A Tent with a View: Colonial Officers, Anthropologists, and the Making of the Field in Northern Rhodesia, 1937–1960

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WHEN THE ANTHROPOLOGIST Max Marwick was considering where to live while doing fieldwork among the Ngoni people in 1946, the district commissioner, (Sir) Douglas Hall, suggested a site near a place called Chenjela Mountain. According to J. A. Barnes—who came to do his research there when Marwick left soon after—Hall had suggested the site and provided concrete for the foundation on the understanding that later it would become a government rest house for touring administrators. Barnes built the house on a slope of Chenjela with a view of the bush and scattered villages below. He cut down several trees to improve the view, an enterprise his research assistant thought a bit peculiar.1

In this article I aim to shed light on the interplay of influences in such incidents by examining anthropology from the perspective of the history of the field sciences—those sciences that use fieldwork instead of or in addition to laboratory work. This approach draws attention to the field itself, the material side of fieldwork, and the infrastructure, equipment, and work organization necessary to conduct scientific work in a particular field site. It also allows one to relate scientific practices to nonscientific practices occurring in the same field site, such as the sharing of practices between colonial administrators and anthropologists considered in this study.2 Ideally, a field science approach allows one to examine the relationship

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This paper is based on two chapters from my dissertation, “The Lion in the Path: Fieldwork and Culture in the History of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 1937–1964,” University of Pennsylvania, 1994. The title is used with apologies to E. M. Forster. The themes raised in his work—of savagery and civilization, and the importance of the view to the European touring in exotic places—will, however, find some resonances here.


2 Here I am defining “practices” as practical activities necessary for doing fieldwork, but with the understanding that practices such as these form a continuum with what we call scientific methods. For example, historians of the field sciences have shown how the practices associated with tourism partly formed the basis of astronomers’ solar eclipse expeditions in the late Victorian period and, in the early Victorian period, how the practices of painters, mining engineers, and prospectors came to be employed by geologists. Alex Soojung-Kim Pang, “Spheres of Interest: Imperialism, Culture, and

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between the material culture and technology of a science and the view of the field that informs its daily practice and makes the field what it is for that science. The history of colonial science in Africa has suffered from too sharp a dichotomy between the external and the indigenous, science being viewed as a European import more or less successfully transferred into a hostile environment. The field science perspective brings to the history of colonial science in Africa the ability to ground that science in its African context and thus to understand what is African about science in Africa.

Since at least the 1920s, fieldwork has held a special place in anthropology, both as a scientific method and as a central tenet of its professional ethos. Ideally fieldwork involves living for a length of time in the society the anthropologist is studying—learning the language, collecting data of various kinds, observing daily activities, and, it is hoped, coming to understand the world view of the local people. Only after such experiences is an anthropologist considered qualified to contribute to the discipline’s chief aim of producing theories about human social and cultural behavior. As part of the discipline’s ethos, fieldwork also functions as the essential rite of passage that any student of anthropology must endure before aspiring to an academic career.

The Rhodes-Livingstone Institute (RLI) in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) provides a good case study for a field science approach to the history of anthropology (see Fig. 1). The RLI was the institutional focus for a large group of anthropologists who accomplished path-breaking work after World War II, work based not only on fieldwork in the usual rural setting for anthropology but also in an urban setting new to anthropology. In the 1930s the governor of Northern Rhodesia, keen on the potential uses of anthropology for solving problems of social change in the colony, pushed for the founding of an anthropological institute and garnered support for it from local sources such as the mining companies. After World War II, this institute became part of the British government’s postwar colonial development effort and was lavishly funded by the Colonial Social Science Research Council (CSSRC). This enabled the RLI to recruit a team of talented young anthropologists, most of whom were working for their doctorates.

The RLI’s first directors set out to create a coordinated program of applied anthropology useful for colonial development. They trained teams of researchers specifically for that purpose, attempting to achieve comparability of data on a range of topics studied in different field sites. This went beyond the usual collection of genealogies used by anthropologists to unravel kinship structure, extending to the collec-


tion of demographic statistics that RLI researchers used for comparative analysis of the variety of local societies and their adaptation to changes brought about by urbanization, industrialization, and labor migration. As a group the RLI anthropologists developed new methods of fieldwork and analysis, including the case method, situational analysis, and network theory, to name but a few. They produced studies that addressed problems of contemporary African life rather than producing retrospective descriptions of precolonial social systems. They also broke down the dichotomy previously drawn between urban and rural societies, becoming the pioneers of urban anthropology.

They accomplished this in a difficult social and political context. That context comprised a watershed between decolonization in the northern colonies of central Africa and greater segregation and apartheid to the south. Like other African colonies, Northern Rhodesia had felt the wind of change blowing across Africa following World War II. The black majority expressed its aspirations through political parties such as the Northern Rhodesian African National Congress and other organizations such as the African Mine Workers Union.

A second wave of European colonialism also swept the country in this period with an influx of white settlers and mine workers attracted by Northern Rhodesia's copper boom. Many of these immigrants came from the so-called white South—Southern

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5 The phrase was used by British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in 1960, speaking to South Africa's white parliament.
Rhodesia and South Africa—where Europeans earlier had settled in relatively large numbers. Whites similarly pressed for self-determination and an end to British colonial rule. In response, in 1953 Britain created the Central African Federation—Northern and Southern Rhodesia, joined with Nyasaland—as a step toward a future settler-dominated dominion that would help maintain a balance of power against an increasingly segregationist and nationalistic South Africa. The African fight against federation boosted the development of black nationalist parties, and the late 1950s saw a militant and increasingly well-organized drive for majority rule, which led to Zambian independence in 1964.

To understand how the RLI’s field methods evolved in the context of decolonization in Northern Rhodesia, one must focus on two crucial periods: First, the sharing of field practices with colonial administrators in the rural research of the 1940s, when the Institute was especially vulnerable to government pressure; and second, the evolution of urban field methods in the turbulent early 1950s, when Institute anthropologists distanced themselves and their methods from the colonial government, responding to political pressure from their African informants and research assistants.

