

Risk management in banks

Econ 4335 Lecture 13

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April 26, 2010

Types of risk

- ▶ Credit risk (default)
- ▶ Liquidity risk
- ▶ Interest rate risk
- ▶ Exchange rate risk
- ▶ Market risk
- ▶ Counterparty risk
- ▶ Operational risk

Mitigating risks

- ▶ Risk pricing
- ▶ Diversification
- ▶ Hedging
- ▶ Risk measurement
- ▶ Good procedures

The expected cost of default

Consider a marketable loan (e.g. a bond)

- ▶ Promised repayments: C_1, C_2, \dots, C_n at t_1, t_2, \dots, t_n
- ▶ Risk-free interest rate: r , continuous compounding

Value if all repayments on time:

$$P_0 = \sum_{k=1}^n C_k e^{-rt_k} \quad (1)$$

Value of loan to risk-neutral investors when positive probability of default:

$$P_N = \sum_{k=1}^n E[C_k] e^{-rt_k} \quad (2)$$

Expected cost of default: $P_0 - P_N$.

The yield to maturity

The yield to maturity is the rate of interest that the buyer of a loan implicitly gets if there is no default.

If the loan above is sold for the price P , the yield to maturity R is defined by

$$\sum_{k=1}^n C_k e^{-Rt_k} = P \quad (3)$$

If the market is dominated by risk-neutral investors, $P = P_N$ and

$$\sum_{k=1}^n C_k e^{-Rt_k} = \sum_{k=1}^n E[C_k] e^{-rt_k} = P_N \quad (4)$$

- ▶ The credit spread is defined as $s = R - r$.
- ▶ Alternative measure of credit risk
- ▶ Measure of expected cost of default when investors are risk neutral

Application to banking

- ▶ Marginal funding rate replaces the risk-free interest rate
- ▶ Risk-neutral bank in a competitive environment then sets repayments that make $P_N = L$.
- ▶ The yield to maturity on the loan is then R .

Example

All repayments made in period n . Probability of no default in period n is p_n . No recovery if default. The bank sets the C_n that satisfies

$$P_N = p_n C_n e^{-rn} = L$$

The return to maturity is given by

$$C_n e^{-Rn} = P_N = L$$

Solution: $C_n = Le^{rn}/p_n = Le^{Rn}$, $R = r - (1/n) \ln p_n$

The spread

$$s = R - r \quad (5)$$

- ▶ depends positively on default probabilities
- ▶ depends negatively on recovery rate
- ▶ depends in complicated way on time path of cash flow and default probabilities
- ▶ if the probability of default per unit of time is constant, λ (Poisson process) and the recovery rate is zero, $s = \lambda$
- ▶ Higher spread for borrowers with high debt-to-asset ratios
- ▶ Higher spreads for borrowers with more risky assets or incomes

The spread

- ▶ Banks with pricing power will add a profit margin
- ▶ Should risk-averse banks add a risk premium?

A digression on accounting

- ▶ Default probabilities often start low and increase as the loan matures
- ▶ In the beginning the spread is usually more than enough to cover actual losses
- ▶ Loan loss provisions are usually not made before a loss is more likely than not (either on an individual loan or a group of loans)
- ▶ Fast growing banks tend to show high profits to begin with
- ▶ Their accounts may exaggerate their solidity
- ▶ Reform proposal: Use spread to make provisions in advance

Another digression on accounting

Spread on bonds sometimes exceed default probabilities by a wide margin

- ▶ In many bond market liquidity is low
- ▶ Statutory regulations severely limits demand for bonds that are rated beyond a certain levels
- ▶ Bond markets sometimes freeze
- ▶ Market prices reflect forced sales ("fire sales")
- ▶ Value on the basis of "hold to maturity" or market price?

Back to banks' management of credit risk

Suppose

- ▶ large number of small borrowers
- ▶ default probabilities for the individual borrowers are independent
- ▶ the spread is set to cover expected default loss
- ▶ loan loss provisions properly reflect the spread and expected losses

Conclusion

- ▶ no reason for a risk-averse bank to charge more for the loan
- ▶ no need to keep equity in order to offset loan losses.

