Grading guidelines for the Written Exam (4 hours)

General information

The students got the following instructions:

- The exam lasts for 4 hours.

- Answer 4 out of 6 short-answer questions and 1 out of 2 long-answer questions. The short-answer questions (responses) will count for 40% of the grade and long-answer questions (responses) will count 60%. The short answers count equally.

- When answering questions, you should define all relevant concepts.

- You may reply in English, Norwegian or another Scandinavian language.

- You do not need to include formal references or a bibliography, but if you quote specific authors word for word, remember to put this text into quotation marks and report the source to avoid plagiarism. Responses are automatically checked for plagiarism in Inspera.

- This is an individual assessment and you must not communicate with others during the exam period. Student responses will also be checked against each other for plagiarism in Inspera.

Hence, students were asked to answer 4 out of 6 short-answer questions and 1 out of 2 long-answer questions. The short-answer questions (responses) should count for 40% of the grade and long-answer questions (responses) should count 60%. The short answers count equally. However, it is OK if the responses vary somewhat in length across these questions. An unanswered question will be assigned an F when calculating the grade for the exam as a whole.

This is the first time the course is given in English. We received many questions concerning language before the exam. Students were told that they would not be graded on grammar or writing style. Moreover, upon request, we suggested that they could put an English term in brackets if they were uncertain about their translation into Norwegian/Scandinavian.

The purpose of this exam is mainly to test the students acquired knowledge and skills as defined by the course's leaning outcomes:
https://www.uio.no/studier/emner/sv/statsvitenskap/STV1300/

Note that reading list in Leganto is not 100 % complete/correct, so please use the PDF we uploaded in Canvas in instead (attached to this email).

The number of questions is the same as for previous school exams (not higher), as we assume having access to the literature means that students will spend more time on each question (even if they have been encouraged to think about this as a school exam given the time constraints).

The long-answer questions emphasize to test students' skills and competences, in addition to knowledge. The short-answer questions are thematically narrower, and will above all test knowledge about different topics (and thus parts of the syllabus; breadth). But they do also in many cases include an "analytical component" since this is a home exam and students can, in theory, look up definitions etc. Hence, they will have to reflect and discuss a bit here too in order to fully answer the question.

The instructions suggest candidates should define all "relevant" concepts (even when we do not ask for definitions), but note we can generally not expect as detailed definitions and explanations as those presented below.

The grading should follow the general guidelines for the Department of Political Science at the University of Oslo: https://www.uio.no/studier/eksamen/karakterskala/fagspesifikk-karakterbeskrivelse/sv-isv.html

What will distinguish the responses in terms of quality is the level of detail and clarity, level of understanding, analytical skills and the ability to discuss in an independent manner. One should not reward provision of irrelevant information. Indeed, the best ones will have prioritized the (limited) time to focus on aspects to the point. The best have perhaps chosen to give somewhat longer answers to the short-answer questions that open for more discussion, but answers count equally. A clear and well-structured presentation should generally be rewarded, especially in the case of the long-answer question.

Specific information

Below we indicate what we expect from responses to the various questions at the different levels.

Answer 4 out of 6 short-answer questions:

1. What is the difference between a "dichotomous" and "continuous" conceptualization of regime types (democracy and dictatorship), and how would you justify the use of a continuous concept and measure?

Key readings: *Clark, Golder and Golder (2018), chapter 5*

The question deals with issue of whether we should conceptualize and measure democracy and dictatorship as two separate categories or as a continuum. Here one might begin by clarifying the difference between a concept and a measure: a mental category/construct that

capture the meaning of objects, events or ideas vs. observable indicators of that construct (by means of "operationalization"). A continuous concept presents the difference between democracy and dictatorship as a matter of degree: regimes might be more or less democratic and dictatorial. This requires a measure that takes on any value within a given range. Meanwhile, a dichotomous concept defines regimes as either dictatorial or democratic to begin with. Thus, a dichotomous measure of regime type has only two discrete values.

To justify the use of a continuous concept and measure, one may point to those who argue that regime type is, by nature, a matter of the degree – in contrast to those who argue that there is natural zero point: a country can't be "half-democratic". However, one may also argue that "it depends" on the question one wants to analyze using a democratic concept/measure, like Clark, Golder and Golder do. For example, a research focus on transition from one regime type to another would suggest that a dichotomous measure is appropriate: there needs to be a threshold to pass, at least. Meanwhile, if one, for example, studies the effect of something on a country's level of democracy, a continuous concept is implied and continuous measure is needed.