“THE OPPRESSOR OF THE VILLAGE LAZY-BONES”

Ruled by the British South African Company in the early years of the twentieth century, Northern Rhodesia gained an administrative and technological infrastructure built mainly to extract and export minerals and other products, including African labor for the more highly developed industrial areas in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. White settlers, both on farms and in the mining towns of the country’s Copperbelt (see Fig. 2), brought with them distinctively southern African forms of segregation—master-servant relationships on farms and in the domestic sphere, and an industrial color bar and city-planning style that allotted racially defined groups to segregated areas and occupations. These relationships followed British colonial patterns established earlier in India, as well as British and Afrikaner patterns established in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

But a more paternalistic pattern of relations was also practiced, because of Northern Rhodesia’s smaller number of whites and its large rural hinterland, where administrators employed practices appropriate to colonies without white settlement. There, through a system of provincial and district headquarters called bomas, government officers carried out regular tours to the surrounding villages, collecting taxes, settling disputes, and sometimes encouraging local development. The views and practices associated with this style of administrative fieldwork were what the first RLI anthropologists, Godfrey Wilson (director, 1938–1941) and Max Gluckman (director, 1942–1947), found when they arrived just before World War II.⁶

The tour of the rural areas—central to both the practice and the ethic of colonial administration—demonstrated the relationship of the government to the people and the land. To avoid expensive and often scarce motor transport, touring officers often rode bicycles or horses (or were sometimes carried in hammocks) accompanied by

⁶ The term boma derives from Swahili in British East Africa, where it refers to a brush stockade built for security. The Institute was founded in 1937 and Wilson appointed director in 1938. Gluckman became the second director in 1942.
an entourage of porters and assistants. Chief among the assistants were the district messengers, the unarmed African enforcement wing of the local administration. In a few places the government built rest houses for touring officers, but in most places officers used tents and camped outside, rather than within, the villages. They did this primarily for reasons of health, associating African villages with increased exposure to mosquitoes, vermin, and human carriers of disease. Some officers even refused to use tents, believing that a good breeze was best for deterring mosquitoes, whereas others engaged in practices intended to invoke local ideas of authority. In Mwinilunga district, for example, the touring officer slept in a "Lunda bed"—an elaborate and heavy affair used only by chiefs, made of logs that were carried by porters and reconstructed at each stop on the tour.7

Administrators referred to touring as "getting under canvas," and colonial officers rose in the esteem of their colleagues according to the amount of time they had spent under canvas. This suggests the importance of the experience of camping in the rural areas for shaping the colonial officer's ethic of administrative fieldwork, his view of

Africa, and his vision of its proper development. The colonial officer selected a tent site using a number of criteria, both practical and aesthetic.

As District Officer Kenneth Bradley observed of a less-than-desirable tent site in Northern Rhodesia in 1938, “We found an uninspiring camp, set in small, shadeless scrub against a kopje [small hill] which radiated heat like an electric stove. The view was entirely shut off by a mat of small bushes and one dead tree.” Situated near a heat-radiating kopje, this camp lacked human comforts. In contrast, the qualities of a tent site and its view that Bradley found inspiring can be detected in the following description:

I am camped tonight on the slope of . . . a valley under a grove of tall, thin trees. Across the valley a great precipice rises a thousand feet or more. . . . I like the precipice opposite my camp. . . . Maize gardens lie thick along the valley floor. Perhaps that is why I feel affection for my precipice. If its foot were shod in dark and ancient forest or had a scree of shattered boulders where leopards den, it would be sinister. Instead, at its foot is a tiny golden square, where an old man and his wife have cut their precious garden out from among the trees.8

What Bradley found inspiring was a view of a wild African scene—a “precipice” (escarpment) rising dramatically from a valley floor. But the scene was not too wild, for at the foot of the escarpment a husband and wife cultivated a small, “precious” garden. In contract, the uninspiring camp had no view and gave Bradley an opposite impression from that of the Eden-like scene of the man and woman in their maize garden. Bradley also took possession of the more pleasing view when he said that he felt affection for his precipice—and perhaps also for his people, the villagers he administered while on tour.

In the period immediately preceding the arrival of the RLI anthropologists, the colonial government introduced the policy of indirect rule to Northern Rhodesia, a policy that required administrators to stimulate the supposedly natural evolution of African societies toward higher levels of civilization while depending primarily on local rulers rather than their own direct administration. As Bradley said of his role as touring officer during the earlier phase of direct administration, he himself was “the ruler of individual lives and the oppressor of the village lazy-bones,” while under indirect rule he merely “stimulate[d] the chief to perform [this] role.”9

Indirect rule philosophy espoused giving more responsibility to chiefs, but the government’s development goals, especially after World War II, demanded greater activity by both administrators and technical officers in the areas of housing, health, and agriculture. A sense of urgency motivated colonial intervention in a landscape that—far from being static—seemed to be developing or, more often, degenerating from the impact of rapid social change. Laws concerning African agricultural practices, intended to prevent the erosion and deforestation of land under population pressure, stood as one example of this type of colonial intervention—one that rural Africans deeply resented.10

9 Bradley, Diary, pp. 35, 39.
In the area of African political development, however, administrators did not feel the same urgency. Administrators assumed that African political development would be gradual and based on hierarchical chieftainship and cooperative village communities, forms of organization they believed to be appropriate to primitive peoples slowly evolving toward civilization. Colonial officers knew that they partly created the tribal traditions that they used to justify administratively convenient forms of local government. Where these practices came most into question was not, however, in rural areas, where the sensitive administrator was thought to be capable of setting right any disputes concerning the political traditions of his people. It was in the cities of Northern Rhodesia that administrative practices received their greatest challenge, because the slow evolutionary view that informed them had little place for urban Africans or for cities as an African form of development, except in a very distant future.

In the late colonial period, urbanization had gained “at least partial official acceptance.” The 1935 strike by Northern Rhodesia’s African miners and the general strike wave that hit African in the mid-1930s and continued into the 1940s led to dramatic changes in labor and urban policies on the part of the British government. Administrative practices, however, changed more slowly. The government maintained a form of the district officers’ tour in the cities on the grounds that it was familiar to Africans from village life. When things went wrong, as in the 1935 strike, colonial administrators cited the lack of personal administrative contact with Africans in the mine compounds (of the kind familiar from the rural areas) as the “central problem.”

