morality. Shame, and sometimes even carefully calibrated ridicule, may be the tools we need. Not that appeals to morality—to justice, to human rights—are irrelevant. For the aim of anti-honor-killing activism should be to encourage more of the people of Pakistan to realize that their country is disgraced by allowing these wrongs. The wrongness of these killings is essential to the explanation of why they are shameful; as were the wrongness of footbinding and slavery to the arguments that they were sources of Chinese and British shame. And the hope I see is that when the moment comes, the change will be a revolution: a large change in a small time.

Already, as we have seen, women—and men—in Pakistan ask the question: How can a man claim to be honorable who kills a woman of his own family? Already modernizing intellectuals ask the question about honor killing that Kang Youwei asked about footbinding: How can we be respected in the world if we do this terrible thing? And they ask this question not just because their honor world has expanded to include the rest of humanity but also because they want their nation to be worthy—in their own eyes—of respect. Honor must be turned against honor killing as it was turned against dueling, against footbinding, against slavery. Keep reminding people, by all means, that honor killing is immoral, illegal, irrational, irreligious. But even the recognition of these truths, I suspect, will not by itself align what people know with what people do. Honor killing will only perish when it is seen as dishonorable.

FIVE

LESSONS AND LEGACIES

What our fathers called the archetype of honor was, in reality, only one of its forms. They gave a generic name to what was only a species. Honor is to be found therefore in democratic centuries as well as in aristocratic times. But it will not be hard to show that in the former it presents a different face.

—Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*[1]

HONOR: THE BASICS

We have traveled through many ages and climes in search of honor's role in three past moral revolutions, visiting Wellington and Winchilsea in London, Kang Youwei in Beijing, Ben Franklin in Philadelphia, and Josiah Wedgwood in Stoke-on-Trent; and we ended in modern Pakistan where, we may hope, a revolution will soon be underway. Now we have reached the stage where, as I promised at the start, we can lay out what we have learned about honor in the form of a basic theory.

Here, then, is the picture: Having honor means being entitled to respect. As a result, if you want to know whether a society has a concern with honor, look first to see whether people there think anyone has a right to be treated with respect. The next thing to look for is whether that right to respect is granted on the basis of a set of shared norms, a code. An *honor code* says how people of certain identities can gain the right to respect, how they can lose it, and how having and losing honor changes the way they should be treated.

You can show people many kinds of respect. Every kind involves giving appropriate weight in one's dealings with people to some fact or facts about them. One sort of respect that matters involves having a *positive regard* for someone because of their success in meeting certain standards. We can term this *esteem*. We esteem people who are good at all kinds of things, from skydiving to poetry. Sometimes regard doesn't derive from success against a

standard, however; and this is the second kind of respect that matters for honor. It is *recognition respect*. We owe recognition respect to police officers on duty (provided they live up to the relevant professional codes). Find a society with a code that assigns rights to respect of either kind, and you have found honor.

People like the Duke of Wellington and the Earl of Winchilsea who share both an identity and an honor world are *honor peers*. Generally, they have a right to respect from one another, which is based not on esteem but on mutual recognition of their shared status. Honor peers are equals in an important way. That kind of honor among peers is very different from *competitive honor*, which you get by excelling at something, by being better at meeting some standard than others. Achilles' honor, due to him because he was a great warrior, was competitive. Competitive honor is intrinsically hierarchical, because it ranks people against a standard.

An honor code requires specific behavior of people of certain identities: different identity, very often, different demands. Often, for example, codes make different demands of women and men. But people who respect a shared code belong to a shared honor world, whether or not they share an identity. What they have in common is that they acknowledge the demands the code makes of them in virtue of their identity and expect others to do the same. The Pashtunwali includes an elaborate code of just this kind, as did the codes that governed the Chinese literati or English gentlemen.

Both recognition respect and esteem can be distributed by honor codes without any regard for morality. The recognition respect that English gentlemen had a right to, for example, was not morally deserved. And the esteem that successful actors get

reflects their meeting standards of excellence, true, but not standards of *moral* excellence. Honor codes can also require people of certain identities to do things that are actually immoral: honor killings, most obviously.

Still, one kind of honor is the right to respect you gain by doing what morality requires; and another is the kind of right to esteem you get when you do even more than morality requires. That is the honor of moral saints like Mother Teresa. Finally, morality itself requires us to recognize that every human being has, other things being equal, a fundamental right to respect that we term *dignity*. Dignity is a form of honor, too, and *its* code is part of morality.

However you come by your honor—whether by success that led to esteem, or by recognition of some salient fact about you—you can lose it if you fail to meet the code. If you adhere to an honor code, you'll not only respond with respect to those who keep it, you'll respond with contempt to those who don't. So, if you yourself meet the standards, you'll have self-respect; and if you yourself fall short, you will have contempt for yourself, which is shame. If someone doesn't feel shame when they fail (or, at least, when they fail badly) that shows they don't adhere to the code. We say that they are shameless.

What you should feel when you are keeping the code is less straightforward. Pride is shame's opposite, and you might have supposed that it is the right response to one's own honor. But some codes of honor require modesty among the honorable. Still, in many societies, honor codes invite people of certain identities to claim esteem when they deserve it and to insist upon it when it isn't offered.

