct
- Are both $A \& B$ and $A$ in same questionnaire?
- Paper show that direct and indirect tests yield roughly the same result.
- Transparent
- Argument 1: Linda is more likely to be a bank teller than she is to be a feminist bank teller, because every feminist bank teller is a bank teller, but some bank tellers are not feminists and Linda could be one of them ( $35 \%$ )
- Argument 2: Linda is more likely to be a feminist bank teller than she is likely to be a bank teller, because she resembles an active feminist more than she resembles a bank teller ( $65 \%$ )
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## Sophistication

- Graduate student social sciences at UCB and Stanford
- Credit for several statistics courses
- "Only $36 \%$ committed the fallacy"
- Likelihood rank T\&F (3.5) < T (3.8) "for the first time?"
- But:
- Report sophisticated in Table 1.1, no effect
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## As a lottery

- "If you could win $\$ 10$ by betting on an event, which of the following would you choose to bet on? (check one)"
- "Only" 56 \% choose T\&F over F


## Department of Economics

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## (6) Univinsititit

How to make the optimal decision in theory

- For each alternative action:
- Make an assessment of the probability distribution of outcomes
- Compute the expected utility associated with each such probability distribution
- Choose the action that maximize expected utility
- How do people make probability assessment?


## Extensional versus intuitive

- Extensional reasoning
- Lists, inclusions, exclusions. Events
- Formal statistics.
- If $A \subset B, \operatorname{Pr}(\mathrm{~A}) \geq \operatorname{Pr}(\mathrm{B})$
- Moreover: $(A \& B) \subset B$
- Intuitive reasoning
- Not extensional
- Heuristic
- Availability
- Representativity.
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## Representative versus probable

- "It is more representative for a Hollywood actress to be divorced 4 times than to vote Democratic." (65\%)
- But
- "Among Hollywood actresses there are more women who vote Democratic than women who are divorced 4 times." (83\%)
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## Representative heuristic

- While people know the difference between representative and probable they are often correlated
- More probable that a Hollywood actress is divorced 4 times than a the probability that an average woman is divorced 4 times.
- Thus representativity works as a heuristic for probability.
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## Availability Heuristics

- We assess the probability of an event by the ease with witch we can create a mental picture of it.
- Works good most of the time.
- Frequency of words
- $\mathrm{A}_{-}{ }_{---\quad \text { ing (13.4\%) }}$
- $\mathrm{B}:_{-----} \mathrm{n}_{-} \quad$ (4.7\%)
- Now, $A \subseteq B$ and hence $\operatorname{Pr}(\mathrm{B}) \geq \operatorname{Pr}(\mathrm{A})$
- But ....ing words are easier to imagine
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## Predicting Wimbledon.

- Provided Bjørn Borg makes it to the final:
- He had won 5 times in a row, and was perceived as very strong.
- What is the probability that he will ( $1=$ most probable)
- Lose the first set (2.7)
- Lose the first set but win the match (2.2)
- It was easier to make a mental image of Bjørn Borg winning at Wimbledon, than losing.


## 

## We like small samples to be representative

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- Dice with 4 green $(G)$ and two red (R) faces
- Rolled 20 times, and sequence recorded
- Bet on a sequence, and win $\$ 25$ if it appear

1. RGRRR
$33 \%$
2. GRGRRR
65\%
3. GRRRRR
2\%

- Now most subject avoid the fallacy with the transparent design


## More varieties

- Doctors commit the conjunction fallacy in medical judgments
- Adding reasons
- NN had a heart attack
- NN had a heart attack and is more than 55 years old
- Watching TV affect our probability assessment of violent crimes, divorce and heroic doctors. (O'Guinn and Schrum)
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The critique from Gigerenser et.al

- The Linda-case provide lots of irrelevant information
- The word 'probability' has many meanings
- Only some corresponds to the meaning in mathematical statistics.
- We are good at estimating probabilities
- But only in concrete numbers
- Not in abstract contingent probabilities.
- Of 100 persons who fit the description of Linda.
- How many are bank tellers?
- How many are bank tellers and active in the femininist movement?
- Now people get the numbers right


## More on Linda

- In Kahenman and Tversky's version even sophisticated subject violate basic probability
- The concrete number framing removes the error
- Shleifer (JEL 2012) in a review of Kahneman's recent book (Thinking fast and slow.)
- «This misses the point. Left to our own devices [no-one reframes
to concrete numbers] we do not engage in such breakdowns"
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## The base rate fallacy

- Bill and The HIV-test
- Non-infected have $99.9 \%$ probability of negative
- Infected always test positive
- 1 out of 1000 who are tested, are infected.
- A representative population of 1001 persons tested
- 1000 are not infected, on average 1 test positive
- 1 person is infected and test positive
- Thus 2 persons test positive and one of them are infected.
- Conditional probability: $50 \%$ probability that Bill is infected


## Suppose we test 1001 persons

- Statistically 1 will be infected and test positive
- Of the 1000 remaining, $99,9 \%$ will test negative, and one will test positive. (on average)
- If Bill did a HIV-test and got a positive. What is the probability that Bill is in fact infected?
- Write down your answer.
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## An advise

- If you want to learn statistical theory, especially understand contingent probabilities and Bayesian updating:
- Translate into concrete numbers
- This will enhance
- Your understanding when you study it, and
- Your ability retain what you have learned 10 years from now.
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## For the seminar

A dice has four Green (G) faces and two Red (R) faces. The dice will be rolled 20 times, and the result ( R or G ) will be written down. This will produce a sequence of 20 letters.
You can choose one of the three short sequences below:

1. RGRRR
2. GRGRRR
3. GRRRRR,

Suppose that if your chosen sequence appears in the sequence of 20 letters, you would win 500 kroner. Which one of the sequences 1.-3. would you prefer?

- Ask 4 students each, two sophisticated and two non-sophisticated.
- You may collaborate and attend lectures for first year students and students at intermediate/advanced courses in statistics at the math department.
- Send me the results prior to 3rd lecture.


## Probabilities

- In a text over 10 standard novel-pages, how many 7-letter words are of the form:

1. _-_-_n_
2. _-_-_ly
3. ___-_ing
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## Expected utility

- This is a theory for ranking lotteries
- Can be seen as normative: This is how I wish my preferences looked like
- Or descriptive: This is how people actually choose between lotteries
- A litle note showing some basic ideas of a proof will be provided, but I will here only:
- Explain what expected utility is
- Discuss the basic axiom - the independence axiom
- The note try to present the basic intuition on why expected utility follows from this axiom
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## What is a lottery?

- A list of possible outcome: $\mathrm{x} 1, \mathrm{x} 2, \mathrm{x} 3 \ldots, \mathrm{xn}$
- Associated probabilities p1,p2,...pn
- Probabilities add to one.
- Example1: 100 kroner with $40 \%$ probability and -20 koner with 60\% probability
- A lottery can have only one outcome:
- 70 kroner with $100 \%$ probability - that is 70 kroner for sure.
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## Notation

$-\left(x_{1}, p_{1} ; \ldots ; x_{n}, p_{n}\right) \quad$ means

- $x_{1}$ with probability $p_{1}$;
- ... and
- $x_{n}$ with probability $p_{n}$
- Null outcomes not listed:
- $\left(\mathrm{x}_{1}, \mathrm{p}_{1}\right)$ means $\mathrm{x}_{1}$ with probability $\mathrm{p}_{1}$ and 0 with probability $1-p_{1}$
$-(x)$ means $x$ with certainty.


## (4) indionsititet

## As usual - a utility function can represent reasonable preferences

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- $\left(x_{1}, p_{1} ; x_{2}, p_{2} ; x_{3}, p_{3}\right) \succcurlyeq\left(y_{1}, q_{1} ; y_{2}, q_{2} ; y_{3}, q_{3}\right)$,
- If and only if
- $\mathrm{U}\left(x_{1}, p_{1} ; x_{2}, p_{2} ; x_{3}, p_{3}\right) \succcurlyeq U\left(y_{1}, q_{1} ; y_{2}, q_{2} ; y_{3}, q_{3}\right)$
- Expected utility claim that the utility function has a particular form, e.g. linear in probabilities
- $U=\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_{i} u\left(x_{i}\right)$
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## Independence Axiom

- Consider a lottery, $L_{x}$, where you get something, $X$, with probability $p$ and 0 otherwise (probability $1-p$ )
- Suppose that there are two lotteries, call them $A$ and B that are equally good: A ~ B
- Now it will not matter if $X$ is lottery $A$ or $B$
- That is $L_{A} \sim L_{B}$
- Why is this called independence
- The ranking of $A$ and $B$ is independent of context. If they are equally good when they stand alone they are equally good in a lottery.
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## The independence axiom in action

- Consider the lotteries
- A: 3000 for sure
- B: 4000 with $80 \%$ probability
- C: 3000 with $25 \%$ probability
- D: 4000 with $20 \%$ probability
- If $A$ is better than $B$, then $C$ is better than $D$
- Why?
- Let $L$ be the lottery $X$ with $25 \%$ probability and 0 otherwise
- If $X=A$ we get $C$
- If $X=B$ we get $D$
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## A theorem proven by von Neuman and Morgenstern (1944)

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- Take the independence axiom
- Add continuity:
if $B$ (est) $>x>W$ (orst) then there is a probability $p$ such that (B,p;W,1-p) ~ (x)
- Standard assumptions like complete and transitive.
- It follows that lotteries should be ranked according to Expected utility $\operatorname{Max} \sum \mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{i}}\left(\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}\right)$
- In the following we will focus on alternative theories - And the evidence for these
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Positive linear transforms

- we may choose $u(0)=0$
- Consider two utility functions $u$ and $v$ such that - $v(x)=a u(x)+b, \quad a>0$
- They yield the same ranking of lotteries:
$E v(x)=\sum p_{i} v\left(x_{i}\right)$
$=\sum p_{i} a u\left(x_{i}\right)+\sum p_{i} b=a E u(x)+b$
- Maximizing $E v$ isequivalent to maximizing $E u$
- Start with any $u(x)$ and use $v(x)=u(x)-u(0)$
- Note that $v(0)=0$
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## Next week: Prospect theory

- Based on Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
- The most cited paper in Econometrica
- A major part of why Kahneman got the Nobel Price in 2002
- Tversky died in 1996
- Prospect theory is an alternative to expected utility
- It is easiest to discuss in contrast to expected utility
- Key concepts
- Loss aversion and the reference point
- Decision weight (as opposed to probabilities)

