

1. Opt. conditions with random deposits

$$D + E = kD + R + L \quad (1) \text{ Accounting identity}$$

Return from lending: $p(L)$

$$\text{Return from defensive position: } Y(R) = \begin{cases} rR & R \geq 0 \\ (r+b)R & R < 0 \end{cases}$$

$$D = (H+X)D_0, E(X) = 0 \text{ s.t. } E(D) = D_0, X \geq -1, D_0 > 0 \text{ s.t. } D \geq 0$$

$$X \sim F(x) = P(X \leq x), f(x) \equiv \frac{dF(x)}{dx} > 0 \text{ pdf of } X.$$

Before optimization, we need to know for which realizations of X is R negative s.t. we know its return fn.

$$R = (1-k)D + E - L = (1-k)(H+X)D_0 + E - L = 0$$

(1)

$$(2) \quad x_c = \frac{L-E}{(1-k)D_0} - 1 \text{ is the critical value for which } R = 0$$

For $X \geq x_c$, $Y(R) = rR$; $X < x_c$, $Y(R) = (r+b)R$

$$E(R) = (1-k)D_0 + E - L = -(1-k)D_0 x_c \text{ is the expected defensive position.}$$

The bank's profit is returns from loans and defensive positions added together:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi(L, x_c(L)) &= p(L) + Y(R) \\ &= p(L) + \int_{-1}^{x_c} (r+b)R(x)f(x)dx + \int_{x_c}^{\infty} rR(x)f(x)dx \\ &= p(L) + (r+b) \int_{-1}^{x_c} [(1-k)(H+X)D_0 + E - L] f(x)dx + r \int_{x_c}^{\infty} [(1-k)(H+X)D_0 + E - L] f(x)dx \\ &= p(L) + E(R) [(r+b)F(x_c) + r(1-F(x_c))] + (1-k)D_0 [(r+b) \int_{-1}^{x_c} x f(x)dx + r \int_{x_c}^{\infty} x f(x)dx] \\ &= p(L) - (1-k)D_0 x_c [(r+b)F(x_c) + r(1-F(x_c))] + (1-k)D_0 [r \int_{-1}^{x_c} x f(x)dx + b \int_{x_c}^{\infty} x f(x)dx] \\ &= p(L) + (1-k)D_0 \left\{ -x_c [(r+b)F(x_c) + r(1-F(x_c))] + (r \cdot E(X) + b \int_{x_c}^{\infty} x f(x)dx) \right\} \\ &= p(L) + (1-k)D_0 \left\{ b \int_{-1}^{x_c} x f(x)dx - x_c [bF(x_c) + r] \right\} \quad (3) \end{aligned}$$

Since the distribution of X is known, x_c is just a number, $F(x_c)$ a probability (of $R < 0$), Expected profit is a fn. of loans L and x_c , which is a fn. of L too and $\frac{\partial x_c}{\partial L} = \frac{1}{(1-k)D_0}$ from (2).Under certainty, $x = 0$ s.t. $\Pi(L, D(0)) = \Pi(L)$. Optimal condition:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi(L) &= p(L) - \underbrace{(1-k)D_0 x_c}_{=R} \cdot \begin{cases} r, & R \geq 0 \\ r+b, & R < 0 \end{cases} \quad \left| \quad \begin{array}{l} L^* \text{ defined as } p'(L^*) = r \\ L^* \text{ defined as } p'(L^*) = r+b \end{array} \right. \quad (4) \\ &= R = A' - L \\ &\quad \downarrow \\ &\text{Liquid asset } A' = (1-k)D_0 + E = A - kD_0 \end{aligned}$$

