The aim of this course is to provide students with a rigorous understanding of applied game theory for political science. The course is based upon the textbook *Political Game Theory: An Introduction*, McCarty and Meirowitz (2007). Students will also be required to read a series of influential journal articles that apply game theory in a political science setting. Students will find Morton (1999) useful for guidance into evaluating the empirical implications of the theoretical models encountered in this course.

**Topics**

1. Intro: Choice and Social Choice Theory
   - McCarty and Meirowitz (ch 1 - 4 2007)
   - Morton (1999, ch 1 - 3)

2. Games in the Normal Form
   - McCarty and Meirowitz (ch 5 2007)
   - Hotelling (1929)
   - Calvert (1985)

3. Bayesian Games in the Normal Form
   - McCarty and Meirowitz (ch 6 2007)
   - Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985)
   - Austen-Smith and Banks (1996)

4. Extensive Form Games
   - McCarty and Meirowitz (ch 7 2007)
   - Romer and Rosenthal (1978)
   - Austen-Smith and Banks (1988)
   - Fearon (1995)

5. Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
6. Repeated Games
   - McCarty and Meirowitz (ch 8 2007)
   - Epstein and Zemsky (1995)
   - Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987)
   - Austen-Smith and Wright (1994)

7. Bargaining Theory
   - McCarty and Meirowitz (ch 9 2007)
   - Fearon and Laitin (1996)

8. Mechanism Design and Agency Theory
   - McCarty and Meirowitz (ch 10 2007)
   - Baron and Ferejohn (1989)
   - Cameron and McCarty (2004)

9. Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models I
   - Morton (1999, ch 4 - 9)
   - Carrubba, Yuen, and Zorn (2007)
   - Signorino (2007)
   - Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2006)

10. Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models II
    - Grenato, Lo, and Wong (2010)
    - Clinton (2007)
    - Bas, Signorino, and Walker (2007)
References


