Lærebøker:
Jennifer Nagel, 2014. Knowledge. A very short introduction. Oxford U.P. ISBN 978-0-19-966126-8
Peter Godfrey-Smith. 2003. Theory and Reality. An Introduction to the philosophy of science. Chicago U.P. ISBN 978-0-226-30063-4
Artikler
*01. René Descartes: Meditations on First Philosophy. (I-III). Translated by Donald A. Cress. 1993. (Third Edition.) Hackett Publishing Company. ISBN 0-87220-172-4. Side 59-81. Norsk utgave: Meditasjoner over filosofiens grunnlag. Oversatt av Asbjørn Aarnes. Aschehoug & Co. 1992. ISBN 82-03-16943-0. Side 13-37. Tilgjengelig i PDF: http://www.nb.no/nbsok/nb/85e3135493d839d91131400a118037bd.nbdigital?lang=no#5
02. Barry Stroud: The Problem of the External World. I Barry Stroud, 1984. The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism. Oxford U.P. ISBN 9780198247616. Chapter 1. Tilgjengelig via Oxford Scholarship online, fra UiO. DOI: 10.1093/0198247613.003.0001
*03. Catherine Z. Elgin: Skepticism Aside. I Joseph Keim Campell, Michael O'Rourke and Harry Silverstein (eds.). 2010. Knowledge and Skepticism. MIT Press. ISBN 9780262513968. Side 309-324.
04. Edmund Gettier: Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? I Analysis, 23.6 (June 1963). Side 121-123. Tilgjengelig online via JSTOR.ORG fra UiO. DOI: 10.2307/3326922. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3326922
05. Alvin Goldman: Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge. I Journal of Philosophy, 73 (20) (1976). Side 771-791. Tilgjengelig online via JSTOR.ORG fra UiO. DOI: 10.2307/2025679. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2025679
06. Linda Zagzebski: The Inescapability of Gettier Problems. I The Philosophical Quarterly, 44, 174 (Jan. 1994), side 65-73. Tilgjengelig online via JSTOR.ORG fra UiO. DOI: 10.2307/2220147. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2220147
07. Sally Haslanger: What knowledge is and what it ought to be. Feminist Values and Normative Epistemology. I Haslanger, 2012: Resisting Reality. Social Construction and Social Critique. Oxford U.P. ISBN 978-0-19-989262-4. Chapter 12, side 341-364. Tilgjengelig via Oxford Scholarship online, fra UiO. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2676113
*08. Hilary Kornblith: Introduction: What is naturalistic epistemology? I Kornblith (ed.) 1994. Naturalizing Epistemology. (2. Edition). MIT Press. ISBN 978-0-226-30063-4. Side 1-14.
*09. W.V. Quine: Epistemology Naturalized. I Quine, 1969. Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia U.P. ISBN 0-231-08357-2. Chapter 3. Side 69-90.
10. Jaegwon Kim: What is ”naturalized epistemology”? In J. Tomberlin (ed.) 1988. Philosophical Perspectives 2. Epistemology. Ridgeview. Side 381-405. Tilgjengelig online via JSTOR.ORG fra UiO. DOI: 10.2307/2214082. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214082
*11. Lynne Hankinson Nelson: Who Knows. I Nelson, 1990. Who Knows: From Quine to a Feminist Empiricism. Temple U.P. ISBN 0-87722-647-4. Chapter 6. Side 255-299, 357-361.
*12. Judith Baker: Trust and Rationality. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 68, (1987). Side 1-13. Reprinted in Sosa, E. et al. (eds.) 2008. Epistemology: An Anthology. (3. Edition). Blackwell Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4051-6966-0. Side 807-814.
13. Jennifer Lackey: Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission. The Philosophical Quarterly, 49, 197 (Oct. 1999). Side 471-190. Tilgjengelig online via JSTOR.ORG fra UiO. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2660497
14. Gail Stine: Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure. Philosophical Studies 29 (1976), side 249-261. Tilgjengelig online via Springer (http://link.springer.com/journal/11098/29/4/page/1), fra UiO.
*15. Keith DeRose: Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense. I J. Greco and E. Sosa (eds.), 1999. The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, Blackwell Publishers. ISBN 0-631-20291-0. Side 187-205.
*16. Nelson Goodman: The new riddle of induction. I Goodman (1983 (1954)), Fact Fiction and Forecast, Harvard U.P. ISBN 0674290712, side 59-83.
*17. Karl Popper: Science: Conjectures and Refutations. I Popper (2002 (1963)), Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, 2nd edition. Routledge. ISBN 0415285941. Side 42-86.
*18. Thomas Kuhn: Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice. In Kuhn (1977), The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific tradition and Change. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 0-226-45806-7. Side 320-339.
*19. Elizabeth Anderson: Knowledge, Human Interests, and Objectivity in Feminist Epistemology. Philosophical Topics 23 (2) (1995). Side 27-58.
20. Helen Longino: Can There Be A Feminist Science? Hypatia, Vol. 2, No. 3, Feminism & Science, 1 (Autumn, 1987). Side 51-64. Tilgjengelig online via JSTOR.ORG fra UiO. DOI: 10.1111/j.1527-2001.1987.tb01341.x
21. Sharon Crasnow: Feminist Philosophy of Science: Values and Objectivity. I Philosophy Compass. 8 (4), side 413-423. Tilgjengelig online: DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12023
*22. Helen Longino: Taking Social Studies of Science Seriously. In Longino (2001). The Fate of Knowledge. Princeton U.P. ISBN: 0691088764. Kapittel 2, side 11-41.
*Finnes i kompendium for emnet.
Anbefalte ressurser:
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://www.iep.utm.edu
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu