

**Exam
PECOS 4010
Autumn 2020**

I. Short Answer Essays (40%)

Provide answers for five of the following six terms

Define and briefly discuss significance

1. The commitment problem
 - a) Bargaining theory of war. Fearon (1995). The inability of an actor to commit to peace.
 - b) Given costs of war, actors should find a bargaining solution whereby war (and the costs of war) are avoided. Nonetheless, three main reasons for war with rationality can occur: information problems or misrepresentation, commitment problem, and issue indivisibility.
 - c) Commitment problem consists of three elements:
 1. First strike problem – if one or both actors has an advantage in striking first, there will exist a temptation to attack.
 2. Preventative war – if one actor is gaining an advantage over time – that actor will not be necessarily committed to peace in the future. Serves as an inducement for the slower growing power to attack now when relatively more powerful.
 3. Strategic territory and appeasement, whereby the capture of territory alters the relative strength of the two parties.
2. Resource curse
 - a) Natural resources – increased risk of corruption, poor governance. Elites and Government are not dependent on the support of the population, hence taxes, which in turn gives them less incentives to democratize.
 - b) Natural resources – increase risk of conflict onset (Collier & Hoeffler argument, etc.)
 - c) Natural resources – prolongation of conflict (non-state actors finance themselves through natural resources) (can help recruitment)
3. Stationary bandits
 - a. Definition – a stationary bandit steals like a regular bandit (or roving bandit) but does not move around and limits the theft (taxation) to a limited population in a particular circumscribed territory.
 - b. Consequences
 - i. Monopoly rights to the stationary bandit means that there are no other bandits – stationary bandits get rid of roving bandits. (Roving bandits do not).
 - ii. Stationary bandits have an incentive to protect the source of their wealth – ban murder, etc.— eliminates anarchy and establishes some notion of order

- iii. Since the warlord takes a part of total production in the form of tax theft, it will also pay him to provide other public goods whenever the provision of these goods increases taxable income sufficiently.
 - iv. Roving bandits have no incentive for anyone to produce or accumulate anything that may be stolen and, thus, little for bandits to steal. No one accumulates wealth as it will be stolen. Under the rule of a stationary bandit, peasants have an incentive to invest as they know how much will be taken by the stationary bandit.
 - v. In many ways the Stationary bandit is like Bates' specialists in violence. They play a fundamental role in the development of the early state.
- 4. Constraining power sharing institutions
 - a. Gates et al (2016). A type of power sharing – not inclusive and not dispersive.
 - b. “share the road” logic – no one gets too much – everyone is constrained.
 - c. Political institutions that constrain the state and protect individuals from repression.
 - d. Mechanism assuring peace is to work against mobilization and recruitment into a rebel group.
- 5. Specialists in violence
 - a. Key actor in the development of the early state. (Bates 2001).
 - b. Similar to Olson's (1993) stationary bandits (not roaming bandits)
 - c. Similar to Tilly -- the state as an extortion racket
 - d. Implicit bargain whereby the specialists in violence tax but protect.
 - e. Creating a monopoly on the use of violence
 - f. Investment of the taxed wealth and protection from roving bandits increases investment and accumulation of wealth – development.
 - g. Development associated with increasing specialization
 - h. Specialists in violence become rulers.
- 6. Illiberal democracy
 - a. Zakaria (1997). Electoral democracies. Leaders are elected but the general public is not protected from repression from the state.
 - b. Liberalism – focus on liberties – protection of the freedom of expression, assembly, religion, property.
 - c. Constitutional liberalism. Separate and independent judicial system
 - d. Democracy does not lead to constitutional liberalism necessarily
 - e. Post-conflict state building should focus on developing liberal institutions, don't focus on elections alone

II. Essays (60%)

Answer two of the following three questions:

- 1. Most armed civil conflicts recur. On average, once the fighting stops, the peace only lasts seven years. What can be done to prevent war recurrence? What paths to peace are available? How can political order and stability be achieved? Discuss the relationship between state development and state fragility.**

How can third parties stop the fighting? Can political stability be established externally? What role can the international community play to end civil wars?

A. Preventing war recurrence – Escape the Conflict trap ---

- 1. war is development in reverse –**
 - i. conflict trap: war → economic costs →war
 - i. Political conflict trap:
War→state repression→grievances→war
- 2. political development and state fragility (Some combination of #2 and #3)**
 - a. Political violence → state fragility
 - i. Definition of a fragile state – state unable to deliver social contract – unable to protect citizens
 - ii. Political violence (civil war)
 - iii. Discuss the relationship between state development and state fragility.
 - b. State Development interlinks political, economic and social
 - c. Political Development
 - i. State Building
 - ii. Rule of Law
 - iii. Political Accountability
 - d. Economic Growth (development)
 - e. Social Mobilization
 - f. State fragility stems from crises in one of these dimensions – especially econ→political
 - g. Crises compounded in environments without political accountability
- 3. Relationship between state development and state fragility**
 - i. State monopoly on violence – coercion harnessed to promote security, production, and investment – control violence that undermines security, production, and investment.
 - ii. Connection between revenue and political legitimacy – problem of gaining wealth from natural resource rents – no elite investment in political system – no accountability
 - iii. Patterns of strong state development and patterns of weak state development

- iv. Weak states and opportunity to rebel
- v. Changing political institutions (irregular transfers of power) and armed civil conflict.
- vi. Failed democratization. Rise of illiberal democracy
- vii. Corruption and revenues – no protection of property – no investment

4. Paths to Peace

- a. Power Sharing
 - i. Short-term peace agreement
 - ii. Long-term instability
 - iii. Types of powersharing
- b. Good governance – limit state repression
- c. Strengthen the state – Fearon and Laitin
- d. International regimes – natural resource regulation
- e. External intervention
 - i. Peacekeeping (PKOs)
 - ii. Third-party intervention
 - iii.

