

**Exam**  
**PECOS 4010**  
**Autumn 2022**

**Answer two of the following three questions:**

1. Different political systems around the world and throughout history have exhibited different degrees of order and disorder. How does political violence lead to political instability? In contrast, how can violence lead to a stronger state and more stable politics? Discuss the relationship between state development and political stability. How are political instability and state fragility related?

A. What role does violence play in political development and in state fragility?

a. Political violence → state fragility

- i. Definition of a fragile state (better term than state failure) – state unable to deliver social contract – unable to protect citizens
- ii. Political violence (civil war)
- iii. Conflict trap --- war is development in reverse – war → economic costs → war
- iv. Political conflict trap War → state repression → grievances → war

B. Violence → stronger state

- a. Bates (2001) (specialists in violence), Olson (1993) (stationary bandits -- not roaming bandits), Tilly (the state as an extortion racket – War made the State and The State made War)
- b. Creating a monopoly on the use of violence – state development
- c. Investment of the taxed wealth and protection from roving bandits increases investment and accumulation of wealth – development – increases the power and capability of the state
- d. Early state development depends on implicit threat of violence – the coercive role of the state

C. Relationship between state development and state fragility

- a. State monopoly on violence – coercion harnessed to promote security, production, and investment – control violence that undermines security, production, and investment.
- b. Connection between revenue and political legitimacy – problem of gaining wealth from natural resource rents – no elite investment in political system – no accountability (Bates – 2015 – When things Fell Apart)
- c. Patterns of strong state development and patterns of weak state development
- d. Weak states and opportunity to rebel
- e. Changing political institutions (irregular transfers of power) and armed civil conflict.
- f. Failed democratization. Rise of illiberal democracy

- g. **Corruption and revenues** – no protection of property – no investment

D. How does this relationship between violence and state fragility relate to political institutions?

- a. Governance and war / Political institutions associated with war or peace
  - a. Armed conflict is inherently political
  - b. Nature of government affects conflict between states and within a state
  - c. Political institutions – nature, change, level of consolidation all relate to interstate and intrastate armed conflict
  - d. Governance, legitimacy, state capacity, capabilities
  - e. War causes institutional instability
- b. Political institutions and decreasing chances of civil conflict (intrastate war and armed conflict)
  - a. **Inverted U** – (Hegre, et al.) (Fearon and Laitin) – both strong autocracies and strong democracies do not experience much civil conflict – most conflict occurs among countries that are neither democratic nor autocratic
  - b. **Political Change and instability leads to civil conflict** – political stability associated with less armed civil conflict
  - c. **Irregular changes in political leadership is strongly associated with political violence** – more regular changes in leadership less associated with civil conflict
  - d. Consolidated vs. unconsolidated democracies
  - e. Unconsolidated institutions and political instability which in turn is related to civil conflict
  - f. **State development and conflict – weak states experience more civil conflict – stronger states experience less conflict**

E. What factors can explain political order and disorder?

- a. Fukuyama – Political order based on three factors
  - a. The State
    - 1. centralized source of authority
    - 2. monopoly of military power over a territory and a population
  - b. The rule of law
    - 1. Social rules codified into written laws
    - 2. property rights protection
    - 3. laws serve to organize the distribution of power
    - 4. institutions replace individual leaders as focus of power
  - c. Accountable government
    - 1. Rulers held accountable to law
    - 2. Accountable to parliaments, assemblies, and other bodies representing a broader portion of the population
- b. Fukuyama – disorder
  - a. Missing one of the three elements – typically accountability
  - b. Weak absolutism (early France, early Spain, Latin America)
  - c. Successful absolutism (Russian monarchy)
  - d. Failed oligarchy (Hungary and Poland)

- c. Bates – prosperity and the development of state authority
  - a. Secure property rights – investment
  - b. Violence and order

2. What role does identity play in armed conflict? How does identity shape horizontal inequality? What role does identity play in a rebel organization? How can identity shape patterns of recruitment and allegiance to a rebel group? How can identity help a non-violent campaign? How can identity be constructed? How does identity shape notions of nationalism?

- 1) Role of identity
  - a) Nationalism
  - b) Group identity –
    - i) political exclusion
    - ii) economic exclusion
- 2) Horizontal inequality
  - 1) Inequality between groups
  - 2) Not vertical inequality – inequality between groups); typically measured with the gini coefficient.
  - 3) Gurr – relative deprivation theory
  - 4) Stewart; Østby; Cederman et al find that vertical inequality is not associated with armed conflict, but horizontal inequality is.
  - 5) Basis of horizontal inequality is the group, basis of civil war is the group – not the individual.
- 3) Identity and the Rebel group
  - a) Recruitment
  - b) Allegiance
  - c) Club goods – ethnic or religious identity are non-material incentives to get you to join and stay in a rebel group
  - d) Non-violent groups also depend on identity – affiliation with the group
- 4) Construction of identity
  - a) Common language
  - b) Common dress
  - c) Common rituals – ways of doing things
  - d) Political repression / political exclusion
  - e) Economic exclusion
  - f) War and conflict can shape identity
  - g) Education and identity
- 5) Nationalism and identity
  - a) State creates common identity
  - b) Integrative nationalism vs. exclusive nationalism
  - c) Nationalism and civil war

3. James Fearon (1995) argues that war between rational, unitary actors will only

occur if at least one actor has private information or cannot credibly commit to a negotiated settlement.

Explain briefly why war is not rational if there is complete information and no commitment problem.

Explain briefly how incomplete information might lead to war.


What is a commitment problem?

If there is complete information and there are no commitment problems, war is not rational. There will be a bargaining space in which both parties will find an outcome more desirable than experiencing the costs of war. Rationality is defined as making a decision to obtain a more desirable outcome.

War is possible because there is no bargaining space. As portrayed in the Figure below, both Great Britain and Germany believe that they will win a war. The costs of war for both parties are such that there is no overlap in each country's perception of the bargaining range.

For this to occur there must be a problem of incomplete information. Both countries believe that they could win a war. Germany perceives that it would win 70% of the time. Great Britain believes that Germany has a 45% chance of winning (or that Britain has a 65% chance).

As portrayed in this figure, the costs of war are not uncertain. Only the chances of winning ( $p$ ) is uncertain.



Incomplete information about the costs of war could also affect the bargaining space.

Commitment problems occur when bargains are not enforceable: the parties cannot credibly commit to the bargain. There are two forms of commitment problem, first-strike advantage (pre-emptive war) and preventive war. With pre-emptive war, when the combined states' (or a

single state's) first-strike advantages are greater than the costs of war, the bargaining range is empty and no self-enforcing peaceful outcomes exist. With preventive war, Power A is dominant at time(0), but over time Power B is growing stronger and eventually overtake Power A at time(t). Power A cannot credibly commit that it will not attack before time(t).