Syllabus/achievement requirements

Reading list

Sannikov, Y. (2008) “A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal-Agent Problem,” Review of Economic Studies, 75, 957-984.

Biais, B., T. Mariotti, G. Plantin, and J.-C. Rochet (2007) “Dynamic Security Design: Convergence to Continuous Time and Asset Pricing Implications,” Review of Economic Studies, vol. 74(2), pages 345- 390

DeMarzo, P. and Y. Sannikov (2006) “Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous-Time Agency Model,” Journal of Finance 61: 2681-2724.

DeMarzo, P., M. Fishman, Z. He and N. Wang (2011) “Dynamic Agency and the q Theory of Investment,” working paper, Stanford GSB

Sannikov, Y. (2007) “Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time,” Econometrica.

Williams, Noah (2011) “Persistent Private Information,” Econometrica

Di Tella, S. and Y. Sannikov, Y. (2016) “Optimal Asset Management Contracts with Hidden Savings,” working paper

Gonzalo Cisternas (2016), “Two-Sided Learning and Moral Hazard,” working paper, MIT

Published Mar. 29, 2016 9:19 AM