Books:
Kallestrup, J. (2012) Semantic Externalism. Oxford: Routledge.
Sainsbury, M. R. and Michael Tye. (2013) Seven Puzzles of Thought: And How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Articles:
Besson, C. (2012) ‘Empty natural kind terms and dry-earth’, in Erkenntnis 76: 403–425.
Boghossian, P. (1997) ‘What the externalist can know a priori’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian society, 97: 161–75.
Burge, T. (1979) ‘Individualism and the mental’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 4: 72–121.
- (1982) ‘Other bodies’, in Foundations of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press, 82–99.
- (1989) ‘Individuation and causation in psychology’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 70: 302–322.
Goldberg, S. (2006) ‘An Anti-Individualistic Semantics for 'Empty' Natural Kind Terms.’ Grazer Philosophische Studien 70.1: 147–168.
Häggqvist, S. and Åsa Wikforss (2007) ‘Externalism and a posteriori semantics’, Erkenntnis, 67.3: 373–386.
Korman, D. (2007) ‘What Externalists Should Say About Dry Earth.’ Journal of Philosophy 103.10: 503–520.
McDowell, J. (1986) ‘Singular thought and the extent of inner space’, in P. Pettit and J. McDowell (eds.), Subject, Thought and Context. Oxford: Claredon Press, 137–168. Reprinted in McDowell 1998, 228–259.
Noonan, H. (1990) ‘Object-Dependent Thoughts and Psychological Redundancy.’ Analysis, 50: 1-9.
Putnam, H. (1975) ‘The meaning of “meaning”’, in K. Gundersen (ed.), Language, Mind and Knowledge: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, VII, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 131–193.
Segal, G. (1989) ‘The Return of the Individual.’ Mind, 98: 39-57.
Sawyer, S. (2003) ‘Sufficient absences’, Analysis, 63. 3: 202-208.
- (2004) ‘Absences, presences, and sufficient conditions’, Analysis, 64.4: 354–57.