In the wake of the unrest, the colonial government also considered the possibility that social research might be useful for solving urban problems and supported the

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11 The administrator’s evolutionary view of African political development is revealed in one of the questions a provincial administrator felt anthropologists should investigate—the African’s potential for responsibility and whether he will “become a ‘first class Britisher’ or a ‘third class Italian’ when left on his own” (Letter, D. C. Petauke, 19 October 1944, SEC 1/131, National Archives of Zambia [hereafter NAZ], Lusaka, Zambia). It is important to note, however, that not all administrators held views similar to this administrator’s or Bradley’s. Although many maintained authoritarian and paternalistic views regarding Africans, a few had more egalitarian attitudes and favored African self-determination.


establishment of an anthropological institute in central Africa. Governor Hubert Young had long wanted to establish a museum for archaeological and anthropological exhibits. After the 1935 strike the governor used the argument that societies undergoing rapid social change needed study.\(^{14}\) The postwar period was generally a time of experimentation by local governments and the Colonial Office in the use of expert knowledge and the different ways of employing it. This experimentation extended to anthropology and sociology, both in the greater numbers of their personnel deployed in Africa relative to other social sciences, and in the variety of positions supported—from government sociologists to social science institute researchers to individuals working directly under the Colonial Research Committee.\(^{15}\)

The Colonial Office and the colonial governments carried out this experimentation cautiously, however, fearing the political implications of the use of expert knowledge. For example, the Colonial Office’s plan for a labor department in Northern Rhodesia met with considerable opposition from the government’s provincial (mostly rurally based) administrators, though the strike of 1940 finally forced the issue. Even then the administrators and mining companies severely restricted the scope and independence of the new labor officers. The first officers were seconded from the provincial administration itself, and the new department had to agree that these officers would not discuss labor policy with African workers or “become intermediaries between workers and the mines.”\(^{16}\)

The treatment of the RLI’s urban anthropologists—another potentially troublesome group of experts—paralleled this case in some respects. Like labor experts, anthropologists had developed expertise on another aspect of African life—social organization and culture, areas where their views might clash with those of the administration. Administrative officers up to this time had been the chief group of experts on African life, with ethnographic study, at least at the level of reports on local customs, being one of the administrator’s usual tasks. Thus, anthropologists represented a rival group of experts claiming greater professional credentials for the task and, perhaps more alarmingly, the right to look at administration itself as part of the relevant social situation. And, as in the case of the labor officers, Africans might use the results of expert study to challenge government policy, following the anthropologists’ example. Despite the anthropologists’ sharing of practices with administrators in the early years of the RLI, the rivalry between them as experts on African culture would come to dominate the relationship.

“IT IS NOT PLEASANT TO BE MADE AN OBJECT OF STUDY…”

The first two RLI anthropologists arrived in Northern Rhodesia just prior to World War II. Because of the war, research and staff remained at low levels until 1946. Between 1938 and 1946, however, these director-researchers established precedents for fieldwork and negotiated with the government for the resources to conduct research.

Although officially an independent research institute, the RLI was controlled by

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a board of trustees comprised of members of government and representatives of the mining companies and white settler communities. In the field as well as when dealing with the board of trustees, RLI anthropologists found themselves in an environment strongly influenced by the colonial civil service, for Northern Rhodesia had the highest proportion of administrators to population in British Africa.\(^\text{17}\) Moreover, the RLI anthropologists as individuals may have felt these colonial civil service influences more than most anthropologists, because many of them were born in Africa, educated in anthropology in courses also attended by trainees for the colonial civil service, or both. Of the first six directors of the Institute, three had family connections or were born in Africa (Wilson, Gluckman, and J. Clyde Mitchell) and two others were civil servants themselves before becoming directors (Henry Fosbrooke and C. M. N. White).

The influence of the civil service on RLI anthropologists also formed part of the more extensive contact developing between colonial governments and anthropologists of the functionalist school that had emerged between the world wars. Function-  

alists studied societies as organic wholes characterized by harmonious systems of relationships and institutions that could be elucidated through scientific methods of observation based on fieldwork. The first group of anthropologists “to make field research an indispensable feature of anthropological inquiry,” they gained acceptance by colonial governments partly because their “descriptions of their research methods were very like [colonial] political officers’ accounts of their administrative procedures.” These procedures included the district officer’s immersion in the life of his subjects, which was supposed to lead to an intuitive understanding similar to the “nearly mystical communion” that the anthropologists claimed they also could achieve with their subjects. Both anthropologist and district officer spent considerable time in the field, both learned African languages and customs, and both often came to identify with the interests of “their people.”\(^\text{18}\)

They also suffered from similar occupational hazards. District officers sometimes became “bushed”—a malady characterized by lethargy, inability to maintain European standards of dress and behavior, and failure to follow government directives and policies. Although medical and psychological explanations were given for these symptoms, the political dimensions of this “disease” are apparent. The fear of becoming bushed, and the accusation that one had become bushed, made erring civil servants adhere to government policy. Government gave leave privileges and moved administrators to new areas partly to prevent this malady, keeping the civil servant from developing too great an identification with a particular area or people.\(^\text{19}\)

\(^{17}\) The founding of the RLI and its funding by government, mining companies, and the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund is discussed by Brown, “Anthropology and Colonial Rule” (cit. n. 4). For a discussion of relations among the RLI, the governor, and the board of trustees, and the notable absence of scientists from the board, see pp. 185–186. On the proportion of administrators, see Raymond Apthorpe, ed., Social Research and Community Development: Based on the 15th Conference of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute for Social Research, Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia, Government Printer, 1961. This high proportion may have been due to the necessity to cover the large but sparsely populated area of Northern Rhodesia and to the importance of the colony’s copper.

\(^{18}\) Kuklick, Savage (cit. n. 11), p. 190.

\(^{19}\) Frequent moves were characteristic of young civil servants in the urban areas as well as in the colonies; they were rationalized as a means of developing general skills. See Henrika Kuklick’s The Imperial Bureaucrat: The Colonial Administrative Service in The Gold Coast, 1920–1939 (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1979) for a discussion of the background and training of colonial civil servants.
Anthropologists could also “go native” in this way, a reason government sometimes gave for not hiring them. Although the case of Northcote Thomas—a government anthropologist who identified too closely with his informants—was cited for years afterward as a reason for government wariness of anthropologists, the more important precedents for the RLI were Paul Kirchoff and its own first director, Godfrey Wilson. In 1931 the prominent anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski failed to support Kirchoff, a young researcher, against the Colonial Office’s demand that he be removed from his research site because of allegations that he was a communist agitator. In the case of Godfrey Wilson, local mining companies cited his conscientious objector status as one of the reasons for banning him from his urban research site at the beginning of World War II. Later, as African independence movements got underway, the danger would no longer be of anthropologists going native by taking on the traditional customs of the locals, but of them going native by supporting African political causes.20

But in the early days of the RLI, the directors set out to establish a good working relationship with government and to prove the usefulness of social research for the government’s development plans. They hoped to thereby gain favorable conditions for their research. Wilson and Gluckman, the first two directors, negotiated terms for research officers similar to those for civil servants. Wilson was hired under the usual civil service conditions, with traveling allowances and transport following that of general orders for district officers.

