ABSTRACT

Migration studies have focused attention on ethnic institutions in global and gateway cities. This ethnic lens distorts migration scholarship, reinforces methodological nationalism, and disregards the role of city scale in shaping migrant pathways of settlement and transnational connection. The scale of cities reflects their positioning within neoliberal processes of local, national, regional, and global rescaling. To encourage further explorations of nonethnic pathways that may be salient in small-scale cities, we examine born-again Christianity as a means of migrant incorporation locally and transnationally in two small-scale cities, one in the United States and the other in Germany.

When Heaven's Gift, a Nigerian-born migrant who had recently settled in Manchester, New Hampshire, invited us to visit his "home church" to hear him preach, we were not sure what to expect. As soon as we arrived at the storefront that housed the Lord's Outreach Church, however, we realized that, in fact, we had a very clear idea of what we would see. We expected a Nigerian or, at least, African congregation. To our surprise, we found that almost all of the congregants were white, and their dress and battered faces bore witness to the harshness of working-class lives. Heaven's Gift and his Nigerian wife, Elizabeth, sat off to the side, not as guests but as part of the leadership of the congregation. Both were dressed in their Sunday best, he in a suit and tie and she in a good dress and churchgoing hat. A white minister conducted most of the service, accompanied by a small group of musicians, one of whom was a Ghanaian with a Harvard degree and a good job. When it was time for the sermon, Heaven's Gift preached to his fellow congregants, moving many to high emotion and then calling on them to come forward and be healed. Many did so, and at his touch they silently fell to the floor in a state of trance.1

Moments of nonrecognition constitute one of the strengths of ethnographic fieldwork, as is recognized in the development of grounded theory (Burawoy 1991:9; Glick Schiller 2003; Schensul et al. 1999). The research team that visited the Lord's Outreach Church had an expectation about the composition of the congregation based on the prevailing assumption that immigrants live and worship within distinct "ethnic communities." This assumption had structured the initial proposals for the research described in this article, although in previous work both Glick Schiller and Çağlar had contested the facile use of concepts of "ethnic community"
and documented the institutional processes through which ethnic categories and identities are constructed and naturalized (Çağlar 1990, 1995, 1997; Glick Schiller 1977, 1999; Glick Schiller et al. 1987a, 1987b). As a result of the visit to the Lord's Outreach Church and similar experiences in Manchester and in the German city of Halle an der Saale, where we were also studying the new migration to small-scale cities, we reconfigured our research questions to specifically address nonethnict forms of settlement and their connection to city scale. If we had confined our understanding of Heaven's Gift's local and transnational paths of incorporation to a study of Nige-rian or African networks or organizations, his home church would not even have been included in our narrative.

The central concern of this article is to develop a conceptual framework for the study of migration, settlement, and transborder connection that is not dependent on the ethnic group as either the unit of analysis or sole object of study. In its place, we suggest an ethnographic approach to locality, building on and contributing to the developing literature on the rescaling of cities within global neoliberal agendas (Brenner 2004; Jessop 2000; Smith 1995). To illustrate our nonethnict approach to migrant settlement, we draw from ethnographic research conducted from 2001 to 2005 in Halle and Manchester. In both cities, we worked with born-again Christians, so this article also provides a situated account of the joint participation of migrants and natives in local fundamentalist congregations and transnational networks. Research on migrant settlement has focused on bounded ethnic populations with a shared identity and mode of in-corporation. Much of this research and almost all of the theory has been based in cities categorized as either global or gateway cities. The term gateway city refers to locations of first settlement of large numbers of migrants. Some such cities, for example, New York and London, are also classified as global cities. The terms are not synonymous, but both do refer to cities that are relatively well positioned in hierarchies of economic and political power (cf. Sassen 1992; Waldinger 2001). Less-well-positioned cities, which we designate “small-scale,” are particularly important locales in which to obtain insights to move migration research beyond the use of the ethnic group as the unit of analysis and beyond the hegemony of a single model of migrant incorporation.

The study of nonethnict forms of incorporation:
A conceptual vocabulary

A voluminous historical and ethnographic literature details the constructed nature of ethnic identities and ethnic group boundaries (Brubaker 2004; Gonzalez 1988; Hill 1989; Park and Miller 1921; Bath and Kloosterman 2000; Sollors 1989). Moreover, studies of what the authors of this literature see as ethnic “communities” are replete with descriptions of divisions based on class, religion, region of origin, or politics among members of the “same” group. Recent work on “su-perdiversity” in British cities acknowledges the internal divisions within ethnic groups in terms of language, place of origin, legal status, and stratification, although this perspective does not free itself from the grip of ethnic categories of research (Vertovec 2005). Yet scholars of migration continue to use “ethnic community” as both the object of study and the unit of analysis in migration research. The new diaspora studies perpetuate the problem by defining the unit of study as people who share an ancestry and a history of dispersal. The ethnic lens used by these scholars shapes—and, in our opinion, obscures—the diversity of migrants’ relationships to their place of settlement and to other localities around the world.

Beginning in the 18th century, nation-state-building projects of state officials, politicians, intellectuals, and transnational migrant leaders legitimated a political ideology that portrayed individuals as having only one country and one identity. At the end of the 19th century, scholars incorporated their commitment to the nation-state into their developing social sciences. Their orientation, which has been called “methodological nationalism,” approached the study of social processes and historical processes as if they were contained within the borders of individual nation-states (Beck 2000; Martins 1974; Smith 1983; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002a, 2002b). Nation-states were conflated with societies, and the members of those states were assumed to share a common history and set of values, norms, social customs, and institutions. Through an extension of the logic of methodological nationalism, migrants were, by defini-tion, culturally and socially different because they originated in other national territories; natives, by this same logic, became a homogeneous whole.

Some writers prefer to label this approach the container theory of society to highlight that most social theorists, including Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, and Talcott Parsons, have contained their concept of “society” within the territorial and institutional boundaries of the nation-state (Beck 2000; Urry 2000). We find the term methodological nationalism more useful, however, because it reminds us that conventional “objective” social theory harbors a political position. Scholars who are methodological nationalists not only take the boundaries of the nation-state for granted but also contribute to the reproduction of their state’s projects. They operate within an idée fixe: Their nation-state was internally homogeneous until its harmony was disrupted by migrants who entered the national space as the bearers of disruptive differences (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002a, 2002b).

Caught in a logical loop that arises from the way they enter the study of migration in the first place, social scientists in North America and Europe continue to debate theories of migrant settlement that are seriously disconnected from the historical and ethnographic record. In the United States, such concerns have led to a “new assimilation-ism,” whereas Europeans often prefer to renew their calls for
“integration” (Alba and Nee 2003; Brubaker 2004; Heckmann 2003; Sackmann et al. 2003). Seeking a conceptual vocabulary that does not obfuscate from the outset the local and transnational processes being queried, we use the term incorporation. Incorporation can be defined as the processes of building or maintaining networks of social relations through which an individual or an organized group of individuals becomes linked to an institution recognized by one or more nation-states. Our entry points into the study of incorporation are individual migrants, the networks they form, and the social fields created by their networks. Social fields are networks of networks that may be locally situated or extend nationally or transnationally (Glick Schiller 2003, 2005b; Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999). Social fields are the aspect of social relations through which broader social forces enable, shape, and constrain individual migrants and their networks (Epstein 1969; Jenkins 1992; Mitchell 1969). Although our approach provides the conceptual space to follow individuals into organized groups, it is not dependent on the study of formally organized activities. In our approach to incorporation, the focus is on processes and social relations rather than on culture, identity, or function. This orientation encourages the exploration of multilevel ties within and across the boundaries of nation-states and facilitates the discussion of simultaneity—inclusion both within a nation-state and transnationally (Glick Schiller 2003, 2005b; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004).

We use the concept of “mode of incorporation” to emphasize that different institutional domains facilitate and eventuate migrant incorporation and that any particular individual may become engaged in one or more modes of incorporation. Consequently, our analysis takes into account the impact of social structures and global forces in shaping social fields while moving the study of migrant incorporation beyond the scholarly preoccupation with organized membership (formal employment, legal status, or citizenship) or subjective identification.

Tracing such indirect connections within a social field is an important aspect of the study of migrant incorporation. Mark Granovetter’s (1973) work on the significance of weak ties and an entire line of scholarship built on this insight made it clear that social incorporation may be facilitated by relationships that are indirect and involve infrequent interaction. Weak ties can be an important form of social capital. Social capital has been defined as “the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of their membership in networks or broader social structures” (Portes 1998:6). Network ties provide access to resources. Consequently, the participation of individuals in personal or organizational networks, which place them in social fields that provide them with the capacity to command scarce resources, is an indicator of incorporation. Resources include material rewards, such as money, as well as employment, training, social recognition, social connections, and prestige.

Moreover, each mode of incorporation has multiple possibilities. Following Pnina Werbner’s (1999) usage, we designate these multiple possibilities pathways. We speak of “multiple modes of incorporation” to emphasize that there is no single, exclusive trajectory of migrant incorporation (Glick Schiller et al. 2005). Individual migrants may incorporate using one or several modes of incorporation and multiple pathways within each mode. The approach we outline moves researchers beyond the study of migrant incorporation focused on the establishment or diminution of ethnic “community” or identity. The unit of analysis is no longer a hypothetical community represented by certain neighborhoods, businesses, churches, or recognizable last names. Instead, we follow individual migrants and their descendants into their various networks and social fields. And the object of study can include various pathways of incorporation that include but are not limited to ethnic pathways.