Under uncertainty, maximization involves the use of Leibniz's formula

$$\frac{d}{dx} \int_{u(x)}^{v(x)} f(x,t) dt = f(x, v(x)) v'(x) - f(x, u(x)) u'(x) + \int_{u(x)}^{v(x)} f'_x(x,t) dt.$$


$$\frac{d}{dL} \int_{-1}^{x_c(L)} x f(x) dx = x_c f(x_c) \frac{\partial x_c}{\partial L} \quad \text{since } -1 \text{ is a number and } x \text{ is independent of } L.$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi'(L) &= p'(L) + (1-k)D_0 \left[\frac{b x_c f(x_c)}{(1-k)D_0} - x_c b F'(x_c) \frac{1}{(1-k)D_0} - \frac{1}{(1-k)D_0} (bF(x_c) + r) \right] \\ &= p'(L) + b x_c f(x_c) - x_c b f(x_c) - [bF(x_c) + r] \\ &= p'(L) - [bF(x_c) + r] = 0 \end{aligned}$$


$$\text{FOC: } p'(L^*) = bF(x_c) + r \quad \text{where } F(x_c(L)) \text{ is } P(R < 0). \quad (5)$$

Comparing (4) and (5); they are very similar, only the opt. L^* in (4) is discontinuous. It essentially involves equating marginal returns on L and R .

Graphs: certainty



uncertainty



In this graph optimal asset allocation is $R > 0$ with a lower r $P'(L) = r$ will be on the right side of L_c , which isn't allowed, and we will have to set $P'(L^*) = r+tb$ and have $R < 0$. If $L^* = L_c$, we have an unstable equilibrium.

$F(x_c)bt+r$ approaches r as $L \rightarrow 0$, $r+tb$ as $L \rightarrow \infty$. The new return curve on R , the defensive asset, is a smoothed version of the previous one. Even if $L < L_c$, the defensive position may be negative due to a shock to X .

2. Comparative Statics

Certainty: $P'(L^*) = r, R \geq 0$
 $P'(L^*) = r+tb, R < 0$

uncertainty: $P'(L^*) = bF(x_c) + r$

- * Higher D_0 : higher L_c , the return on R curve shifts to the right, more lending at optimum.
- * Higher E : same qualitative effect, but bigger as E is 100% liquid asset.
- * Lower $P'(L)^c$: a flatter $P(L)$ curve. More likely to stay on the safe side ($L^* < L_c$), Lower L^* .
- * Liquidity dry-up: b increases. More likely to have $R > 0$. Lend less. L^* smaller.

3. Value of Equity

Find value f_n by inserting opt. conditions back into π .

Certainty:

$$\pi(L^*, E) = \begin{cases} P(L^*) - [L^* - E - (1-k)D_0] \cdot r & R \geq 0 \\ P(L^*) - [L^* - E - (1-k)D_0] \cdot (r+tb) & R < 0 \end{cases}$$

$$\frac{\partial \pi(L^*, E)}{\partial E} = \begin{cases} r & R \geq 0 \\ r+tb & R < 0 \end{cases} \quad (7)$$

Uncertainty:

$$\pi(L^*, E) = P(L^*) + (1-k)D_0 \cdot [b \int_{-1}^1 x f(x) dx - x_c(L^*, E) (bF(x_c(L^*, E)) + r)]$$

$$\frac{\partial \pi(L^*, E)}{\partial E} = P'(L^*) \cdot b f(x_c) \cdot \left[\frac{\partial x_c(L^*, E)}{\partial E} + (1-k)D_0 \left\{ \frac{b x_c f(x_c)}{(1-k)D_0} - \frac{1}{(1-k)D_0} (bF(x_c) + r) - \frac{x_c b f(x_c)}{(1-k)D_0} \right\} \right]$$

Here L^* depends on E directly

$$= \frac{[bF(x_c) + r] b f(x_c) + b x_c f(x_c) - b x_c f(x_c) - \frac{[bF(x_c) + r]}{(1-k)D_0}}{(1-k)D_0}$$

$$= \frac{bF(x_c) + r}{(1-k)D_0} \cdot (b f(x_c) - 1) \quad (8)$$

4. Riskier X , e.g. higher σ makes $F(x)bt+r$ curve flatter s.t. banks will be more cautious and lend less.