Honor, we have learned, is not just an individual thing. First of

all, as we've already seen, the honor code's requirements depend on your identity, which means it makes the same demands of all those who share your identity. But, second, you can share in the honor of people of your own identity, feeling self-respect or pride when they do well (and shame when they do badly) and being treated with respect or contempt by others as well. And this is so even if you yourself have done nothing at all.

A BACKWARD GLANCE

Much in this image of the life of honor sounds horribly old-fashioned, doesn't it? Nowadays we are supposed to see through such ersatz ideals and recognize that morality, properly speaking, is about the avoidance of harm, or fairness, or consent, or rights; and that your gender and your class, in any case, play no role in determining what morality demands of you. Honor is to be exiled to some philosophical St. Helena, left to contemplate its wilting epaulets and watch its once gleaming sword corrode in the salt air.

This, of course, is not my view. I want to argue in this final chapter that honor, especially when purged of its prejudices of caste and gender and the like, is peculiarly well suited to turn private moral sentiments into public norms. Its capacity to bind the private and the public together is evident in the way that it led—in Britain, in China, and now in Pakistan—from individual moral convictions to the creation of associations, and the planning of meetings, petitions, and public campaigns. All of which, as the historians and the sociologists will rightly urge, are essential to the final successes of political movements of this kind. That is one reason why we still need honor: it can help us make a better world.

But systems of honor not only help us do well by others; they can help sustain us in our pursuit of our own good. If the codes are right, an honorable life will be a life genuinely worthy of respect. Such an honor world will give respect to people and groups that deserve it. Respect will be one of the rewards of a life worth living and it will strengthen the self-respect of those who live well. In a world in which respect is given to those who live well, more people will be able to live well; the culture of respect will sustain them. So, honor is no decaying vestige of a premodern order; it is, for us, what it has always been, an engine, fueled by the dialogue between our self-conceptions and the regard of others, that can drive us to take seriously our responsibilities in a world we share. A person with integrity will care that she lives up to her ideals. If she succeeds, we may owe her our respect. But caring to do right is not the same thing as caring to be worthy of respect; it is the concern for respect that connects living well with our place in a social world. Honor takes integrity public.

THE MORAL CHALLENGE

But if moral progress is what we care about, why fuss about honor at all? We know it can go wrong as easily as it can go right, after all. It was wrong and defaming for Winchilsea to have accused Wellington of deception, honor aside. So you might think that Wellington should have asked for an apology to correct the lie, not because his honor was offended. Here, then, is the challenge that morality issues to honor: If people should do what is right because it is right—an ideal of the moral life that was first clearly articulated by Immanuel Kant—the system to which these

noblemen were responding is objectionable because, even when it guides them to do what happens to be right, they will be doing it for the wrong reasons. If what's wrong is lying or refusing to give an apology you owe, why not say so? Why does it help to drag in honor?

Consider the simplest sort of case. Suppose I am someone with a sense of honor. And suppose, too, that the codes of my honor world grant a right to respect to those who deal honestly with other people, something that morality, of course, also requires. If I am tempted to lie or cheat or steal, I will have a variety of reasons for resisting the temptation. The most basic reason is just that to do so would be wrong. If I abstain for this reason, I display what Kant called a good will: I do what is right because it is right. And he thought, as he says in the first sentence of the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, that a good will was the only unqualifiedly good thing in the world.[2]

But because I have a sense of honor, I also want to maintain my right to be respected. So I have a further reason for abstaining, namely, to maintain my honor. I want to be worthy of respect, whether anyone does in fact respect me or not. Both duty and honor, then, provide me with reasons that have nothing to do with anyone else's actual responses to me—reasons that are, in that sense, internal. But there are also external reasons for doing what is right—reasons, like fear of punishment by the courts, that depend on what would happen if people found out that I had done something wrong. As an honorable person, I care not just to be worthy of respect but also about actually being respected; I like being respected, and besides, if people cease to respect me, they will treat me less well.

One reason Kant thought it was best if we acted out of the goodness of our wills was that if we tried to do so and succeeded, it would usually not be accidental that we did what was right. Someone who acts only out of the external concerns I just mentioned, on the other hand, will have no reason to do the right thing unless she thinks she might be discovered. Notice, though, that in the case I imagined—the case where the code honors those who do what is morally right—the concern for honor is, in this respect, like a good will. If I can get honor by doing what is morally right, then the motive of honor will be active whatever the contingencies of the external situation. So, if you valued the good will for Kant's reason, you could value honor—provided its codes associated honor with doing what was right—for exactly the same reason. Its connection with right action would not be contingent, it would be internal.

This is not, I think, Kant's own view. When he explicitly considers the "inclination towards honor" as a motive, early on in the *Groundwork*, he says that it is not worthy of the highest respect, even where it happens to coincide with the common interest and with duty. The reason is that, in his view, the only thing that deserves full respect is doing the right thing because it is the right thing to do; acting, as he sometimes puts it, from a motive of duty.

Now Kant's discussion here is of a case where honor and duty coincide "*glücklicherweise*," that is, by a happy chance. So he isn't considering the possibility that I just canvassed of a kind of honor whose connection with morality is *not* a matter of chance. Perhaps, then, he could agree with me that, in the special case of a fully moralized honor code, which attaches respect only to doing

your moral duty, honor is a motivation that is as valuable as duty. Something like this was Wilberforce's view, as we saw, and both Kant and Wilberforce were models of Protestant piety.