Nonethnic forms of incorporation connect migrants in social relationships built on factors other than the claims to common culture, descent, or history that stem from ethnic forms of categorization or self-identification. In the workplace, neighborhood, and political and religious organizations, migrants form social ties with both natives and migrants who bear different ethnicities. For example, although discussions of migration and politics often privilege identity politics, in many places, a migrant can become an elected official by developing nonethnic networks with local political-party activists. This is certainly the case in Halle and Manchester, where foreign-born men have won elections without relying on an ethnic base.

Religion is another mode of incorporation that includes diverse pathways. Although most research on migration and religion highlights ethnic identities and homeland ties, some scholars of religious pathways emphasize religious identities and networks (Chafetz and Ebaugh 2002; Corten and Marshall-Fratani 2001; Robbins 2004; Vásquez and Marquardt 2003). These researchers trace the contemporary growth of globe-spanning religious networks and organizations to the development of unequal globalization (Vásquez in press; Vásquez and Marquardt 2003). Islam, in particular, is being studied as a global project, with its transnational networks coming under intense scrutiny. Caribbean and Latin American migrants’ appropriation of conservative U.S. Pentecostalism as a response to their economic, social, or legal marginalization in urban contexts has been increasingly researched (Brodwin 2003; Gill 1990). Much of the research on migrant settlement and transnationalism in the United States and Europe, however, conflates religion and ethnicity, whether scholars have studied Christian or Muslim migrants.

This is particularly evident in the growing literature on new forms of Pentecostalism and migrant settlement in Europe and the United States. Although the research contains clear indications that many worshippers emphasize a...
community in Christ without an ethnic suffix, scholars persist in categorizing the worshippers by their ethnicity. The result is a contradictory narrative in which those studied speak of their community in Christ and "their identity as primarily Christian," whereas the researchers characterize the believers as African, Nigerian, Ghanaian, or Salvadorian (Hunt and Lightly 2001:122; see also Adogame 2002; Menjívar 2003; van Dijck 2004).

In Europe, scholars describe "African Christianity," which they portray as part of the development of African ethnic communities or African congregations. Because of this ethnic bent, the beliefs and practices of the migrant's fundamentalist Christianity are interpreted only in relation to conditions in the homeland or to the migrant experience. When the ethnic group is the unit of analysis, the experiences that Christians in a particular locality share, as articulated through their religious practices, as well as the impact of these experiences on the believers' lives are not accessible. Stephen Hunt and Nicola Lightly (2001:109, 121), for example, studied a specific Pentecostal congregation in London but generalized their findings to affiliated churches distributed not only throughout Great Britain but also in India, the Caribbean, Hong Kong, the United States, and Europe. They claimed that the religious belief system they observed was "the product of both development in West Africa, especially Nigerian . . . and an adaptation to Western society" (Hunt and Lightly 2001:107). Lost in this African homeland and Western society framing of Christian practices are the similarities between "African Christianity" and "the fundamentalist Christianity" of congregations glossed as "largely white working class" (Harding 1987:170) or simply as "middle class US citizens" (Luhrmann 2004:518) or believers whose whiteness and ethnicity go unmarked (Hunt 2000).

**Toward a theory of locality: Linking city scale to pathways of migrant incorporation**

By setting aside the ethnic group as the unit of analysis and promoting the study of multiple pathways of incorporation, we lay the groundwork to study specific localities of incorporation in shaping migrant settlement and transnational connection. Although migration research has not provided a sufficient theory of locality, seminal work has focused on the city as context (Bretell 2003; Çağlar 2001, 2005, in press; Goode and Schneider 1994; Leeds 1980; Soysal 2001; Straßburger et al. 2000; Yalçın-Heckmann 1997). An important tradition in U.S. historiography and immigrant studies describes the settlement of immigrants in a particular city (Cinel 1982; Handlin 1941; Lamphere 1992). By the 1990s, migration researchers in Europe had begun to note relationships between the size, significance, or political configuration of particular cities in which migrants were settling and the pattern of incorporation of these migrants (Bommes and Radtke 1996; Koopmans and Statham 2000; Rex 1996; Schiffauer 1999; Schmitter Heisler 1998). Increasingly, ethnographies describe migrants settling in the United States in suburban, rural, or nongateway cities (Bretell 2005; Goode and Schneider 1994; Holtzman 2000; Koltyk 1997; Mahler 1995). Very occasionally, U.S.-based scholars have addressed the relationship between the political economy of the sending locality and the transnational space into which it extends (Rouse 1992; Smith 2001). With the exception of the global cities literature, however, studies of particular cities contain little or no examination of the relationship between the positioning of the city within broader domains of financial, political, and cultural power and of the trajectories of migrant settlement (Steppick and Portes 1993; Waldinger 2001; Waldinger and Bozorgmehr 1996).

Even the studies of global cities have done little more than allude to the consequences of a city's scalar dimensions for migration flows and settlement. If such cities have distinct structures that are not generalizable to the nation-states in which they are located, then migration pathways into these cities should reflect their distinct globality (Sassen 1992, 2000). In the absence of comparative material on cities of different scale, however, identifying just what is different for migrants in global cities is difficult, and the term *global city* remains evocative rather than definitive (Eade 1997). For example, Jörg Dürrschmidt (1997) has argued that transnational networks of residents can be understood as a mark of a global city but has not addressed the comparative data that report transnational networks as a common feature of migrant settlement in cities that are not global. Similarly, Saskia Sassen (1992) has underscored the crucial links between cities as key players in global networks of finance capital and the development of a low-wage service sector dependent on low-paid migrants. But low-wage sectors dependent on migrant labor are part of the economies of cities of varying sizes and degrees of global significance. It is far more useful to understand all contemporary cities as global but with different scalar positions.

We suggest that, by developing and deploying the concept of "city scale," migration researchers will be able to apprehend the role of locality in shaping the migrant pathways of incorporation. As developed by Neil Brenner (1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2004), Neil Smith (1995), Erik Swyngedouw (1992, 1997), and others, working from initial formulations of Henri Lefebvre (1991), scale theory allows one to take locality into consideration but within the intersection of hierarchies of power. The term *scale* can be defined as the summary assessment of the differential positioning of cities determined by the flow and control of capital and structures of power as they are constituted within regions, states, and the globe. An assessment of scalar position is particularly necessary in the contemporary context of neoliberal global capitalism, in which cities are no longer embedded within a nested hierarchy of power that is primarily structured by regional and nation-state institutions. Cities increasingly must compete
Several discrete aspects of state policy and capitalist investment are discussed within the rubric of the “neoliberal agenda” (Ferguson and Gupta 2002). These include the reduction in state services and benefits, the diversion of public monies and resources to develop private service-oriented industries, from health care to housing (sometimes in arrangements called “public–private partnerships”), and the relentless push toward global production through the elimination of state intervention in a host of economic issues, from tariffs to workers’ rights. Each of these aspects of neoliberalism has different impacts on particular urban areas, but all affect the relationship between migrants and cities of settlement. The new and differential pressures on cities have been addressed by scholars concerned with neoliberal urban restructuring (Brenner 2004; Brenner et al. 2003; Gulbrandsen 2005). These scholars have noted that, increasingly, local officials must work to attract foreign capital and market their cities by recasting their localities as centers of knowledge, finance, and tourism (Çağlar in press; Gulbrandsen 2005; Henry et al. 2002; Holland et al. 2006; MacLeod and Goodwin 1999; Zukin 1991). It is also clear that in the competition between cities, there are winners and losers. Just how a city is rescaled within this continuing quest for positioning has implications for the opportunities it provides for its migrants. The demise of Keynesian economic policies that relied on the redistribution of tax revenues to reduce regional disparities within national borders and the advent of neoliberal agendas, although implemented to different degrees in different nation-states, account for the increased salience of scale factors in assessing the fate of specific cities.9

Although the art of assessing city scale is relatively undeveloped, we can project a series of measures that mark the differences between small-scale cities and global cities: Indicators of a small-scale city include relatively small finance and banking sectors, difficulty in attracting flows of capital for the growth of dynamic forms of sectoral activities such as technology, a marked lack of employment opportunities for college-educated youth, a shrinking local tax base, and an almost complete lack of money for locally funded social programs. The size of the population of the city, rather than being an absolute measure, is a reflection of regional, national, and global relationships; it is not, in and of itself, an indicator of scale but very often interacts with the factors just listed. Proximity to other urban centers also must be considered in scalar assessment.

The existing literature on neoliberal urban restructuring has not addressed the relationships between migration and cities, although a few seminal studies demonstrate that urban officials and elites view questions of migration from the perspective of their city’s struggle for positioning with respect to regional, national, and global flows of capital (Henry et al. 2002; MacLeod and Goodwin 1999). Migration scholars confront the challenge of situating migrants within an analysis of the contemporary rescaling of cities. If scale is indeed an important variable in shaping migrant incorporation, including the establishment of transborder networks, then it is important to develop research in cities of different scale to complement what is known about global cities and their migrants. Small-scale cities may contain social capital and community-building strategies that are shaped by the scarcity of economic capital, commercial opportunities, and professional employment. That is to say, cities that differ in scalar dimensions also may differ in their modes and pathways of incorporation. For example, whereas migrants in cities of various scales are turning to forms of born-again Christian identity, this form of incorporation may have heightened importance in small-scale cities. To provide the context for the nonethnic Christian pathways of local and global incorporation that we found in both Halle and Manchester, we examine and compare these cities from the perspective of the factors of scale that shape the lives of migrants and natives.