The differences in the way that anthropologists and district officers traveled, however, caused some difficulty. In negotiating for the best possible allowances, both Wilson and, later, Gluckman, used civil service language to express the similarity of their work to that of civil servants. Where they admitted to differences, the directors stressed the greater difficulty of anthropological fieldwork. Wilson, when asked to suggest a basis for the amount of traveling allowance for an anthropologist in the field, spoke of the “officers” of the Institute being “encamped in rural districts”—language that suggests their similarities to district officers. “District officers on tour” were allowed 22 carriers if alone and 28 if accompanied by their wives. Anthropologists, Wilson felt, needed 30 and 40 carriers respectively, because a “longer stay in camp necessitates more baggage.” The longer stay in camp meant that the anthropologist must also spend more money on “presents to natives” than the district officer who was just passing through.21

Wilson’s use of phrases such as “on tour,” “in camp,” and “presents to natives” played down important differences between anthropologists and district officers. Anthropologists may have moved from one village to another in the course of fieldwork, but not in the manner of the visiting delegation of the district officer. “In camp” was


21 Correspondence from Wilson to the board of trustees, 3 September 1937; 18 July 1938; 11 March 1939, RC 1385. NAZ. “Presents to natives” was changed later to “gifts to informants” in RLI accounting (Ian Cunnison, personal communication).
appropriate terminology for the district officer’s temporary sleeping arrangements. Anthropologists, however, needed more permanent accommodation for their longer stays—larger tents or even houses, as Gluckman argued when asking for fixed field allowances for periods when the anthropologist was not on the move. Moreover, the allowance for “presents to natives” was larger than that of the district officer, he argued, because the anthropologist remained a long time in a particular village.22 This revealed an important difference in the anthropologist’s relations with the local people. The district officer’s “presents” did indeed function as gifts, designed to buy the favor of chiefs and offset the cost of local provisioning of food for the officer and his carriers. The anthropologist’s presents functioned more as wages paid to informants for their cooperation over the considerable period that he or she lived with them.

A visible dimension of identification with government accompanied this verbal identification. When in the field, some male RLI anthropologists wore kabadula or “khaki”—long, baggy shorts worn by colonial civil servants (see Fig. 3). African research assistants also sometimes wore kabadula in the field, considering them a symbol of high status, since African employees of government were usually required to wear trousers in contrast to their white supervisors’ kabadula.23 At least in the

22 Minutes of the board of trustees meeting, 1 August 1941, RC 1385. NAZ.
23 M. B. Lukhero, interview with author, Chipata, Zambia, October 1991. District messengers, who were relatively high-status African employees of government, also wore kabadula. I have been unable
early days, neither anthropologists nor assistants attracted criticism from the African population for this overtly colonial style of dress. Other anthropologists, however, may have been critical of the wearing of what they called "Pommie pants" instead of the briefer style of shorts more commonly worn in southern Africa by men who were not members of the civil service.\textsuperscript{24}

RLI anthropologists followed the model of the colonial administrator in more than dress, talk, and negotiation for similar conditions of service. Government patterns of work and movement in the field influenced anthropological activity, and Africans sometimes perceived anthropologists to be following those patterns. Touring government officers conducted simple village censuses for tax purposes and rough surveys of agricultural production. An anthropologist collecting data for a quantitative survey also moved from village to village asking similar, though more extensive, questions about local populations and mapping gardens in the manner of a government surveyor. A man from the Luapula province of Zambia who, as a boy of seven, had seen the RLI researcher Ian Cunnison at work in his village, remembered him as "some kind of census taker" because of the questions he asked about marriage, family size, and clan affiliation.\textsuperscript{25}

Another pattern of behavior shared with colonial administrators expressed the RLI researchers' development orientation. Both colonial officers and anthropologists engaged in the cultural promotion of the people they worked with in Northern Rhodesia—that is, they employed arguments based upon supposed cultural traits to argue for appropriate kinds of development for their favorite tribes. Colonial officers often emphasized the particular characteristics of their people that suited them for progress. Bradley, for example, evaluated the various tribes he toured among according to their industry and ambition. Only the kinds of ambition that fit with a people's appropriate place on an implicit evolutionary scale of development, however, met with his approval. Bradley admired the Kunda people, who had responded enthusiastically to a cotton-growing scheme, but criticized a Chewa chief who bought a motorcar for being a fool.\textsuperscript{26} By becoming better farmers, the Kunda were responding in an appropriate way. The chief, on the other hand, had developed a craving for European luxuries beyond his appropriate level of development—and his pocketbook.

Because African political development was intended to advance gradually along "traditional" lines, the government showed considerable interest in discovering the traditional political structures of the various tribes to stimulate them to evolve appropriately. The government commissioned Gluckman, for example, to report on the

\textsuperscript{24} Marwick interview (cit. n. 1).

\textsuperscript{25} M. (anonymous), interview with author, Mwansabombwe, Zambia, July 1992. Some of the old people in Luapula called Cunnison "Lingi Stoni"—Livingstone. According to Cunnison, they were "casting back for an equivalent they could use" for him since he didn't fit other current European categories. They chose Livingstone because he, too, had asked questions. (Ian Cunnison, interview with author, Hull, England, August 1993).