But Kant himself says we should "praise and encourage" righteous acts motivated by honor.[3] That seems only sensible. After all, if people find it hard (as they evidently do) to act from duty, we have cause to make sure they have other reasons for doing what is right. To meet this moral challenge, we don't need forms of honor that are fully moralized, connecting the entitlement to respect only with doing your moral duty. What we need are codes of honor that are *compatible* with morality, which is a much weaker demand. And, in fact, Kant, like the other Enlightenment thinkers I discussed in the first chapter, always writes as if honor—at least of the right sort—is a good thing.

The fact that honor can motivate good acts, however, doesn't make it a reason to do them, does it? For Kant, talk of reasons is connected to something quite grand: freedom—my self-conception as a freely acting person. Freedom is not a matter of being undetermined; it is a matter of being determined by reasons. To be free, then, is to see myself as responding to reasons for acting. Reasons are intelligible, and not just to the person in question. This is why we cannot reinterpret the reasons that guide our choices as simply reflections of what we happen to want. When, as we say, I "grasp" a reason, it makes *sense* to me as a basis for doing (or thinking or feeling) something. The reason makes me understand why I should do it. And if *you* are to make sense of me, you must grasp that it provides such a basis, too. To see your choices as flowing from bare desires is to have no real reasons at all. It's no surprise that the Latin word for the bare will—*arbitrium*—ended as our word "arbitrary."

Kant's insight was that the free will is not a will ungoverned; it is, rather, a will governed by reasons. And a will that is governed by reasons has to take those reasons as coming from outside itself.

I am arguing, against Kant, that honor is another of the calls on us made by reason; it is a call that depends on our recognition of the many different standards presupposed by those codes of honor. And when those standards make sense to us—when we inhabit the same honor world—we understand as well that those who meet them deserve our respect. Sometimes, as we have seen, the standard will be morality. Often, however, it will not.

THE HIERARCHY PROBLEM

Sometimes we are motivated by a sense of justice or by a concern to do the right thing, whether anyone else notices or not. Often, though, we are motivated (or motivated as well) by the ways we expect people to respond to what we do. People who like us, for example, will treat us better, so we want to be liked for that reason. These are what we can call "instrumental" reasons for caring about other people's attitudes to us. But by and large, we humans respond to respect and contempt not because we have instrumental reasons to do so, but because we cannot help it. It's just a fact about us that we want to be respected, and we want it, at least in part, for its own sake.

Some social psychologists have recently proposed taxonomies of the fundamental moral sentiments, the feelings that are "recruited," as they put it, by cultures to sustain their norms. The catalogue includes responses that relate to the avoidance or alleviation of harm; to fairness and reciprocity; to purity and pollution;

to boundaries between in-groups and out-groups; and to what they call "awe" and "elevation."[4] But they also acknowledge a fundamental human disposition to care about hierarchy and respect, with respect understood as something that is derivative of hierarchy. John Locke, writing in 1692, put it concisely, long ago: "Contempt, or want of due respect, discovered either in looks, words, or gesture . . . from whomsoever it comes, brings always uneasiness with it; for nobody can contentedly bear being slighted."[5] The emotions and practices of honor—esteem, contempt, respect, deference—developed, it is reasonable to suppose, with hierarchy in troops of early humans. Is honor, in this way, atavistic?

It's not a worry we can immediately dismiss. One problem with the British code of gentlemanly honor was that it distributed respect in hierarchical ways that were incompatible with morality. True, it required gentlemen to challenge other gentlemen who denied them the respect they were owed as gentlemen; but it made no such demand when your accuser was of the lower orders. The proper response, when a man of the lower orders treated you disrespectfully, it turns out, was to strike him with a horsewhip. The horsewhip was symbolic here. The distinction between knights and others in the feudal system was a distinction between those who fought on horseback and those who fought on foot. The horsewhip signified your status as a gentleman, as one who rode; the word "chivalry" comes from the French word for a knight, a *chevalier*, one who rides a *cheval*, a horse. (The highest honor in France today is still to be a Chevalier of the Legion of Honor.)

The gentlemanly code did require certain forms of behavior—duty to king and country, courtesy, and so on. But the code had regard to mere facts of birth as well as to norms of behavior: you got points by being wellborn. It continued this feature of the standard that gave Prince Hal his claims to honor. Occasionally, by the eighteenth century, it might be conceded that someone could overcome birth—that a man could be (in that condescending phrase) one of "nature's gentlemen." There was less willingness, though, to concede that a wellborn man or woman—a lady or a gentleman by birth—could be, as it were, one of nature's plebians. (Though, of course, many a young woman learned from reading novels that a member of the upper classes can behave like a brute.)

The struggle to break the tight connection between honor and birth is nearly as old as the connection itself. Recall Horace—son of a freed slave—addressing Maecenas, the richest and noblest of the private patrons of the arts in Augustan Rome, some two millennia ago. Maecenas "says it's no matter who your parents are, so long as you're worthy," but Horace complains that most Romans take the opposite view.[6] Anyone who offers himself for public office, the poet grumbles, gets asked "from what father he may be descended, whether he is dishonorable because of the obscurity of his mother."[7] This is the feature of the old system of honor that we have rejected, as we have grown suspicious of the idea that some people deserve better (or worse) treatment on account of identities they did not choose. Social status—class, if you like—should grant you no moral rights, people think; nor should your race or gender or sexual orientation.[8]

To be sure, respect isn't always connected to hierarchy. Recognition respect, remember, is treating someone in ways that are appropriate in light of facts about them, and that's often a moral duty. For instance, the moral duty to avoid causing unnecessary pain to others derives from a respect due to them because of their

capacity for suffering. Even the British code of gentlemanly honor, as we saw, incorporated a form of recognition respect: within the background assumption of a shared class membership, it thus insisted on a certain form of social parity. The duel we began with brought a venerated war hero and an undistinguished peer together on a field as equals.