### The sameness of small-scale city difference: Halle and Manchester compared

Halle in Sachsen-Anhalt, Germany, and Manchester, New Hampshire, in the United States, can be understood as small-scale cities. The two cities share certain factors in their relationship to hierarchies of political and economic power that can be summarized in terms of their scalar positioning. Although they are similar in terms of the absolute size of their metropolitan area populations, each numbering under 250,000, it is their similarities of scale that are important to compare.10 Both are, relatively speaking, marginalized cities, on the peripheries of more successful urban centers. Despite the efforts of each city to project a high-tech profile, both cities have found themselves in relatively weak competitive positions within national and global urban hierarchies. At this point, we can only begin to outline the similarities of scale, but the evidence we have assembled provides a useful perspective on what otherwise might seem puzzling aspects of the relationship between each city and its migrants.

Halle is a declining industrial city characterized by low-wage jobs and a high rate of unemployment, its scalar position considerably weakened by German unification in 1989. An arts and culture project funded by the German Federal Cultural Foundation conferred on Halle a dubious distinction by designating it a “shrinking city,” noting that it had lost 70,000 people in a decade.11 Competing with the neighboring city of Leipzig and located 100 miles from Berlin, the nearest large-scale city, Halle has had trouble attracting investments in new high-tech enterprises and institutions that oversee and service finance capital. After unification, the large industrial plants that were the base of its economy were sold to foreign investors. More than 30,000 people lost
their jobs when most of the factories were closed or downsized. Some German and EU capital has been invested in Halle over the past 15 years but not in sectors that provide much employment for local people or migrants. Banking and commercial enterprises have been built, housing has been renovated, and redevelopment in the city center continues. Although there has been some investment in the modernization of Halle's industrial sector to increase productivity, this type of investment has done little for the city as a whole because the retooling has resulted in the employment of far fewer workers (Barjak 2000). In addition, construction and supply contracts often go to firms from western Germany, which means that investment capital does not provide profits for local companies or, often, even employment for local people. Most of the people who have benefited from the reconstituted financial sector have come from western Germany and maintain residences there. The limited size of this sector has left few professional jobs for natives of the east and almost none for migrants, especially not for people without EU citizenship.

The city leadership of Halle has spoken of developing the city as a center of knowledge and technology on the basis of its 19th-century history as a scientific center and its 500-year-old university. In an effort to boost its scientific resources, several German research institutes were located in Halle in the 1990s. City leaders have been hampered in their effort to develop the profile of Halle as a knowledge center, however, because Halle is not a political center. After German reunification in 1989, Halle, although the biggest city of the new state of Sachsen-Anhalt, lost the competition to become the capital of the state. Without political power, the city leaders could not prevent the closure or restructuring of academic departments within the city's university and medical school, which impeded their ability to command the nexus of resources that might transform the city.

In 2004, on the city's own website, Halle officials described the city as “the nucleus of a wide area constituting an economic metropolis, in which service industries and technology centres predominate” (Halle die Stadt n.d.). Yet the same website reported that the “best known local products are Hallorenkugel chocolates, Kathi cake mix, and railway rolling stock built at Ammendorf,” ignoring the low-tech nature of chocolate and cake-mix production and the closure of the railway-car factory. In 2005, the biggest economic news was the opening of a call center, which assured several hundred jobs. More recently, the opening of a call center, which assured several hundred jobs. In 2005, the biggest economic news was the opening of a call center, which assured several hundred jobs. More recently, the opening of a call center, which assured several hundred jobs. In 2005, the biggest economic news was the opening of a call center, which assured several hundred jobs. In 2005, the biggest economic news was the opening of a call center, which assured several hundred jobs.

Since the 1990s, the level of unemployment in the city has been very high (just under 20 percent in 2004), leading to severe competition for even unskilled work and illegal work. Non-EU migrants with legal permission to work have found few opportunities for employment and even less chance for occupational mobility. Within this rather grim picture, some migrants have established small businesses, realizing that business development is the only path to employment for themselves and members of their families and networks. Because the native population, with its socialist background, did not have much commercial experience or access to wholesale networks, migrants have been able to compete with natives, although the poverty of the local population sets the parameters of the types of businesses that can succeed. This was especially true of migrant start-up retail businesses in the early 1990s. More recently, migrant businesses often have been offshoots of businesses first established elsewhere in Germany and then expanded into underdeveloped market niches.

Because of the factors that discourage migrant settlement, the numbers of foreigners in Halle are rather low, especially in comparison with German cities of larger scale. Although the size of the migrant population of Halle doubled between 1990 and 2000, migrants constitute only four percent of the population, with the largest number coming from the European Union. Among the non-EU foreigners, African migrants from a wide range of countries and Vietnamese make up small but visible minorities. There are Kurdish refugees from several countries but, unlike many other German cities, very few Turkish residents. Given the local economy, few migrants have voluntarily come to Halle. Most have come through resettlement policies that distribute refugees among all the German states and do not permit resettlement without an offer of employment. Most refugees who can, leave and settle in western Germany, where the possibilities for both legal and “off the books” employment are much greater. The migrants who remain include people in a diverse array of legal categories: asylum seekers, who are not allowed to seek employment or move; refugees or immigrants with German partners or children through such partners; elderly refugees, either Russian Jews or “ethnic Germans” who do not believe they would be employable elsewhere in Germany; students; small business owners; and workers recruited within business networks. City leaders often portray migrants as uneducated and undesirable, in contrast to the technologically skilled foreigners they hope will come rebuild the city as a center of knowledge. Nevertheless, there are skilled professionals among the unemployed migrants. Some of them have even been educated in Halle. In fact, relatively few migrants actually are without some education.

Fifty-eight miles north of Boston, Massachusetts, Manchester is not a shrinking city; in fact, according to its own promotional material, Manchester was designated the seventh “Best Small City for Doing Business in America” in 2005 (Manchester Economic Development Office n.d.). And yet, like Halle, Manchester faces severe problems in terms of the competition for investment capital, for high-tech industries, and for well-paying jobs. Manchester lost most of its large-scale industry between the 1930s and the 1960s. In the 1990s, Manchester, like Halle, experienced an influx of capital, including investment in the industrial sector. This led to a brief
period of optimism in which it seemed that small, nonunionized factories with low wages and a short, flexible supply chain to high-tech and defense industries centered in the greater Boston area might contribute to an economic resurgence in Manchester (Gitell 2001). Many of these industrial shops (including operations that manufactured wire and cable, high-intensity lamps, and materials for defense and electronics products) were actually parts of large transnational corporations whose headquarters and primary investment centers were elsewhere.

A new reversal of fortunes began with the high-tech crash in 2000, and in the following years manufacturing also declined. The percentage of the workforce employed in manufacturing in New Hampshire declined from 13.4 percent in 1998 to 9.5 percent in 2004. Because it was through this type of production that the city played a larger role within complex regional and international supply chains that triggered foreign direct investment, the decline in manufacturing in the city weakened its links to global markets. Although service industries have grown, they have done so in ways that reflect the small scale of the city. Much of the service sector is concentrated in hospitals and other charitable institutions.

Meanwhile, expansion of the population has provided some employment in construction. Through the short-term high-tech boom and the subsequent crash and moderate recovery, Manchester has succeeded in maintaining a rate of unemployment that is lower than in much of the United States and dramatically lower than in Halle. The rate was 2.4 percent in 2000 and 4.3 percent in 2004 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2006).

Unlike Halle, which has a rapidly shrinking population, Manchester has grown in size since 1990, attracting internal migrants, both native and foreign born, from further south in New England, as well as international immigrants and refugees whose first place of settlement in the United States is Manchester. The 2000 census reported that 6.58 percent of the population of Manchester was foreign born. The foreign born who have arrived in the past 15 years make up 4.2 percent of the population of greater Manchester, a proportion similar to that of Halle. As in Halle, Africans from many different countries and Vietnamese are among the most visible migrants, but Manchester also has attracted people from throughout Latin America, the Spanish-speaking Caribbean, and Haiti. The newcomers have been attracted to Manchester because of the synergy between its industrial expansion in the 1990s and its relatively inexpensive housing costs and low crime rates. By 2005, however, housing prices had risen dramatically and rental property was priced beyond the reach of most residents.

Manchester resembles Halle in terms of the aspirations of its city leaders, who hope to build a new, vibrant high-tech economy. The leadership of both cities understand the need to be competitively positioned within the global economy to succeed; to date, both cities have failed in this endeavor, although both have attracted investment focused on reconstructing the central city. In 2004, Manchester officials rather plaintively called for assistance in developing a “Strategy for the New Economy.” In an Internet advertisement, they acknowledged that Manchester needed to analyze its “relative position in the world economy” (City of Manchester, New Hampshire, USA n.d.) so that it could compete in the next decade. In fact, the city leadership did have a development strategy in the 1990s and took high political risks to implement it. In place of external capital flows, officials turned to borrowing and to raising taxes to fund an entertainment industry, investing first in a new arena suitable for hockey and various concert venues on the main street of the city and then in the construction of a minor league ballpark near the central business district. Whether this gamble would be any more successful than the EU investment in the urban redevelopment of Halle was unclear. What immediately became apparent were the political costs of rejuvenating the real-estate market of the city center and making it a more attractive place to visit or live for those with ready money. Property taxes rose, and the mayor who led the downtown revitalization lost the 2005 election.

In terms of their position on migration, both Halle and Manchester are pulled in different directions by competing sets of interests that reflect the cities’ similar positioning as small-scale cities. On the one hand, foreigners are seen as a new, criminal factor in urban life and one that seriously drains local services. To make concrete the drain on city services, especially on schools, the media, political leaders, and service providers in both cities often refer to the large number of languages spoken in the city that make service provision difficult. Halle public schools note that students speak more than 50 languages. Manchester public schools report that at least 76 languages are spoken among their students and that they serve approximately 1,700 children in their English as a second language (ESL) programs (Southern New Hampshire Area Health Education Center 2005).

