Gates, S., & Humes, B. D. (1997). Games, Information, and Politics: Applying Game Theoretic Models to Political Science. University of Michigan Press
Morton, R. B. (1999). Methods and Models: A Guide to the Empirical Analysis of Formal Models in Political Science. Cambridge University Press
Downloadable articles, books and other texts
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Achen, C (2002) An Agenda for the new political methodology: Microfoundations and ART, Annual Review of Political Science, 423 – 450.
Aldrich, J.H., J.A. Alt and A. Lupia (2008) The EITM Approach: Origins and Interpretations, in Box-Steffensmeier, H.E. Brady and D. Collier Oxford handbook of Political Methodology 828--843.
Andreozzi, Luciano 2004. “Rewarding Policemen Increases Crime. Another Surprising Result from the Inspection Game”, Public Choice 121: 69–82.
Bas, M.A., C.S. Signorino and R.W. Walker (2008) Statistical Backwards Induction: A Simple Method for Estimating Recursive Strategic Models, Political Analysis 16(1): 21 – 40.
Bates, R.H. (1998) The International Coffee Organization: An International Institution”, in R.H. Bates et al., Analytic Narratives. Princeton University Press.
Brehm, J., & Gates, S. (1993). Donut shops and speed traps: Evaluating models of supervision on police behavior. American Journal of Political Science, 555-581.
Brehm, J. and S. Gates (2008) Teaching, Tasks, and Trust. Functions of the Public Executive. Russell Sage Foundation: New York. Chapter 6.
Carrubba, C.J., A. Yuen and C. Zorn (2007) In Defense of Comparative Statics: Specifying Empirical Tests of models of Strategic Interaction. Political Analysis 15(4): 465 – 482.
Camerer, C., A. Dreber, E. Forsell, T.-H. Ho, J. Huber, M. Johannesson, M. Kirchler, J. Almenberg, A. Altmejd, T. Chan, E. Heikensten, F. Holzmeister, T. Imai, S. Isaksson, G. Nave, T. Pfeiffer, M. Razen & H. Wu (2016): Evaluating replicability of laboratory experiments in economics. Science 351(6280):1433-6.
Chiozza, and H. Goemans (2004) Leaders and International Conflict or Chiozza and Goemans, “International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders,” American Journal of Political Science 48,3604-619.
Diermeier, D. and K. Krehbiel (2003) Institutionalism as a Methodology, Journal of Theoretical Politics 15(2): 123—144.
Diermeier, D. and R.T. Stevenson (2000) Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events, American Political Science Review 94(3): 627- 640
Fehr, E. & U. Fischbacher (2005): The Economics of Strong Reciprocity. In S. Bowles, H. Gintis & E. Fehr (eds.) Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: The Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life. Cambridge Mass.: The MIT-Press.
Gates, S. and S.B. Quiñones (1995) Game Theoretic and Empirical Methodologies: Ever the Two Shall Meet? The Political Methodologist 6(2): 30 – 36.
Granato, J., M. Lo and M.C. Sunny Wong (2010) A Framework for Unifying Formal and Empirical Analysis, American Journal of Political Science 54(3): 783 – 797.
Granato, J., M. Lo and M.C. Sunny Wong (2011) Modelling and Testing the Diffusion of Expectations: An EITM Approach, Electoral Studies 30(4): 389 – 398
Granato, J. and F. Scioli (2004) Puzzles, Proverbs, and Omega Matrices: The Scientific and Social Significance of Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models (EITM), Perspective on Politics 2(2): 313 – 323.
Heggedal, T.-R, L. Helland & R. Morton (2016): Electoral competition and political rents in the lab. CESAR Pre-study plan 1/16.
Kenkel, B. and C.S. Signorino (2011) Estimating Models of Strategic Interaction in R, Journal of Statistical Software.
Levitt, J. & S. List (2007b) Viewpoint: on the generalizability of lab behavior to the field. Canadian Journal of Economics 40:347-70.
Lupia, A. and K. Strøm (1995) Coalition termination and the strategic timing of parliamentary elections, American Political Science Review 89(3): 648 – 665.
Miguel, E., C. Camerer, K. Casey, J. Cohen, K. Esterling, A. Gerber, R. Glennerster, D.Green, M. Humphreys, G. Imbens, D. Laitin, T. Madon, L. Nelson, B. Nosek, M. Petersen, R. Sedlmayr, J. Simmons, U. Simonsohn & M. Van der Laan (2014) Promoting Transparency in Social Science Research. Science 343(6166): 30-1.
Morrow, J.D., 1989. Capabilities, uncertainty, and resolve: A limited information model of crisis bargaining. American Journal of Political Science, pp.941-972.
Morrow, James D. (1994). Game theory for political scientists. Chapters 1 & 3.
Morton, R. (1993) Incomplete Information and Ideological Explanations of Platform Divergence American Political Science Review 87(2):382-92.
Morton, R. & K. Williams (2010) Experimental Political Science and the Study of Causality: From Nature to the Lab. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (ch2 & ch3)
Myerson, R. (2001). “On the Value of Game Theory in Social Science,” Rationality and Society 4(1): 62-73.
Pahre, R. (2005). Formal theory and case-study methods in EU studies. European Union Politics, 6(1), 113-145.
Schelling, Thomas. 1978. Micromotives and Macrobehavior. W.W. Norton. [Chapters 1, 3, and 6].
Signorino C.S. and Yilmaz K. (2003) Strategic Misspecification in Regression Models, American Journal of Political Science 47(3): 551 – 566.
Signorino, C.S. (1999) Strategic interaction and the statistical analysis of international conflict, American Political Science Review 93(2): 279 - 297
Van Damme, Eric 1989. Stable Equilibria and Forward Induction, Journal of Economic Theory 48 (2): 476-496.
Morrow, James D. (1994). Game theory for political scientists. Princeton University Press.
Schelling, Thomas. 1978. Micromotives and Macrobehavior. W.W. Norton.