Yet there's no denying that appraisal respect, being comparative, does conduce to hierarchy of some sort, though we should be clear that this needn't run afoul of morality. When someone does something morally heroic, we can owe her not just normal recognition respect but appraisal respect as well, and the esteem we grant her is suffused with moral feeling. At the same time, much of the esteem we pay—much of the honoring we do—involves standards that have nothing at all to do with morality. When we honor great scholars and artists and athletes, it is not usually their moral virtues that we are assessing. (Indeed, we are by now quite used to being let down morally by our academic, artistic, political, and sports heroes.) Still, in meritocratic societies, esteem often reflects reasonable standards of evaluation. Should I not esteem a Nobel Prize laureate? Or someone my university grants an honorary degree for services to philanthropy? Or the recipient of the Légion d'honneur? Or the Congressional Medal of Honor?

"*Everybody* has won, and *all* must have prizes," the Dodo says in *Alice in Wonderland.* But we do not live in Wonderland. We can't help recognizing hierarchies in realms such as athletic or intellectual achievement: to take these realms seriously just is to recognize that you can do better and worse in them. As a result, a properly organized system of esteem can support motives that we should want to support. And since the psychological mechanisms

that underlie esteem will operate whether we wish them to or not, organizing them, to the extent that we can, to align with ends we can endorse is the only sensible policy.

In response to Protestant skepticism about esteem (of the sort we saw in Wilberforce), Hume was adamant that "a desire of fame, reputation, or a character with others, is so far from being blameable that it seems inseparable from virtue, genius, capacity, and a generous or noble disposition."[9] By "virtue" he means moral excellence, of course; but by "genius" he means excellences of other kinds. Hume's point here is the obverse of the one I cited from him in chapter 1. There his point was that you can have honor without virtue—the honor of the dueling "debauchee" is vicious; here he insists that it is hard to sustain excellence without the support its practice gains from honor. Honor isn't morality; but the psychology it mobilizes can unquestionably be put in the service of human achievement.

THE THIRST FOR BLOOD

Honor can meet the moral challenge, then, and it can also purge its dependence on morally illegitimate forms of hierarchy. But it faces a third challenge I want to consider, which is that it seems unattractively connected with violence. The duel, footbinding, slavery, honor killing: all are associated with forms of life in which honor is sustained by battle or the infliction of pain. Maybe, in the early history of our species, honor-related emotions helped give structure to groups that could hunt, protect themselves from predators, and share the task of raising children. Group action was coordinated by patterns of deference in judgment and obedience

in behavior. Culture has taken these basic mechanisms and put them to other uses. But often these devices for maintaining order fail, and when they do, as likely as not, we humans, and especially we men, fight.

We are indeed a spectacularly violent species: we fight within groups, often to the point of death; and we organize ourselves to fight between groups more often than most other species as well. We fight not only for food and sex and power but also for honor. In the search for honor people spend resources, and men, more particularly, risk their lives; it would only have settled in us as a hereditary disposition if these costs once had compensating benefits. Whatever they were, they presumably explain why our concern for hierarchy—and our capacity to locate ourselves and others within it—is so well honed.

Inevitably, then, the historical changes that ended dueling, slavery, and footbinding have changed honor but not destroyed it. As we have seen, each of these changes was part of a longer, larger revolution in moral sentiments that has aimed to reduce the role of class and race and gender in shaping hierarchy. These social changes altered the meaning of honor; but they did not destroy every hierarchy since, in particular, they allow distinctions based on merit. Rather, they aimed to change the standards, adjust the criteria against which people are evaluated. But another central social project has been to tame honor's thirst for blood.

That is actually one of the striking achievements of the moral revolution that ended dueling in Britain. It removed a routine kind of appeal to violence, taming disputes about honor. (There is something of an irony here. For the duello codes had once themselves been a moralizing advance: they replaced a culture in Renaissance Italy in which young men found their honor in unregulated affrays, of the sort in which Romeo kills Tybalt in Shakespeare's play.) Cardinal Newman, in the discussion I mentioned earlier, insisted always on the gentle in gentleman—his description of the ideal, which runs for several pages, makes for fascinating reading. Not only does Newman's gentleman avoid the infliction of pain, he "has his eyes on all his company; he is tender towards the bashful, gentle towards the distant, and merciful towards the absurd; he can recollect to whom he is speaking; he guards against unseasonable allusions, or topics which may irritate; he is seldom prominent in conversation, and never wearisome."

And a little later, as if deliberately (if implicitly) rebuking the duelists of an earlier generation, the cardinal writes: "He has too much good sense to be affronted at insults, he is too well employed to remember injuries, and too indolent to bear malice."[10] From Mackenzie's and Sterne's "Man of Feeling" in the late eighteenth century to Newman's mid-Victorian gentleman there is a developing body of argument, in fiction and in the moral essay, that aims to displace the irritable masculinity of the battlefield, jealous of martial honor, with the more amiable civility of the drawing-room.