On the other hand, both cities on occasion prefer to celebrate the new migrants. In Manchester, much of the business and political leadership, including the former mayor, has seen new immigrants as providing the diversity needed to market Manchester as a global city as well as sustain Manchester’s low-wage industries. In a ten-minute videotape about the city, available in 2004 on Manchester’s official website, the diverse nature of the workforce was mentioned seven times. Celebrations of cultural diversity are organized by a community center that provides ESL classes. A Cultural Diversity Task Force circulates a monthly newsletter noting the holidays of various ethnic groups in the city, although most of these groups are not well organized, if at all.

Whereas Halle certainly does not need more labor, for certain purposes it does need foreigners. In discussions with city officials, including the mayor, we learned that Halle officials wish to dispel the city’s reputation as a place where
neo-Nazi youth attack foreigners. The officials believe that to compete globally for investors, corporations, and highly skilled professionals, the city must be viewed as culturally diverse and open to foreigners and newcomers. The new slogan for Halle, “City in Change,” signals the aspiration of city leaders that the repackaging of the city will attract capital so that jobs lost in the industrial and manufacturing sector can be replaced by employment opportunities in the service and knowledge sectors. Consequently, Halle celebrates its newfound cultural diversity through public rituals. Although the asylum seekers and migrants from countries like Nigeria and Iraq are not exactly the foreigners the city is striving to embrace in this transition to a knowledge society, the migrants are part of the much-needed culturally diverse image Halle wants to cultivate. The city endorses the celebration of Foreigners’ Week, a federal initiative that must be implemented with local resources and funding. In addition, Halle has provided funding through Eine Welt Haus, a nongovernmental organization that organizes programming about foreigners or for foreigners throughout the year. The city also funds a community center dedicated to foreign–native interaction, which primarily occurs through cultural events.

In short, both cities want migrants as part of the public representation of the city. Neither city offers incorporative possibilities with much social mobility and prosperity for the migrants. Manchester offers low-wage jobs; Halle offers minimal social benefits. Neither of the cities translates its marketing of diversity into sustained services that could support migrants’ efforts to become incorporated in the city. In the “new geographies of governance” (Peck 1998:5), both Halle and Manchester have reduced access to public monies and resources. Both have little money for city services and little or no money for services for migrants. Unlike the case in larger-scale cities, such as Berlin or New York, very few public or private agencies provide migrants with opportunities to develop careers as culture brokers who can represent the needs or interests of particular ethnicities. The handful of migrants who work in social-service agencies generally do not occupy paid managerial positions. Those few migrants who achieve political or public prominence advance not as ethnic leaders but on the basis of a broader nonethnic constituency. Sometimes, they play the role of public foreigner—persons called on to be general representatives and spokespeople for foreigners in the city.

**Born-again incorporation: Building a Christian transnational social field**

Although the scale of Halle and of Manchester mediates against the forms of ethnic incorporation that are so frequently described for global cities, migrants do find ways to settle in these cities and form local and transnational social fields. In both cities, we found migrants participating in born-again Christian networks of support and empowerment. In our opening vignette, we introduced Heaven’s Gift, who joined a home church with a mostly white, working-class congregation but one that included in its ranks migrants from Ghana, Iraq, and Sudan. In a city such as Manchester, forming a Nigerian congregation would have been difficult because only a handful of Nigerians live in the city and they include Catholics and Muslims. Heaven’s Gift, however, might have had success in using a pan-ethnic African identity to build a congregation. Several hundred African Protestants reside in Manchester, and an African identity was becoming part of public discourse and these migrants’ self-ascription when Heaven’s Gift began his project. Nevertheless, he invested most of his energies in building the Resurrection Crusade, a religious network that linked believers together on the basis of their born-again Christianity.

An Ogoni by birth, Heaven’s Gift, with his wife, Elizabeth, claimed refugee status in the United States on the basis of the Nigerian government’s efforts to suppress the Ogoni movement against Shell Oil. He had studied theology in Nigeria and been ordained a minister as had his father before him. For several years, apparently from a base in a refugee camp in Nigeria, Heaven’s Gift had worked with a U.S. missionary church, establishing a series of new churches. This experience convinced him of the importance of uniting people in prayer rather than beginning competing congregations. He initiated his unity project while still in Nigeria and continued it in Manchester:

> Prayer is something that can bring people together, because every church talks about prayer. When I came to the United States, in 1999, here to Manchester, I found that the churches were not together. Everybody was like building his own church, working very hard to make sure his church is good and better. And I think we can … come together as one, not only as Christians (but to) build a community.

Although Heaven’s Gift had a brother in Chicago and family and Nigerian friends elsewhere in North America, he and Elizabeth settled in Manchester. His ties to a fundamentalist Christian network seem to have been part of the equation that led him to Manchester, although he attributes his presence there to God’s will. As Susan Harding (1987) has pointed out, narratives are read backward as part of an ongoing witnessing of the presence of Jesus in the life of the believer so that personal accounts serve as testimony and methods of evangelizing. Heaven’s Gift’s settlement, made possible by the transnational social fields within which he traveled, provided him with the social capital that allowed his project to grow dramatically. This strengthened his ability to reach out to native Christians as well as migrants and to bring them into his Manchester project and his transnational social field. Less than a year after Heaven’s Gift settled in Manchester, he was able to obtain a legal charter for the Resurrection Crusade, whose mission was uniting various
established Christian congregations to “win the people of Manchester for God.”

In the course of the next four years, Heaven’s Gift, together with a core group of people he gathered around him, including a Puerto Rican woman and several white New Hampshire natives, built the Resurrection Crusade so that it was able to draw as many as 20 congregations into its activities. The Resurrection Crusade was more than an organizational nexus. It had its own individual activists, who pulled members of their own personal networks into an expanding field of Christian activity and connection. Between 2002 and 2005, increasingly, migrants from all over the world joined the social field that was constructed and expanded by Heaven’s Gift and his core activists. The number of migrants in the core also increased. About 20 percent of those who attended conferences, prayer breakfasts, and prayer events sponsored by the Resurrection Crusade were migrants of African, Caribbean, Latin American, and Asian origin. Most of the congregations that joined the Resurrection Crusade resembled Heaven’s Gift’s home church; they were composed primarily of white New Hampshire natives. The Spanish-speaking congregation and the African American congregation that participated in Resurrection Crusade activities did not define their churches in ethnic terms but as born-again Christian churches. In 2005, the Resurrection Crusade established a prayer center in an office building in the central business district of Manchester—the area that was key to the plans of business and political leaders to revive the fortunes of the city. The Prayer Center invited Christians to attend prayer vigils for the city or to call the center to speak to a spiritual counselor, day or night.

When the Resurrection Crusade leadership spoke of building community, their vision was one of encompassment rather than enclosure. They extended their network into the domains of politics with considerable success because the agenda of the Resurrection Crusade resonated within broader political projects that had great legitimacy at the beginning of the 21st century in Manchester, the United States, and the homelands of many of the migrants. Locally, political and business leaders were receptive to public displays of religious fervor and welcomed opportunities to align themselves with Christian pastors who expressed concern for the moral state of the city and the world. These local leaders also favored public representations of ethnic and racial diversity, and the activities of the Resurrection Crusade provided them with publicity, a morality discourse, and an audience that appeared diverse. At the same time, nationally and internationally, President George W. Bush and his neocon allies both in and out of government were preaching the global application of Christian values. In this setting, the Resurrection Crusade built networks that linked members—migrants and natives alike—to local and state-level Republican and Democratic politicians. The New Hampshire governor in 2004, who was a conservative Republican and strong Bush supporter, personally attended the Manchester Community Prayer Breakfast of the Resurrection Crusade. The Democratic, Catholic mayor of Manchester attended the breakfasts from 2003 to 2005 and developed an ongoing relationship to the Resurrection Crusade. By 2005, he was thanking God and the Resurrection Crusade’s prayer intercession for the miraculous recovery of his ill granddaughter.

When this mayor first began to deliver messages to Resurrection Crusade conferences and breakfasts, however, he approached Heaven’s Gift and the Resurrection Crusade through the same ethnic lens that our research team had taken into Heaven’s Gift’s home church. He emphasized the contributions of immigrants and refugees to the city through their hard work and diverse cultures. He praised the newcomers who, through their factory work, contributed to the strength of the city’s economy, noting that, by the beginning of the 21st century, Manchester welcomed “new immigrants from Central America, South America, Asia, Africa, and Central Europe.” He went on to celebrate Manchester’s new “colorful mosaic” of immigrants, noting that in the past 20 years Manchester experienced an infusion of energy and vitality that has contributed to a sense of rebirth, where people from all ethnicities and religious backgrounds come together to form a new and exciting community. We celebrate the diversity of Manchester and embrace the fact that people from all over the world come to our wonderful city to find the freedom to practice the religion of their heritage. [Baines n.d.]

This narrative stood in sharp contradiction to the pathway of local and transnational incorporation through born-again Christianity that was being pursued by the migrants who participated in the prayer breakfasts and prayer conferences. Rather than emphasizing their foreignness and diverse religious heritage, they spoke of a divide in the city between those who sided with Jesus and those who stood with the devil. The dividing line that the Resurrection Crusade’s version of fundamentalist Christianity envisioned both locally and globally was between born-again Christians willing to personally testify that they have accepted Jesus as the only judge of truth and all others.19

The Resurrection Crusade drew from the global–local discourse of Pentecostal Christianity that joins migrants and natives together to claim specific cities as battlegrounds in which to wage “spiritual warfare.” According to Alice Smith, a white U.S. pastor, leader of the U.S. Prayer Center, based in Texas, and a frequent speaker at Resurrection Crusade conferences in Manchester, spiritual warfare is the “cosmic conflict that rages between the Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of Satan” (1999:6). The Resurrection Crusade trained “prayer intercessors” in “strategic or city level spiritual warfare” against the Devil who assigns his “territorial spirits . . . to rule geographical territories and social networks (Smith 1999:23). This message pervaded Heaven’s
Gift’s public discourse, and his speeches at the prayer breakfasts stressed the need to rid Manchester of all demons and evil spirits and build Christian community and unity.

Migrants and natives told Glick Schiller that they came to Resurrection Crusade events because of their concerns for religious unity, stronger families and churches, and the need to ensure Manchester was a Christian city. The white natives of New Hampshire who came to events sponsored by the Resurrection Crusade ranged from manual laborers to successful businesspeople. Many had developed personal networks with migrants through shared activities as prayer intercessors or in other Christian projects in the city. For core activists, migrants and natives alike, the network of believers became their primary social field in terms of the density of network ties.

At the same time, migrant core activists built weak but significant bridging ties into other spheres of life, including the political domain. The ties were weak in Granovetter’s (1973) sense, in that the networks linking migrants networks to political actors were not based on multiple mutual or dense connections. But the ties provided the migrants who participated in the Resurrection Crusade’s social field with social capital. They became connected to people who could and did provide resources: A shop foreman helped place believers in factory jobs or more desirable shifts; networks of middle-class women furnished migrants’ apartments and ensured newborn babies had proper clothing; and public officials provided prestige, social acceptance, and access to public resources. For example, the Democratic mayor welcomed members to City Hall each year for the National Day of Prayer, allowed the Resurrection Crusade to pray in the aldermanic chambers in 2005, and made it possible for the Resurrection Crusade to hold yearly prayer programs in a city park, for which the city provided a band shell, speaker system, and police protection. Police and firemen also participated in the event. Migrants who were not activists in the Resurrection Crusade but who attended its churches, breakfasts, prayer conferences, and days of prayer found that they were warmly welcomed and encouraged to seek closer spiritual communion and access to the social capital of the Resurrection Crusade.

Among the public resources made available to the Resurrection Crusade through its political networks was a weekly show on local public-access television in which Heaven’s Gift was the featured preacher. This outlet gave him and other members of the Resurrection Crusade more direct access to a broader public and recognition that reinforced their access to the political arena.

The social field of the Resurrection Crusade forged by Heaven’s Gift provided those who entered it with national and transnational as well as local incorporation. In building this pathway of incorporation for himself and other migrants in Manchester, Heaven’s Gift drew from his personal ties to the leaders of the U.S. Prayer Center, the Texas-based organization with which he had been affiliated in Nigeria. Leaders of this intensively evangelizing network, which includes white Americans and Nigerians, travel in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the United States to recruit combatants for spiritual warfare. Signaling its transnational connections through its slogan “Discipling the Nations,” the center lists the travel schedule of its leaders on its website (U.S. Prayer Center 2004). Heaven’s Gift also attended conferences of other globe-spanning religious networks, including the U.S.-based Morris Cerullo World Evangelism organization. Pastor Cerullo, the leader, has met with important dignitaries in the Philippines, Jordan, and Russia, where he claims to have preached to crowds of up to 100,000 (Morris Cerullo World Evangelism 2005).

In the course of several years, the core members of the Resurrection Crusade, both migrants and natives, established personal relationships with traveling evangelists who spoke at Resurrection Crusade events. They could see through the links on the Resurrection Crusade website as well as through the personal testimony of speakers at events that the same preachers who prayed with them in Manchester posed with Miss America, Benny Hinn (a globally known preacher), and pastors in Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, and Indonesia. The mailings those in the Resurrection Crusade network received from the U.S. Prayer Center informed them that there is now “One Superpower under God” and promised copies of a book by President Bush if they donated money. Migrants reported that, because God was in command in the White House, they were empowered to realize their objectives.

We found two born-again Christian churches in Halle composed primarily of migrants, the French-speaking L’Esprit du Seigneur Church, led by Pastor Mpenza, a Congolese minister, and the Miracle Healing Church, an English-speaking congregation led by Pastor Joshua from Nigeria. On first glance, both churches seemed dramatically different from the Resurrection Crusade and Heaven’s Gift’s home church in Manchester and more typical of the ethnically based congregations described in the migration literature. After all, one congregation mainly included Congolese and the other mainly Nigerians, most of whom were Ibo. It was not until we began systematically attending church services and prayer meetings and met with the pastors and congregants that we began to see that to represent these churches as ethnic congregations was to obscure the way their participants located themselves in Halle and transnationally. The two churches provided their members a pathway that was similar to the one we found among born-again Christian migrants in Manchester. Not only did both Pastor Mpenza and Pastor Joshua use a narrative of self-representation similar to that of Heaven’s Gift and identify their churches as Christian rather than in ethnic terms but they both also organized church activities on this basis. Both pastors in Halle and several of their core activists told us, “It
is not by accident that I have come to this city,” meaning that the purpose of their presence in the city and in the church was to bring their Christian leadership to the city and claim it for Jesus. When Pastor Mpenza was asked whether he regarded his congregation as a Congolese one, he answered,

No, no. It isn’t a Congolese church. This is not the origin of the Word of God. I have told you about my origin. I have come from Congo where I met my Lord, where I worked for the Lord. And now I am here, in Germany, where I had the feeling that the inhabitants were in need of the same message. So I’ve clearly said that this church is not a Congolese church. I’ve clearly said it is a church of Jesus.

In a study of primarily Ghanaian churches in the Hague, Rijk van Dijk (2004) noted that the migrants claim that their mission is evangelism to the Dutch majority of the city. Although he stated that this mission led the churches to establish ties with Dutch Pentecostal churches, he dismissed the Ghanians’ evangelism on the ground that few Dutch people were converted. By taking their Christian identity seriously, we were able to observe how the Christian identity claims of the migrants in the two churches in Halle shaped their social practice and their interaction with the natives in the city and country.

By acting as evangelists, members of the two congregations developed various kinds of networks in the city, in Germany, and transnationally. Moreover, although the L’Esprit congregation did not grow in either African or German members, over a five-year period, the Miracle Healing Church increased in its size and in its recruitment of Germans. Most of the members of L’Esprit were asylum seekers and quite poor. The pastor and his wife had been granted refugee status with permanent residency; only a few others had a right to permanent residence. The congregation of only about 30 members was not totally African but included a few German women. Only a few of the African members spoke passable German. The Sunday donations were small and the congregation could not afford its own space for worship.

In contrast, the Miracle Healing Church had approximately 150 members; increasing numbers of its migrant members had permanent legal status, primarily through marrying Germans, and could speak some German; their leader, Pastor Joshua, could speak German fluently. By 2005, about 15 percent of the membership was German. In 2004, the congregation had a sufficient income from its own tithes and donations from its congregants to rent and renovate a building, where it held Sunday services, meetings, counseling, “Friday miracle healing services,” child care during Sunday services, Bible study, and German classes. Learning German was said to be essential, not only so that the migrants could settle properly in Germany but also so that they could “bring God’s word to the city.” The Miracle Healing Church insisted on simultaneous translation between English and German. Sunday-service attendance ranged from 75 to 150 people. Of this number, by 2005, 15 to 25 were not from Africa. Almost all the non-Africans were German, either from Halle or from neighboring towns and cities. Their educational, class, and religious experience varied greatly. By 2005, the Miracle Healing Church had recruited at least six German women and men as part of its core of church activists. Significantly, whereas many of the German members of the general congregation were women who had relationships of marriage or had borne a child with an African man, most of the German activist men and women did not have African partners.

Because the two congregations differed in size, the networks of their pastors, the particular talents of their leaders, and the legal status of their members, their modes of evangelism were different. Members of L’Esprit found that African gospel choirs were welcomed in public spaces on various occasions in Halle and the surrounding region, and so they conducted what they called “an evangelism of music.” Although they were not successful in recruiting many Germans or growing numbers of migrants into their folds, they did develop institutional ties through these activities, finding support from the handful of organizations charged with migrant integration and multicultural representations of Halle, which provided space and publicity to the L’Esprit Church. Eine Welt Haus listed the congregation’s Sunday prayer services on its monthly calendar of cultural events in the city. The Meeting Center for Germans and Foreigners provided space for these services.

Gospel choirs composed of L’Esprit members performed prominently at various events in Halle in which the presence of foreigners was acknowledged and celebrated as evidence of the city’s multicultural openness to the world. These included the opening ceremonies of the yearly celebration of Foreigners’ Week, held in the center of the city and attended by the mayor and various public dignitaries. Gospel choirs performed at summer cultural events and in 2003 represented the city of Halle in a festival in which the Land of Sachsen-Anhalt celebrated itself. Sometimes performers received small stipends for their participation, and some of the youthful members became interested in pursuing the multicultural gospel choir business beyond the confines of the church, but the Pastor successfully opposed this development. The church did participate in 2003 in a public ritual during African Week in Halle. While the L’Esprit choir sang and Pastor Mpenza prayed, the vice mayor laid a wreath at the statue of Anton Wilhelm Amo, an 18th-century resident of Halle who was the first African to study and teach in Germany. The city and university representatives used the occasion to claim Halle’s roots as a multicultural city. In rhetoric similar to Heaven’s Gift’s response to the mayor of Manchester, Pastor Mpenza spoke of the living presence of Jesus in the city.
When the L’Esprit Church held its own public performance in 2003, it received funding to rent instruments and publicize the concert from the Green Party foundation that had begun to fund African Week activities. A French-speaking Senegalese migrant, who had served for many years as a public foreigner and culture broker in Halle, and who held a position in the foundation, advised the congregation to hold the concert on the International Day of Human Rights. Although Pastor Mpenza accepted the suggestion and the funding, in a discussion after the event, he said that the concert “took place within the frame of evangelization. There is evangelization by means of language, and there is evangelization by means of music.”

