Syllabus/achievement requirements

Reading list

Main text

Persson, T. and G. Tabellini: Political Economics. Explaining Economic Policy, 2000. Cambridge, MA: MIT. Ch. 1-8, 11 and 13.


Acemoglu, D., and J. Robinson: Inefficient Redistribution, 2001. p. 649-61. American Political Science Review 95.

Alesina, A., and E. la Ferrara: Ethnic diversity and economic performance, Journal of Economic Literature 43(3), pages 762-800. 

Banerjee, A., and L. Iyer: History, institutions, and economic performance: The legacy of colonial land tenure systems in India, 2005. p. 1190-1213. American Economic Review 95.

Duflo, E. and R. Chattopadhyaym: Women as policy makers: Evidence from a randomized policy experiment in India, Econometrica 72: 1409-43 (2004).

Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman : Protection for sale, American economic review 84: 833-850.

Hassler, J., K. Storesletten, F. Zilibotti: Democratic Public Good Provisio , Journal of Economic Theory. Vol. 133 (1), March 2007, pp. 127-151.

Hibbs, D. A. : Voting and the macroeconomy, 2006. Ch. 31 in B. R. Weingast and D. A. Wittman: "The Oxford handbook of Political Economy". 

Lind, J. T. : Why is there so little redistribution?, 2005a. Nordic Journal of Political Economy 31.

Lind, J. T.: Do the rich vote Concervative because they are rich?, 2009. Mimeo, UiO.

Matsusaka, J. G. and F. Palda: Voter turnout: How much can we explane?, Public Choice, vol. 98, No. 3/4 (jan. 1999), pp. 431-446.

Persson, T. and G. Tabellini: Constitutional rules and fiscal policy outcomes, American Economic Review 94: 25-46.

Pettersson-Lidbom, P.: Do Parties Matter for Economic Outcomes? A Regression-Discontinuity Approach, Journal of the European Economic Association, 2008 6:5, pp. 1037-1056.

Published Oct. 13, 2009 4:15 PM - Last modified Nov. 23, 2020 1:21 PM