\textsuperscript{26} Bradley, \textit{Diary} (cit. n. 8), pp. 75–78, 65–66.
Lozi political structure and recommend ways to reform it. His report, however, carried his cultural promotion of the Lozi too far for government, which refused to implement the reforms he recommended because of the high expense of paying the numerous traditional office holders whom he thought should be maintained.27

The Institute’s link with the Rhodes-Livingstone Museum fostered other opportunities for cultural promotion. The Museum, conveniently located near the major tourist attraction of Victoria Falls, provided a connection with the white public, who may not have had a clear idea of what an anthropologist was, but who understood the value of collections of African curios. RLI anthropologists collected cultural artifacts for the Museum and wrote essays for a “material culture” series of booklets for tourists. Indeed, the potential of Northern Rhodesia for tourism led Gluckman to make some of the most imaginative moves in the area of cultural promotion. In 1944, he suggested to the provincial commissioner a scheme for promoting tourism in Barotseland, the home of the Lozi people, his research subjects: “Like Switzerland, the Africans should export their picturesqueness. Again, Barotse is most suitable here, though I speak without knowledge of other areas. I can see rich tourists being prepared to pay to fly to Mongu for the barge-trip down river with some hunting and fishing. . . . They would enjoy buying curios in situ. . . . A levy for the Native Treasury could be made on each tourist.28

In this plan, Gluckman shared something of the development vision of the colonial officer—the Lozi should prosper through culturally appropriate activities such as local crafts and their own “picturesqueness”—an approach that Bradley, with his love of Kunda cotton-growing and dislike of chiefs in motorcars, would have understood. The anthropologist, however, gave a contemporary European example for the Lozi to emulate—Swiss exploitation of their own picturesqueness. This perhaps suggests a difference between the colonial officer’s development vision and that of the RLI. Bradley’s approval was based on the Kunda fitting into the idyllic agrarian development vision, coinciding with the best view from the colonial officer’s tent. From this point of view, therefore, the Chewa chief’s mistake was to import into the African countryside a product of the European city and its advanced civilization—a motorcar. Although it is not expressed in this quotation, Gluckman’s larger view of the Lozi allowed for contemporary urban development. He did no urban research aside from a brief visit to Lozi workers in the gold mines of South Africa, but Gluckman always placed rural Barotseland in the context of southern African urbanization and industrialization. He applied to Northern Rhodesia the ideas of the South African historian, William Macmillan, who held that South Africa was a single society, racially diverse but economically and socially interdependent.29

In their capacity as development anthropologists, RLI researchers sometimes


worked closely with colonial officers, which also led to a sharing of practices. In crisis situations, RLI anthropologists even worked temporarily as government employees. During World War II, Gluckman wrote propaganda directed at the Lozi people. During the 1948–1949 famine, J. Clyde Mitchell agreed to be seconded from the RLI in the middle of his Yao village survey to participate in a government campaign to persuade the Yao to plant drought-resistant crops.30 In times of crisis the Institute felt pressure to prove its usefulness, especially during World War II, when its claim on government funding was a low priority in the face of war needs. Because of a number of problems involving Gluckman’s early fieldwork, as well as the barraging of the first director, Wilson, from his urban field site at the start of the war, Gluckman would have been especially sensitive to the need to get along with colonial administrators to maintain the Institute’s existence during the war.31 While developing his “Seven Year Plan of Research,” Gluckman agreed to warn incoming anthropologists to maintain “discretion”—appropriate behavior on sensitive issues—by cultivating a relationship with the administration: “The Institute has been assured of the assistance of all Government departments. I add some comments, chiefly arising from the Provincial Commissioners Conference [which I attended]. (a) The question was raised of the discretion of sociologists, and I undertook that all would be warned to work in the closest collaboration with the Provincial Administration in their dealings with Native Authorities.”32 Gluckman’s notion of discretion, however, could be summed up in the note he passed to Barnes in the middle of a heated discussion with an agricultural officer in Southern Province after the war: “Suaviter in modo, fortiter in re”—“Be pliant in your appearance, but firm in fact.”33

Although Gluckman used administrative talk and wore kabadula, in the end his observation and criticism of administrators contributed to the problems that led to his leaving the field for a university career. This was because the crucial element that differentiated Gluckman’s vision of Africa and that of colonial administrators was Gluckman’s inclusion of the administrator himself in the African field that the anthropologist studied. As he put it in a memorandum to the chief secretary to the Northern Rhodesia government, “It is not pleasant to be made an object of study, and I can only urge District Officers to appreciate that when they say they are more

30 “Barotse Civil Wars and World War, 1939–1943,” RLI Manuscripts File, “Gluckman,” Institute for African Studies, Lusaka, Zambia. Richard Brown (“Passages,” [cit. n. 27], p. 531) comments that Gluckman “undertook war propaganda among the Lozi with enthusiasm” (p. 531). His left-wing sympathy for the Soviet Union may have also figured in Gluckman’s support of the war effort. Mitchell to Colson, 15 January 1949; J. Clyde Mitchell Papers (hereafter JCM), 1/3, Rhodes House Library (hereafter RH), Oxford, UK. In a letter to Barnes about the Nyasaland Agriculture Department’s suggestion to government that force be used to persuade Africans to plant drought-resistant crops, Mitchell observed that this “isn’t indirect rule” (Mitchell to Barnes, 12 January 1949; JCM 3/4, RH).

31 In his article on Gluckman, Brown (“Passages” [cit. n. 27], p. 526) points out that there were three phases in Gluckman’s career: his early insecurity in his position, his increasing ambition for a role in development planning, and finally his desire for an academic career and disillusionment with development.

32 “First Annexure to the Research Plan,” December 1944, p. 3, “Rhodes Livingstone Institute,” 1945–6, CO 927/8/7. Public Record Office, London. Gluckman carefully qualified his advice to researchers to cooperate with administrators in cases where collaboration would disturb the anthropologist’s relationship with Africans: “For instance, he said that if we were asked to identify to the administration individuals who had broken the law, one way of avoiding conflict would be to reply, ‘I’m sorry I can’t help you; all these Africans look the same to me!’” (J. A. Barnes, personal communication).

33 Barnes interview (cit. n. 1).
interested in, and do more for, the welfare of the people than the chiefs they must allow themselves to be studied in their role as a most important part of the modern political administration.”

The prospect of being an object of study must have been particularly disturbing to administrators who considered themselves to be the experts on African societies and who now found themselves included with Africans within the scope of another professional group’s expertise. Moreover, Gluckman remarked in the same memorandum that the administration should welcome the possibility that the African “should begin to feel that he can use the expert” and cite the “sociologist’s knowledge” in arguments with the administration. Thus, the dislike of being observed and the possibility that Africans might use anthropologists’ expert knowledge contributed to the hostility many administrators felt toward the RLI.

By the 1950s, the changing political situation and the RLI’s move toward urban research led to still greater differences between administrative and anthropological practice. Indeed, the anthropologists’ acceptance of the city in their view of African development became useful for distinguishing RLI research practices from colonial administrative practices. And the difference between administrators’ and anthropologists’ field practices—as perceived by Africans—became the key factor contributing to a researcher’s success or failure in the field. Even in rural fieldwork anthropologists had to distance themselves from colonial practices. Arriving in the 1950s, Ian Cunnison could not imagine any way that being like an administrator would have helped with fieldwork, since at that point it would have involved seeming to take government’s side in relation to the people he was studying. In urban fieldwork, this demonstration of difference helped to mold new field practices and create a very different kind of anthropological field.