The Miracle Healing Church’s mode of evangelism was through healing miracles that members understood were made possible by God acting through his anointed Pastor Joshua. Those healed were encouraged to testify and to provide evidence that “Jesus is alive” and that the “holy spirit moves in Halle.” As was the case when Heaven’s Gift ministered to congregants in Manchester, when Pastor Joshua called on congregants to come forward to be healed during regular prayer services and special healing services, both migrants and natives came forward, prayed, and sometimes fell into a trance.

Whereas Pastor Mpenza and his congregation used public activities in Halle in which church members were incorporated into the city as Africans or foreigners but interpreted their presence as an enactment of their Christian mission, Pastor Joshua and the Miracle Healing Church created their own incorporative events and activities. The pastor, the choir, experienced prayer intercessors, and other active members of the church began traveling to neighboring cities to hold healing sessions in German born-again congregations. In 2005, they held a five-day Healing Conference in the public hockey rink in Halle. Two to three hundred people were in attendance on each evening of the conference. These numbers paralleled the attendance at Resurrection Crusade conferences in Manchester. In both cities, about two-thirds of the participants were natives, and they participated enthusiastically in the healing, trancing, and prayer. This event represented a significant step in increasing incorporation of the Miracle Healing Church into the born-again sector of Halle and of Germany, and transnationally.

The Miracle Healing Church developed a set of ties to other born-again Christian missionaries, who, in 2000, began to come to Halle in increasing numbers, bringing with them connections to German or transnational religious organizations. In organizing its first Healing Conference, the Miracle Healing Church forged close ties with several such organizations in Halle, which cosponsored the event and provided staff, speakers, security, prayer counselors, prayer warriors, and organizational experience. These contacts included a U.S.-based Mennonite mission and the Second Coming mission, led by an Egyptian–German man and his German wife, who had attracted a growing number of young German converts. The Second Coming evangelists strove to unite born-again Christians in Halle, using a discourse of unity through a network of prayer similar to that of Heaven’s Gift in Manchester. A small home church of Vietnamese born-agains based in Halle, which had been initiated by Paul, a local native Christian missionary, also participated and lent support to the Healing Conference.

Pictures of the deliverance and healing activities of the pastor and his congregation were prominently posted on its website. In 2005, the home pages featured a photograph of Pastor Joshua praying with a young, blond white woman. The caption proclaimed that the church was “the place of miracles, signs, and wonders. There is Power in God’s Word!! Here . . . the sick get healed, the blind see, and many are delivered from bondage of sin.” The Church also produced videotapes of its healing services and sold them through its website and at church services.

Both predominantly migrant churches in Halle had built formal and informal ties to “free churches” in Germany, but the Miracle Healing Church had a much denser local set of networks. As is legally necessary, both the Miracle Healing Church and L’Esprit Church were formally registered in Germany. In addition, both congregations worked with a native German Pentecostal church in Magdeburg to become formal members of a German Pentecostal organization (Bund Freikirchlicher Pfingstgemeinden, or BFP), which provided them with access to a broad network of Pentecostal churches. Several members of the Miracle Healing Church attended a pan-European Pentecostal conference in a Berlin stadium in June 2003 that was called to organize a European-wide organization of Pentecostal churches and bring religious revival to Germany. Both the Miracle and L’Esprit churches had visits from traveling pastors who spoke to the congregations. Pastor Mpenza had ties to other churches in Belgium, France, Congo, and Chad. His personal networks through family and friendship brought visiting preachers to the congregation in Halle.

Pastor Joshua, the Nigerian pastor, operated on a grander scale, and, consequently, the migrants who participated in the Miracle Healing Church’s religious network established a denser social field that extended into western Germany as well as to churches and missions in disparate parts of the globe. Pastor Joshua had ties to both African and German Pentecostal pastors in several German cities, and members of some of these churches attended his Healing Conference. By the end of 2005, Pastor Joshua was launched into the international circuit of pastors through his participation in a massive prayer meeting in South Korea and his travels with a delegation of German pastors to India. The Miracle Healing Church’s connections to evangelizing networks in India had actually been forged several years before, when an Indian pastor based in western Germany had
visited Halle and convinced members of the congregation to send funds for his missionary work in India. The Miracle Healing Church also participated in the same U.S.-based, born-again Morris Cerullo World Evangelism organization to which Heaven’s Gift in Manchester was peripherally connected. Although Pastor Joshua had not met Cerullo, the Miracle Healing Church sent funds to aid Cerullo’s efforts to convert Jews in Israel.

The transnational religious connections of the pastors were important for locating them in multilayered networks and for providing legitimacy and social ties for individual migrants. In Halle, as in Manchester, weak ties had significance in several different ways. Through their pastors, the congregants were exposed to and experienced themselves as part of overlapping Christian, globe-spanning networks in ways that validated their faith and their presence in Halle. These ties were also understood as a form of social capital that could, on occasion, be shrewdly manipulated. A previous pastor of the Miracle Healing Church used ties to Christians in Belgium to obtain asylum there. Becoming a pastor took no formal training—only the recognition by others that one had a calling from God. The Miracle Healing Church had already spawned one new pastor, a Nigerian man who married a German woman from Magdeburg, where he then established a new congregation.

As did the migrant members of the Resurrection Crusade, the migrant members of the Miracle Healing Church found themselves increasingly participating in a local religious social field to which they contributed their own networks and, at the same time, in which they benefited from access to additional resources offered by native members. The ties provided by this kind of networking were those of an expanding network of connection rather than those of institutionalized formal affiliation; they linked migrants to a broader evangelizing Christian project through social fields of connection. These relationships to Christian projects elsewhere, however, situated migrants in broader Christian missionary projects and reflected and reinforced their understanding that they were part of a movement that reached far beyond Halle. These types of indirect connections overlapped with organizational ties and with the personal friendships that migrants made with visiting pastors and missionaries. The faces of some of the activists, both Nigerian and German, would light up when they spoke of their conversations with some of the visiting pastors and of how much they enjoyed the pastors’ return visits.

Some material resources have become available to migrants through their participation in the churches and the broader social fields to which they are connected. The L’Esprit choirs received small payments for some of their performances. Members of both churches who had personal or familial crises sometimes received assistance from funds collected from their congregations. Membership in the Miracle Healing Church directly assisted asylum seekers who were attempting to settle in Germany by marrying Germans. Young couples in eastern Germany often do not get married. Church membership evolved as a form of courting. Migrants who were church members were able to convince German partners of their good character as well as of the necessity of marriage by involving the partners in church services. During these services, potential spouses could see that, although they might find the religious behavior of their migrant partners strange, the congregation was part of a broader and powerful movement that had legitimacy in other parts of Germany and globally and one that had an increasing German as well as African leadership. They also learned that marriage was necessary for membership in this church movement. The desire of the African partner to marry was presented not as a utilitarian effort to obtain a passport but as an act that promised both partners health, prosperity, and fulfillment with strong religious connotations.

Once married, migrants found that their spouses’ family networks were sometimes welcoming and, although the German families were often poor, they could provide various sorts of direct assistance, such as child care and local knowledge about accessing governmental offices and benefits. In addition, a German spouse could facilitate a migrant’s ability to open up a business or provide a legal basis to begin a trading network. Many of the African members of the Miracle Healing Church had been experienced traders before migrating to Germany. Although business successes in Halle were few, and some marriages made it possible for members to migrate to western Germany where economic possibilities were considerably greater, other marriages facilitated local business possibilities and provided success stories to inspire members of the congregation. For example, Ruby, a Nigerian woman who served as treasurer in the Miracle Healing Church, had a relationship with a much older German man who had been fairly successful in business. Although she was unable to involve him actively in the church, she was able to convince him to marry her. Once married, he provided her with the capital to open up a small “Afro-shop” in the city.

Whereas in Manchester the goal of bringing Christian morality to the city resonated with the cultural understanding of many of the natives, this was certainly not the case in Halle. The highly emotive Christianity of born-again churches served to differentiate migrants in the eyes of the natives in Halle. For many Germans, migrants from Africa were exotic not only culturally but also in terms of their religion and religious sensibilities. In Germany, religious organizations (Koerperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts) recognized as public corporations are subject to public law and, in turn, receive a proportion of revenues collected from taxpayers registered as members of designated denominations. Although the umbrella organization (BFP) holds the status of public corporation, it has eschewed the right to obtain...
The situation of Christian migrants is more complex in eastern German cities such as Halle, where 80 percent of people are not officially affiliated with a church. Most eastern Germans are disinterested, distrustful of all churches, or atheists. On the one hand, this situation made it more difficult for migrant Pentecostals to build a religiously based social field that provided as much social capital as the one in Manchester. On the other hand, some aspects of the small scale of Halle enabled migrants organized as born-again Christians to build networks that linked them to culture brokers or German natives. The estrangement that natives of Halle felt with the rest of Germany and the new capitalist economy and culture that had marginalized them was mediated through the Christian networks provided by born-agains, including African migrants. The atheism or the widespread indifference to religion in eastern Germany posed an ideal counterpoint to the narrative that legitimated the migrants’ claim that they had been sent by God to Halle to evangelize and united them with other Christians struggling against those in league with the devil.