But the taming of personal gentlemanly honor did not remove the temptation to pursue collective honor with the blade and the gun. As Newman was writing, British men were going out into an expanding empire, imbued by their reading of Shakespeare's history plays or adaptations of the *Morte D'Arthur* with notions of honor more than half a millennium old. The twentieth century began with a war whose carnage was unspeakable and whose aims are impossible to remember. Rupert Brooke, a young and sensitive English

poet, who would have thought dueling ridiculous, nevertheless celebrated this pointless waste of human life with memorable vigor:

Blow, bugles, blow! They brought us, for our dearth,
Holiness, lacked so long, and Love, and Pain.
Honor has come back, as a king, to earth,
And paid his subjects with a royal wage;
And Nobleness walks in our ways again;
And we have come into our heritage.[11]

Those who train our armies claim that military honor is essential in both motivating and civilizing the conduct of warfare. As I shall argue below, I am inclined to believe them. But the trouble, of course, is that sentiments like Rupert Brooke's—and what even moderately sensitive soul does not feel the temptation of responding to the call of those bugles?—make us more likely to go to war.

It is no doubt utopian to hope that international society will be able in the foreseeable future to work out ways of managing disagreement that make the threat of warfare obsolete. And if armies are a necessary evil, the life of professional soldiers is one of the places where we still need something close to the enduring culture of martial honor, the honor of Prince Hal.[12] We need, though, to keep it in its place, which is the battlefield, not the conduct of foreign policy.

ESTEEM AND PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

As we have seen, recognition respect of a basic sort is now something we believe everyone is entitled to, in the form of human

dignity. But that doesn't mean that we won't grant different forms of respect to people of particular identities. We grant just such particular rights to respect to priests during services, managers at work, policemen in uniform, judges on the bench, and many other public officials in the conduct of their duties. Often in these cases our respect takes the form of a kind of context-bound deference: in the courthouse, we call the judge "Your Honor," and we don't criticize her with the same frankness we might display if she made a legal error in a dinner party conversation.

One of the consequences of the democratization of our culture is that we don't expect people to show deference of this sort to their fellow citizens outside the contexts of their special roles; in older, less democratic forms of social life, men could expect deference from women, the upper classes could expect it from members of the lower orders, and whites could expect it from blacks . . . and they could expect it everywhere and all the time. That created social worlds in which the experience of most positive forms of recognition was denied to large parts of the human population.

But when it comes to sustaining and disciplining those special social roles, appraisal respect—esteem—plays a critical role. It helps maintain demanding norms of behavior. As Geoffrey Brennan and Philip Pettit point out, esteem, as a way of shaping our behavior, is, in effect, policed by everybody in the honor world. The reason is simple: people in an honor world automatically regard those who meet its codes with respect and those who breach them with contempt. Because these responses are automatic, the system is, in effect, extremely cheap to maintain. It only requires us to respond in ways we are naturally inclined to respond anyway.

Suppose, instead, you wanted to achieve the same effects

through the formal mechanism of the law. Then you'd have to give new police and sentencing powers to particular people, which produces new worries. You'd face the old Latin question: *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?* Who will guard the guards? One attractive feature of the economy of esteem is that all of us are its guards. No individual has the focused power to apply the incentives of esteem that a police officer has when she arrests you, or a judge does in deciding a sentence.[13]

Consider the code of military honor. It calls on people as soldiers (or as marines, or officers, . . . there is a variety of relevant identities) and, of course, we now know, as Americans or Englishmen or Pakistanis; and while soldiers may feel shame or pride when their regiment or their platoon does badly or well, fundamentally it matters to them that they themselves should follow the military's codes of honor.

It is worth asking why it is that honor is needed here. We could, after all, use the law all by itself to guide our armies; military discipline makes easy use of all sorts of punishments. And mercenaries can be motivated by money. So, why aren't these ordinary forms of social regulation—the market and the law—enough to manage an army, as they are enough to manage, say, such other state functions as the maintenance of the highways?

Well, first of all, both these other forms of regulation require surveillance. If we are to be able to pay you your bonus or punish you for your offenses, someone has to be able to find out what you have done. But when the battle is hardest, everything is obscured by the fog of war. If the aim of a soldier were just to get his bonus or escape the brig, he would have no incentive to behave well at the very moment when we most require it. Of course, we could devote

large amounts of expensive effort to this sort of surveillance—we could equip each soldier with a device that monitored his every act—but that would have psychological and moral costs as well as significant financial ones. By contrast, honor, which is grounded in the individual soldier's own sense of honor (and that of his or her peers), can be effective without extensive surveillance; and, unlike a system of law or a market contract, anyone who is around and belongs to the honor world will be an effective enforcer of it, so that the cost of enforcement of honor is actually quite low, and, as Brennan and Pettit noticed, we won't have to worry about guarding its guardians.

There's another reason for favoring honor over law as a mechanism for motivating soldiers. The sorts of sacrifice that are most useful in warfare require people to take risks that require them to do things that are, in the jargon, supererogatory: they are acts that are morally desirable but which ask too much of us to be morally required. To punish someone for failing to do something that they have no duty to do is morally wrong. Since it is normally permissible, however, to offer a financial reward for doing what is supererogatory, that might lead you to think that the right way to regulate military behavior, if you could solve the problem of the fog of war, would be by financial incentives.