5. What factors can explain political order and disorder?

- a. Fukuyama – Political order based on three factors
 - i. The State
 - 1. centralized source of authority
 - 2. monopoly of military power over a territory and a population
 - ii. The rule of law
 - 1. Social rules codified into written laws
 - 2. property rights protection
 - 3. laws serve to organize the distribution of power
 - 4. institutions replace individual leaders as focus of power
 - iii. Accountable government
 - 1. Rulers held accountable to law
 - 2. Accountable to parliaments, assemblies, and other bodies representing a broader portion of the population
- b. Fukuyama – disorder
 - i. Missing one of the three elements – typically accountability
 - ii. Weak absolutism (early France, early Spain, Latin America)
 - iii. Successful absolutism (Russian monarchy)
 - iv. Failed oligarchy (Hungary and Poland)
- c. Bates – prosperity and the development of state authority
 - i. Secure property rights – investment
 - ii. Violence and order

6. Third Party intervention – international community

- a. International regimes (international community) –
 - i. natural resource regulation
 - 1. Kimberly Process – diamond regulation

- 2. 3TG regulation
- b. External intervention
 - i. Peacekeeping (PKOs)
 - 1. PKOs remarkably successful – reduce conflict recurrence
 - a. Need adequate force levels
 - b. Need adequate budget
 - ii. Third-party intervention
 - 1. Preponderant force
 - 2. Balancing
 - 3. Inadequate troop investment in intervention
 - a. Problem of asymmetric balance of power between rebels and the state
- c. Problems with foreign intervention and democratization
 - i. Few examples – Japan (maybe West Germany)
 - ii. Need for the indigenous creation of institutions
 - iii. State development

- 2. Thomas Friedman wrote in a New York Times article entitled ‘Foreign Affairs Big Mac I’ on December 08, 1996 that: ‘Countries with McDonald’s within their borders do not go to war with other countries with McDonalds within their borders.’ Three years later, NATO (i.e. the US) bombed Belgrade in Serbia during the Balkan Wars, and in 2008 Georgia and Russia fought an interstate armed conflict.**

What mechanisms underlie the McDonalds Peace Proposition? How do these mechanisms compare to the underlying theory of Gartzke’s Capitalist Peace? How do they compare to Russett and Oneal’s exposition on the democratic peace, Triangulating Peace? Speculate as to why you think the McDonalds Peace Proposition failed in the case of the US-Serbia dyad?

- 1. Wars between states very rare
- 2. Mechanisms to McDonalds Peace
 - i. McDonalds in a country signifies econ development
 - ii. McDonalds is a franchise --Foreign investment from USA
 - iii. Financial and economic ties make wars between integrated countries costly
 - iv. Business sector will lobby against the war to protect their investment
 - v. McDonalds signifies westernization
 - 1. Cultural affinity decreases chances for interstate war
 - vi. Other mechanisms

3. Gartzke – Capitalist peace
 - A. Gartzke (2007). Capitalist peace not democratic peace that explains the lack of wars between democracies. Most strong democracies are capitalist and globally networked. Financial ties, investments
 - B. Economic development
 - C. Globalization (interdependent economies)
 - D. Shared interests from profit orientation of capitalist firms

4. Democratic peace theory Russett & Oneal
 - i. Political institutions and conflict escalation processes between two countries (interstate war and armed conflict)
 - ii. Liberal Peace / Democratic Peace (Russett and Oneal) – triangle of democratic institutions, economic interdependence, international mediation (international organizations)
 - iii. Dyadic peace – weak link argument (least democratic institutions in a pair of countries) (least economically open society) (least internationally networked)
 - iv. Normative explanations – Kant
 - v. Structural explanations
 - vi. Audience costs and reputation – bargaining theory of war (Fearon)
 - vii. Mutual interests
 - viii. Dyadic peace vs. global systemic peace
 - ix. Economic Interdependence
 1. International open markets foster peace
 2. Argued by both Russett & Oneal and Gartzke
 - A. Russett & Oneal economics AND democracy work together
 - B. Gartzke – capitalist system is key not democracy

5. International organizations
 - i. International community
 - ii. Third leg of Russett & Oneal triangle

3. What role does identity play in armed conflict? How does identity shape horizontal inequality?

What role does identity play in a rebel organization? How can identity shape patterns of recruitment and allegiance to a rebel group? How can identity help a non-violent campaign?

How can identity be constructed? How does identity shape notions of nationalism?

- 1) Role of identity
 - a) Nationalism
 - b) Group identity –
 - i) political exclusion
 - ii) economic exclusion
- 2) Horizontal inequality
 - 1) Inequality between groups
 - 2) Not vertical inequality – inequality between groups); typically measured with the gini coefficient.
 - 3) Gurr – relative deprivation theory
 - 4) Stewart; Østby; Cederman et al find that vertical inequality is not associated with armed conflict, but horizontal inequality is.
 - 5) Basis of horizontal inequality is the group, basis of civil war is the group – not the individual.
- 3) Identity and the Rebel group
 - a) Recruitment
 - b) Allegiance
 - c) Club goods – ethnic or religious identity are non-material incentives to get you to join and stay in a rebel group
 - d) Non-violent groups also depend on identity – affiliation with the group
- 4) Construction of identity
 - a) Common language
 - b) Common dress
 - c) Common rituals – ways of doing things
 - d) Political repression / political exclusion
 - e) Economic exclusion
 - f) War and conflict can shape identity
 - g) Education and identity
- 5) Nationalism and identity
 - a) State creates common identity
 - b) Integrative nationalism vs. exclusive nationalism
 - c) Nationalism and civil war