Although migrants, particularly Africans, were seen as different and exotic, this difference was perceived as embodying greater spirituality, which was to be emulated and embraced as part of the path toward salvation. The strength of this attraction was particularly evident at the Healing Conference, where Germans seeking more meaningful religious experiences looked to Pastor Joshua and his core migrant activists for guidance. Most of the natives who attended and sought healing were already part of local free churches; many had deep ties in local village life. They included teachers, counselors, and the unemployed. Almost all had more economic resources than the migrants. They ranged in age from teenagers to pensioners, brought together by their search for spiritual support, which they believed emanated from the African migrants’ emotive religiosity. The acts of healing that Germans and migrants witnessed and experienced together were not only personally transformative but also embodiments of the social connections they both sought and that the born-again networks were able to provide.24

**Conclusions**

Small-scale cities may find that, although they must market some form of culture, their relationship to migrants is not necessarily structured around ethnic diversity.25 This is true in Halle and Manchester, where city leaders have tried to reposition their cities through different aspects of cultural-knowledge industries: scientific and high-tech knowledge in Halle and entertainment and high-tech knowledge in Manchester. Although both cities publicly do hold multicultural celebrations, they lack sufficient resources to fund ongoing activities and social services organized to serve, highlight, or market specific ethnicities. Within the contemporary cultural economy of cities, the marketing of various guises of culture—tradition, ethnicity, art, crafts, cuisine, cultural production, entertainment, specialized knowledge, design, or architecture—is itself a product of the synergy between the urban economy and its successful competition for regional, national, and global capital. Cultural industries anchored in ethnic diversity may become particularly important for certain economically depressed industrial areas but only if those cities are able to provide public or private funding for organizational activities, a critical mass of people claiming the same origin or pan-ethnicity, and the conditions for an ethnic niche economy (Çağlar in press; Scott 2004). As we have shown, this has not been the case for Halle or Manchester, struggling with the many consequences of their weak positioning.

In Halle and Manchester, migrants were cast as simultaneously dangerous or exotic Others and as useful, colorful bodies that represented a necessary component for marketing the city as a global actor. Whatever the public image of cultural difference being promoted, it offered migrants neither resources nor social mobility through leadership positions. Moreover, from the point of view of many migrants in these cities, the diversity politics they encountered, which offered difference without incorporation, was something to be avoided. It was a form of racialization that constructed them as outsiders in opposition to natives.

If migrants were to find their way into local urban life, it had to be by nonethnic pathways. Religion does not comprise the only set of cultural performances, beliefs, and identities through which migrants became part of the life of the small-scale cities we studied. In our larger study, we are exploring various nonethnic pathways: workplace networks, businesses that market to the mainstream, and participation as social citizens in public life. In this article, however, we have chosen to emphasize nonethnic religious incorporation because we think that the current global turn to religion is simultaneously a reflection of and a counterpoint to the neoliberal global nexus that is rescaling cities and, therefore, that this pathway might be of greater relevance to downscaled, marginalized cities. The migrants who joined the born-again churches and networks we have described chose a setting that did not highlight their public differentiation. Their spirituality brought them together with natives on terms in which migrants, as Christians, became the conveyors of morality, virtue, and godliness in a godless land. By choosing to emphasize a Christian universalism rather than an ethnic particularism, some migrants sought ways to become incorporated as local and global actors on their own terms. At the same time, the Christian networks they built
in both cities gave them access to various kinds of social, economic, or political resources.

Both the U.S. Prayer Center and the German organization of born-again churches (BFP) specifically encourage identification with the local city. The fundamentalist Christian religious congregations, organizations, and networks described here are just as much a part of the global production of locality as efforts of various cities to reinvent themselves as centers of culture with or without the added spice of ethnic diversity. In small-scale cities, born-again Christianity may be more effective in linking disempowered migrants and natives alike to networks of power than any strategy devised by city leaders. Born-again Christianity resonates with the yearning for a sense of being at home in the world that is shared by migrants displaced from their previous life and natives who find themselves increasingly estranged from the reduced economic opportunities and public rhetoric of urban resurgence of their rescaled cities.

Our findings suggest that more attention should be paid to the specificities of locality in both migration studies and contemporary religious studies. As we have argued, migration studies not only tend to flatten all patterns of migration settlement into the same model as assimilation or transnationalism but also often project the model of incorporation prevalent in one type of city—the gateway city—to all cities of migrant settlement. Often the terms global and gateway are used interchangeably, with no attention paid to the scalar positioning and power of a particular city or to the development of a comparative framework encompassing cities of different scale. Hence, the dynamics of globalization have been incorporated into migration scholarship in a very limited way because migration scholars have underappreciated the constant restructuring of the political economy of globalization, as it is experienced by all residents, including migrants, in different localities. Indifference to the significance of specific urban contexts in theorizing migration is anchored in a methodological nationalism that uses ethnic groups and the nation-state as the framework of analysis rather than examining the scalar positioning of cities. Comparative studies are needed to more fully theorize the frequency and distribution of different pathways of migrant incorporation, including various types of nonethnic pathways. But, of course, the first step is to acknowledge that there are different pathways, and this is the step we have taken in this article.

We have suggested that the pathways of migrant local and transnational incorporation that predominate within particular cities may reflect differences in scale. Furthermore, we have posited that nonethnic pathways will play a greater role in overall migrant incorporation in smaller-scale cities. If migrants become prominent or exert influence on the cultural practices, beliefs, and civic life of these cities, they will not and cannot assume these roles as “representatives of” or “leaders of” particular ethnic “communities.”

Until careful comparative research of migrant incorporation is done in cities of different scale, however, it is not possible to do more than generate hypotheses.

Locality must be of equal concern to researchers who have responded to the contemporary worldwide religious awakening and revival of beliefs in occult and hidden powers that have accompanied the implementation of neoliberal agendas (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999; West and Sanders 2003). In the wake of the resulting growing inequalities, disparities, and despair, ethnographers must document the way in which religious movements build on particular experiences of place and location as well as dislocation. Harding (1987:167) and others have noted the shifting of “inner and outer boundaries” that has separated Christian “fundamentalists” from “world culture.” This has been a historic shift with worldwide consequences that are making fundamentalist Christianity a potent political force. Current religious studies are split, however, between those that pay too little attention to the way in which global transformations take place in particular places and ethnographies that are confined to the local or the specific transnational “community” without following the networks that recruit, empower, and activate various situated actors.

The growing salience of a politics of identity—national, ethnic, and religious—is anchored in a worldwide shift that Jonathan Friedman (2001, 2002) has termed “double polarization.” Double polarization refers to the fluctuations in power contained within the contemporary transformations of the global system and the accompanying dislocations of wealth, hegemony, and spatial hierarchies that produce two simultaneous tensions. Whereas the vertical polarization pulls the political and cultural elites upwardly and more or less unifies them, this very same process pushes the lower echelons of societies into downward mobility and into fragmented (horizontal) competition for resources on the basis of religious, ethnic, and cultural categories. This complex process of “double polarization” of cultural fragmentation and the formation of economic, social, and cultural transnational networks set the context for the urban transformations we observe in different parts of the world in current neoliberal times.

In places subject to deindustrialization and, particularly, in cities of small scale—like Halle and Manchester—the effects of this double polarization are experienced most harshly by the marginal and economically and socially most vulnerable groups. In the absence of opportunity structures for ethnic pathways of incorporation, religion becomes more prominent as a pathway for becoming part of the locality, for newcomers as well as for native populations of cities experiencing economic insecurity. The global political-economic processes of current neoliberalization are blind to distinctions between newcomers and natives, who, despite the differences in degree of their vulnerabilities, are united in their “missing” futures while kept apart in
the ideologies of multicultural policies as well as in migration studies.

Formulated in particular localities in a dynamic process that is global in its reach, fundamentalist Christianity is now the moral cover for the neoliberal destruction of family, local institutions, and the fabric of local life (Glick Schiller 2005a; Harvey 2003). Its emphasis on family values, the need to build the moral fiber of local communities, and the efficacy of healing through prayer all have salience as migrants and natives experience the wastelands of their local cities and particular forms of restructuring. Often, the migration literature counterposes a positive state of national integration or incorporation to a disjunctive, dissociative state of isolated settlement. Our purpose in urging migration scholars to develop a more nuanced and fine-grained reading of processes of incorporation is neither to uphold the sterile dichotomy between migrant integration and dysfunctional segregation nor to posit a nonethnic religious pathway as superior to ethnic forms of incorporation. Rather, we argue for setting aside methodological nationalism to place the study of situated experiences of migrant settlement and transnational connection within the global dynamics of a neoliberal capitalist agenda and its impact on localities everywhere. Globalization affects the dynamic of migrant incorporation and transnational connections and takes particular forms in places of different scale. In this article, we have underscored these local aspects of globality as they play themselves out within a religious nonethnic pathway of migrant incorporation in small-scale cities. It is our hope that this discussion will move the study of migration beyond the ethnic group as a unit of analysis as scholars explore local rescaling of globality.

Notes

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1. We use pseudonyms for the names of the migrants and the local congregations and missionary organizations to protect their privacy and confidentiality.

2. The debate certainly offers many useful insights on which we build. Various scholars have worked to define different aspects of integration, building on earlier work by sociologists such as Milton Gordon (1964), to distinguish cultural and social processes of settlement. Gordon’s work provides a framework for distinguishing between migrants’ public identities and their institutional incorporation. Working along these lines, some scholars, especially in Germany and the Netherlands, not only differentiate structural integration from sociocultural integration but also note different functional modes of integration: economic, political, and educational (Sackmann et al. 2003). This work on functional modes of integration is similar to work in U.S. sociology on modes of migrant incorporation, in which scholars assess processes by which migrants become structurally connected to the institutions of a new nation-state (Ellis 2001; Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001; Guarinizo et al. 2003; Nee and Sanders 2001; Portes and Börzúa 1989).