Or: What about model and statistical uncertainty?

Why equity is needed

- ▶ Some borrowers are large
- ▶ Losses are highly correlated
- ▶ Specialized banks
- ▶ Accounts do not always reflect all expected losses

The Basel accords

- ▶ Old approach: Minimum capital requirement relative to total liabilities
- ▶ Basel I, 1988: Capital requirement 8 per cent of risk-weighted assets.
 - ▶ Four different risk weight depending on type of borrower, collateral and maturity
 - ▶ Range from 0.0 for OECD-states, via 0.2 for OECD banks, 0.5 for residential mortgages (below 100 per cent), to 100 for loans to businesses
 - ▶ Some off-balance sheet items included
- ▶ Basel II
 - ▶ Banks may use their own risk models to produce weights
 - ▶ More types of risk included (market risk)

The Basel accords

Capital requirements can be satisfied with equity, subordinated loans or hybrid capital.

- ▶ Tier 1: Minimum 4 per cent. Equity and some hybrids
- ▶ Tier 2: Other hybrids and subordinated loans.

Detailed rules differ from country to country.

Capital adequacy rules are supplemented by limits on credits to single customers.

Academic criticism of Basel I

- ▶ The risk weights do not represent the actual risks well
- ▶ It is macro risk factors that matter, not individual risks
- ▶ Fixed weights can never represent more than one macro risk factor well (F&R8.1.3)

The demand for reserves

The bank's expected profits

$$\Pi(R) = r_L(D - R) + rR - r_p E[\max(0, \tilde{x} - R)] - r_D D \quad (6)$$

- ▶ R = level of reserves
- ▶ r = interest rate on reserves
- ▶ r_p = penalty interest rate
- ▶ x = net withdrawals

Cost of liquidity shortages

$$C(R) = E[\max(0, \tilde{x} - R)] = r_p \int_R^D (x - R) f(x) dx \quad (7)$$

$$C'(R) = -r_p \int_R^D f(x) dx = -r_p \Pr[\tilde{x} \geq R] < 0 \quad (8)$$

$$C''(R) = r_p f(R) \geq 0 \quad (9)$$

$C(R)$ decreasing and convex

Choice of R

$$\Pi(R) = r_L(D - R) + rR - C(R) - r_D D \quad (10)$$

First order condition for R

$$-r_L + r - C'(R) = 0$$

$$Pr[\tilde{x} \geq R] = \frac{r_L - r}{r_p} \quad (11)$$

Probability of borrowing at penalty rate equals liquidity premium $r_L - r$ over penalty rate r_p

Marginal costs and benefits

Insert $R = D - L$ in definition of profits:

$$\Pi = r_L(L) + r(D - L) - C(D - L) - r_D D \quad (12)$$

Marginal cost of loans / Marginal benefit from deposits

$$r - C'(D - L) = r + r_p Pr[\tilde{x} \geq R] \quad (13)$$

- ▶ Charge more for loans and pay more for deposits
- ▶ Marginal costs and gains falls with $D - L$
- ▶ Can be incorporated in monopolistic bank model

Liquidity management in practice

- ▶ Wholesale deposits more volatile
- ▶ Reserves mainly in interbank market
- ▶ Premium on longer interbank loans
- ▶ Prudent banks who borrow a lot in interbank market must also have deposits there or unused credit lines
- ▶ Longer term interbank loans carry a liquidity premium

Interest rate risk

Interest rate risk can in principle be avoided by two methods

- ▶ floating interest rates on all deposits and loans
- ▶ every loan with fixed interest rate is financed with fixed interest rate bonds or time deposit with the same duration

Reason that banks assume interest rate risk:

- ▶ Depositors prefer more liquid deposits
- ▶ Deposit financing is cheaper than bond financing
- ▶ Some borrowers are willing to pay more for fixed-rate loans

Reserves will be needed