THE MAKING OF THE URBAN FIELD

It was appropriate at that time to tour the town and Mine Compounds by bicycle, accompanied by two or three Messengers and dressed in khaki. Even if people took no notice it served to remind them of the Boma and the Government. We were, after all, the “Queen’s men” and if we chose to be a little old-fashioned, perhaps it was fitting. It was the sight that the people were used to in the villages. Besides, we could take the temperature as we rode along, and enter to some extent into the African’s feelings as we were borne over to the side of the road by a succession of badly driven motor-cars coming up behind us.

In the booming Copperbelt towns of the 1950s, the district officer had become an anachronism, symbolic of the inadequacies of the colonial government in urban

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34 Gluckman to Beresford Stooke, Chief Secretary to the Northern Rhodesia Government, “Memorandum on Co-operation between Government and the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute,” 18 April 1944 (“Rhodes-Livingstone Institute General, Plan of Research, Minutes of Meetings, 1944–1947,” 1/1, Secretariat 1/126; Anthropology 4, 16, 19, NAZ. See also Grillo’s discussion of the discomfort experienced by the “customer for research” (Grillo and Rew, eds., Social Anthropology (cit. n. 15), p. 23). One RLI anthropologist who worked on a colonial development project and noticed the problems created by the administration itself concluded, “What I know about development is dangerous!” Mitchell to Barnes, 5 August 1949, Mitchell papers, 3/4 (cit. n. 30).

35 “I well remember the surprise with which a District Officer greeted my naive remark that I was studying him too, and I think I was more circumspect thereafter.” J. A. Barnes, “Some Ethical Problems of Modern Fieldwork,” in Anthropologists in the Field, eds. D. G. Jongmans and P. C. W. Gutkind (Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum), p. 200.

36 Short, Sunset (cit. n. 7), pp. 119–120.
Africa. Little had been done to modernize urban administrative practices largely because the mines discouraged government interference in issues affecting their authority over the workforce.\textsuperscript{37} District Officer Robin Short, for example, served in the mining town of Kitwe at a time when both urban whites and blacks resented the colonial government, though for different reasons. In the situation described above, he may have been the victim of “munt-scaping,” a common practice among Copperbelt whites who enjoyed driving their cars dangerously close to Africans on bicycles wobbling along the bumpy township roads.\textsuperscript{38} Such whites generally considered colonial officers to be “Negrophiles” who stood in the way of white self-determination in Northern Rhodesia. Africans also saw colonial government as inappropriate and ineffectual, and they began to develop forms of urban organization themselves—welfare societies, unions, and political parties—to address the needs not being met by the government.

The practices of anthropologists, like those of administrators, had been shaped by the conditions of the rural field. The move to an urban field site brought a number of new forces to bear upon them. In the towns RLI anthropologists felt even greater pressure to conform to local European standards of behavior than they had in the countryside. With federation, anthropologists and their African assistants were also subjected to growing pressure from African nationalists and intellectuals.

RLI researchers had few concrete precedents to follow for adapting rural research practices to an urban setting. The status of the participant-observer method customarily employed by functionalists, for example, came into question in racially segregated urban areas. Researchers could not simply join in the activities of their subjects in places where their behavior could be observed by other whites. Neither could they hope to blend into the background and watch the natural functioning of urban black society when their very presence violated the strictures of segregation and constituted a political stand in the eyes of local whites.

Language presented another difficulty not encountered in rural areas, where research was usually restricted to a single ethnic group. RLI anthropologists chose “town Bemba” for the Copperbelt research, but the choice of any particular language would have increased their distance from speakers of other languages. Moreover, their proficiency in any local language might also have been resented by whites in positions of authority in the mines, most of whom used “Fanagalo” (also called “Chilapalapa”), a “patois of Zulu and English evolved in South Africa . . . [which] had become the language of the mines in Southern Africa” and which was comprised mainly of commands.\textsuperscript{39} Part of the difficulty of speaking a single language in a town setting could be overcome through the employment of African research assistants from different tribes. For this reason and others, the researcher’s dependence on local assistants was greater in towns than in rural areas.

Government hiring policy for the civil service also influenced the RLI’s freedom in hiring researchers and provided a way to force outward conformity to government-approved political views. Early in the Institute’s history, the board of trustees made it clear that they expected it to adhere to the government’s policy of

\textsuperscript{37} As A. L. Epstein observed at the time, “The office of the District Commissioner has its origins in the conditions of rural administration.” Parpart, \textit{Labor and Capital} (cit. n. 12), p. 39.

\textsuperscript{38} “Munt” was a derogatory term that Northern Rhodesian whites, most of whom came from South Africa, used for Africans. It was derived from \textit{umuntu}, the term used in Bantu languages for “person.”

\textsuperscript{39} Parpart, \textit{Labor and Capital} (cit. n. 12), p. 62.
favoring British nationals and, when possible, people of “pure British descent.” This may have been a factor in Gluckman's conformity to civil service dress and fieldwork practices, for he was both South African and Jewish, as well as a sometimes-open supporter of African nationalism, and he doubtless felt insecure in his position.\textsuperscript{40} Later, Cold War criteria were added to the civil service requirements. The board of trustees required that candidates for research positions be neither communists nor fascists, at least not openly.\textsuperscript{41} Political neutrality was also supposed to be maintained in the research itself, and some government and mining company officials took this to mean that any questions about Africans’ political beliefs or union leanings were out of bounds. Here Mitchell, the fourth director (from 1952 to 1955), insisted on the researcher's freedom to conduct studies along political lines and demanded support from the trustees in case the mines or local whites misunderstood his own research. The board refused to support him, however, until he threatened to call off the whole project.\textsuperscript{42}

The RLI’s African research assistants came under scrutiny as well, which led to difficulties with recruitment. Although a colonial officer sympathetic to the RLI recommended the “rather bolshy man Harry Nkumbula” for a position, the director could not take the suggestion seriously. Mitchell had already encountered difficulties in hiring enough assistants for the Copperbelt survey team because those best qualified were frequently “cleaned out by Security.”\textsuperscript{43} Elizabeth Colson, the previous director (1948–1951), made these comments:

\begin{quote}
Sorry to hear about the difficulties with African assistants. As things tightened up, I was afraid that would happen. Obviously, any African who is alive enough to ask questions about social structure is probably going to be on the black list. It's probably impossible too for them to be objective about it, and if they start discussing sociology, economics, or what have you with their friends—oh well. Too bad we don't have machines that can be guaranteed against holding political opinions.\textsuperscript{44}
\end{quote}

She then speculated that even machines would be suspected of bias in the current atmosphere of suspicion.

