

No.	Title	Readings	Lecturer
1	Introduction The Neo-Classical model of labour supply and labor demand	LabEc ch1: 1.1-1.3, ch4: 4.1-4.4	OR
2	Human Capital	LabEc ch: 2.1-2.5	OR
3	Job-search and the design of unemployment insurance	LabEc ch3: 1.1.1-1.1.3, 1.2.1-1.2.3, 2.2 (introduction, up to 2.2.1), Shavell and Weiss (1979) Markussen (note)	SM
4	The matching model	LabEc ch9: 1, 2, 3	SM
5	Empirical economics: Why correlation does not imply causality	Mostly harmless... p.3-68 Additional readings on econometric methodology (see reading list below)	SM
6	Empirical economics: Tools for disentangling correlation from causality: IV, DiD, F.E., RD	Mostly harmless... p.113-133, 221-243	SM
7	Moral hazard - theory: The principal-agent model and implications for managerial pay Efficiency wages Undesired consequences	LabEc ch.6 Levitt and Dubner, chapter 1 Frey and Jegen 2001 Ariely et al 2009	OR
8	Moral hazard - applications: Unemployment insurance Sickness insurance Disability insurance	Røed og Zhang (2003) Røed and Westlie (2010) Johanson og Palme (2005) Bratsberg, Raaum og Røed (2010)	SM
9	"Active policies" for the unemployed and for workers with health problems	LabEc ch11: 1-3 Markussen, Mykletun og Røed (2010)	SM
10	Minimum wage and employment protection	LabEc ch12:1-2 Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009)	OR
11	Collective bargaining	LabEc ch7: 1-2 ch12:4 Freeman (2005)	OR
12	Collective bargaining II (right to manage) Long-term changes in the labor market – polarization of jobs and women's superiority	LabEc ch.7:3-4 Autor (2010)	OR
13	Institutions and labor market performance	LabEc ch.12: 2-5 Blanchard (2005)	OR