The best answers to this question will indicate an accurate understanding of the difference between continuous and dichotomous concepts and measures, probably provide some examples and provide arguments demonstrating that they are able to consider the conditions under which a continuous concept and measure is appropriate.

2. What distinguishes parliamentary from presidential democracies, and how do these differences affect the "chain of delegation and accountability"?

Key readings: *Clark, Golder and Golder (2018), chapter 12, Kreppel (2017) (chapter 7 in Caramani)*

This topic was covered in detail in one lecture. Whether a democracy is parliamentary, presidential, or semi-presidential depends on the relationship between (a) the government, (b) the legislature, and (c) the president if there is one. According to the Clark, Golder and Golder's presentation, emphasized during lectures, two questions are important to ask: 1) is the government responsible to the elected legislature and 2) is the head of state popularly elected for a fixed term in office? Note that Kreppel refers to "fused-power systems" vs. "separation-of-powers systems".

In a parliamentary system, the government is responsible to the elected legislature – i.e. dependent on support of the majority of the legislature to exist – while the Head of state is not popularly elected.
- For a long time, this was the predominant type of democracy, but weakened since the 1970s.
- Creates integration of legislative and executive powers (mutual dependence).

Some will perhaps specify a bit further: Legislative responsibility refers to a situation in which a legislative majority has the constitutional power to remove a government from office without cause. Which means that the government can be removed even if it has not done anything wrong or criminal.

This happens through two mechanisms:

1. First, the mechanism that the legislature can initiate to remove a government is called the "vote of no confidence". Initiated by the legislature who votes. If the government does not obtain a legislative majority in this vote, it must resign.
2. Second, the "vote of confidence", which is initiated by the government. This is a vote regarding a piece of legislation. Usually on important issues – and the vote either confirms the support for the government or it doesn't and the government resigns.

In a presidential system, the government is not responsible to the elected legislature – i.e. not dependent on support of the majority of the legislature to exist – while the head of state is popularly elected.

- The principle leads to formal separation of powers, between the legislative and executive branch – they are supposed to balance each other (a system of checks and balances).
- The elected president may govern through presidential decrees (dekreter).

The scope and strength of presidential decrees vary from country to country. A presidential decree is an order by the president that has the force of law. However, this does not necessarily mean much more that interpreting existing laws. In any event, a president needs allies in the legislature in order to make significant policy changes.

Some will perhaps also define "semi-presidentialism", but note that we do not ask for this. Moreover, we do not ask for details here – we ask for the main difference.

Next, the question is what does this mean for the "chain of delegation and accountability". First, we expect a definition of this concept: delegation means transfer of power to someone (from a "principal" to an "agent"), who can make decisions on your behalf, but that this power can be withdrawn and hereby creating «accountability». Second, students need to combine all the definitions provided so far to answer the questions. In representative democracies, we have a chain of delegation (from voters to politicians) and a chain of accountability (from politicians to voters). Clark, Golder and Golder discuss this explicitly based on Kaare Strøm's well-known figure distinguishing between delegation and accountability in parliamentary and presidential systems. The main point here is that in parliamentary systems, this is a single chain from voters to civil servants, via the MPs, Prime Minister/Cabinet and Ministers. While in presidential systems, we have a multiple chain of delegation and accountability: voters delegate power to a legislature *and* a president (the executive). More relationships exist, creating a complex chain(s) of delegation and accountability. As a result, moreover, the legislature and president have to bargain in order to

govern and produce policy. The difference between the two types has also been called hierarchical vs. transactional relations.

Students that provide an accurate definition of the key concepts and are able to apply them together in a discussion should be rewarded. For those with a particularly deep understanding, it is possible to go into details on principal-agent problems and variations in the role of legislature and executives, but keep in mind that we expect short answers here.

3. What aspects of political parties are most relevant for parties' ability to reduce the autonomy of individual legislators? Reflect briefly, on whether so-called "mass parties" are more likely to succeed in lowering the autonomy than "catch-all parties".

Key readings: Kreppel (2017); Katz (2017) (chapter 7 and 12 in Caramani)

The autonomy of legislators is discussed in Kreppel's chapter, and was briefly touched upon during the relevant lecture. Kreppel argues that the autonomy of individual legislators is dependent on party characteristics and electoral system/party system features. According to Kreppel, for most legislators, "there are two primary concerns or goals: (i) election/re-election; and (ii) the achievement of some set of policy outcomes". Thus, the underlying question is, basically, the same in the case of all the variables: "to what extent is the political future of an individual member of the legislature controlled by his/her political party?" (Kreppel 2017, p. 134). It is therefore argued that strength of the party unit is related to candidate selection procedures, internal organization of parties, electoral system and source of party/campaign funding. We do not ask for explanations of how the various variables matter, but they need to elaborate on party organizations in order to answer the next question. Kreppel argues that parties with a closed, centralized candidate selection process; generally decentralized decision-making structures; and a unified leadership within and outside government, are more likely to reduce the autonomy of individual legislators.

