

**Question 1 (Group A; Berhardsen et al.)**

Consider a profit-maximizing bank, as in 3.1.3 in F&R, taking all interest rates  $(r_D, r_L, r)$  as given, where  $r_D$  is the rate of deposits,  $r_L$  is the one on loans and  $r$  the one in the interbank market. Each bank is required to keep a fraction  $g$  of its deposits as reserves; i.e.  $K = gD$ , where  $D$  is the volume of deposits. With  $m$  as the net position in the interbank market, we have from the balance sheet, without equity, that  $R + L + m = D$ , where  $L$  is the volume of loans. The multi-output cost function is  $C(D, L)$ , with “standard” properties.

- Derive the first-order conditions for the profit-maximizing bundle  $(D, L)$ .
- Explain why the relevant rate of interest on loans, respectively deposits, for the bank is:  $r_L - r$ , and  $r_D - r(1 - g)$ .
- Derive the impact on bank behaviour of a higher rate of interest in the interbank market. What might cause  $r$  to go up?

**Question 2 (Group B; Hovland et al.)**

The competitive equilibrium of the banking sector, as outlined in section 3.1.4 in

F&R, can with identical banks, each with constant marginal costs;  $\frac{\partial C}{\partial L} = a$  and

$\frac{\partial C}{\partial D} = b$ , be characterized by:  $r_L = r + a$  and  $r_D = r(1 - g) - b$ , where  $g$  is defined in

Question 1, and with an equilibrium condition as given by; cf. (3.12) in F&R:

$I(r_L) = (1 - g)[S(r_D) - B]$ , where  $B$  is the net supply of government bonds. Assume

that aggregate demand for loans is linear;  $I(r_L) = I_0 - jr_L$ , with  $I_0$  and  $j$  both

positive and also with aggregate private savings a linear function;  $S(r_D) = S_0 + sr_D$ ,

with  $s > 0$ .

- Derive the equilibrium rate of interest in the interbank market.
- What is the effect of a reduction in government debt?
- What is impact of “shocks”, like a lower value of  $I_0$ , or a higher value of  $S_0$ ?

How can “money hoarding” in the banking sector be analyzed within this model?

**Question 3 (Both groups)**

Banks might be tempted to take too risky positions. Discuss briefly, without any formal model, what actions governments can take to prevent such behaviour.