Once we have a set of shared codes about military honor, though, we also have commitments that make us think of money as the wrong idiom for rewarding military prowess: it is symbolically inappropriate. We don't give soldiers bonuses for bravery, we give them medals; and, more important, we honor them. We give them the respect we know they deserve. I have been arguing that we live not after honor but with new forms of honor. Still, our

modern standing armies have kept in place a world of military honor many of whose loyalties and sentiments I suspect Wellington would have recognized; as would, indeed, Homer's Achilles or Shakespeare's Duke of Bourbon, who—realizing at Agincourt that the day is lost—cries out:

> *Shame and eternal shame, nothing but shame!*
> *Let's die in honor!* (Henry V, *Act IV, Sc. v)*

Soldiers who think like that make formidable opponents.

These reflections on why honor is such an effective and powerful way of motivating soldiers suggest that there may be analogous arguments to be made for other professions. Teachers, doctors, and bankers, for example, all do many things where it is very hard or expensive for outsiders to keep an eye on how conscientious they are being. We have every reason to hope that they will do more than can be required of them by their contracts of employment. And, as we saw in the crises in the American economy in the first decade of this millennium, the behavior of individual bankers seeking to make profits can, in the aggregate, impose large costs on all of us.[14]

I'm not an economist, and to understand how we should shape professional norms requires the sorts of reflection on the design of institutions that economists have made their professional study. But it is a noticeable fact of recent history that in many professional domains the consolations of money have, to some extent, shouldered aside those of esteem. Sometimes the two currencies have reached an unappealing compact. The surgeon Atul Gawande has argued, in reviewing the evidence about the rising

costs of health care in the United States, that there are medical communities in which the values of entrepreneurship—hard work and innovation in the service of expanding profits—have overtaken the traditional guild values of the Hippocratic Oath. When this happens, esteem grows aligned with money, to the detriment, as he argues, of health.[15]

As for teaching, how often have you heard people ask what happened to the dedicated teacher who worked long hours, respected by her community and her students' parents? (Then again, if society properly esteems what good teachers do, why are they paid so stintingly?) It is, no doubt, a complex historical question both to what extent there was once a world in which in each of these professions was regulated by professional norms sustained by an honor code and how much that honor world has gone. But my suspicion, which is widely shared, is that there really has been a loss here.

HONORABLE MISSIONS

Honor, in the form of individual dignity, powers the global movement for human rights; as merited individual esteem, it allows communities both large and small to reward and encourage people who excel; as national honor, with its possibilities of pride and its risks of shame, it can motivate citizens in the unending struggle to discipline the acts of their governments. Add these to the ways in which honor can serve us in the professions. And in all these contexts it draws on a feature of our social psychologies that is, so far as we know, inescapable.

But I want to end, now, not with abstractions but with two peo-

ple, a man and a woman, whose backgrounds and circumstances could not be more different. Each of them was led by a sense of honor to behave in the estimable ways that are the best argument for the life of honor. Each of them challenged a code of honor that ran against decency and justice, and in doing so moved their own societies—and not just their own societies—toward a juster future.

Let me start with the man. In early 2004, as everybody remembers, the world learned that American soldiers at the detention facility at Abu Ghraib in Iraq had abused men and women in their custody. On May 7 of that year, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld testified before the United States Senate that the guards at Abu Ghraib, like all American servicemen in Iraq, were under "instructions . . . to adhere to the Geneva Conventions."[16] This came as a surprise to Captain Ian Fishback, a twenty-six-year-old officer in the 82nd Airborne Division, who had served two tours—in Afghanistan and in Iraq—under the impression that the Geneva Conventions did not apply in those conflicts. In the course of a short career, in which he had already received two Bronze Stars for valor, he had seen detainees in Iraq being abused at Camp Mercury near Fallujah in the nine months before Rumsfeld gave his testimony. Indeed, in the course of his service in the two theaters of war he had come across "a wide range of abuses including death threats, beatings, broken bones, murder, exposure to elements, extreme forced physical exertion, hostage-taking, stripping, sleep deprivation and degrading treatment." He thought that these breaches of the Conventions might be the consequence of the fact that others, like him, were unaware of what the standards governing detainee treatment were.

And so he decided to find out what his formal obligations

actually were, not least because he had been taught at West Point that, as an officer, he should ensure that his men never faced the burden of committing a dishonorable act. He wrote later that he consulted his

> chain of command through battalion commander, multiple JAG lawyers, multiple Democrat and Republican Congressmen and their aides, the Ft. Bragg Inspector General's office, multiple government reports, the Secretary of the Army and multiple general officers, a professional interrogator at Guantanamo Bay, the deputy head of the department at West Point responsible for teaching Just War Theory and Law of Land Warfare, and numerous peers who I regard as honorable and intelligent men.[17]

None of these sources, he said, was able to provide him with the "clarification" he sought.

