

**ECON 4925 Autumn 2007**  
**Electricity Economics**  
Lecture 4

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# Multiple plants

- N plants with reservoirs, a single aggregate consumer,  $x_t$  = total consumption
- The energy balance

$$x_t = \sum_{j=1}^N e_{jt}^H, \quad j = 1, \dots, N, \quad t = 1, \dots, T$$

- The energy balance has to hold as an equality
- Reservoir constraints only

# The social planning problem

$$\max \sum_{t=1}^T \int_{z=0}^{x_t} p_t(z) dz$$

subject to

$$x_t = \sum_{j=1}^N e_{jt}^H$$

$$R_{jt} \leq R_{j,t-1} + w_{jt} - e_{jt}^H$$

$$R_{jt} \leq \bar{R}_j$$

$$R_{jt}, x_t, e_{jt}^H \geq 0$$

$T, w_{jt}, R_{j0}, \bar{R}_j$  given,  $R_{jT}$  free,  $j = 1, \dots, N, t = 1, \dots, T$

# The Lagrangian function

- Eliminating consumption by inserting the energy balance

$$\begin{aligned} L = & \sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{j=1}^N e_{jt}^H \\ & \int_{z=0} p_t(z) dz \\ & - \sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{j=1}^N \lambda_{jt} (R_{jt} - R_{j,t-1} - w_{jt} + e_{jt}^H) \\ & - \sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{j=1}^N \gamma_{jt} (R_{jt} - \bar{R}_j) \end{aligned}$$

# The Kuhn – Tucker conditions

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial e_{jt}^H} = p_t \left( \sum_{j=1}^N e_{jt}^H \right) - \lambda_{jt} \leq 0 (= 0 \text{ for } e_{jt}^H > 0)$$

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial R_{jt}} = -\lambda_{jt} + \lambda_{j,t+1} - \gamma_{jt} \leq 0 (= 0 \text{ for } R_{jt} > 0)$$

$$\lambda_{jt} \geq 0 (= 0 \text{ for } R_{jt} < R_{j,t-1} + w_{jt} - e_{jt}^H)$$

$$\gamma_{jt} \geq 0 (= 0 \text{ for } R_{jt} < \bar{R}_j), \quad t = 1, \dots, T, j = 1, \dots, N$$


# Backwards induction

- The terminal period: No satiation of demand  $\rightarrow$  all plants use up all water in the terminal period

$$p_T \left( \sum_{j=1}^N e_{jT}^H \right) = \lambda_{jT} > 0 \Rightarrow \lambda_{jT} = \lambda_T$$

- If all reservoirs are in between full and empty in period  $T-1$ : the plants will face the same price equal to the water value in the terminal period also in period  $T-1$

# Indeterminacy of plant quantities



# Equality of water values

- For a water value to change either the reservoir constraint must be binding or the reservoir is emptied
- Assume that the social price for periods  $t$  and  $t + 1$  are equal. Can it then be optimal for a plant to have a full reservoir in period  $t$ ?
  - Yes it may be optimal, but the shadow price on the reservoir constraint will be zero
  - The reservoir must be full when the social price increases



# Equality of water values, cont.

- Assume that the social price is the same in period  $t$  and  $t + 1$ . Can it then be optimal for a plant to empty the reservoir in period  $t$  ?
  - Yes, but the water value in period  $t$  and  $t + 1$  must be the same
  - The reservoir must be full when the social price increases
  - The reservoir must be emptied when the social price decreases

# The case of pure accumulation

- If the water value is greater than the social price, then production is zero and all inflows are accumulated
- A plant may accumulate water and produce zero for many periods
- The water value will be equal for all zero production periods and equal to the social price in the first period with positive production

# Hveding's conjecture

- Assume independent hydropower plants with one limited reservoir each, and perfect manoeuvrability of reservoirs, but plant-specific inflows
- The plants can be regarded as a single aggregate plant and the reservoirs can be regarded as a single aggregate reservoir when finding the social optimal solution for operating the hydropower system.