To answer the analytical question, they need to know the main differences between party organizational models and identify relevant aspects. This a challenging task as the models are complex and the connection has to be established; there is no explicit discussion of this question in the book.

The archetypal mass party is organized on the ground in local party branches composed of members who have certain obligations to the organization in exchange for rights to participate in the organization's governance, especially by electing delegates to the party's national congress (or convention or conference). It is a hierarchical organization but in theory an internally democratic one. The catch-all party has much of the same formal form as the mass party (members, branches, congress, executive), but is "organized as the supporters of the party in public office, rather than as its masters" (Katz 2017, p. 221). Moreover, it has a weaker ideological profile than the mass party.

The models do not explicitly comment on candidate selection etc. Nevertheless, it could be argued that mass parties seem more likely to control the individual legislators than the catch-

all parties. Both models depict a hierarchical organization, and not a particularly decentralized party structure. But mass parties have a strong, dominant extra-parliamentary organization and a compared to the catch-all party. This is likely to promote unitary leadership structure and thus control of individual legislators. The clear ideological profile is probably also something that will tie legislators together. On the other hand, the emphasis on membership rights and intra-party democracy makes it less likely that the party elite control decision-making processes. In this sense, the more elite dominated catch-all party is perhaps better suited to discipline. Yet this will depend on how the candidate selection is organized. "The greater the party leadership's control over a member's re-election, the lower the member's autonomy" (Kreppel 2017). Since there is no clear correct answer here, the way candidates argue – the level of reflection – is the most important. Candidates who are able to problematize and provide some nuances should be rewarded. Outstanding answers will combine insights from both Kreppel and Katz' chapters.

4. Provide three different explanations for the correlation between economic development and level of democracy.

Key readings: *Clark, Golder and Golder (2018), chapter 6 and 9*

The question here is how scholars have explained the correlation between economic development and level of democracy.

One possibility is "modernization theory". Here, economic development correlates with level of democracy because it affects both "democratization" (i.e. transition to democracy) and "democratic survival". The many mechanisms include transformations in richer economies (i.e agrarian society -> industrialization -> post-industrialization) and associated educational and value changes that support democracy.

Second, a very different explanation is the so-called "survival story", under which economic development correlates with level of democracy only because richer democracies are more likely to remain democratic than poor ones. The invoked mechanisms here are "rationalist" and typically based on the idea that it is more irrational to abandon democracy in rich countries. For example, more actors/people might run the risk of losing great assets in a chaotic and possibly violent regime transition. (CGG argues that this does not suffice as a sole explanation and that modernization processes probably provide a more convincing explanation.)

Third, economic development might correlate with level of democracy because democracy positively affects economic development. This could be because democracy is associated with rule of law and protection of property rights. (However, CGG argue that the empirical evidence for this causal chain is weak/inconsistent).

A final possible explanation is that some third "spurious" factor may explain both economic development and level of democracy (e.g. geographic or cultural factors). (Importantly, it

should be clear from CGGs discussion that the relationship is likely not entirely/mainly spurious.)

To provide a good answer one needs to understand the difference between correlation and causation, and briefly indicate what different theoretical possibilities are about and how they might account for the correlation in question. There is no time to explain any of these theories in-depth, but answers might vary in terms of how concisely theories are presented (and compared). Modernization theory is probably what most will think of first. Those who mention and explain both modernization theory and survival theory should be rewarded. If you also mention the reverse causal relationship (effect of regime type on economic development), it is a plus.

5. How and why might a consensus-oriented political-institutional environment affect dissatisfied voters?

Key readings: Clark, Golder and Golder (2018), chapter 16

By definition, more consensus-oriented democratic institutions tend to disperse political responsibility to a greater extent (for example across actors, across institutional levels and across time). Said differently, and using a common term in the research literature, "clarity of responsibility" is poorer in consensus-oriented democracies.

This can in turn create difficulties for dissatisfied voters when it comes to holding incumbent government to account on Election Day. The reason is that voters are less certain of which actor/government/levels has actually affected the policy outputs/outcomes that produce dissatisfaction. This may in turn explain why empirical studies often find that voting based on "retrospective performance" is less important in more consensus-institutional contexts where clarity of responsibly is poorer.