3. The term incorporation is not widely known in some parts of Europe, such as Germany and Sweden, and cannot be readily translated. In German, incorporation carries more aggressive implications than integration because it projects a complete ingestion by the body politic of those who are different. Because thousands of articles in English use incorporation as a way of describing various types of migrant sociality, however, we have decided to use it and build on this literature. (See, e.g., Portes 1995 and Schmitter Heiser 1992.) For a structural approach to “integration” that looks at multiple forms of relationships between local populations without assuming the container of the nation-state, primarily within an African context, see Schlee and Horstmann 2001 and the research produced by the Integration and Conflict Department of the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology (http://www.eth.mpg.de). For an effort to look at simultaneous structural incorporation locally and transnationally that also uses a concept of “assimilation,” see Morawska 2003. Stephen Castles and Mark Miller (1993) approach migration as a process.

4. With its focus on social relations within fields of power, social-field analysis is not a form of methodological individualism. It does allow for the active role of individuals both in networks and within formal organizations. Many people have both individual and formal organizational forms of social ties; others belong to networks that are neither dyadic nor preclusive of other relationships and interactions. These ties indirectly connect the people in the social field with some form of organized activities.

5. Emerging theological and political differences call into question the simple categorization of Islam as a “global religion” (Schüffauer 2001, 2002). The emerging research on Islam and migration can pave the way for a critique of the ethnic-group orientation of much of migration scholarship (Allievi and Nielsen 2003).

6. Whereas several studies have examined Muslim Turks in Germany and the changing structures of Turkish Muslim organizations in Germany, France, and the Netherlands, religious networks beyond ethnic boundaries are disregarded, and almost no research has focused on nonethnic Islamic networks within a European city (Amiriaux 2001; Kastoryano 2002). Meanwhile, many who study U.S. migrants have created their own ethnic ghettos, entranced by “what new ethnic and immigrant groups were doing together religiously” (Warner and Wittner 1998:9).

7. We believe that both localities of departure and of settlement should be analyzed in relation to their positioning within the regional, national, and global structuring of economic and political
power (Çağlar 2006, in press). In this article, given the limits of our data, we focus on localities of settlement.

8. Rather than speaking of “global” cities, some migration researchers have popularized the term gateway city to highlight the relationship between the position of the city within a state and globally and the attractiveness of a city to migrating populations (Clark 2004; Ley 2003). Nevertheless, those who use the term have not moved on to develop a comparative framework that examines how opportunity structures and, consequently, modes of incorporation differ in nongateway cities.

9. The construction and destruction of localized capital investment is one of the dynamics of capitalism (Harvey 2003). Contemporary neoliberal capitalist policies have initiated and legitimated a new and intensive cycle of restructuring.

10. The population of Halle was reported to be 240,119 in 2003 (Brinkhoff 2004). Halle at that time contained within its administrative boundaries the region of Halle-Neustadt, which, before the unification of Germany, had been considered a separate, suburban city. Manchester is also relatively small, with the 2004 census estimate projecting a population of 109,310 residents (Manchester Economic Development Office 2004). Greater Manchester (population 205,440 in 2000) includes towns that directly border on Manchester, and it is both a federal statistical unit and a catchment area for the provision of certain social services (Manchester Economic Development Office 2004).

11. The project, entitled “Shrinking Cities,” examined four regions, Halle–Leipzig, Manchester–Liverpool in England, Detroit in the United States, and Ivanovo in Russia. The purpose of the project was to begin “a debate about how to deal with shrinking populations in urban areas. It also examines how the social fracturing and physical deterioration that occur in these areas can breed new movements in music and art, giving new identity and pride to cities” (Long 2004). Declining population size rather than scale factors were taken to be indicative of and contributive to urban crisis.

12. Some EU migrants found employment more easily than natives. For example, Italians worked in Italian restaurants. Other EU residents who were legally entitled to work, however, even those who could speak German, faced a series of bureaucratic challenges even when offered employment.

13. Official figures do not include the “ethnic Germans” or Jewish settlers who have German citizenship but are considered foreigners by the local population.

14. Inc. magazine designated Boise, Idaho, number one among all size categories and Manchester number 21 (Kotkin 2005).

15. Although we only have statistics for the state as a whole, both the peak numbers and the decline in manufacturing primarily reflect the situation in Manchester, where ever-increasing global competition rapidly reduced the viability of revitalizing the city’s economy on the basis of small factories with cheap, primarily immigrant, labor.

16. U.S. unemployment rates are difficult to compare with German rates because persons not eligible for benefits or “actively seeking work” are not counted among the unemployed in the United States. Still, clearly, the Manchester rate of unemployment is considerably lower than that of Halle.

17. The 2000 U.S. census seems to us to have significantly undercounted the number of migrants in Manchester, judging from our personal knowledge of the Vietnamese, Congolese, and Sudanese populations. Likewise, if they included the Jewish and German-ethnic migrants, the Halle numbers would be larger. All in all, the percentages of foreign-born newcomers in both cities are similar. One-third of the foreign born (34 percent) in Manchester had lived for over 50 years in the United States. Most of these people now identify as Americans and are U.S. citizens.

18. Our research in Manchester explored various forms of religious incorporation, among them, a Buddhist temple whose core membership consisted of a transnational family network; the local mosque that served migrants from several regions of the world plus several New Hampshire natives; and a Catholic parish that held separate masses in Vietnamese, Spanish, and French as well as for Africans. The leaders of the temple and the mosque adamantly denied that their houses of prayer represented their ethnic groups, distancing themselves from efforts to recognize the congregations as synonymous with ethnic “communities.” Within the Catholic parish were multiple and conflicting representations of identity, including those of ethnicity. The Catholic hierarchy, apparently caught between paradigms of ethnically based U.S. migrations settlement, a history of national parishes, and the present-day global currents of Catholicism, encouraged migrants to attend the one parish mentioned above and organized the masses in terms of ethnicities and pan-ethnicities while representing the entire parish as multicultural. The African migrants from the Congo, Kenya, and Tanzania who sought to develop a prayer group based on a Charismatic Catholicism rather than their African identity were discouraged from this form of religious practice and from evangelizing. Of course, ethnic-based religious networks can stretch transnationally and incorporate people into transnational social fields. For example, Alevi networks succeeded in doing this for migrants in Europe. Nonethnic affiliations offer one of a range of possibilities that migrants may pursue, whether they are Christian, Muslim, or of some other religious affiliation. The research challenge in this article is to begin a discussion of the conditions under which ethnic or nonethnic options are followed rather than privileging either pathway of incorporation.

19. Harding (1987) used the term fundamentalist to describe this form of Christian belief and practice, which represents a form of Christianity that combines a literal reading of the Bible with a direct engagement with the contemporary world. As she indicates, many fundamentalist churches build on a reading of Pentecostalist doctrines of rebirth of the soul, but, rather than withdrawing from the world and its politics to embrace an embodied sainthood, they call for an activist politics to institute the rule of God over all the earth, including its political leadership. For further discussion of these issues and ethnographic accounts of variations in Pentecostalism and born-again Christianity, see Austin-Broos 1997; Brodwin 2003; Harding 1987, 2000; Luhmann 2004; and Robbins 2004.

20. The National Day of Prayer, which had been part of the U.S. calendar of celebrations for a long time, was recently taken over by born-again Christians and used in their spiritual warfare campaigns.

21. As Harding 1987 and Brodwin 2003 point out, whereas the anthropologist sees social capital, the convert sees evidence of “an ever-living God.”

22. During its first years, the Miracle Healing Church had some minimal contact with organizations in Halle that supported multicultural activities, and it still receives some publicity from one city-funded organization. However, the church received most of its support from a religious rather than a secular institution. It was given free worship, cooking, and social space by a Protestant youth organization that was part of the established religious organizations of the city, and it also held prayer services in the theology school of the university.

23. In Germany, the federation was organized into more than 570 municipal bodies of approximately 35,000 baptized members and 60,000 other associated members. The organization identified with the charismatic movement and had international ties with the Swiss Pfingstmission and with the Assemblies of God. See Bund Frierkhirchlicher Pfingstgemeinden KdöR n.d.
24. The embodied nature of the conversion experience and of Christian healing cannot be further examined within the scope of this article. See Luhrmann 2004 and Csdoras 1994.

25. In Halle, this ambiguity is anchored within the tension between the multiple meanings of ‘foreigners,’ who include migrants as well as the much-desired high-skilled foreign experts and scientists of the high-tech and knowledge sectors that Halle wishes to rejuvenate. Within different discourses, both become part of the marketing of the city as a place open to the world.

26. In the 1980s, reacting against Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-systems framework, anthropologists intensified their study of local agency. Jean and John Comaroff’s (1999) work on the occult economy has stimulated a similar response. Vásquez and Marquardt 2003 represents an outstanding effort in religious studies to understand local religious actors within transnational networks and global capitalist forces. For further thoughts on the local experience of globality and of Christian transnational social fields, see Glick Schiller 2005a and 2006.

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Wimmer, Andreas, and Nina Glick Schiller

Yalçın-Heckmann, Lale

Zukin, Sharon

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Nina Glick Schiller
University of New Hampshire and Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology
Department of Anthropology
University of New Hampshire
Durham, NH 03824
ngs@cisunix.unh.edu
schiller@eth.mpg.de

Ayşe Çağlar
Sociology and Social Anthropology Department
Central European University
1051 Budapest, Zrinyi 14/Hungary
caglara@ceu.hu

Thaddeus C. Guldbrandsen
Center for Rural Partnerships
Plymouth State University
Plymouth, NH 03264-1595
tcguldbrandsen@plymouth.edu