African nationalists and intellectuals during the federation period applied pressure of their own on the Institute. Africans on the RLI survey team found research at times involved harassment, when research subjects accused them of being “Federal agents” and threatened to beat them.\textsuperscript{45} Even in the countryside, villagers suspected anthropologists of being government spies. In one case a conservative local chief, aware that local people would suspect any researcher of being a spy, required Colson

\textsuperscript{40} Brown, \textit{Passages} (cit. n. 27), 1979, p. 527.

\textsuperscript{41} Colson to Mitchell, 31 December 1949, Mitchell Papers 1/3 (cit. n. 30).

\textsuperscript{42} “In order to make my study I shall have to interview members of all shades of opinion, from Communists among Africans to near-Fascists among Europeans. Therefore, I expect, in due course, my activities will be labeled 'subversive' by those who cannot understand the nature of scientific social investigations” (Mitchell to the Board of Trustees, 4 September 1950, Mitchell Papers 1/3 [cit. n. 30]). He mentions his threat to resign in a letter to Colson, 2 November 1950 (Mitchell Papers 1/3 [cit. n. 30]). In the end, the support was ineffective, and A. L. Epstein—who was doing research on African miners—was banned from mine property in the middle of his study.

\textsuperscript{43} Fox-Pitt to Colson, 21 September 1950, Mitchell Papers 1/3 (cit. n. 30). Harry Nkumbula was the prominent leader of the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress. Mitchell to Colson, 2 November 1950; Mitchell Papers 1/3 (cit. n. 30).

\textsuperscript{44} Colson to Mitchell, 2 December 1950; Mitchell Papers 1/3 (cit. n. 30).

to pitch her tent close to the house of a local Northern Rhodesia African National Congress member, hoping to stifle the man’s political activities. In rural as well as urban areas, Africans frequently questioned researchers about their political beliefs or looked to them as a source of information about the current political situation. Because they knew they were being watched by security agents, researchers had to avoid making remarks that could be construed as encouraging African political activity. When asked by people in her research site to tell them about “Congress,” Colson would pretend to misunderstand and then launch into an explanation of the workings of the United States Congress.46

As intellectuals with political beliefs of their own, the African assistants also applied pressure on the Institute. The Institute found itself in a difficult position during the two days of prayer called by Congress to protest the coming of federation in 1953. Assistants in the field working on the urban surveys participated in this strike without repercussion, arguing that for reasons of statistical accuracy working on the survey on those days would be counterproductive.47 At the RLI headquarters, however, the situation was different. Government informed the administrative secretary that it was planning to dismiss African employees who failed to come to work on the days of prayer and implied that she should follow the same policy. To back this up, they planned an official visit to the Institute during the strike.48

The assistants’ political loyalties, however, more often helped the Institute to continue its research in the urban areas. Assistants went in first to talk to nationalist or union groups about the proposed research, smoothing the way for the survey teams. RLI researchers were careful to obtain formal permission for their activities from these groups. And despite the efforts of government security to clean out activists from the RLI staff, most research assistants actually carried on political work while employed by the Institute, sometimes with the help of the researchers.49 Ultimately, pressures from both sides transformed RLI fieldwork practices. In response to the color bar, anthropologists grew more dependent on African assistants for fieldwork in urban areas. Nationalist pressures also led to greater dependence on assistants who were themselves political activists, giving legitimacy to the research in the eyes of other Africans.

Anthropologists also cultivated an image of scientific neutrality. Under a later director, Henry Fosbrooke (1956–1960), the RLI undertook a publicity campaign to emphasize its neutrality, producing a poster to be distributed throughout the Federation. The language of the poster stressed the Institute’s independence and its mission to produce data for use by all members of the central African public, including Africans. The photographs sent a mixed message, however. Some of the researchers pictured on the poster wore kabadula and took reassuringly (to government and the white public) central positions with respect to assistants and informants. The University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (UCRN)—symbol to many African

46 Elizabeth Colson, interview with author, Lusaka, Zambia, 4 August 1992. Colson was one of the few American anthropologists to work at the RLI and the only female director, though Audrey Richards had turned down an offer of the job after Godfrey Wilson left in 1939, because she preferred to work in Britain during the war.


48 M. McCulloch to Mitchell, 17 April 1953, RLI Management File, “Mitchell.”

49 Chiwale interview (cit. n. 45); A. L. Epstein, interview with author, Brighton, England, 1 December 1990.
intellectuals (and most RLI researchers and assistants) of the Federation—figured prominently in another photo. Other scenes, however, would have proved disquieting to those whites and government officials who might have agreed with Bradley’s view of chiefs with motorcars. Smartly dressed assistants figured prominently in photographs showing them conducting interviews, researching in the library, and running statistical equipment. The photo of the Institute itself, however, expressed a mixed message, its colonial-style architecture deliberately disguised as much as possible by the director’s landscaping efforts.

Changes in rural fieldwork also expressed the anthropologists’ attempt to distance themselves from colonial administrators and their field practices, now associated by most Africans with the Federation. Some anthropologists switched from the use of tents to the use of caravans and vanettes for fieldwork. Unlike the tent, which was associated with the colonial officer on tour, these vehicles were considered modern tools of research, neutral in their political associations and indicating a trend toward a new kind of research appropriate to a soon-to-be-independent African state. This switch only became possible because of the arrival in southern Africa of second-hand Army vehicles after World War II and increasing numbers of four-wheel-drive vehicles in the postwar period. Researchers such as Wilson and Gluckman had little choice but to use porters and tents for their rural fieldwork before and during the war.

Thus, the Institute’s research depended on projecting a dual image and on using practices that would give an impression of neutrality to both of the opposing sides in the battle over federation. Sometimes this approach worked. As one Zambian observed of local impressions of the RLI in those days, “The name ‘Rhodes’ was very controversial, but the name ‘Livingstone’ was very admirable, so I think that they [RLI researchers] were seen as neutral.” But this dual image also represented a compromise charged with conflict, which can be seen most distinctly in the contrast between the two RLI directors who were themselves colonial administrators.