But talk of clarification was partly euphemism. What he had actually been doing much of the time was raising the issue of the abuse at Camp Mercury. At one point, one of his commanders suggested to him that, if he persisted in these inquiries, the "honor of his unit was at stake."[18] Captain Fishback knew, however, that there is a difference between the honor of the unit and its reputation. And so, though the U.S. Army let him down, he was not willing to give in. He provided information to Human Rights Watch investigators, telling them what he knew. When their report appeared, the Army let him down again: the CID investigators who spoke to him seemed mostly concerned to trace the names of the sergeants who had provided him with some of his information and to explore his relationship with Human Rights Watch.[19]

On September 16, 2005, Ian Fishback chose not to hide behind the anonymity he had been offered by Human Rights Watch. He wrote to Senator John McCain, urging him to "do justice to your men and women in uniform" by giving them "clear standards of conduct that reflect the ideals they risk their lives for." Eventually, Senator McCain joined two other senators in drafting legislation that did just that.

Ian Fishback shows the power of honor in the service of human decency. He understands that honor means caring not just about being esteemed but about being *worthy* of esteem, as well; and he was willing to risk the disapproval of his peers and his superiors—which is to say, the prospect of a blighted career—to preserve that entitlement. His personal sense of honor, his sense of honor as a military officer, his sense of honor as an American: all these were at stake, and at issue. "We are America," he wrote to Senator McCain, "and our actions should be held to a higher standard, the ideals expressed in documents such as the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution." Here we see the double service that a sense of national honor offers each of us: it allows us to engage with the life of our country, but it can also grant us the engagement of those of our fellow citizens who care for our common honor, too.

As for his standard of individual honor, it includes loyalty to the law and to morality as well as to the men who serve under him, and he rates these above the wishes of his superiors. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld—whose grasp of these truths about honor seems less certain—was quoted as saying at the time: "Either break him or destroy him. And do it quickly."[20] Perhaps he didn't say this. It is bad enough that it is so easy to believe that he did. So it

is a good thing—for Captain Fishback and for his fellow citizens—that Ian Fishback is, as one of the congressional staffers who spoke to him put it, "a very powerful person," not to mention "the most honor-bound individual I've ever encountered in my life."[24]

Captain Fishback reminds us that military honor properly understood is something that all of us—soldiers and civilians—have a reason to respect. But to understand the full range of honor's power, we need to look in less obvious places than in the soldier's world. And no place could be less obvious than a farming village in the developing world. But the woman who is my second model of honor was born (about six years before Captain Fishback) in just such a place, in the village of Meerwala, near the town of Jatoi in Muzaffargarh District in the southern part of the Punjab in Pakistan. Her name is Mukhtaran Bibi, and her family farms about two acres in an area dominated by powerful members of a Baloch tribe called the Mastoi.

On June 22, 2002, her brother, Shakur, who was twelve or thirteen years old, was accused by some of the Mastois of having dishonored Salma, a woman of their tribe in her early twenties, apparently because he was talking to her in a wheat field near his home. His accusers decided to teach him a lesson: they beat and raped him and held him captive.

Shakur's father asked the local mullah to intervene, but he was unable to persuade the Mastois to relent. And so the father went to the police. By the time they appeared, the Mastois had upped the ante, accusing Shakur of raping Salma; he was delivered into the custody of the police and held in the prison in Jatoi eight miles away, charged with *zina bil jabr*, the Hudood offense that occurs when sex outside marriage involves coercion or deception.

As negotiations proceeded that afternoon between representatives of Mukhtaran and Shakur's family and the Mastois, a large group gathered in front of the walled Mastoi farmhouse, three hundred yards away from Mukhtaran Bibi's home. Mukhtaran's father, Ghulam Farid, told her in the evening that he had been assured that if he came with his daughter to apologize for Shakur's offense, the matter would be settled. And so, after nightfall, Mukhtaran, her father, her uncle, and a family friend walked toward the open space near the mosque where more than a hundred men were gathered. Mukhtaran, then about thirty years old, carried her Koran, a book she could not read but that she had learned to recite by heart, a book that she taught to the village children, a book she thought would protect her.

Five Mastoi men dominated the proceedings, waving their rifles, shouting, threatening the men who accompanied Mukhtaran Bibi. One of them, Salma's brother, Abdul Khaliq, waved a pistol. Mukhtaran Bibi laid her shawl on the ground before them, in a gesture of respect, recited a verse of the Koran, and prayed quietly to herself as she waited to see what would happen. She did not have to wait long. The Mastoi men had already decided that their response to the dishonor they claimed for the imaginary assault on Salma would be to dishonor the family of the boy they had accused. Mukhtaran Bibi was taken by four men and gang-raped for an hour in a shed not far away. When they were done, they pushed her outside, almost naked, and her father took her home.

The brazenness of the Mastoi assault reflected, of course, a conviction that they would get away with what they had done. In circumstances like these in the Punjab, a woman of Mukhtaran Bibi's background—a poor woman from a farming family—could

be expected to suffer in silence; and her family, terrorized by the Mastoi, with their weapons and their connections in the police and the provincial government, would have to go along. Many women in her circumstances in the Punjab would have killed themselves.

But the next week, at Friday prayers, the mullah in his sermon condemned the Mastoi men for what they had done. The story of a woman sentenced to gang rape by a *panchayat*—a village council—appeared in a local newspaper, was taken up by human rights groups, spread by the Web, and appeared in the international press. The government of the Punjab ordered the local police to look into the matter. And so, on a Sunday eight days after her brutal assault—eight days spent in tearful isolation with her family—Mukhtaran Bibi was summoned by the police and taken to Jatoi with her father and her uncle to be questioned. Reporters gathered at the police station began to question her also and, rather than retreating in shame, she told them her story.