The best answers to this question will indicate a basic understanding of what the majoritarian-consensus dimension is about in principle as well as give a concrete example(s) of institutional traits that disperse responsibility explaining how this creates difficulties for dissatisfied voters (typical examples might include minority and coalition governments).

6. How has the nature of revolution changed from the eighteenth century to the present?

Key readings: *Bessinger (2012) and Skocpol (1979)*

Compared to the "Great Revolutions" (e.g. France, Russia, and China), contemporary revolutions are:

- More temporally compact, lasting days and weeks rather than months and years
- Less likely to take the form of rural insurgencies and more likely to involve massing large number of citizens in urban centers. As a result, they are often less violent

- Less likely to draw support from peasants and workers; contemporary revolutions often draw support from the urban middle classes.
- More likely to demand civic and political freedoms and act as pathways for political liberalization. Social revolutions that involve significant transformation of economic and social life are less likely.
- Less likely to involve vanguard-like organizations. Instead, the organizational model of revolution tends to see protestors organize in "negative-coalitions"

A very sophisticated answer would define the concept of revolution, drawing on either Skocpol, Tilly, or Beissinger. Here, students could be expected to note the differences between political and social revolutions, noting that the former are now more common than the latter. The students might also note the phenomenon of "Third World" revolutions, in which revolutionary coalitions are multiclass, more likely to advance cultural/religious demands, and be anti-colonial in origin.

Answer 1 out of 2 long-answer questions:

1. **"Civil wars are principally caused by economic factors." Discuss.**

Key readings: *Collier and Hoeffler (2004); Fearson Laitin (2003)*

To achieve a good grade we would expect the student to define civil war and set out the economic explanation for civil war.

- Key question is how can rebels finance a rebel army?
  - Easier if there are opportunities for crime and extortion
  - Foregone income is considered when deciding to rebel; the lower regular incomes, the lower the cost of rebellion. Key implication: higher GDP per capita should be negatively associated with civil war
- Civil wars are especially likely in resource rich countries:
  - Resources allow for authoritarian governance and thus grievances; these resources also create incentives to overthrow incumbents
  - More economic opportunities for rebel movements through looting and extortion
  - Abundant resources can also strengthen the identity of groups that stand to gain from secession or increased autonomy
  - Indirect effects of resource curse: Slow economic growth, corruption, poor governance, and resource capture and looting, in turn, may lead to conflict.
  - Countries with "lootable resources" (e.g. diamonds, coltane, etc.) are particularly civil war prone as those resources create opportunities for financing rebels. In particular, if these resources are diffusely located, and found in areas distant from central government control
- Also important to consider the development trap:
  - Low level of development -> conflict -> erodes development -> conflict

- Conflict pushes a country off a grown path and this effect is persistent over time
- Of the 259 armed conflicts since 1945; 60% of all armed conflicts recur. Since the mid 1990s, most conflict onsets have been recurrences

We would expect the student to evaluate the importance of economic factors via reference to alternative explanations. These include:
- Military/political opportunity
  - Especially applicable to forms of armed insurgency (defined as asymmetric (or irregular or small) warfare)
  - Key factor is a weak state: weak state institutions, poor infrastructure, scattered settlements, and recent political instability, e.g. failed democratization.
  - Especially likely when country has "rough terrain" – mountainous/inaccessible regions that the state struggles to penetrate and administer and that can host rebel groups
- Ethnicity
  - Less evidence for direct effect for ethnic and religious heterogeneity and the incidence of civil war. More evidence for ethnic and religious heterogeneity having a mediating role in non-democracies as unequal distribution of resources to ethnic groups leads to deprivation, which lowers the costs of rebellion

A really excellent answer might also consider general macro trends in civil wars over time. In particular, students might consider:

- How the changing availability of military technology has been enabling of war. Especially relevant in post-Soviet states where conventional intrastate war is more likely
- Irregular armed insurgencies are less likely post-Cold War and more likely to involved Marxist groups. As this type of insurgency declines, military opportunity arguments become less salient

2. What is/are the effect(s) of electoral systems on the size of party systems? You may well illustrate your discussion with region/country/state examples.

Key readings: Clark, Golder and Golder (2018), chapter 13 and 14.

This question is discussed in detail in the books and during the relevant lecture. Hence, it is not a particularly challenging question analytically. However, elections systems and party systems are complicated phenomena. In order to provide a nuanced answer/discussion, they need to understand varieties of electoral systems, cleavages, party systems etc.