C. M. N. White (temporary director in 1955–1956 and 1960–1962) had been warned by government that he might be unpopular with RLI staff because of his colonial service background. The opposite proved to be true. The RLI staff liked him, but White attracted the disapproval of European society. He often left Europeans’ dinner parties early to join his Luvale friends—whose culture he had studied while an administrator in northwestern Northern Rhodesia—in kachasu parties at their homes. (Kachasu is a local form of distilled alcohol.) The Institute’s assistants liked him, and the gardeners were delighted when, on hearing the sound of drums coming from the director’s house, they crept near for a peek and saw him dancing Luvale-style with his servants. Earning European disapproval for fraternizing across the color bar was not White’s worst problem, however. He was a gifted amateur ethnographer, and his fondness for kachasu and too great identification with “his

50 Elizabeth Colson, interview with author, El Cerrito, California, 19 September 1990.
51 Mainza Chona, interview with author, Lusaka, Zambia, 13 August 1992. Cecil Rhodes, after whom the Rhodesias were named, was considered by Africans the main instigator of colonialism. Africans still regarded the missionary, David Livingstone, with some approval. Anthropologists may have shared this view, expressed in Evans-Pritchard’s referring to the RLI as “The Saint and the Sinner Institute” (Cunnison interview [cit. n. 25]). Also see Brown (“Anthropology” [cit n. 4], pp. 180–181), who believes the choice of the name “Rhodes-Livingstone” was made for local fund-raising purposes.
people” had led government to delay his promotions. The problem of what to do with him still remained, for he was a talented administrator and commanded the respect of other colonial officers for his deep understanding of Luvale culture and fluency in African languages. The solution was to keep him out of sensitive posts and place him in charge of institutions where his pro-African attitudes would be welcomed—such as the RLI.

Henry Fosbrooke, on the other hand, irritated many of the white researchers and black assistants, due to his “Bwana DC” (District Commissioner) mannerisms and practices. Although Fosbrooke had serious disagreements with the colonial government, favored African majority rule, and eventually resigned over the trustees’ decision to hand the Institute over to UCRN, he was always seen by government administrators and the mining companies as someone they could work with. Like White, he was an administrator-ethnographer, and he had worked both as a government sociologist and colonial officer in Tanganyika. There he had “caught the Maasai bug” and had identified closely with the people he administered. But unlike White, his social habits in white society were staunchly European, and when he socialized with Africans at the RLI’s Lusaka headquarters (see Fig. 4), it was in European style—inviting African secondary school boys for tea and allowing his children to

play tennis with them—though these, too, were controversial actions at the time.\textsuperscript{54} Activities such as these, however, fitted well with the civilizing mission of the colonial administration. Its practices focused on the maintenance of authority and the training of youth to fit into a hierarchical system, and their roots can be found in the British public school on which the early colonial service was partly modeled.

This administrative style, however, offended some members of staff—black and white—who were accustomed to the more collegial, informal, and egalitarian style of the earlier directors. Anthropologists sometimes referred to him disparagingly as a mere “ethnographer,” indicating that their differences with him were part of the more general struggle over the use of expertise in the late colonial period. And his work policy of “interchangeability without loss of status” was deeply resented by the research assistants. It meant that they had to take on nonresearch jobs—including gardening tasks—which represented a loss of professional self-esteem, even though it did not involve lower pay. A white anthropologist, who had just returned from research in Nyasaland at the time, would stalk about the Institute grounds observing in a loud voice that “Bwana DC says you must be his garden boys!” It is ironic that these landscaping duties were intended to change the Institute’s appearance so that visiting Africans would not be offended by its colonial-style architecture.\textsuperscript{55}

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

[The African research assistants] are far more difficult to deal with than European [researchers]—far more fastidious. God knows what is going to happen when they [have] to live in tents. I am sure that there is going to be a riot.\textsuperscript{56}

Although no riots broke out among the urban research assistants when they were asked to do surveys in rural areas and live in tents, Director Mitchell’s joking prediction suggests that the aspirations of this particular group of African intellectuals clashed with the mystique of “getting under canvas” that anthropologists and colonial officers shared. For urban Africans, fastidious standards of dress and behavior indicated status in the “smart” 1950s and were incompatible with many aspects of the anthropologist’s rural field practice. New field practices and technology, symbolized by some researchers’ preference for caravans or vanettes over tents, thus also suited the aspirations of an emerging group of African intellectuals—along with a new group of outside experts—who constructed an alternative view of development after independence.

Influenced as it was by its urban field experience and identification with young African nationalists, RLI anthropology nevertheless represented a blending of urban and rural field practices and a view of African development that encompassed both city and countryside. Although RLI researchers pioneered the use of modern technology in the form of vehicles and statistical methods, they also maintained the importance of long-term participant observation in the rural setting. Most important,

\textsuperscript{54} Henry Fosbrooke, interview with author, Lake Duluti, Tanzania, 10 January 1992; Peter Rigby, interview with author, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 2 March 1993; C. (anonymous) interview (cit. n. 53).


\textsuperscript{56} Mitchell to M. McCulloch, 1 April 1953, RLI Management File, “Mitchell.”
they were conscious of vital differences between their view of an interdependent rural and urban African field and the "picturesque" rural view of Africa held by white settlers and colonial administrators. As one RLI anthropologist wrote in 1960, a turning point in the struggle for African independence:

Some Europeans consider that Africans are best suited to the "natural" conditions of life in the bush, following their own customs, and are happiest when least contaminated by civilisation. This notion is harmless when it only leads people of a romantic disposition to appeal for preservation of the picturesque. It is more dangerous when it is used by others as a reason for denying the possibility of African advancement, and as a justification for policies of apartheid.57

Scientists in the field develop methods in response to political, social, cultural, and material conditions, which include the preexisting practices of others who share the field. Nevertheless, shared practices do not lead directly to a shared view of the field. Even when RLI anthropologists wore colonial garb and talked with administrators about the pleasures and pains of touring, they saw a different Africa. Prior theoretical and political commitments, such as Gluckman's application of William Macmillan's view of a single interdependent, though racially diverse, society also shaped the view. So, too, did the new experience of urban fieldwork and the perspectives of the RLI's African research assistants. Thus, influenced by these factors, RLI anthropologists selectively chose and adapted from preexisting practices those that proved useful for getting the work done in a rapidly changing political situation.