In the years that have followed, with the assistance of human rights activists in Pakistan and abroad, Mukhtaran Bibi has continued to fight for justice. And the authorities in her country are divided between those who help and those who hinder her cause. The local police, used to siding with the powerful, misrepresented her testimony, asking her to place her thumbprint on an empty sheet of paper and then distorting her story. But then a judge interviewed her and the mullah and actually recorded what she said. Within three months, a court sentenced six men to death for their part in her rape. But that sentence was then overruled by the high court in Lahore, which acquitted them. Then a Shariat Court overruled the high court; and the Supreme Court, faced with conflicting decisions from three different kinds of courts, intervened

of its own accord and decided to consider the case itself. That was in 2005. In February 2009, there were reports in the Pakistani newspapers that the federal minister for defense production, Abdul Qayyum Khan Jatoi, who represents Mukhtaran Bibi's area in the Parliament of Pakistan, was trying to persuade her to withdraw the case. More amazing, perhaps, is the fact that the case was still pending seven years on.

In the meanwhile, Mukhtaran Bibi had been protected from her angry Mastoi neighbors by a perpetual police guard. And in March 2009, she married one of the policemen who had been sent to the village to protect her.

But while the courts of Pakistan have dithered, Mukhtaran Bibi has transformed her village and her country. The illiterate farmer's daughter has become Mukhtar Mai, Respected Elder Sister, which is the name by which she is now known around the world. When the government sent her a check for compensation, she used it not only to pay her legal expenses but also to start a girl's school in Meerwala. She didn't want another generation of the girls around her to grow up illiterate and disempowered. As her case became better and better known around the world, she received money and assistance from many places; she now runs not just two schools (one for girls, one for boys) but the Mukhtar Mai Women's Welfare Organization, which provides shelter, legal assistance, and advocacy.

Above all, she speaks out again and again about her situation and that of other rural women. Rather than hiding with the shame that her rapists meant to impose on her, she has exposed *their* depravity and insisted on justice, not only for herself but also for the women of her country. She understood that neither her caste

nor her gender were reasons for denying her respect. Mukhtar Mai lives her dignity and, in doing so, teaches other women that they too have a right to respect.

Nicholas Kristof, the *New York Times* journalist who helped make Mukhtar's case known around the world, describes the scene at her home in these words:

> Desperate women from across Pakistan arrive in buses and taxis and carts, for they have heard of Mukhtar and hope that she may help. The worst cases have had their noses cut off—a common Pakistani punishment administered to women in order to shame them forever. So Mukhtar hears them out and tries to arrange doctors or lawyers or other help for them. In the meantime these women sleep with Mukhtar on the floor of her bedroom . . . every night, there are up to a dozen women, lying all over the floor, huddled against one another, comforting one another. They are victims with wrenching stories—and yet they are also symbols of hope, signs that times are changing and women are fighting back.[22]

In her own story, told to a French journalist, Mukhtar Mai describes facing the angry crowd of Mastoi men consumed with their own honor. And she writes: "But although I know my place as a member of an inferior caste, I also have a sense of honor, the honor of the Gujars. Our community of small, impoverished farmers has been here for several hundred years, and while I'm not familiar with our history in detail, I feel that it is part of me, in my blood." It is hard to know how to interpret these words, through the veil of translation. But her description of her early life and her

father's response to the assault on her both suggest that she was raised within a family that understood that, wherever they stood in the local hierarchy of status, they, too, were entitled to respect.

You might ask what honor does in these stories that morality by itself does not. A grasp of morality will keep soldiers from abusing the human dignity of their prisoners. It will make them disapprove of the acts of those who don't. And it will allow women who have been vilely abused to know that their abusers deserve punishment. But it takes a sense of honor to drive a soldier beyond doing what is right and condemning what is wrong to insisting that something is done when others on his side do wicked things. It takes a sense of honor to feel implicated by the acts of others.

And it takes a sense of your own dignity to insist, against the odds, on your right to justice in a society that rarely offers it to women like you; and a sense of the dignity of all women to respond to your own brutal rape not just with indignation and a desire for revenge but with a determination to remake your country, so that its women are treated with the respect you know they deserve. To make such choices is to live a life of difficulty, even, sometimes, of danger. It is also, and not incidentally, to live a life of honor.

SOURCES and ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

These notes record my largest intellectual debts, mention some materials that an interested reader might want to pursue in thinking further about these issues, and discuss a few questions that did not find a place in the main body of the book.

I learned a great deal when I made the first version of these arguments in the Seeley Lectures at Cambridge in January 2008, and I should like to thank the members of the Faculty of History for their hospitality (and for trusting a non-historian with the past!). I learned yet more when I gave later versions as the Romanell–Phi Beta Kappa Lectures at Princeton University and the Page-Barbour Lectures at the University of Virginia in March and April 2009. My analysis of honor was the subject of fruitful conversations at the Department of Philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania in March 2009, where I gave a single lecture that focused on the philosophical argument; and at the University of Leipzig in June 2009, where I gave a slightly different lecture on the same theme. In November 2009, I gave the Leibniz Lecture of the Austrian Academy of Sciences in Vienna on honor, which afforded me more help as my work on the book was coming to a close. Equally helpful in finishing the book were the discussions on