Clark, Golder and Golder do not pay much attention to the party system concept as such. They state that political scientists typically distinguish between party systems based on the number and size of the parties that they contain:

- A single-party system is one in which only one political party is legally allowed to hold power.
- A one-party dominant system is one in which multiple parties may legally operate but in which only one particular party has a realistic chance of gaining power.
- A two-party system is one in which only two major political parties have a realistic chance of gaining power.
- A multiparty system is one in which more than two parties have a realistic chance of gaining power.

However, in democratic regimes, "party system" is often defined as the relationship between the parties (in plural): patterns of interaction between parties competing for political power.

Party systems might be described along different dimensions. Here the size is in focus – the number of parties included, which is the basis for the different system types mentioned in Clark, Golder and Golder (mentioned above).

Two other concepts will be important in the discussion and thus merit definition: cleavages and electoral systems.

Parties often represent particular groups in societies and mirror social and political "cleavages" (= divisions), such as centre-periphery (Europe), confessional cleavage (e.g. protestant vs. catholic), urban-rural cleavage, class cleavage, post-materialist cleavage etc. When *political* (politicized) cleavages exist, we see a socio-structural foundation (conflict of interest), but also a collective identity and an organizational element (parties, interest organizations).

An electoral system is a set of laws that regulate electoral competition between candidates or parties or both. It consist of the methods and rules of counting votes to determine the outcome of elections. Main elements are:
- An "electoral formula" determines how votes are translated into seats (i.e. elected representatives)
- The "ballot structure" is how the electoral choice is presented on the ballot paper.
- "District magnitude" is the number of representatives elected in a district.

Main types of electoral systems based on the electoral formula that they employ are:
- Majoritarian (most votes win)
- Proportional (according to number of votes)
- Mixed systems (combination of boths).

Probably some will also specify this further – and present sub-types – or they will wait until the discussion itself.

As for the question itsef, Maurice Duverger's theory is key (at the core of Clark, Golder and Golders chapter). This states that the size of a country's party system depends on the complex interplay of both social and institutional factors:

- Social divisions create the "demand" for political parties and are the main driving force: the more social cleavages there are in a country and the more that these cleavages are cross-cutting, the greater the demand for distinctive representation and the greater the demand for (multiple) political parties.

- Yet electoral institutions thereafter determine the extent to which this demand is translated into parties that win votes and parties that win seats.

- Specifically, non-proportional electoral systems weaken the tendency for social cleavages to be translated into new parties.

- Majoritarian electoral systems make two-party system more likely, while proportional systems stimulate multiparty systems.

- Disproportional electoral systems discourage the formation and electoral success of new parties in two related ways:

  o First, the mechanical effect of these systems leaves small parties with fewer seats in the legislature than the votes cast for them would have produced in a PR system. The extent to which this happen, depends on the degree of proportionality of the system. In highly disproportional systems, like in single member district plurality Systems (SMDP), small parties will find it harder to win seats. Thus, the mechanical effect punishes small parties and reward larger ones. This mechanism will have a negative impact on the size of party systems.

  o Second, the strategic (or psychological) effect of these systems leaves small parties with fewer votes than the latent support for their policies in the electorate would suggest they could attract. Voters in majoritarian systems, and not least SMDP systems, have an incentive to engage in strategic voting, i.e. not vote for the most preferred candidate, but the your most preferred candidate with a realistic chance of winning. While elites are encouraged to in strategic entry – i.e. not joint their most preferred political alternative but rather compete under the label of an existing party with a realistic chance of winning. In proportional systems, meanwhile, they do not face this trade-off and small parties might even play a pivotal role in parliament.

The implications can be summed up in two statements:
- Single member district plurality systems encourage two-party systems (Duveger's law)
- Proportional representation rules favour multiparty systems (Duverger's hypothesis)

That being said, Duverger's law has been questioned on theoretical grounds. The logic by which the mechanical and strategic effects of SMDP electoral rules lead to two-party systems works at the district-level. Whether it leads to a two-party system at the national level depends on whether the same parties dominate across electoral districts. Clark, Golder and Golder present several factors influencing the degree of nationalization of party systems.

We assume the level of specification will differ depending on how much they have worked on this topic and understand. The elaboration in Clark, Golder and Golderæs book is quite detailed. A really good answer is fairly specific. To get a good grade, we expect definitions or core concepts and a discussion of the relationship electoral system/party system, at least in general terms, demonstrating good mastery of the course curriculum. Provision of empirical examples should be rewarded. The same goes for specification of what elements in electoral systems that influence the degree of proportionality, and in the end, the conditions under which the logic of the two mechanisms apply. Excellent responses will be detailed, well-structured and written in an independent manner.